Compass Points - Muscular Comments
Readers expand the discussion
September 21, 2024
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Some safety tips are well known. Wear a seat belt while driving a car. Wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle. Recent world events have added a new safety tip. If you are a terrorist in the Middle East, do not wear your pager in your pocket. Just don't do it.
The US is being challenged around the world by ongoing threats and conflicts. What will happen next? No one knows. No matter what happens, however, there is no doubt Compass Points readers will have insightful analysis and comment.
Over the last week, Compass Points readers have responded online and off with a cornucopia of comments, insights, and analysis. Only a few of the comments are re-posted below. Most of the full comments are available for reading on the Compass Points site. As always, comments have been edited for length and content. Several long, thoughtful comments have been reduced to just a sentence or two. Often the real enjoyment comes, not as much from the excerpt included below but, from reading the comment in full. Compass Points appreciates the full, insightful, and professional comments of all readers. Many thanks!
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G.I. Wilson
DOD's addiction to and over reliance on technology is literally a doomsday clock for the US. This acquisition driven defense policy is NOT about winning wars. It is about Congressional money slathering and awarding contracts to keep Silicon valley afloat! And of course to keep the DOD revolving door operating at warp speed to accommodate the after-market goals of DOD heavy breathers, both suits and uniforms. I'm getting the impression that the only thing that has to do with successfully fighting wars in the Pentagon are the historical pictures on the bulkheads!
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Don Whisnant
I retired in 1975 after 22 years of service, so I proudly consider myself part of the 'Old Corps.' As the years go by, I find myself increasingly concerned about the future direction of our Marine Corps.
In the September issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, a captain put forth the idea that training all Marines to be riflemen is unnecessary and could even detract from our operational capabilities. While I firmly believe that every Marine has the right to voice their opinions, this suggestion strikes at the very heart of what it means to be a Marine. The idea that every Marine is a rifleman isn’t just a tradition; it's a core principle, one that has shaped the identity and success of our Corps for generations. To suggest abandoning it seems, to me, nothing short of sacrilege.
When I consider other recent changes, such as those proposed under Force Design 2030, I can’t help but question whether some of our current leaders fully understand what it means to be a Marine. We’ve always been about adaptability, but that adaptability was built on a foundation of shared skills and values. Straying too far from that foundation makes me wonder whether the Corps I served is the same one that exists today—or the one that will exist tomorrow.
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Ira
. . . That brings me back to our ground forces.
Recruitment goals have not been met for a number of years. Most most eighteen and nineteen year olds are not cut from the same cloth as GIs and Marines formerly were.
And from what I can infer, based upon what I read, they are not forged with as much rigor by by strong, tough drill instructors they formally were.
Cutting to the chase, I have no idea how these kids of today would be able to survive against hardened tough Russians, Chinese, North Koreans, and so on and so forth.
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Douglas C Rapé
The critique of the Marine Forces in readiness often focuses on amphibious assault being obsolete. The first combat action by Marines in Korea was after a tactical offload at Pusan. The Amphibious Assault at Inchon followed. The common denominator in Amphibious Assault, tactical off load, administrative off load or fly in is that they deliver the MAGTF to the fight. Getting ashore, via multiple options, is only one part of the plan. The most important part after those options is being able to fight once there.
FD-20XX has no way to actually come ashore, nothing of note to fight with once there and no viable way to sustain whatever you have put ashore.
If one were do a map reconnaissance of where MAGTFs could possibly be required, from the Aleutians to Northern Japan to N Australia in a conventional conflict with China, the options are endless and none have much to do with sinking the Chinese war ships. If one only focuses on the Maritime chokepoints in the Pacific, the key would be holding them icw allied nations and not needing to re- capture them.
Permit me an analogy. As NATO, in 1985, looked at the vast tank Armies of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR they opted for tanks, artillery, close air, anti tank mines and the anti tank weaponry of various ranges from 4000 meters to 100 meters as well as a variety of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Imagine if the USMC came along and said they could become the eyes and ears, place themselves beyond the FEBA clandestinely, live off of the land, resupply by conventional delivery vans and disrupt the tank assault with satchel charges. How is EABO different?
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Alfred Karam
What struck me as rather poignant passage from CP analysis is this: “There are instances where decorated officers with such experience and more have been banned from the Corps’ professional military education programs and denigrated as not having sufficient “expertise.” If the Corps talks only with its current members, it will miss out on the decades of combat experience that former and retired Marines have gained in regular and irregular combat operations.
If the Marine Corps leadership believes that seasoned, combat experienced senior officers and enlisted, have no idea what they are talking about and must be banned from the dialogue, and professional development of/with active duty Marines, should we then tell ALL Marines to stop reading books about combat and strategy, in the tactical, operational, strategic and political realm? Should Marines burn books by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Frederick the Great, Napoleon and so on.
Marines should fear no one, especially when one is using no weapons but their voice!
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Rob Barrow
In discussion with other Marines, we came to a common conclusion. Our EXSUM? The Commandant signed a document that is empirically provable false. He knows it. I’ve lost “trust and confidence” in his ability to lead the Corps and I’m not alone.
He was surely knowingly aware his false word is widely disseminated and goes to Corps and combatant commander readiness and ultimately national security. Why is he not being called out for it? Because accountability does not exist.
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Jerry McAbee
I find it particularly sad that the CPG praises the "campaign of learning" for minor adjustments to divestments in infantry, cannon artillery, aviation, and combat service support. The adjustments are proof positive that divestments were arbitrary and ill conceived. Trying to sugar coat the damage done by Force Design by lauding the "campaign of learning" is somewhat akin to praising the rancher for closing the barn door after the horses have escaped.
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polarbear
I have to say that the Commandant, when exercising his strategic thinking, demonstrates his flawed narrow mindedness of terrain appreciation. Attempting to hide HMARS (with anti-ship missiles) and Marine Raiders (as stay behind asymmetrical forces) on small islands is just a bad idea. As the “eyes and ears” of the Joint Force, both will be quickly located, isolated and neutralized.
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John Watkins
Noticed an article in the Sept 17th issue of Defense News. It was about the fitting of an AGM- 158A onto to an FA-18 Super Hornet from VMFA- 262. Range of the missile is 260 miles. The extended range units AGM- 158 B and C is 620 miles. Makes me wonder about the use of FD 2030. What is the use of putting marines on an island with missiles (not invented yet) when the now non-existent MAGTF could be doing this today. The AGM-158 B and C are for the F-35, but bet a couple of smart Gunnies could fit them to the F/A-18. Even the AH-1Z sank a ship. Kinda makes you wonder what use FD 2030 is. You could sink all of the Chinese ships screwing with the Philippines with one Marine air strike. Especially if you use the extended range missile.
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Randy Shetter
Imagine a squadron or two of seaplanes armed with these missiles. They would have the whole Pacific Ocean as maneuver space plus the stand-off range of the missiles. They could strike from anywhere.
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Charles Wemyss, Jr.
. . . All to the point that it takes great Senior leadership period, whether officer or enlisted to care for the warfare of their Marines. It is disappointing to date to see a lack of honest and meaningful leadership at the highest level of the Corps. Not naming any names but the oldest standing structure in Washington, DC is missing some leadership bricks at the moment. We lead from the front or whether we can best control the movement and or maneuver of the formation employed. We are unique in pushing leadership down to the smallest unit level and of course it pays dividends.
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polarbear
. . . How flexible? At the start of the WW2, the 6th Marines Regiment, forming in Southern California and getting ready for South Pacific jungle warfare. Suddenly, the 6th Marines got orders to sail to the Azores. Winston Churchill was short on forces and needed help to cover those British possessions in the Atlantic. The President (FDR) volunteered the Marines and ordered the 6th Marines to board ships to help defend the Azores. While in route their orders changed to defending Iceland (after a stop at South Carolina to pick up cold weather gear and the 1st Marine Brig HQ).
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Solomon
The Army's MDTF has out-Marine Corps'd the Marine Corps without destroying its force structure.
The most head freaking thing about this is that the "original designers" of Force Design 2030 DID HAVE SOME GOOD IDEAS. Unfortunately they acted in private, did not get buy in from stakeholders in this endeavour, and would accept no criticism of their plan.
Force Design 2030 will be studied in business schools as the ultimate in "change agent" failure.
Fortunately the Marine Corps is a robust organization. It can be saved from a terrible plan and flawed thinking. Rebuilding the MAGTF is essential. Fixing naval shipping is essential. Putting together a solid plan to do so (I've seen a few linked from these pages) is also essential.
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Colonel Jack D. Howell
The thing I most remember about combat structure of the Marine Corps was the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Everything was focused on mission and task organization from a MEU, MEB, or MEF. Further, I remember the Corps doing an Artillery reorganization study in 1988-or 89. I was a member of this study. The thrust behind this was to find a suitable lighter weight replacement for the M-198. The study also looked at the Multiple Launch Rocket System as a possible replacement for an artillery battery within the Artillery Regiment.
Over the years, I have watched the Force Structure of the Corps change...not necessarily for the better! I believe that the Force Design 2030 has taken the "sting" out of the MAGTF by reducing capabilities. The loss of Tanks, Bridging, Heavy Artillery, and reduction in aircraft will have serious consequences in the long-term. While I grasp the concept of seizing the littoral Islands in the South China Sea, it is fraught with too many unknowns. And to tell our Marines who will occupy these islands that they may have to forage is highly questionable strategy.
The other big question that I ponder is the transport of our Marines on naval vessels that have questionable reliability. Does the US Navy have the total lift capability to handle our needs based on the mission(s) assigned? I don't have a warm and fuzzy feeling.
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Randy Shetter
The time is now for HQMC to stop doubling down on the misguided FD concept. After five years or so, there is nothing to show for it other than a weakened Marine Corps. The Littoral Combat Regiments are offensively weak, the Landing Ship Mediums are non-existent, and the missile program is weaker still. The Marine Corps cannot conduct offensive expeditionary missions, due to divestment of combined arms combat capabilities. Stop going down this rabbit hole.
The Marine Corps cannot compete with the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the missile arena because this is their domain. In a few years, the Army will have five Multi-Domain Task Forces dedicated to long-range precision strike deployed to various theaters. However, there is one domain in which the other services cannot compete in: that being a combined arms naval expeditionary force. However as an offensive force in a pre-FD organized Marine Corps, the Marine Corps can still contribute to the precision strike mission by deploying HIRAINS (HIMARS raids).
Imagine a traditional pre-FD artillery regiment with an added HIMARS battalion. As part of a MAGTF, HIMARS can be deployed by air or by LCAC to launch areas. Such raids would possibly require less personnel than a SIF or the LCR. In this manner, I believe the Marine Corps can still contribute to the deep precision strike without losing its offensive capability as an expeditionary force.
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Charles Wemyss, Jr.
The bad news after five years of FD Happy Talk and divestiture of combined arms assets, the Marine Corps has nothing to show for the effort. Now the good news, the Corps has nothing to show for it. Meaning, if the CMC can find some bottled oxygen, take a breath or two and clear his head, and the planning guidance reduced to “we will reequip and improve the Corps so that it regains full MAGTF capability and can better meet its Title X mandates” then we can get on with it.
Otherwise, it is status quo and that is not working well at the moment.
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Paul Van Riper
The challenge as always is securing the funds needed to equip the Corps with the needed modern armor, wheeled artillery, new bridging, munitions (including new types such as loitering munitions and the right kind of missiles), and whatever advances there are in assault bridging. Types and numbers need to be based on a new operating concept; those developing such a concept would do well to take a very close look at Vision 2035.
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Jerry McAbee
The Army has developed world class short, mid, and long range anti-ship missile capabilities without divesting other needed capabilities. By comparison, Marine Corps anti-ship capabilities are inferior and insignificant - - not only to Army capabilities but also to Navy and Air Force capabilities. The Marine Corps needs to "smell the coffee," change course, and restore its offensive capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to global threats across the range of military operations.
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medevicerep
Strength is a great deterrent. We are not projecting strength. We are projecting insecurity, unsureness, a lack of will and certainly a lack of purpose.
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Alfred Karam
Sage words and counsel for all of us to live by, Gen Zinni. What you laid out sir, is what I have lived by as a professional, and as a citizen, husband and father.
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Randy Shetter
We're Marines, and we'll see this battle through!
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Compass Points salutes all readers who in their own ways are continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps.
Reception order to deter Russian and Chinese military forces in the North Pacific the Army deployed a missile equipped Multi Domain task Force to a remote Alaskan island . I doubt if a MLR was even in the planning calculations of the combatant commander. One Army element deployed from Hawaii, home of 3d MLR. As a joint planner I would have a hard time figuring out a role in most contingencies for the Marine Corps as it is organized and equipped today.
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/09/20/us-troops-finish-deployment-remote-alaska-island-amid-spike-russian-military-activity.html
I have wondered endlessly what was going through the mind of CMC that gave us FD-2030. It occurs to me that the answer might his asking himself the same questions that Smedley Butler was asking late in his career. Neither Marines nor any of the other service chiefs decide where or why Marines will be deployed. These decisions are made by our political leaders and now, as well as in Smedley's era, those decisions have been almost universally bad. Having a "force in readiness" is an invitation for politicians to engage in the "sport of kings" that gets Marines killed and almost always ends with nothing to show for it. Even the Korean war, which at least saved half of the Korean peninsula failed to achieve strategic victory. Do the math, check the scorecard, what benefit to world peace or the advancement of freedom has the blood of so many Marines, soldier, sailors, or airmen been worth the cost. I call it Smedley Butler syndrome, he recognized the stark reality that ignoring General Washington's edict to avoid foreign entanglements is almost always pretty good idea.