Marine Corps Compass Points

Compass Points - Ship Comes Home

Marine Corps Compass Points — Sat, 18 Jul 2026 15:19:22 GMT

Compass Points - Ship Comes Home

Now, more ships need to go out.

July 18, 2026

Over the last year, three amphibious ships sailed out so the Navy and Marine Corps, working together, could provide the US in the Caribbean with a flexible and credible air, ground, logistics, crisis response force.

After completing nearly a year long deployment, the last of the three ships, the USS Ft Lauderdale, has returned home.

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Amphibious transport dock USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD-28) pulled into Naval Station Norfolk on Thursday, capping off a nearly year-long deployment in the Caribbean, the Navy announced.

The ship originally deployed as part of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and supported missions ranging from the early January raid in Venezuela that captured the country’s former president, Nicolás Maduro, to multiple humanitarian aid and disaster relief response efforts in the region.

“During its 334-day deployment, sailors and Marines aboard Fort Lauderdale operated seamlessly with joint services and naval assets in the region to accomplish 3,194 sorties, 792 hours of flight operations, and transiting more than 51,093 nautical miles,” reads a U.S. 2nd Fleet news release.

When it deployed last August, the Iwo Jima ARG featured USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), Fort Lauderdale, USS San Antonio (LPD-17) and the embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. San Antonio came back to Norfolk in April for maintenance work and returned to sea at the end of June, USNI News recently reported. Iwo Jima came home in early June.

-- USNI News

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Now, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit has taken over duties in the Caribbean.

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PUERTO RICO -- The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit has officially assumed the mission as the premier tactical force-in-readiness within the U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility. Operating under the designation of Littoral Combat Force-24, the command offers tactical options via an agile Marine Air-Ground Task Force of over 1,300 Marines and Sailors to the theater. Commanded by U.S. Marine Corps Col. Ryan Lynch, LCF-24 is directly nested under Joint Force Maritime Component Command and Joint Task Force 84-2 to support Operation Southern Spear.

“The Marines and Sailors of LCF-24 are postured to execute all prescribed mission sets directed by our higher echelons of leadership; to deter the threats facing our hemisphere today,” said Col. Lynch. “Through our transition with the 22nd MEU, we have seamlessly assumed the watch. Our posture is active, our forces are integrated, and we are committed to standing as the regional security partner of choice.”

. . . A Purpose-Built Force for the Littorals Distinct from a standard Amphibious Ready Group/MEU deployment, LCF-24 is a purpose-built MAGTF engineered for distributed operations. The force maximizes its rapid littoral maneuver capabilities by operating from both shore-based nodes and amphibious transport dock USS Fort Lauderdale, which is exclusively aligned to support the MAGTF’s mission.

-- Marines.mil

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If the Marine 24th MEU “has officially assumed the mission as the premier tactical force-in-readiness within the U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility” why has the deployed Marine unit been re-named “Littoral Combat Force-24”?

The reason is lack of amphibious ships. The 24th MEU needs three amphibious ships to embark its entire air, ground, logistics unit. Without the normal three amphibious ships, only a portion of the 24th MEU can deploy. Portions of the 24th MEU are stuck on various land bases, including Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico.

For the Marine Corps to provide the Nation with fully capable Marine crisis response forces around the globe, the Navy needs to do a better job building and maintaining fully capable amphibious ships.

The lack of ready amphibious ships has been a problem for years, but was made immensely worse when the Marine Corps Commandant, General Berger, in the summer of 2019 made the misguided decision to unilaterally throw out the long standing agreement for at least 38 amphibious ships.

The previous Commandant, General Neller, in his official posture statement of 7 March 2018 testified that the Marine Corps needed “upwards of 50 amphibious ships.” General Berger could not even hold the line at 38. The Secretary of the Navy paused all amphibious ship building to sort out the mess. It took retired Marine Corps general officers appealing to members of the SASC, in particular Senator Sullivan, to get Congress to establish a new floor of 31 ships and to designate the Marine Corps as the service that would set the requirement for amphibious ships.

This following information acquired online makes clear that amphibious ship readiness grew much worse starting in 2011.

● The 2011 Maintenance Cliff.

Prior to 2011, the Navy generally kept its long-term maintenance cycles steady, keeping about 80% to 90% of the fleet available. Starting in 2011, compounding delays and extended repair periods caused availability rates to plummet to roughly 46%.

● The 2015 All-Time Low.

In 2015, the operational readiness rate for these vessels hit a historic nadir of 39%, leaving only 12 out of 30 ships capable of putting out to sea.

● The Current Crisis.

Congress legally mandates that the Navy maintain a minimum of 31 operational amphibious ships to support Marine Corps deployment needs. While the physical inventory stands at 32 ships, severe shipyard backlogs and aging hulls mean that only 14 ships are actually functional and free from maintenance delays.

Here is the actual data in five-year intervals. The readiness rate remained steady from 1995 through 2005. After 2010 the readiness rate collapsed.

YEAR ----- INVENTORY ----- SHIPS ABLE TO SAIL

1995 ---------- 40 --------------------- 35

2000 ---------- 36 --------------------- 31

2005 ---------- 34 --------------------- 28

2010 ---------- 31 --------------------- 21

2015 ---------- 30 --------------------- 12

2020 ---------- 31 --------------------- 14

2025 ---------- 32 --------------------- 14

2026 ---------- 32 --------------------- 14

If the new Commandant in 2019 had resolutely focused the Marine Corps on global crisis response, that would have helped the Navy to focus on the need for more amphibious ships. Instead, in 2019 the Marine Corps abruptly changed the focus and began dismantling combined arms, crisis response units, equipment, and capabilities.

The result today is the Marine 24th MEU is sent to the Caribbean without the amphibious ships it needs.

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Marine Corps officials this year said they’ve had to make adjustments to how they deploy Marines because of the amphibious fleet’s readiness woes. To that end, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to U.S. Southern Command in May as the Littoral Combat Force-24, which is operating from land-based nodes across the Caribbean . . . .

-- USNI News

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When a crisis erupts anywhere in the world, the US needs to have at least one forward deployed Marine MAGTF nearby that can quickly arrive to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight. US Marines onboard Navy amphibious ships do not need local airports and do not need permission from local governments. US Marines arrive with a flexible air, ground, logistics unit that can jump in and help with a variety of missions. In the past, if the crisis expanded, Marines on scene could be augmented with another Marine MAGTF on amphibious ships, as well as fly-in-echelons, supported by maritime pre-positioning ships.

When Marines on amphibious ships arrive to any crisis, anywhere around the globe, US allies are reassured, and adversaries are deterred. Marines can arrive quickly with the combat capabilities to help an ally, and can arrive just as quickly with the combat capabilities to deter or harm an adversary.

Compass Points salutes the hard working sailors and Marines onboard the USS Fort Lauderdale as they return from nearly a year long deployment.

Three amphibious ships went out. Now three amphibious ships have returned. What should happen next is for three different amphibious ships to sail forward. Where are they?

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USNI News - 07/16/2026

USS Fort Lauderdale Returns from 11-month Deployment to the Caribbean

By Mallory Shelbourne

https://news.usni.org/2026/07/16/uss-fort-lauderdale-returns-from-11-month-deployment-to-the-caribbean

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Marines.mil - 05/29/2026

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit Assumes the Watch as Littoral Combat Force-24, Advancing Operation Southern Spear in USSOUTHCOM AOR

By Capt. Shawn Doublet 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

https://www.24thmeu.marines.mil/News/Article/Article/4504064/24th-marine-expeditionary-unit-assumes-the-watch-as-littoral-combat-force-24-ad/

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Compass Points - Unexpected Visits

Marine Corps Compass Points — Fri, 17 Jul 2026 16:58:22 GMT

Compass Points - Unexpected Visits

Navy and Marine Corps arrive suddenly

July 17, 2026

An unidentified pilot from the Blue Angels demonstration flight team made a low level pass over Florida’s Pensacola Beach on Wednesday. The roar and turbulence from the aircraft startled beach goers and sent beach umbrellas tumbling.

Acting Secretary of the Nay Hung Cao, looked into the demonstration of the Blue Angels’ low level flight capabilities, and posted his thoughts on social media.

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Flight debrief complete.

No reprimands. No firings. No problem.

That’s the sound of Freedom!

Semper fi and Hooyah.

— Acting Secretary of the Navy, Hung Cao (@SECNAV) July 16, 2026.

pic.twitter.com/lB1y8f83w7

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Meanwhile, in the Middle East, the US continues to conduct strikes against Iranian military targets and to seal off Iranian traffic from using the Strait of Hormuz

US Marines were ordered to fast rope onto a moving oil tanker and take charge.

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U.S. Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11th MEU) boarded the commercial tanker M/T Wen Yao in the Gulf of Oman on July 16, 2026, as part of a verification operation supporting the U.S. maritime blockade against Iran, highlighting Washington’s expanding ability to police shipping around the Strait of Hormuz. Announced by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on July 17, 2026, the mission underscores a more assertive U.S. effort to restrict Iranian maritime activity while safeguarding legitimate commercial navigation through one of the world’s most strategically important chokepoints.

The operation showcases the integration of Marine boarding teams with U.S. naval and intelligence assets to strengthen maritime interdiction and sustain pressure on Iran’s regional logistics network. As tensions persist across the Middle East, this layered enforcement approach reinforces deterrence, enhances maritime security, and preserves freedom of navigation along a critical global energy corridor.

According to CENTCOM, American forces have now redirected three commercial vessels attempting to breach the blockade, disabled one vessel that failed to comply with U.S. instructions, and boarded the M/T Wen Yao to verify full compliance with the ongoing U.S. naval blockade against Iran. CENTCOM added that the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters remain open to international navigation, except for vessels attempting to violate what it described as America’s “steel wall blockade.” The announcement signals that Washington is pursuing a selective maritime enforcement campaign focused on vessels suspected of violating blockade measures rather than restricting legitimate international commerce.

The operation demonstrates how U.S. forces are integrating Marine expeditionary units with naval assets, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and maritime interdiction capabilities to sustain pressure on Iran’s maritime network. This layered approach strengthens regional deterrence, expands maritime domain awareness, and underscores the United States’ ability to enforce maritime restrictions while preserving freedom of navigation across one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The boarding of the M/T Wen Yao forms part of a broader U.S. campaign to establish persistent operational control over the maritime approaches to southern Iran. Rather than attempting to halt all shipping movements, U.S. forces appear to be employing intelligence-led maritime enforcement operations that combine surveillance, naval patrols, and Marine boarding teams to identify and intercept vessels suspected of supporting sanctioned Iranian trade or violating blockade measures.

-- Army Recognition / Naval News - “U.S. Marines Board Wen Yao Tanker as Washington Steps Up Maritime Pressure on Iran”

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US Marines serve as a rapid response force for the United States. Marines are a global air, ground, logistic force that can conduct low level flight ops over a Florida beach in one part of the globe, while at the same time conducting visit, board, search, and seizure operations in the Gulf of Oman.

Compass Points appreciates the Blue Angels for taking time to allow Florida beach goers to get a close look at their aircraft, and thanks the Marines from the 11 MEU for visiting the M/T Wen Yao in person and explaining what they are allowed to do and what they are not allowed to do.

When US Marines arrive by aircraft or landing craft, that is the sight and sound of freedom.

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AVBrief - 07/16/2026

No Reprimands’ For Blue Angels’ Beach Buzz

By Russ Niles

https://avbrief.com/no-reprimands-for-blue-angels-beach-buzz/

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Army Recognition / Naval News - 07/17/2026

U.S. Marines Board Wen Yao Tanker as Washington Steps Up Maritime Pressure on Iran.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/u-s-marines-board-wen-yao-tanker-as-washington-steps-up-maritime-pressure-on-iran

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Compass Points - Cloud is Down?

Marine Corps Compass Points — Thu, 16 Jul 2026 16:33:07 GMT

Compass Points - Cloud is Down?

What happens when high tech is unplugged?

July 16, 2026

In both civilian life and in military operations, it is often said that everything is moving to the cloud. Is that true? Even if it is true, is it wise?

The US Marine Corps has announced it is looking at technology that could help Marines stay connected when the cloud goes down.

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As the Marine Corps explores ways to bring AI tools to the battlefield, it is looking at one software company’s proposal to keep troops computing when broader access gets cut off.

Ditto will announce Monday that the Marines’ Project Dynamis will evaluate their technology for turning radios, cell phones, even drones, into a local network that can keep data flowing and AI tools running locally when cloud access disappears.

“Ditto’s position is that we do not leverage a server-client model,” Eric Hanft, Ditto’s senior vice president for public sector and a former Army infantry officer, said in an interview. “If you continue to architect your data flows around that, you never remove this fundamental dependency that, if two edge nodes need to communicate and have to go to and from a server—and that server is not available—there’s no communication.”

A digital and data communication failure is a nightmare scenario that the United States has largely been able to avoid in past operations. But over the past two decades, those operations have increasingly focused on the Middle East, where the United States did not face adversaries that were capable of disrupting critical communications infrastructure.

-- Defense One, “Marines eye cloudless networks to keep AI tools running when the cloud goes down”

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Many pundits and prognosticators today are predicting that because of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, satellites, and precision munitions, wars of the future will be fought at a distance, from clean control rooms. Wars of the future will be high technology combat.

Despite advanced technology, however, much of the fighting in recent years in Ukraine and Gaza is not futuristic. In Ukraine, soldiers are fighting and dying in muddy trenches. In Gaza, the fighting took place in rubble filled streets and in treacherous subterranean caverns. The US today has reduced much of Iran’s military to rubble. What is left in the rubble? Sticks and stones.

Writing in the Small Wars Journal, author Casey Christie predicts that, “Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones.”

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In an era defined by artificial intelligence, drones, and satellite-guided warfare, it may seem absurd to suggest that the future of war lies in trenches, artillery, and rifles. Yet history has a way of circling back on itself and as nations race to develop increasingly advanced systems of destruction, they also create the means of their own paralysis. The next great war will not be won by the most technologically advanced army, but by the one that can still fight when all technology fails. This is not a romantic return to the past, nor a doomsday prediction, but a logical outcome of warfare’s evolution. Each new military breakthrough has produced a corresponding countermeasure, driving modern battle toward a point of diminishing returns. Directed-energy weapons now drop entire drone swarms from the sky. Cyber-attacks can paralyze command networks. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) systems threaten to fry electronics across vast regions. Logically, therefore, when all sides possess such capabilities, the advantage shifts not to the most advanced, but to the most adaptable.

The Paradox of Progress

For over a century, the trajectory of war has been defined by progress – faster aircraft, smarter bombs, and more connected command networks. Yet every step toward technological supremacy also increases fragility. Modern militaries are built upon vulnerable foundations: GPS, communications satellites, and data-dependent logistics. An adversary that can disrupt those systems does not need to outgun its opponent; it only needs to unplug it. The U.S., the U.K., China, and Russia are all developing EMP and high-power microwave weapons designed to do exactly that.

The U.S. Department of Defense has warned repeatedly that an EMP detonation could disable unshielded electronics across an entire theatre of operations. Russia claims to have a number of non-nuclear EMP devices that have allegedly been tested for battlefield use. China’s military doctrine openly discusses “information dominance” as a means of blinding an adversary before the first shot is fired. If such weapons are ever used at scale, the result would be immediate regression as drones would fall, satellites would go silent, and precision-guided munitions would become scrap metal. Armies would be forced to fight with what still works: small arms, fieldcraft, artillery, and ground tactics that predate the digital age.

-- Casey Christie predicts that, “Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones.”

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Sticks and stones? Or AI and precision munitions?

Is warfare more science than art?

The Marine Corps’ foundational publication, Warfighting, says that war will be forever not just science and not just art, but will be ever-shifting levels of science and art, combined with the power and complexities of the human will.

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THE SCIENCE, ART, AND DYNAMIC OF WAR

Various aspects of war fall principally in the realm of science, which is the methodical application of the empirical laws of nature. The science of war includes those activities directly subject to the laws of ballistics, mechanics, and like disciplines; for example, the application of fires, the effects of weapons, and the rates and methods of movement and resupply. However, science does not describe the whole phenomenon.

An even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the realm of art, which is the employment of creative or intuitive skills. Art includes the creative, situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and experience, and so the art of war subsumes the science of war. The art of war requires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. It involves conceiving strategies and tactics and developing plans of action to suit a given situation. This still does not describe the whole phenomenon. Owing to the vagaries of human behavior and the count- less other intangible factors which influence war, there is far more to its conduct than can be explained by art and science. Art and science stop short of explaining the fundamental dynamic of war.

As we have said, war is a social phenomenon. Its essential dynamic is the dynamic of competitive human interaction rather than the dynamic of art or science. Human beings interact with each other in ways that are fundamentally different from the way a scientist works with chemicals or formulas or the way an artist works with paints or musical notes. It is because of this dynamic of human interaction that fortitude, perseverance, boldness, esprit, and other traits not explainable by art or science are so essential in war. We thus conclude that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.

-- Marines, MCDP-1, Warfighting

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While pundits and prognosticators may predict that technology means wars of the future will be fought at a distance from cloud connected clean control rooms, technology is rarely dependable. While it is true that military contractors spew out proposals for new technology at a cyclic rate, still warfighting will always be filled with the unexpected.

In wars of the future, crucial technologies will go down. The technologies may stay down for a few minutes, a few days, or weeks, or more. If military units depend on fragile technologies that cannot be easily repaired, replaced, or resupplied, they are in for a surprise. Warriors must always be prepared to continue the fight with the most rudimentary technology.

Compass Points salutes Casey Christie and his insightful article, “Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones.”

When trained in the art and science of war, and in the complexity of the human will, US Marines can prevail in any conflict, whether high tech, low tech, or no tech.

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Small Wars Journal - 11/20/2025

Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones

By Casey Christie

Casey Christie is the Managing Director of Christie and Associates, a London-based private military security and intelligence firm. With decades of experience in security, intelligence, and risk analysis, he has written extensively on geopolitical threats, security and defense, and modern warfare. His work has been published in The Times of London, The South African Sunday Times, and Ukraine’s Kyiv Post, among others.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/20/future-war-will-be-fought-with-sticks-and-stones/

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Defense One - 07/13/2026

Marines eye cloudless networks to keep AI tools running when the cloud goes down

The software company Ditto says it can solve a key problem by networking “whatever transports the customer brings.”

By Patrick Tucker

https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2026/07/marines-cloudless-networks-ai-cloud/414716/

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Compass Points - Lock & Load!

Marine Corps Compass Points — Wed, 15 Jul 2026 14:38:34 GMT

Compass Points - Lock & Load!

Dr. Antonoff prepares Marines for the fight.

July 15, 2026

Lock and Load!

Marines know what that means.

Insert the magazine. Let the bolt go home.

That should chamber a round. The Marine should be able to fire.

But what if there is no ammunition in the magazine?

With a fire fight about to begin, and no ammunition, that is a problem.

For Marines, and particularly for Marine leaders, there are all kinds of ammunition.

To direct the fight, to give orders, to outwit a hostile adversary, and to adjust to rapid changes on the battlefield, Marine leaders need to be well armed intellectually. Before the battle begins, Marine leaders must have a brain housing group that is fully armed and ready to fire.

Marine Majors are sent to Command and Staff College at Quantico. The aim of CSC is to arm the Marine. Through a series of readings, discussions, staff rides, and problem sets, the Marines are prepared for crises to come. Throughout the school there are knowledgeable instructors, constantly prodding, questioning, and stretching the students’ understanding of war.

For years at Command and Staff College, there was no instructor better than Dr Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD. Dr. Antonoff is President, Antonoff Associates. She is a recognized expert in military-diplomatic history with a focus on War Studies. Dr Antonoff has been quoted, “I use both classical Great Power Politics and emerging strategy and concepts to inform geo-strategic analysis of today’s Great Power competition.”

What does Dr Antonoff think about the education of Marine leaders, about Force Design, and about Great Power Competition today? Like the Majors at Quantico, prepare to be challenged at cyclic rate by Dr Antonoff’s enlightening perspective.

The Once and Future Marine Corps

An Inquiry into the future of Marine education and operations.

By Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD.

Part 1 - What Happened to Operational Art?

Part 2 - John Boyd, Art Corbett, EABO, and FD2030

Part 3 - Bending the Arc of Future History at CSC and Beyond

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Part 1 - What Happened to Operational Art?

By Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD.

We have zero operational art right now. Ukraine, like Iran, demonstrates the power and limitations of missile and drone warfare. We inflict pain. Do we change behavior? Do we impose our will?

Marine-manned missile batteries on an island chain can inflict pain but not cost. We cannot outshoot the largest industrial base in the world. We cannot outspend a state determined to subsidize a chosen capability at all cost. Look at how China used the 2008-and-after financial crisis: muscling into the global shipping business. She started at zero. After ten years of driving competitors out during the slump, with massive slack capacity everywhere, she emerged as #2. This is the mentality we are up against. We cannot change Chinese behavior by driving up Chinese expenditure on missiles.

Cost imposition moreover is not forcing extra spending in fighting the war. We must re-read and understand Thomas Schelling -- his original essay, not some latterday perversion of his idea. Cost imposition is something we force the enemy to impose on himself as a diversion from the main effort. We provoke it by investing ourselves in a capability we claim to be the “new new thing” -- think SDI -- but that we know to be less vital to ourselves (less harmful if we fail) than the capability where the enemy is currently focused.

In our current planning, we are inviting the enemy to do more against us of what he already intended. We are arraying a thin blue-green line on his doorstep and calling it deterrence, because we think we can complicate his targeting and force him to shoot more missiles than he planned. ‘Nuff said. Except of course China can also do a Grozny or Mariupol; not take the island but flatten it. What then? Do we destroy the missile sights and drone factories in China itself? But again, to what end? How does this win the war? Neither in Ukraine nor in Iran has that worked.

So, what is the follow up? Where is the joint operational concept? How will we exploit space and time to achieve operational objectives, in sequence or in parallel, to accomplish the strategic goal? What IS the strategic goal? Where do the US forces want to end up?

I have been told our joint operating concept is now reduced to Get In & Get Out. More pounding dirt and water. So the Marines become part of an orchestra of percussion. For how long? With what result?

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Part 2 - John Boyd, Art Corbett, EABO, and FD2030.

By Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD.

John Boyd has sometimes been called a tactical thinker, but in fact he understood war as few others did. He knew the need to impose one’s will by confounding enemy thinking.

I fear we have been engaged in confounding our own thinking.

In their initial incarnation, EABO and SIF emerged in an institutional vacuum, devoid of strategic guidance other than “the pacing threat.” However, no concept can take shape in an intellectual vacuum. Art Corbett did his best to fill in the blanks.

Art told my students that we needed to understand from the outset what kind of war we would fight; he believed it was defensive in purpose and positional in character, like a reverse of War Plan Orange. This time we (as Japan once did) would be defending in depth, behind the South China Sea, while China (as we once did) would be launching an amphibious/naval drive to impose its will on home islands. Will US Marines alone deter or stop that charge? Can they?

I asked Art, shortly before he died, whether he had thought about what EABO would look like in joint terms. He gave me a weary look and said not yet. Ditto for my question of whether EABO would work in other maritime theaters (I asked about the Baltic and Arctic as an example), or how the concept might have to be altered or the force supplemented to do so.

But Art’s own conception of EABO also was evolving. The night before he died, after co-teaching a wonderful Gray Scholars seminar on sea-power strategy in history, he emailed me to say that I had persuaded him EABO entailed not a revolution, but an evolution in warfare. As a defense in depth, he had always said, EABO was reverse slope tactics, modeled on Germany’s 1917 thinking. Who were the big guns a mile back from the front? Legacy naval forces, the very ones that we could not risk close in. And what would be enforcing the blockade meant to be accomplished by the Marines on the islands? What if China did what Mahan advised, concentrating forces at our weakest point to force a break in the line elsewhere? The legacy fleet.

So, as a naval concept, EABO was not a displacement of but rather a supplement to traditional naval operations.

This was as far as our conversation got. I meant to explore his new way of thinking -- supplementing rather than displacing older capabilities -- and pursue it with him to its logical conclusions. Alas, we were interrupted by life.

We are now at the mercy of other people’s thinking.

I have heard our EABO posture described as a force/fleet in being. For God’s sake, read and understand Julian Corbett. His fleet in being operated throughout British history on several key conditions:

1) to defend the North Sea and Channel -- i.e., to blockade the enemy in the European theater, close to home -- deterring invasion with an active defense while readily supplied and maintained from home ports,

2) all while supplemented by what Nick Lambert has called flotilla defense, and

3) only temporarily, while a squadron detachment dealt with an emergency in, say, North American waters, South Africa, or elsewhere, and then returned, with the result that

4) the full fleet for most of the time was superior to the enemy.

Absolutely not one jot of the above applies to US Marines in the South China Sea. They are to be a permanent deployment, stretched thin, many, many thousands of miles from home ports, within a WEZ denying ready resupply even given a long logistical tether, on the enemy’s front doorstep, facing a nation of 1.6 billion and an industrial base that has displaced much of Western manufacturing and occupies a critical place in Western supply chains, while purporting to inflict cost on that behemoth with a marginal increase in its missile expenditure (see above.)

I explained this Corbettian confusion in a revised naval warfare lesson card and lecture at CSC over a decade ago. It did not bubble upward. There may be good reason still to have an EABO capability, but let’s not drag Corbett into it. Know Thy History -- and as CSC’s Dr. DiNardo says, be ready to throw the BS flag. Lives depend on it.

Finally, what might the justifiable EABO capability be?

I go back to Art’s teaching.

He originally understood the SIF to be Marine logisticians and planners, putting a host-nation face on everything they did. Logistics problems grew more complicated, but the point remains: EABO presupposes intense training and cooperation with island chain nations. In fact, the locals must do it. THEY man the missiles, break up the invading force’s coherence and momentum, and maintain the blockade.

Marines go ashore and wage combat. We don’t need them as a new tripwire at a new Fulda Gap, forever stuck in place because withdrawing them signals loss of resolve, lack of commitment, change of heart --all the psycho-political folderol that kept US forces stuck in Europe for over 75 years after a two-year commitment. (We always meant Europe to grow the capacity and capability to defend itself within NATO.) The fact that we never did fight in Europe owes less to the tripwire and more to the Reagan strategy, a comprehensive approach using genuine cost imposition, psychological warfare and political subversion, information operations, and a very carefully planned and well informed economic warfare.

All of this was backed by the operational artistry of Air Land Battle, which led Soviet generals invited to observe maneuvers at the new NTC to comment ruefully that their soldiers could not do what ours were doing. All of this together, from samizdat to Solidarity, from the Big Five to Brilliant Pebbles, constituted a mutually reinforcing joint/inter-agency/interallied, all-domain, operational campaign, peace-time and grey-zone, that imposed our will without a shot.

Above all, the campaign to end the Cold War took place in global fashion, using the appropriate domains for local conditions. It built on solid allied and partner support from Thatcher to Kohl to John Paul II. It almost defies belief now, but it happened. It worked.

EABO and the SIF will not work without a regional agreement of some kind. All for one and one for all. Blockade chains, even when they are archipelagoes, cannot work any other way.

John Boyd recognized patterns and lessons in history. Are we allowing officers in PME today to do the same?

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Part 3 - Bending the Arc of Future History at CSC and Beyond

By Dr Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD.

Some Concluding Thoughts.

The points I raised in my previous two posts cover a lot of ground, on purpose. The intrinsic “logic chain” involves multiple timespans and geographical scales. It includes operational, strategic, and grand strategic thinking -- not just weapons and tactics.

I have deliberately used acronyms and historical references without explaining them. They ought to be obvious to any field grade officer or higher. Anyone at any level of command or on any planning staff should know them like the back of his hand. From Mahan and Corbett, 1917 reverse slope, and War Plan Orange, to Grozny and Mariupol, each word or phrase should conjure up images, sounds, sequences of actions as if in a motion picture, and, above all, consequences that do not require explanation.

Who teaches this now? How will the CSC students learn case studies? Will they conduct Clausewitzian Kritik? Will they read Clausewitz? Will they know what Kritik means?

How will they develop operational thinking? What experiences, actual or vicarious, will teach them its meaning and importance? Will they distinguish its purpose-driven progress through time and space from a Big Bang approach to JADO? Will they know how to orchestrate a coalition to impose our will on the enemy?

I fear I know the answers: Unless we take a second look at CSC at MCU, no one will teach history. Students will not conduct case studies. They will not read and understand Clausewitz. They will not know the word Kritik, nor will they practice it under any other name. They will not think operationally. They will not learn JADO independent of a crippling dependency on EBO. (Not a typo; look it up.) They will be unable to command and direct coalitions to accomplish US objectives because they will not learn to connect simultaneous, synchronized tactical actions to such objectives, let alone understand the gravity of not clarifying those objectives in the first place.

They will not know Boyd. They will not understand OODA. They will not study the enemy as a true system, from his historical political culture to his present coalition partners, but only as a collection of infrastructure.

But they will know grand tactics!

And they will know defeat.

Can we change this trajectory now, and bend the arc of future history in our favor?

-- Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD.

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Compass Points thanks Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD for her insights on great power competition and her dedication to educating Marines. The Marine Corps needs a new generation of leaders, fully armed and fully prepared for the next round of conflict and competition. Marine leaders need to be taught hard lessons in the classroom, so they can teach harder lessons to the enemies of the United States.

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US Marine Corps

Weapons Handling

https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Block%20WP%20PP%27s.pdf?ver=2017-05-08-170933-317

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Compass Points - Boyd Still Battling

Marine Corps Compass Points — Tue, 14 Jul 2026 16:05:55 GMT

Compass Points - Boyd Still Battling

John Boyd is still challenging Marines

July 14, 2026

As the US hits targets in Iran for the third night in a row, what is the best path forward in this conflict? Furthermore, what is the best approach to future military conflicts?

Any military leader and any military force that wants to find an advantage in armed conflicts should take time to learn from a former US Air Force fighter pilot and renowned conflict expert, John Boyd.

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“During the 1950s, John Boyd dominated fighter aviation in the U.S. Air Force. His fame came on the wings of the quirky and treacherous F-100; the infamous “Hun.” Boyd was known throughout the Air Force as “Forty-Second Boyd,” because he had a standing offer to all pilots that if they could defeat [him] in simulated air-to-air combat in under 40 seconds, he would pay them $40. Like any gunslinger with a name and a reputation, he was called out many times. As an instructor at the Fighter Weapons School (FWS) at Nellis AFB, he fought students, cadre pilots, Marine and Navy pilots, and pilots from a dozen countries, who were attending the FWS as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact.

He never lost.”

Colonel John Boyd flew in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. He retired from the USAF in 1975 and during his career was known as Genghis John, The Mad Major, and The Ghetto Colonel. “He is remembered as one of the great war strategists of his time. “His manual of fighter tactics changed the way every air force in the world flies and fights. He discovered a physical theory that forever altered the way fighter planes were designed. Later in life, he developed a theory of military strategy that has been adopted throughout the world and even applied to business models for maximizing efficiency.”

-- Super Sabre Society

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How did Boyd win again and again? Boyd had a powerful method of finding advantage in any conflict. Although Boyd’s thinking cannot be easily summarized, he placed great importance on decision making. Boyd argued that anyone involved in armed conflict must make better decisions faster.

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NEED FOR DECISIONS

Against such a background, actions and decisions become critically important. Actions must be taken over and over again and in many different ways. Decisions must be rendered to monitor and determine the precise nature of the actions needed that will be compatible with the goal. To make these timely decisions implies that we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change.

The concepts can then be used as decision-models for improving our capacity for independent action. Such a demand for decisions that literally impact our survival causes one to wonder: How do we generate or create the mental concepts to support this decision- making activity?

-- John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation”

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Several Compass Points readers recommend the thinking of John Boyd as a way to both understand the Marine Corps’ controversial Force Design, and, more importantly, as a way to find a better path forward.

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Polarbear

When I read about the constant and rapidly changing military technologies that seem to be showcased daily, I feel like FD2030 is leaving the US Marine Corps in a cloud of dust at the starting gate. For this reason, I re-read Col. Boyd’s “Destruction and Creation” paper thinking it provides a framework of the preventative medicine for bad strategic thinking. In one of the paper’s opening sections, “Creating Concepts,” Col Boyd states concepts can basically be created or changed two ways: “deduction” or “induction” reasoning. “Deduction” is related to thinking from the general-to-specific, and “induction” is related to thinking from the specific-to-general. Going from general-to-specific relates to deduction, analysis and differentiation. While going from specific-to-general relates to induction, synthesis, and most importantly, integration.

In the next six paragraphs Boyd makes the case that the specific-to-general method is the better way for creating and adjusting concepts. In my opinion, General Berger (and Smith) used misguided deductive thinking to go from a bad 1950s political “Island Chain” containment strategy, to FD2030. They went from the general to the specific and that left the Marine Corps standing in a dry corner on painted floor holding a wet paint brush.

If Col Boyd had known of FD2030, he might have yelled “Bad General” like he was scolding a puppy for a mess on the kitchen floor. Boyd’s method would be to inductively break down the current concepts into small pieces or segments, keeping what is good and throwing out the bad. Then synthesizing what is the old good with the new and integrating these ideas into a new concept, a concept, most likely, much closer to the global, crisis response, Marine Corps MAGTF (Think Boyd’s snow mobile here.).

Col Boyd is not done with the word “deduction” when he introduces “destructive deduction” defined as:

Step 1 is un-structuring a concept by separating its constituent elements from the whole.

Step 2 is “creative induction” the synthesis of “new patterns from the liberated parts.”

Both “destructive deduction” and “creative induction” are important for Boyd’s OODA Loop. During the “Orient” part of the LOOP, the decision maker is creating destructive deduction in the enemy’s mind, while implementing “creative induction” in your own strategic or operational thinking.

If I were a “Den Daddy” or the MC Command and Staff College Commander, I would implement a full course on Boyd’s briefing paper, “Destruction and Creation.” I remember Col Boyd stating that “Destruction and Creation” is the most essential part of his briefings. If the Maine Corps University had given Col Boyd’s paper the attention it deserved, particularly when certain future General Officers attended MCC&S, the Marine Corps would be much stronger today. Instead, today it seems the Marine Corps is sitting in a cloud of dust, left at the starting gate. S/F

-- Polarbear

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Another reader, Samuel Whittemore, adds his own insight.

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Many of the current debates around FD2030 (versatility vs. specialization, divestment speed, Pacific focus) would benefit from officers who can explicitly apply destructive deduction to the assumptions baked into the plan and creative induction to build the next iteration. The Marine Corps has a long tradition of intellectual adaptation. The question Polar Bear raises is whether FD2030 was a genuine act of creative induction after thorough destruction—or more of a deductive leap from one set of premises. That debate is still very much alive, and Boyd’s framework remains one of the best tools for navigating it. S/F.

-- Samuel Whittemore

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One senior author and Marine recalls his discussions with John Boyd and encourages Marines to learn more about Boyd.

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Compass Points commenters frequently mention the noted military theorist, John Boyd. I am surprised and disappointed how often these references contain significant errors. The most common reference is to John’s observe, orient, decide, and act approach to gaining situation awareness and making decisions. Commenters regularly appear to know little more than that one is to work through the OODA loop faster than an enemy. They commonly write of his contributions to the development of maneuver warfare but seem to know little more than the bare essence of his work.

I was very fortunate that John mentored me in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He spent many hours schooling me about war and warfare. Ours was an ongoing and intense discourse that never really ended. There were phone calls at all hours of the day and night that could last for hours. This relationship proved very beneficial and certainly aided my professional development, especially operationally. It was also of considerable value when in retirement I spent time in the Marine Corps Archives located in the Gray Research Center going though John’s papers and his small. personal library as I prepared to teach an elective on his theories in a Command and Staff College seminar elective course.

I urge those who truly want to understand Boyd’s theories to read in the following order these books:

(1) Ian T. Brown’s, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, The U.S. Marines and Maneuver Warfare [the seminal work];

(2) Frans P.B. Osinga’s, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd [the most scientifically informed];

(3) Grant T. Hammond’s, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security [the only author who knew and worked personally with Boyd];

(4) Robert Coram’s, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War [the most vivid and entertaining though factually flawed in places].

Marine leaders should read and understand Boyd. While it is useful to be familiar with Boyd’s critics, pay them little heed; they are all lesser lights.

-- P.K. Van Riper

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Compass Points thanks all readers who are still studying the briefings of John Boyd so the best of Boyd can help all Marine leaders today and tomorrow make better decisions.

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Super Sabre Society

40-second Boyd

By MB Barrett

https://supersabresociety.org/legacy_stories/40-second-boyd/

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Mises Institute

Destruction and Creation

By John R. Boyd

https://cdn.mises.org/destruction_and_creation_by_john_r_boyd.pdf

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Compass Points - Google & Tanks?

Marine Corps Compass Points — Mon, 13 Jul 2026 16:45:31 GMT

Compass Points - Google & Tanks?

Google may know everything --but not tanks.

July 13, 2026

For some time, former Google CEO, Eric Schmidt, has been giving speeches about the future of war. One of his recurring themes is tanks are “useless.”

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Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google, made waves at the Future Investment Initiative conference in Saudi Arabia by urging the U.S. military to shift from tanks to AI-powered drones, citing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as evidence.

In an interview with Bloomberg, Schmidt argued that the effectiveness of a $5,000 drone against a $5 million tank underscores the obsolescence of traditional armored vehicles in modern warfare.

-- Dagens, “Ex-Google CEO Says Tanks Are “Useless” — Drones Are the Future”

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Those overly excited by new technologies have repeatedly declared the end of tanks. After one massive war, many military analysts declared that new technologies made tanks obsolete. That was after World War I. Tanks, of course, continued to be irreplaceable tools on battlefields for than 100 years after they were first declared obsolete. For over a century, infantry on the battlefield have needed tanks. And tanks on the battlefield have need infantry.

Are tanks obsolete? Author and Marine Ben Connable reconsiders the question in his recent LinkedIn column.

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Ben Connable, PhD’s Post

Military innovation is necessary for success in war. But innovation absent informed context is potentially dangerous. Statements like this one by industry leader Eric Schmidt (and generally inverse but equally unrealistic statements like those by Rheinmetall CEO Armen Papperger) reveal a lack of both historical and global appreciation for the facts of war. We owe it to ourselves and to the future of our tech-industrial partnerships to better inform our business leaders. And when they make statements like this we must be prepared with objective facts to ensure we guide innovation rather than let partly-informed technical innovators decide our future security.

As the image indicates: Taking tanks out of a fight has been a relatively cheap activity since the introduction of the tank. German K-rounds in WWI had a low probability of success but cost pennies to manufacture. Molotov Cocktails cost about a pint of gas, a bit of paraffin and some tar, and destroyed many tanks in the mid-20th Century. Early anti-tank rockets cost the equivalent of a few hundred dollars; newer versions of those shape-charge anti-tank rockets are the same munitions used on FPV drones today. Even a Javelin ATGM - remember St. Javelin? - costs about 10% of a modern T-72 tank.

About 4 or 5 tanks have been lost each day in Ukraine since 2022, far fewer than in previous wars. But that comparative number by itself is meaningless. Tanks are more or less useful in different parts of the Ukraine War for many reasons, most of which center on the extraordinarily well developed and fairly static front line, heavy use of mines, and a dense drone network that does not exist and probably cannot exist anywhere else in the world.

Tanks were used in roughly 70% of 21st Century ground battles through 2022. Why? Because any military force that wants to take and hold ground needs to smash and kill another military force taking or holding ground. Mobile protected firepower is part of the calculus. There are no magical or even technical solutions to this problem.

Instead of thinking about the value of tanks relative to the cost of drones, think about how Western armies have allowed risk-averse tank design costs to balloon and available tank inventories to dwindle. Our industrial approach is unsustainable.

Here’s a better way for Schmidt and Papperger to think about tanks: They remain relevant and needed. But they will be destroyed in war (Ukraine, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, etc.) by relatively cheap weapons including drones, mines, rockets, missiles, artillery, IEDs, etc. That has been normal for over 100 years and remains the norm. Integrate drones and counter-drone tech AND find a way to make Western tanks cheaper and in greater quantities. Otherwise we’re leaving our infantry in the lurch. And if our infantry cannot succeed we cannot expect to win land wars.

--Ben Connable, PhD Post (LinkedIn)

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Compass Points salutes author and Marine Ben Connable for his continuing insights and research on warfighting. When US Marines are fighting on the ground in some future crisis, the Marines will need all the protection and assistance they can get. When rounds are exploding, Marines will not need help from Google. Marines will need help from tanks

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Dagens - 10/30/2024

Ex-Google CEO Says Tanks Are “Useless” — Drones Are the Future

By Camilla Jessen Camilla Jessen

https://www.dagens.com/news/ex-google-ceo-says-tanks-are-useless-drones-are-the-future

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Home - Ben Connable

https://benconnable.com/

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Ben Connable - PhD Post

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7482074251953610752/

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Compass Points - Articles & Info

Marine Corps Compass Points — Sun, 12 Jul 2026 12:29:32 GMT

Compass Points - Articles & Info

Index of Articles, Mission & Values, and Legal Notice

July 12, 2026

Sunday is a good day for reflection.

This Sunday is a good day for reflecting on the direction of the Marine Corps. There is growing agreement that the focus of the Marine Corps on a plan to place a string of sensor and missile units off the coast of China has been at best an unnecessary distraction.

From the very beginning seven years ago the plan was controversial and, instead of fading away over the years, the concerns about the focus of the Marine Corps have increased.

For example, one organization of senior retired Marines, the Chowder Society II, has gathered an index of numerous articles which identify dangerous issues with the Marine Corps’ controversial Force Design plan.

How many articles express concerns?

The latest update of the Index of Articles is version 14 of July 1, 2026. The primary index (topic areas A-J) consists of 249 articles, authored or coauthored by 133 different writers, and published in 57 different media outlets. The index of supporting articles (topic area K) consists of an additional 206 articles, authored or co-authored by 165 different writers, and published in 75 different media outlets.

The damage to the Marine Corps’ global warfighting capabilities has not been inflicted by some outside adversary. Instead it has been the acts of very senior Marine leaders who abruptly changed the focus of the Marine Corps from global to local, from offense to defense, from locate, close with, and destroy, to sit as a Pacific sensor node. Misguided senior leaders have done great damage to the Marine Corps’ ability to serve as a worldwide crisis response force, forward deployed on Navy amphibious ships, ready to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight.

As explained in the Index of Articles.

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Force Design 2030 (now Force Design) is fatally flawed. One of its biggest flaws is the unvalidated assumption that offensive operations are no longer possible in a mature precision strike environment, accepting instead that the defense is now the dominant form of warfare. We reject that assumption and propose an alternative vision, which we have published as Vision 2035. Our vision leverages technology to restore maneuver in the age of precision munitions.

— Index of Articles

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There are some signs that the Marine Corps is beginning to rebuild, enhance, and upgrade the Corps’ crucial ability to serve as the Nation’s always ready global, crisis response, force of Marines. More upgrades are needed. This does not mean, for example, bringing back the same armor the Marine Corps so rashly removed. It means finding new solutions to the need for mobile protected firepower and a host of other needs.

Compass Points salutes the hundreds of authors who have written hundreds of articles warning the Marine Corps of danger, and calling the Marine Corps back to its primary duties. Practical upgrades and enhancements are needed now. China is not waiting for the US Marine Corps to recover. The Philippines have no time for excuses from a depleted US Navy and Marine Corps team. Around the world, including in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere, there are nations like the Philippines — allies of the US — under constant threat from some bully nation or terrorist group, including Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and many others.

Nations allied with the US are willing to standup, they are willing to fight, and they are willing to fund their own defense. But they cannot do it alone. They need help. They need the support of the United States. What help can the US provide whenever events in one corner of the globe threaten to blaze into a broader conflagration?

There is no better answer, no better way to immediately help keep the peace than by sending in the Marines. Marines on amphibious ships continually deployed around the globe provide the rapid readiness the US must have to help maintain peace. When Marines arrive at the scene of any crisis, allies are reassured and adversaries are worried. It is time for the US to rapidly rebuild, enhance, and restore the global, forward deployed Navy and Marine Corps team. Around the world, troubles are on the way. It is vital when violence and terror troubles are arriving that the Navy and Marine Corps team is already trained, equipped, and positioned to deter them.

Compass Points thanks the Chowder Society II for continually updating the Index of Articles. The link to the entire Index of Articles is included below along with Compass Points Mission & Values, and the Compass Points Legal Notice.
Compass Points also salutes all readers who in their own ways are faithfully continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps, and particularly thanks all our readers who served as seminar leaders this week by providing a cornucopia of topics, articles, and comments. Many thanks!

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- - - - - Compass Points Mission & Values - - - - -

Compass Points Mission

Provide an independent source of broader thinking, deeper understanding, and better decisions, for a stronger Marine Corps.

Compass Points Values

We believe the Marine Corps must be responsive, relevant, and ready today, and more so tomorrow.

We believe the Marine Corps is never owned by any small group of people, but is always held in sacred trust by every Marine and friend of the Corps, past, present, and future.

We believe Marine Corps success in garrison, in the field, and in operations is a complex ecology of the physical, the intellectual, and the spiritual.

We believe in the complexity of combat.

We believe good data is good, but waiting for more and more data is not necessarily better.

We believe no information system can or will sweep away the fog of war.

We believe nothing is more uncertain than certainty.

We believe planning is good, but first plans rarely survive first contact.

We believe Marines must prepare to battle skilled, devious, and unpredictable adversaries.

We believe Marines must be always ready to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel enemy assault by fire and close combat.

We believe in combined-arms, multi-mission capable Marine Corps units that can quickly arrive anywhere, and address any conflict or crisis.

We believe the Marine Corps must experiment with new technology constantly, and adopt it prudently.

We believe in practicing and perfecting proven methods, while also experimenting with and adopting new methods.

We believe in the Marine Corps culture of teamwork, trust, creativity, and courage.

We believe in candid culture among Marines, never cancel culture.

We believe the strength of the Marine Corps comes from the valor at the heart of each Marine. Each Marine draws strength from the entire Corps of Marines. Together, all Marines are joined across time and geography by a single minded mission:

From the Halls of Montezuma
To the shores of Tripoli;
We fight our country’s battles
In the air, on land, and sea;

— Marines’ Hymn (excerpt)

- - - - - - - - - LEGAL NOTICE - - - - - - - - -

Marine Corps Compass Points is an educational site intended only for comment, discussion, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.

Marine Corps Compass Points is independent and not a part of, or authorized by, the Marine Corps, or any other government agency, organization, or enterprise.

For educational purposes only, Marine Corps Compass Points posts links and excerpts to articles and information focused on the Marine Corps and national security.

Information posted on Marine Corps Compass Points is posted under the copyright Fair Use exception, U.S. Code Title 17 Section 107 - Fair Use.

- - - - - PRIVACY - - - - -

Marine Corps Compass Points uses member information to provide information and services.

Marine Corps Compass Points does not sell our member information.

- - - - - COPYRIGHT - - - - -

Excerpts posted on Marine Corps Compass Points from articles originally published somewhere else remain the property of the original copyright holder. All comments posted on Marine Corps Compass Points become the property of Marine Corps Compass Points. Original material posted by Marine Corps Compass Points including introductions, commentary, and replies are the property of Marine Corps Compass Points.

If you are a copyright owner who believes that any material on Marine Corps Compass Points infringes your copyright, you may seek to have the material removed by sending us a notice via registered U.S. postal mail that includes: (a) your full name, address and telephone number; (b) your e-mail address; (c) identification of the copyrighted work(s) that you believe to be infringed; (d) identification of the infringing material and information sufficient for us to locate the material; (e) a statement of your good faith belief that the material infringes your copyright and the use is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent or the Fair Use exception to copyright law; (f) a statement, under penalty of perjury, that the information provided in the notice is accurate, and that you are the copyright owner or you are authorized to act for the copyright owner; and (g) your physical signature.

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Address: Compass Points POB 10791 Burke, VA 22009 Att: Legal Dept

Upon receipt of a notice complying with all of the above requirements, we will act to remove infringing materials.

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Articles Index - 07/01/2026

INDEX OF PROMINENT ARTICLES ADDRESSING CONCERNS WITH FORCE DESIGN 2030 and TALENT MANAGEMENT 2030

https://mega.nz/file/drxQBYgR#rKaIc1cixbQac7oAwvRbfKqRAP-x0Ais_YwqouDv_Yc

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Compass Points - A Little History

Marine Corps Compass Points — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 13:32:56 GMT

Compass Points - A Little History

Strength of Corps is rooted in history

July 11, 2026

The conflict in the Middle East is heating up again.

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DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — The United States launched new airstrikes against Iran early Thursday, and Tehran responded by targeting U.S.-allied Mideast countries in an exchange of fire that threatened an interim deal intended to help end the war in the Middle East.

. . . The strikes came hours after U.S. President Donald Trump said recent Iranian attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz signaled the end of a fragile ceasefire and threatened to escalate the conflict if they didn’t stop. That raised concerns that the region could tip back into a war that would engulf several countries and could halt energy shipments through the strait that are crucial for the global economy.

-- AP - “US and Iran exchange intensifying fire across Mideast, threatening ceasefire deal”

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In the future, the US will face threats and challenges, not only in the Middle East, but around the globe. If the Marine Corps is going to continue to serve as the Nation’s force in readiness, leaders of Marines must be constantly studying and preparing for a wide variety of conflicts. No matter how technology changes, the nature of war does not change.

From experience in war and from the constant study of war, what do Marines believe about warfighting? What should they believe?

An article in the MC Gazette attempted to capture some fundamental ideas about warfighting. The entire list contains 37 entries focused on a specific approach to war often called maneuver warfare. The first six entries are included below.

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1. War is a violent clash of interests between or among political groups characterized by the use of military or paramilitary force. Its essence is a contest between hostile, independent wills, each trying to impose itself on the other and/or upon a common, contested population through violence and other means. This essential nature of war is immutable, but the forms and character it may take are varied and continuously evolving.

2. Universal attributes of war are danger, friction, uncertainty, unpredictability, and disorder. No amount of planning or preparation can eliminate or control these attributes. The requirement is to be able to operate effectively despite—or even to exploit—these conditions. Human factors are paramount in war. War is arguably the greatest physical, psychological, and intellectual trial known to humankind.

3. The enemy will do everything in its power to be inscrutable, unpredictable, and disruptive of your plans. War being a clash between or among independent wills, it is important never to forget that the enemy always gets a say in how things turn out. Flexibility and adaptability are vitally important.

4. As Sun Tzu said: “Know the enemy and know yourself, and you will never be in peril.” The greatest teacher in war is the enemy. Learn from the enemy. Focus on the enemy rather than on procedures and processes.

5. War is an instrument of policy, initiated, guided, and constrained by policy. All war is political, politics being the process of distributing and exercising power in pursuit of interests. The original motive for war will always be political, but war is also a process of human and social interaction, driven by cultural, economic, ethnic, emotional, and psychological factors.

6. Warfare is the conduct of military action in war. Warfare involves the application of art, science, and will.

-- MC Gazette - “What Marines Believe About War and Warfare”

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The Marine Corps has organized some basic beliefs about warfighting and particularly about maneuver warfare, into a small volume, MCDP 1 - Warfighting. There are many stories about how the Marine Corps came to publish what was originally called, FMFM 1 - Warfighting, and about how it was later updated. One Compass Points reader has taken time to review the subject.

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A Little History

By Paul Van Riper

There are many Marines and others who claim that they were instrumental in the writing of FMFM 1, Warfighting. None of these claims are valid. I say this because I was close to John Schmitt as he studied and wrote the manual. He took aboard many suggestions and recommendations, but he needed no intellectual assistance. He brought his own unique talent and experience to this writing project and many subsequent ones.

John also drew heavily from the Corps-wide and often heated discussions about maneuver warfare that occurred in the nearly ten years before he sat down to write Warfighting. He also benefited from his own experience in an LAV unit at Camp Lejeune and as a doctrine writer at Quantico. Any assertion that Warfighting has no pedigree other than John’s interaction with General Gray is patently false.

In the mid-1990s there were several reasons John felt an update of Warfighting might be needed; large among them was to introduce the key idea of the nonlinearity of warfare, a notion Clausewitz inherently understood (see the Clausewitz homepage). John’s revision under General Krulak’s stewardship came at the same time as MCCDC was moving from an FMFM construct for Marine Corps manuals to the MCDP construct, hence MCDP 1 Warfighting. Note that this version of Warfighting was signed by General Krulak and General Gray to ensure its lineage was widely known.

As Commandant, General Neller asked John Schmitt and me to examine MCDP 1 in light of the wars that had occurred since it was published in June 1997. We first urged General Neller to let us construct a list of things that Marines believe about war and warfare, a list we could use as a baseline when examining Warfighting. General Neller allowed us to do this and then circulated the list to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all former commandants, several of his generals, and several noted military historians for their review and comment.

We later published the list in the Marine Corps Gazette under the pen name “Two Maneuverist” in June 2020.

https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/what-marines-believe-about-war-and-warfare/

Based on the reviewer’s input, which was minimal, John updated the list and we “cross-walked” it with MCDP 1 to determine if there were gaps. We found a few, none that absolutely required an update of the manual. General Neller, however, directed John to rewrite the manual, which he did. After a long and extensive review, General Neller, for unknown reasons, decided not to sign the revised manual.

The assertions that Marines never actually adopted and employed maneuver warfare are difficult to assess if for no other reason than one would have to know what commanders from the battalion and squadron-level to the MEF-level did in aggregate from 1997 through OIF and OEF. That certain commanders did employ a maneuver warfare approach to good effect is beyond doubt; an excellent example is Major General Mike Myatt’s actions as the 1st Division Commander in Operation Desert Storm.

What happened following General Neller’s aborted effort to revise or update Warfighting?

As CG MCCDC then Lieutenant General Berger contacted me after his nomination to be the next Commandant and said he wanted to talk with me about an update once the US Senate confirmed his appointment. He never contacted me afterwards, but as I walked away from shaking his hand at the change of commandants on 10 July 2019, he called me back and said, “Rip, I’ll get a hold of you soon to talk about updating Warfighting. He never did. It was at this time that I begin to lose faith in his words.

When I talk with Marines today, I find few who truly understand Warfighting at any depth. I could attribute this to their involvement in recent wars, demanding schedules, or a general lack of interest in the intellectual side of the profession, but in reality, it is a failure of leadership. Let me leave you with one example, in General Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance he asks Marines to read FMFM 1 Warfighting, the manual that MCDP 1 Warfighting superseded 22 years earlier. It appears that neither the new Commandant nor his staff recognized they were citing a manual no longer in print or easily available to Marines. This to me was a clear manifestation of their lack of knowledge or interest in doctrinal matters

For additional evidence of the Corps’ senior leaders lack of interest in the vital intellectual elements of war and warfare the reader need only look at the Commandant’s recently issued professional reading list; to me it is clear that neither he nor those who assembled that list are serious students of the profession of arms.

-- LtGen P.K. Van Riper (USMC, ret)

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Compass Points salutes LtGen P.K. Van Riper for his insights, and for all Marines and friends of the Corps working to upgrade, enhance, and improve the Marine Corps’ ability to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight.

The Middle East is heating up again. Half a world away, the government of Cuba appears on the verge of collapse. The US, as usual, is facing a variety of threats and challenges all around the globe. Is the Marine Corps prepared for globe crisis response? To be fully prepared, will require, not only more amphibious ships, more pre-positioning ships, more combined arms units, equipment, and capabilities, it will also require a deep understanding of the history of armed conflict and the unchanging nature of war.

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AP - 07/10/2026

US and Iran exchange intensifying fire across Mideast, threatening ceasefire deal

By Jon Gambrell

https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-war-oil-july-9-2026-0472764b119d7aa204de4f7f5e44a9bf

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Marine Corps Gazette - 06/01/2020

What Marines Believe About War and Warfare

by Two Maneuverists

https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/what-marines-believe-about-war-and-warfare/

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Compass Points - Maneuver Methods

Marine Corps Compass Points — Fri, 10 Jul 2026 15:37:16 GMT

Compass Points - Maneuver Methods

How organizational change happens - or doesn’t

July 10, 2026

Small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps. During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine Corps has been engaged in small wars in different parts of the world.

-- Small Wars Manual, 1940

Sometimes, how something is done is almost as important as what is done.

In the years before World War 2, the Marine Corps was very busy with operations around the globe. The Marine Corps wanted to capture and organize all that Marines had learned during those operations. How did they do it? The Marine Corps did not put a handful of supposedly smart guys in a room and have them think deep thoughts about small wars. Instead, for more than a year, experienced Marines all across the Marine Corps were interviewed about small wars. That wisdom from Marines was organized into the Small Wars Manual and published in 1940.

In its own way, the Small Wars Manual of 1940 codified a US Marine Corps way of warfighting. Nearly a half century later, FMFM 1 Warfighting, in a different way, codified a Marine maneuver warfare way of warfighting. In the foreword, General A.M. Gray, the Marine Corps Commandant, described the purpose of the slender volume. “The thoughts contained here represent not just guidance for actions in combat, but a way of thinking in general. This manual thus describes a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty.”

It took years of exercises, experiments, and a massive debate across the entire Marine Corps community before General Gray’s maneuver philosophy was condensed into the publication, FMFM 1 Warfighting.

Some three decades later, in the summer of 2019, with the publication of the new Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the Marine Corps began an abrupt detour by changing the focus of the Corps toward a narrow sensor and missile plan.

Some people today claim that the abrupt imposition of Force Design 2030 was much like the adoption of maneuver warfare, but that is inaccurate.

The maneuver warfare philosophy of FMFM 1 -- later updated to MCDP 1 -- was not abruptly imposed on the Marine Corps. It grew as Marine leaders struggled to upgrade proven Marine Corps capabilities.

Writing under the nom de plume, Marinus, author and Marine, John Schmitt recalls the early development of maneuver warfare.

----------------------------

It is important to understand that the maneuver warfare movement emerged at a particular moment in history. After the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps underwent a period of institutional introspection. The maneuver warfare movement was a response to the institutional and operational dysfunction of the Vietnam experience that sought, among other things, to put the Marine Corps approach to war on a solid historical and theoretical footing.

-- John Schmitt, “Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare”

----------------------------

There are critics of what is now, MCDP 1 Warfighting. Some say it is outdated because it does not talk enough about some new technology, or is outdated because it does not specifically mention some type of war such as insurgencies, religious wars, or civil wars, or is outdated because it does not discuss a particular geography, such as deserts, jungles, cities, or the high north. All these critics misunderstand the essence of Warfighting. MCDP 1 Warfighting was never intended to be an encyclopedia of particular technologies, particular conflicts, or particular locations. It has always been more of a philosophical discussion of the path, the way, and the spirit of a warrior.

As a guide book for thinking about conflict, MCDP 1 Warfighting is no more outdated than Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Clausewitz, or Boyd.

As a philosophical guide to conflict, MCDP 1 Warfighting endures. It is still studied not only by rising military leaders inside the US and around the globe, but it is also regularly included in business school classes.

How did the maneuver warfare philosophy of MCDP 1 find so much acceptance and success inside the Marine Corps? John Schmitt suggests that the successful adoption was based on six crucial factors.

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Why the Maneuver Warfare Movement Succeeded

There are several reasons for maneuver warfare’s institutional success, and those may provide lessons for today’s situation.

-- The maneuver warfare movement came from a point of real institutional pain.

The origin and motivation of the maneuver warfare movement, as mentioned, was the pain caused by the dysfunctional experience of the Vietnam War. It was this motivation that sustained the movement. Maneuver warfare was not merely an intellectual exercise, although clearly it contained an intellectual element. In contrast, many capability development initiatives today seem like purely intellectual exercises not motivated by any institutional pain. They appear to be change for change’s sake.

-- The discourse was extensive, open, and transparent—and frequently messy.

This was critical. The argument took place in the open over more than a decade. It got ugly at times, but this forced the maneuverists to strengthen their case and in the end helped garner widespread support for the doctrine. Maneuver warfare was not developed in secret by some high-level “working group” and then imposed on the rest of the institution. In today’s parlance, we might say it was crowd sourced. The open discourse went a long way toward socializing, strengthening, and eventually vetting maneuver doctrine.

-- The movement operated as a classic insurgency.

While the discourse took place in the open, the maneuver warfare movement itself operated like a classic insurgency, employing an inkblot strategy to gradually expand its influence over time, increasing its profile as it grew stronger. The maneuverists thought of themselves as insurgents, working to subvert the existing order. Maneuverist cells popped up spontaneously around the Marine Corps. With Gray’s succession to the Commandancy, the insurgency became the regime.

-- The movement enjoyed a combination of strong visionary leadership and bottom-up, grass-roots commitment.

Gray provided a compelling and unifying vision as well as critical top-cover for the insurgents. Meanwhile, Lind drew most of the attritionists’ fire, providing additional cover for the rest of the movement. But the ultimate driving force was the growing number of Marines who supported the new concepts. Maneuver warfare would not have succeeded to the extent it did without both the top-down and bottom-up dynamics.

-- Maneuver warfare had strong historical and theoretical foundations.

A key attribute of the maneuver warfare movement was the strength of its intellectual foundation. The maneuverists did their homework. People might have bemoaned the number of German historical examples, but there was no shortage of examples. Meanwhile, maneuver doctrine rested on a solid philosophical foundation of Sunzian, Clausewitzian, and Boydian theories. (One of the early criticisms of Warfighting was that there was “nothing new” in it.

LtGen P.K. Van Riper used to respond that that was true: there was nothing in Warfighting that wasn’t in Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, or Boyd. The trick of Warfighting was that it managed to synthesize those three disparate theories into a coherent whole. In contrast, too many contemporary warfighting concepts appear to be no more than PowerPoint deep. Moreover, many seem to be anti-historical, implying or openly asserting that some technological or other innovation has so “changed the fundamental nature of war” that there is nothing to be learned from the past.

-- The process involved significant experimentation.

Long before there was a Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Second Marine Division became a maneuver warfare laboratory when Gray took command in 1981 and declared at an all-officers call at the base theater that maneuver warfare was the division’s official doctrine. The pinnacle of experimentation was the annual Combined Arms Operation at Fort Pickett, VA, a completely free-play, force-on-force exercise pitting some combination of battalions against each other. At ENDEX each day, all officers and staff NCOs would drive back to the base theater at mainside for an extensive hotwash moderated personally by Gray, with Lind in attendance like a Prussian Nestor. The Combined Arms Operation and similar exercises went a long way toward creating additional maneuverists.

-- John Schmitt, “Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare”

----------------------------

In seven years Force Design has never been a success, not tactically, operationally, nor even philosophically. The Marine Corps allowed itself to be stampeded by a civilian leadership that was in a panic over the development of China’s precision munitions.

How does the adoption of Force Design measure up to the standard set by the Corps’ adoption of maneuver warfare?

1. The maneuver warfare movement came from a point of real institutional pain.

Instead, Force Design came from a fear of China’s precision munitions. Some of the minds behind Force Design came to believe that because of advances in missiles and drones, Navy ships would no longer be able to sail.

2. The discourse was extensive, open, and transparent—and frequently messy.

Force Design by contrast was conceived behind closed doors, wrapped in non-disclosure agreements. Experienced Marine leaders, both active and retired, were locked out of the early development.

3. The movement operated as a classic insurgency.

Force Design, on the other hand, was a top down, theoretical plan.

4. The movement enjoyed a combination of strong visionary leadership and bottom-up, grass-roots commitment.

Force Design suffered from mute, distant leadership and no grass-roots support.

5. Maneuver warfare had strong historical and theoretical foundations.

The Force Design authors seemed to either ignore or reject so much history.

6. The process involved significant experimentation.

Force Design conducted too many war games where the outcome was predetermined and issues and obstacles were wished away.

Sometimes, how something is done is almost as important as what is done. How the Force Design plan was created and imposed on the Marine Corps was among its roster of serious flaws.

Whatever merits there may be in new sensors and missiles for the Marine Corps, sensors and missiles could have been added to the large Marine Expeditionary Forces to be deployed as part of MAGTFs, or as separate Special Purpose MAGTFs. There was never a need to degrade and destroy units, equipment, and capabilities like air, infantry, artillery, armor, engineering, snipers, and more.

From long before the Small Wars Manual to FMFM 1 / MCDP 1 Warfighting, the Marine Corps has served the Nation as a force in readiness. To continue to serve as a force in readiness, the Marine Corps must resolutely focus on training, equipping, and deploying combined arms forces around the globe. The Marine Corps is not a narrow force suited only for one kind of battle in one region of the world. The Marine Corps best serves the Nation as a flexible force capable of performing a wide range of missions in every clime and place.

As important as new technologies often are, the Marine philosophy of maneuver warfare is not limited by any new technology. Maneuver warfare advocates using tempo, along with fire and maneuver, to unhinge and discombobulate an adversary.

The Marine Corps’ Warfighting manual goes far beyond even armed conflict itself. Has there ever been any military manual with the ambition to provide guidance, not only about armed conflict, but to provide a over-arching, comprehensive “philosophy of action”?

As world events grow more dangerous, the need for flexible, forward deployed, combined arms Marines grows more urgent. The Marine Corps must get back to focusing on global crisis response. The Marine philosophy of maneuver warfare is a way of seeking rapid success in any crisis. For any type of crisis, at any location, the solution is the same, send in the Marines!

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MCA Gazette - 08/01/2020

Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare

By Marinus

https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/marine-corps-maneuver-warfare/

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Marines.mil

FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual 1990 (reprint)

NAVMC 2890 Small Wars Manual 1940

https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20%20Small%20Wars%20Manual.pdf

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Compass Points - Quo Vadis?

Marine Corps Compass Points — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 17:01:23 GMT

Compass Points - Quo Vadis?

Where is the Marine Corps going?

July 9, 2026

The US Marine Corps has served the Nation since 1775. After major conflicts, the Marine Corps has always reviewed how it could best upgrade and enhance its service to the Nation. This year, the 250th anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence, is a fitting time for a new beginning for the Marine Corps. It is time for the Marine Corps to take an unflinching look at the decisions of recent years and set a new course.

“Revolution - Part 1” and “Revolution - Part 2” are two Compass Points posts last week that have stimulated broad discussion online and off about where the Marine Corps is today and how it can set a better course.

BGen N.L Cooling (USMC ret) contributed a substantial comment about his view of the development of the controversial Force Design plan. BGen Cooling served extensively during deployments in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. His last active duty assignment was as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies & Operations, HQMC.

BGen Cooling’s comment led to input from two other career infantry officers, General C. C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, and LtGen P.K. Van Riper, the first President of the Marine Corps University and the commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Compass Points thanks the officers for their decades of service in war and in peace, and for their insights about how the Marine Corps can set a better course.

----------------------------

BGen Norman Cooling, (USMC ret)

For the last several years, I have been a regular reader of Compass Points and multiple other publications and sources that have both critiqued and defended “Force Design 2030” (and now “Force Design”). I suspect this is common for those of us who were privileged to serve for decades as Marines. While I believe the criticism of Force Design is merited, I am not certain that all those offering their critiques have been completely forthright or fairly introspective.

To say that Force Design was hastily conceived and poorly tested is true. More importantly, its implementation strategy (divest to invest) accepted an inordinate level of both institutional and national risk. Divesting capabilities and capacities associated with the Marine Corps’ primary, unique role in global crisis response to invest in an unproven, single theater-focused concept -- one arguably duplicative of other service concepts, and supported by untested, “emerging” technologies -- was imprudent.

But one should closely examine the environment from which Force Design emerged. At the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, we had around 63 L-class amphibious ships. By 2019, we had 34. The maintenance readiness rates of our amphibious ships over that span atrophied even more rapidly than the number of ships. And Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS) Squadrons had been reduced from three to two.

We may have had the best-equipped, most capable Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in history, but without the dedicated strategic and operational lift needed to rapidly respond, and the associated systems needed to defend that lift, it is challenging, if not impossible, to serve effectively as the nation’s global crisis response force. The host nation permissions required to support prepositioned, land-based special purpose MAGTFs incur similar limitations as those associated with Force Design units.

In short, the 38th Commandant and Force Design did not cause the atrophy of the amphibious fleet. Abandoning the long-accepted Operational Plan rationale for the amphibious ship floor has had no appreciable impact relative to the reduction experienced over the previous three decades. During that time, the Marine Corps had eight Commandants, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, multiple geographic commanders, a few cabinet secretaries (including a Secretary of Defense), a National Security Advisor, and several sitting Members of Congress (both in the House and the Senate). Even with all of this representation, how effective were we in preserving the strategic and operational lift upon which the MAGTF relies to perform its role in global crisis response?

Having offered a critique of both Force Design and many of its critics, I also humbly acknowledge my own failing to effectively defend the MAGTF and its vital role in our nation’s security. For a brief period, I served as the 37th Commandant’s senior liaison to Congress. As has historically been the case, the Navy had little interest in advocating for amphibious or maritime prepositioned ships. They view this as a Marine Corps responsibility, and worse, as a competitor to platforms upon which they place more value. It was not uncommon for some senior Navy officers to speak about the vulnerability of amphibious ships in the anti-access/are denial (A2AD) environment without pointing out that other capital ships experience similar vulnerabilities without proper augmentation, enhanced technology, and applicable tactics.

Within Congress itself, Member discussions surrounding social initiatives consumed significantly more time than those associated with specific warfighting capabilities. The professional staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee was convinced that amphibious ships could not be defended in the western Pacific, and they were fixated on the close fight in the first island chain. They had a unique interest in evolving a lightning carrier concept. Despite a parade of our most capable senior officers explaining in great detail the importance of responsive, forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Groups with Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG-MEUs), made scalable by land- and sea-based prepositioned assets, these staffers continued to believe that the MAGTF was synonymous with a World War II-era amphibious assault.

I can assure you that both the Members of the Congressional armed services committees and their staffs were thoroughly familiarized with the many arguments Compass Points and others have been arguing in the last several years. They simply did not resonate, and they had not resonated for years. This is the environment the 38th Commandant inherited.

While I do not believe Force Design is the answer, I do believe that it is serving a unique and valuable purpose. It has brought about the richest discussions concerning Marine Corps roles and concepts since those associated with maneuver warfare. It has mobilized many of our Corps’ greatest intellects from all eras (with the notable and unfortunate exception of those in the late 2010s). Most importantly, this debate has promoted greater Congressional and public attention to what the Marine Corps does and what is required for the Corps to do it effectively.

The confluence of current events is also somewhat fortuitous, as the demand for regional crisis response forces has rarely been higher. The public should be made aware of the increased risk in the Pacific when the 31st MEU is deployed out of area. It should also be made aware of the gap U.S. Southern Command experiences when it loses an ARG-MEU and relies instead on a land-based SPMAGTF. Perhaps most importantly, it should be made aware of the consequences of not responding to regional crises.

Finally, and as several senior leaders have noted, it is time to take the lessons of the last decade, apply them to the combat development process, create a newly revised operational concept, and thoroughly vet and test it. This concept should begin with the right assumptions concerning the Marine Corps’ unique roles and specifically address the current and emerging technical challenges to executing those roles.

-- BGen Norman Cooling, (USMC ret)

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BGen Cooling’s remarks brought a reply from General Krulak.

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General Charles Krulak, (USMC ret)

Brigadier General Cooling headed up my Staff Group during some of my time as CMC and did a superb job. He was highly respected for his leadership, willingness to speak up, and for his superb writing and analytical ability. He is a personal friend and I respect his selfless service and sacrifice to our Country and Corps.

One piece of history that has impacted all Services over the past decades was the political decision after Desert Storm to execute what was termed the “Base Force.” This was a significant step towards achieving a “peace dividend” at the expense of DOD. Each Service received a mandate that would significantly touch on personnel and equipment as well as future procurement. For the Marine Corps, it meant a reduction in end strength to 159.1K along with actions to marry requirements to that Force. Obviously, our Navy “brothers and sisters” were faced with similar cuts which translated into force structure in toto. If the Marne Corps was going to 159.1 K, how many amphibs did it need?

General Mundy instituted a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) under MCCDC to determine:

a) What a 159.1K Marine Corps would look like and what could it accomplish in a National Defense role and

b) If the Corps could not viably provide “ready, relevant, and capable” forces, then build a Corps that could do so.

The end result was the Corps was not required to shrink to 159.1K, but was allowed to go to 177K, based on the rigor of analysis done by the FSPG and MCCDC.

Our sister services, however, did not avoid drastic cuts which, in the case of the Navy, included cuts in the surface fleet, including the amphibs needed by Marines.

The Marine Corps fought these amphib cuts long and hard within the DON, DOD, and the Hill, but the cost savings were already being scraped off the table and used for other requirements.

To even think that the Marine Corps did not fight tooth and nail for amphibs is simply wrong. At the end of the day, it was not that the leadership of the Corps rolled over and played dead as the amphibs were cut, it was instead that the drive to find a “peace dividend” demanded what took place. As late as last year, EVERY SINGLE LIVING COMMANDANT signed a letter articulating the need for more amphibs and better maintenance rates.

There is no need to regurgitate the comments made by General Berger that gave the green light to fewer amphibs. Those words are now simply part of our history. What is needed now is what Brigadier General Cooling has articulated: bring back a full up MCCDC and focus on the role of the Marine Corps in National Security. “Quo Vadis?”

-- General Charles Krulak, (USMC ret)

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In turn, LtGen Van Riper relayed some comments of his own about the importance of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

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LtGen P.K. Van Riper, (USMC ret)

Discussions on Compass Points often concern the shortcomings of the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, his Force Design 2030 plan, and his Stand-in Forces concept. All three, however, only came about because of his earlier egregious action: the decimation of the Marine Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the subverting of the combat development process.

The 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, established MCCDC on 10 November 1987, a few months after he became Commandant. His primary purpose was to create a central hub that brought fragmented entities of force development into one command. Gray designed MCCDC so that it could coordinate all the functions needed to develop and support combat forces—doctrine, organizations, training, material (weapons and equipment), leader development (professional military education), personnel, and facilities (buildings, ranges, and training areas). These are often referred today as DOTMLPF (some joint publications add a final “P” for Policy.)

In short, General Gray wanted a unified command that looked at warfighting as a whole when identifying and coordinating the development of requirements. And he wanted that command to instill a maneuver warfare philosophy throughout the Corps.

MCCDC proved its value over more than three decades and became the envy of the other military services. Admittedly, the combat development process was at times criticized for being too deliberate, but the process ensured both the fewest mistakes in force development and fully coordinated support of the existing force. As a former commander of MCCDC, I can attest to the command’s powerful influence.

MCCDC could have and should have made the errors of Force Design impossible. But in July 2020, the 38th Commandant, General David Berger, divided MCCDC into pieces. He moved training, education, and high-level doctrinal development into a new and separate three-star organization, the Training and Education Command. At the time I asked then Lieutenant General Eric Smith, the Commanding General of MCCDC, why the Commandant had separated the command; he told me it was so the Marine Corps would have a general of the same rank as the other military services’ training establishments when they attended meetings and conferences. The Corps used to take pride that its leaders, though sometimes of lesser rank, proved more than able to hold their own in forums with more senior leaders of the other military services.

In essence General Berger undid what General Gray had done when he separated D,T, and E from the other elements of DOTMLPF. The Corps was back to where it was in 1986.

To compound the problem, responsibility for the development of operating concepts, which are the instruments that initiate the combat development process, was moved to the Warfighting Lab, the organization originally designed to test and evaluate such concepts. This was akin to the proverbial act of putting the fox in the hen house. It was and remains a massive conflict of interest.

Upon assuming office as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Berger issued his Planning Guidance and then commenced development of Force Design 2030 outside of the combat development process, which he had virtually destroyed. In circumventing the process, he relied on a small cabal of Marine officers who worked personally with him. As these officers reached the end of their time in service and retired General Berger maneuvered to have them returned to Headquarters Marine Corps under a commercial contract.

Some have claimed that secret groups, non-disclosure agreements, and lack of full discussion across the Corps are common and were the same methods used to develop the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy years before.

That is not accurate. I can attest from personal involvement that then Captain John Schmitt working with General Gray did not sidestep the combat development process. He was the beneficiary of nearly ten years of widespread debate across the Marine Corps and was a participant in much of that debate. The latter stages of the debate were guided by officers at MCCDC. Here is what an online search says about that period.

-- The Spark (Late 1970s)

Following the frustrations of the Vietnam War, young Marine officers and military thinkers began a fierce debate. They wanted to move away from “firepower-attrition” warfare, which relied on smashing head-on into an enemy with raw firepower.

-- The Gathering Momentum (Early 1980s)

In 1980, Air Force Colonel John Boyd gave his famous “Patterns of Conflict” briefing at the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School. His ideas on out-thinking and out-pacing the enemy heavily fueled the intellectual movement.

-- The Climax (1989)

The ten-year intellectual battle ended on March 6, 1989. On that day, Commandant General Alfred M. Gray signed Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting. This manual officially institutionalized maneuver warfare as the core doctrine of the Marine Corps.

There is no comparison between the long process of the open development and adoption of maneuver warfare with the rushed and secretive approach to Force Design.

In a similar way, the amphib crisis the Marine Corps faces today grew from the misguided decision to abandon the long standing ‘2 MEB lift’ agreement. That safeguard was abruptly canceled by General Berger, not by any prior Commandant.

The following summary acquired online makes clear the amphibious ship maintenance issues dramatically worsened, not in the late 1900’s, but in more recent years.

-- The 2011 Maintenance Cliff

-- The 2015 All-Time Low

In 2015, the operational readiness rate for these vessels hit a historic nadir of 39%, leaving only 12 out of 30 ships capable of putting out to sea.

-- The Current Crisis

Congress legally mandates that the Navy maintain a minimum of 31 operational amphibious ships to support Marine Corps deployment needs. While the physical inventory stands at 32 ships, severe shipyard backlogs and aging hulls mean that today only 14 ships are actually functional and available for missions.

When General Berger dismantled MCCDC and circumvented the combat development process, he opened the door to a Marine Corps that today is smaller, less capable, and less able to serve the Nation around the globe. The Marine Corps needs leaders who will restore the MCCDC, and rebuild Marine Corps capabilities for combined arms crisis response.

-- LtGen P.K. Van Riper, (USMC ret)

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Compass Points salutes all Marines and friends of the Corps working to make sure the Marine Corps of tomorrow is stronger than the Marine Corps today.

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Compass Points - MRIC Defense

Marine Corps Compass Points — Wed, 08 Jul 2026 12:59:29 GMT

Compass Points - MRIC Defense

US Marines test new Medium Range Intercept Capability

July 8, 2026

The US Commander-in-Chief has ordered the US to construct a “Golden Dome” missile defense system to protect the continental United States. The US Golden Dome has been inspired by Israel’s very successful Iron Dome system.

The US Marine Corps has also been inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome. The Marines are currently testing a new defensive missile system in Guam. The system can help protect Marine bases from enemy missiles.

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The U.S. Marines deployed a missile system based on Israel’s famed Iron Dome to Guam, Defence Blog reported.

Launchers carrying Tamir interceptors were spotted this week during the “Valiant Shield” military exercise on the U.S. territory in the Western Pacific, reportedly marking their first deployment off the mainland.

The biennial Valiant Shield exercise is a joint effort by the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies to train for potential conflict with China. (JNS sought comment from the Pentagon.)

Marines reportedly evaluated its new medium-range intercept capability, or MRIC, trailer-mounted system, derived from Iron Dome technology developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.

The interceptor used in the system is called the Sky Hunter, built by Raytheon, which serves as the American-manufactured version of the Tamir missile that has proven largely successful for Israel since its 2011 deployment. It has intercepted thousands of rockets, drones and cruise missiles.

Raytheon constructs the Sky Hunter as part of a joint venture at a plant that opened last year in Arkansas.

Israel delivered its first batch of Tamir interceptors to the Marines in May.

The blog reported that the Marines plan to use both Tamir and Sky Hunter missiles initially as it fields three of its Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions through 2028.

-- JNS News

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The MRIC provides the Marine Corps with a new defense capability.

----------------------------

The MRIC restores a medium-range air defense capability the Marine Corps has lacked since retiring its MIM-23 Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries in 1997. Since then, Marines have depended on the U.S. Army’s Patriot and THAAD systems for theater-level air defense.

Designed to engage aerial threats at ranges between approximately 4 and 70 kilometers (2.5 to 43 miles), the MRIC provides Marine Littoral Regiments with an organic capability to defend against drones, cruise missiles, precision-guided rockets, and fixed-wing aircraft while operating in dispersed expeditionary environments.

System Features

The MRIC integrates Israeli-developed Iron Dome technology with U.S. Marine Corps command-and-control systems. The trailer-mounted launcher carries up to 20 Sky Hunter interceptor missiles, the U.S.-built version of Israel’s Tamir interceptor.

The Sky Hunter features an active radar seeker, a two-way data link for mid-course guidance updates, and a fragmentation warhead with a proximity fuze. The system works with the AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), which provides 360-degree target detection and tracking, while the Common Aviation Command and Control System manages target prioritization and engagement.

This integrated architecture enables the system to detect, track, and engage multiple aerial threats simultaneously.

-- The Defense News

----------------------------

Compass Points salutes the Marine Corps’ development work with the MRIC and Sky Hunter. As missile and drone technologies continue to advance, defenses against aerial threats grow more important.

Some theorists have gone further and argued that advanced drone and missile technologies mean that in future wars there will be no bases, no depots, no reservoirs of supply. That cannot be accurate. Fighting forces always need resupply. The entire nation of Israel has lived behind enemy lines for decades. What is needed in the age of precision missiles is missile defense. Military forces must be able to defend against missiles and drones. Starting under the umbrella of precision munition defenses, military forces can then go forward to deter and strike the enemy.

What weapon will the Marine Corps use to strike the enemy? The Marine Corps’ most powerful weapon is the global, combined arms, MAGTF. It is time for the Marine Corps to begin in earnest the work of restoring and enhancing the armor, air, artillery, infantry, engineers, snipers and more that are necessary for the Marine Corps to once again provide the US with a constant, forward deployed, global strike force.

Both the US and the US Marine Corps need a shield of protection. Even once the Golden Dome is built, however, the US would never be able to merely sit back behind its Golden Dome. To deter the adversaries of the US requires more than a shield; it also requires a sword. To defend the US from global threats will require every US military service. When a crisis occurs anywhere in the world, the US needs to be able to call on a flexible force, always ready to arrive quickly at the scene of a crisis, to deter, assist, rescue, strike and fight. In a world full of dangers, the US needs Marines.

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JNS News - 07/01/2026

US Marines reportedly deploy Iron Dome-based system in Guam

Tamir interceptors were recently sent to the U.S. military to be combined, according to a report, with the U.S. version of the missiles to test American capabilities against Chinese threats.

By Mike Wagenheim

https://www.jns.org/news/u-s-news/us-marines-reportedly-deploy-iron-dome-based-system-in-guam

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The Defense News - 06/28/2026

U.S. Marines Deploy New Sky Hunter-Based MRIC Air Defense System on Guam During Valiant Shield 2026

https://www.thedefensenews.com/US-Marines-Deploy-New-SkyHunter-Based-MRIC-Air-Defense-System-on-Guam-During-Valiant-Shield-2026/

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Compass Points - The Future

Marine Corps Compass Points — Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:31:09 GMT

Compass Points - The Future

The Future of the US Marine Corps

July 7, 2026

As the United States wraps up the 250th anniversary celebrations, the next 250 years begin. For the Marine Corps, it is a good time to take stock of where the Corps is today and what path it should take going forward.

Over the last year, the US has deployed a massive naval fleet to the Middle East as part of the ongoing conflict with Iran. The US is also maintaining another fleet in the Caribbean. US Marine crisis response, air, ground, logistic forces are part of both fleets.

In the Caribbean, a Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has been part of the Caribbean fleet for months. The Navy-Marine ARG MEU participated in Operation Absolute Resolve in January 2026. Marines were still in the Caribbean when Venezuela was struck by two devastating earthquakes on June 24, 2026.

Now, in the Caribbean, there are reports that Cuba is suffering from its third nationwide power outage. If the Cuban government collapses, US Marines may be called on for a variety of peace keeping missions.

For decades the US has been able to rely on the Marines to arrive at any crisis to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight. What is the future of the Marine Corps? Is the future global crisis response or is it some other more narrow mission in only one region?

Nearly seven years ago the Marine Corps began to struggle with what the Marine Corps of the future should be. Some senior Marine leaders advocated for less focus on combined arms, global crisis response, and a more narrow focus on small sensor and missile units off the coast of China.

It was not long after the introduction of the sensor and missile unit plan that experienced Marines began to subject the plan to a thorough study. One of the first Marines to step forward publicly with an insightful review of the unexpected plan, was former Secretary of the Navy, Jim Webb. Serving as a Marine infantry officer in Vietnam, Webb was honored for his heroism under fire. Later, as an author, US Senator, or Presidential candidate, Jim Webb never backed away from controversy.

As the controversy over the future of the Marine Corps began in 2020, The National Interest published, Webb’s comprehensive review, “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps.”

In his article, Webb was the first to publicly warn that the sensor and missile plan was a existential threat to the Marine Corps’ ability to serve the Nation both as an always ready crisis response force. and as a combined arms ground combat force.

----------------------------

The convergence of these two realities is at the center of a growing unease with the implications of the recent announcement by Gen. David Berger, the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, that the Corps will move from operational concepts in the Middle East and will re-engage in Pacific Asia. The decision to shift priorities back to this region comes as no surprise to those who closely follow national security issues since by now there is little argument that the United States should never have disengaged from Pacific Asia in the first place. What is surprising is that the new Commandant should be using a predictable re-emphasis on East Asia to propose changing the fundamental force structure and operational doctrines of the Marine Corps.

Interestingly, when citing his philosophical inspiration at the outset of his proposal, General Berger chose to ignore two centuries of innovative and ground-breaking role models who guided the Marine Corps through some of its most difficult challenges. The giants of the past—John LeJeune, Arthur Vandegrift, Clifton Cates, Robert Barrow and Al Gray, just for starters—were passed over, in favor of a quote from a professor at the Harvard Business School who never served. Many Marines, past and present, view this gesture as a symbolic putdown of the Corps’ respected leadership methods and the historic results they have obtained.

Much more important is the potentially irreversible content of the proposal itself. If authorized, appropriated and put into place, this plan would eliminate many of the Marine Corps’ key capabilities. It could permanently reduce the long-standing mission of global readiness that for more than a century has been the essential reason for its existence as a separate service. Its long-term impact would undo the value of the Marine Corps as the one-stop guarantor of a homogeneous tactical readiness that can “go anywhere, fight anybody, and win.” And after the centuries it took to establish the Marine Corps as a fully separate military service, it could reduce its present role by making it again subordinate to the funding and operational requirements of the Navy.

— Jim Webb, “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps”

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In his article, Webb reviews how the Marine Corps has been used over the most recent decades both as an always ready crisis response force and as a substantial and sustained ground combat force.

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The most important evolution of the Marine Corps in our national security posture has been as an immediately deployable, fully capable expeditionary force, with an included mission of amphibious assault. And this has usually required “sustained land operations.”

When North Korea suddenly attacked South Korea in June 25, 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur asked immediately for the Marines, not simply because they had amphibious capabilities but because he knew that whatever it took, they would be ready. By September 15 the Marines had called up thousands of World War II veterans, formed an invasion force, deployed aboard ship, crossed the Pacific and landed at Inchon. The Inchon landing was one of the most technically difficult maneuvers in American history, subject to fluctuating sea tides and well behind enemy lines. Inchon was followed by more than two years of sustained land operations, including the most memorable engagement of the Korean War, the First Marine Division’s breakout from the Chosin Reservoir against vastly superior odds after the Chinese army crossed the Yalu River and surrounded them.

During and after the Korean War, Marine Corps innovation developed and perfected techniques of close air support and helicopter doctrine. During the late 1950s its leadership overcame intense opposition in order to retain fixed-wing aircraft so that the Corps could continue to field a fully capable, homogeneous force that could deploy immediately whenever called upon to do so, with every necessary combat component intact. This effort paid off in Vietnam with the quality of Marine Corps close-air support, a skill perfected only by continuous air-ground training.

In Vietnam the Corps fielded two full divisions and part of a third in sustained land operations, engaging a determined enemy for six years of hard combat that took the lives of fourteen thousand Marines and brought more than one hundred thousand total casualties. In the 1980’s they operated for more than a year in Beirut, Lebanon. They were among the first on the ground during Desert Storm, and again in Afghanistan and then again in Iraq. Such sustained operations as a highly integrated combat force, available to the country’s leadership on demand, has become an inseparable part of the modern Marine Corps tradition.

— Jim Webb, “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps”

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Webb concludes by warning that any idea that the Marine Corps can divest proven combined arms capabilities to focus on a narrow mission in only one region of the world is not supported by history.

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History tells us that in the future there will be other engagements in other places, sometimes littoral, sometimes not. If so, the Marine Corps that will be called upon to respond will be bringing with them only the weapon systems, logistics, technologies and people that our top leaders are now deciding to fund and to build and to train.

What will such a commitment look like? Where will it be? Will it involve “sustained land operations” rather than a “one and done” smack-down launched and quickly recovered by Navy ships? What kind of notice will our Marines have before being sent into harm’s way? What will be the size of that commitment⁠—a company, a battalion, a regiment, perhaps a division⁠—and over what expanse? Will it be urban or rural, or maybe in the mountains? How long will it last? Will there be adequate helicopter and other assets to insert, relocate, provide fire support, resupply and sustain the Marines, weapons systems, and logistical necessities required even to begin such an unanticipated call to duty?

With such drastic “divestments” as those now proposed, will there be enough infantry Marines in the pipeline to replace and sustain the casualty flow and weapons replacements from battalions that are committed, not simply on the first day or the first week but over a much longer period, perhaps under conditions where our aviation assets and other mechanical systems are shot down, or crash, or wear out from such environmental erosions as heat, ice, sand, clay dust, monsoon rains, or the simple wear-and-tear of constant operations?

Technology can increase effectiveness on a battlefield but it cannot replace people or equipment. This is why these recent proposals should be examined with the utmost scrutiny. And it is for these reasons that our country needs a Marine Corps that has every conventional capability inside its proven tradition of “good to go” readiness.

— Jim Webb, “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps”

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Compass Points salutes Jim Webb for his long decades of service to Country and Corps. As the Marine Corps turns to preparing for the next 250 years, Marine leaders would do well to tap the wisdom and experience of Marines like author and statesman, Jim Webb.

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The National Interest - 05/08/2020

The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps

By: Jim Webb

Former Senator and Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb served as a Marine infantry officer in Vietnam, where he was wounded twice and awarded the Navy Cross for “extraordinary heroism.” He currently serves as the inaugural Distinguished Fellow at Notre Dame’s International Security Center.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/future-us-marine-corps-152606?amp

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Compass Points - Boxer ARG/MEU

Marine Corps Compass Points — Mon, 06 Jul 2026 15:04:31 GMT

Compass Points - Boxer ARG/MEU

Boxer and Portland in Middle East waters.

July 6, 2026

US Central Command announced that the USS Boxer and the USS Portland are now operating in Middle East waters.

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USS Boxer (LHD 4) and USS Portland (LPD 27) sail in formation while transiting the Indian Ocean, June 30, 2026. The Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit are currently operating in the Middle East as part of a scheduled deployment. The Boxer ARG includes USS Comstock (LSD 45), which arrived in the region in early May.

@CENTCOM

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The USS Boxer was first put into service over 30 years ago. In recent years, the Boxer has had a troubled maintenance history. When it is able to operate at sea, however, the Boxer is a powerful part of a forward deployed Amphibious Ready Group.

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The Boxer Amphibious Ready Group consists of three warships designed to project Marine Corps combat power from the sea while providing commanders with a highly flexible expeditionary force. Together, the ships transport Marines, aircraft, armored vehicles, landing craft, and logistical support, allowing the force to conduct sustained operations independently or integrate with larger joint and coalition task forces.

At the center of the formation is USS Boxer (LHD 4), a Wasp-class amphibious assault ship that serves as the flagship and aviation hub of the ARG. Designed to support a broad range of expeditionary operations, Boxer features a full-length flight deck and extensive aviation facilities capable of operating Marine Corps aircraft, including the F-35B Lightning II short takeoff and vertical landing fighter, MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters, and UH-1Y Venom utility helicopters, depending on mission requirements. This combination enables the force to conduct air assault, close air support, tactical transport, intelligence, surveillance, and casualty evacuation missions without relying on land-based airfields.

Supporting Boxer is USS Portland (LPD 27), a San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock designed to transport Marines, armored vehicles, engineering equipment, and logistical supplies directly into operational areas. The ship’s advanced command-and-control facilities enable commanders to coordinate complex amphibious and joint operations, while its well deck accommodates Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft and conventional landing craft that can rapidly deliver personnel and heavy equipment onto austere or contested coastlines.

The third component of the formation, USS Comstock (LSD 45), a Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship, expands the group’s amphibious lift capacity by carrying additional landing craft, combat vehicles, and engineering assets. Equipped with a large well deck and extensive cargo spaces, Comstock enables the ARG to sustain expeditionary operations over extended periods while increasing the volume of combat power that can be projected ashore during amphibious missions.

Embarked aboard the ships, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit transforms the naval formation into a fully integrated Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capable of immediate deployment. A Marine Expeditionary Unit combines a reinforced infantry battalion, an aviation combat element, a logistics combat element, and a command element into a self-contained force capable of executing amphibious assaults, raids, embassy reinforcement, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime interdiction missions with minimal external support.

Unlike an aircraft carrier strike group, which is primarily optimized for long-range air operations, an Amphibious Ready Group integrates aviation, ground combat, and logistics into a single expeditionary formation capable of deploying Marines ashore wherever operational conditions require. This capability gives U.S. military leaders a wider range of response options, from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to limited combat operations and the rapid seizure of key coastal objectives.

The deployment also reflects the increasing importance of expeditionary naval forces within U.S. military strategy. Amphibious Ready Groups provide a persistent forward presence while remaining highly mobile, allowing them to reposition rapidly across the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and other strategic waterways. Their ability to operate independently or alongside aircraft carrier strike groups enhances operational flexibility while reducing dependence on permanent land bases in politically sensitive regions.

-- Army Recognition

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The CENTCOM Regional Combatant Commander Admiral Cooper needs Marines onboard amphibious ships to fulfill ongoing operational requirements in the Middle East. The SOUTHCOM Regional Combatant Commander General Donovan needs Marines onboard amphibious ships to fulfill ongoing operational requirements in the Caribbean. All the Regional Combatant Commanders need Marines around the world. If the Marine crisis response, air, ground, logistic, tasks forces are in such demand, why would the Marine Corps change the strategic focus of the Marine Corps away from global, multi-mission, crisis response?

For at least five decades Marine forward deployed combined arms forces have served the Nation well in a variety of global crises. Strangely, instead of building on the foundation of combined arms forces, seven years ago the senior leadership of the Marine Corps changed the focus of the Marine Corps to a plan to place sensor and missile units on islands off the coast of China.

Are sensor and missile units on islands off China’s coast supposed to be the focus of the Marine Corps? What does the US Code say?

US Code Title 10 requires the Marine Corps to maintain, “not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.” The Congress wanted to make sure the Marine Corps remained a middle weight, crisis response force, something stronger than merely light infantry.

The US has light infantry in many units. The 82nd Airborne is light infantry. Special Ops teams like Seal Team 6 are very light infantry. The Marine Corps’ sensor and missile units are very light infantry. The US has several light infantry units. The US also has heavy Army units. The US depends on the Marines to be a middle weight, crisis response force. This is why Congress established the requirement that the Marine Corps would always maintain three full, active duty, combat divisions.

The time is long past for the Marine Corps to enhance and upgrade the Marine Title 10 force. US Code Title 10 is the foundation of the Marine Corps. The US needs the Marine Corps to stop creating new missions and new units, and instead build the advanced Title 10 Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is not returning to some old Title 10 force. Instead, starting with Title 10 as the foundation, the Marine Corps should advance into the future. It time for the Marine Corps to build the 10 x Title 10 Marine Corps. Not a multiple of ten in numbers. The Ten Times Title 10 Marine Corps would have the most advanced technology, comms, weapons, and gear, — including, the newest drones and missiles, and the most powerful drone and missile defenses.

The upgraded and enhanced 10 x Title 10 Marine Corps goes beyond light infantry and provides the Nation with the force it needs, but does not have now, an ultra-modern middle weight, crisis response force that is light enough to get there and heavy enough to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight. Light infantry is neither trained nor equipped to stand and fight against combined arms forces, but the middle weight, 10 x Title 10 force should be organized trained and equipped to stand and fight against any force, any where.

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command will lead the build out of the new 10 x Title 10 Marine Corps. The Combat Development will search research labs around the globe for the latest in weapons and gear. But the Combat Development Command will not start the construction of the 10 x Title 10 Marine Corps with a clean sheet, instead they will start the 10 x Title 10 force with, “not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.” To serve the Nation as more than mere light infantry, the Marine Corps needs a 10 x Title 10 MAGTF focused force and they need to start upgrading and enhancing today.

Compass Points salutes the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and all the Marines deployed around the global ready to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight.

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US Central Command

CENTCOM Status

x.com/CENTCOM/status/2072022657374261514

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Army Recognition - 07/03/2026

U.S. Navy Sends USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group to Middle East as Regional Tensions Rise.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/u-s-navy-sends-uss-boxer-amphibious-ready-group-to-middle-east-as-regional-tensions-rise

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Compass Points - The Next 250

Marine Corps Compass Points — Sun, 05 Jul 2026 14:49:53 GMT

Compass Points - The Next 250

The United States continues the voyage.

July 5, 2026

Over the last week, as we counted down to the 250th celebration of the United States, Compass Points readers have generated online and off a cornucopia of comments, insights, and analysis. Compass Points appreciates all readers who in their own ways are continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps, and also thanks all our readers who served as seminar leaders this week by providing topics, articles, and comments. Many thanks!

Sunday is a good day for reflection.

This Sunday, is a good day to reflect on the first 250 years of the United States, and the prospects for the next 250 years.

The colonialists declared their independence from Great Britain and created the first self-governing nation. Our founders declared, with very little evidence, that ordinary people could not only run their own lives, they could steer the course of a nation. We are still embarked on that great voyage of discovery. Still seeking to find if ordinary people can make enough good decisions for themselves and for the nation to keep the ship afloat.

The Declaration of Independence concluded by appealing for divine assistance;

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And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.

-- US Declaration of Independence, (excerpt)

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Again and again, the founders in pledging all they had, cried out for divine assistance.

In 1774 at the opening of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, our founders began with a prayer.

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First Prayer of the Continental Congress, 1774

O Lord our Heavenly Father, high and mighty King of kings, and Lord of lords, who dost from thy throne behold all the dwellers on earth and reignest with power supreme and uncontrolled over all the Kingdoms, Empires and Governments; look down in mercy, we beseech Thee, on these our American States, who have fled to Thee from the rod of the oppressor and thrown themselves on Thy gracious protection, desiring to be henceforth dependent only on Thee. To Thee have they appealed for the righteousness of their cause; to Thee do they now look up for that countenance and support, which Thou alone canst give. Take them, therefore, Heavenly Father, under Thy nurturing care; give them wisdom in Council and valor in the field; defeat the malicious designs of our cruel adversaries; convince them of the unrighteousness of their Cause and if they persist in their sanguinary purposes, of own unerring justice, sounding in their hearts, constrain them to drop the weapons of war from their unnerved hands in the day of battle!

Be Thou present, O God of wisdom, and direct the councils of this honorable assembly; enable them to settle things on the best and surest foundation. That the scene of blood may be speedily closed; that order, harmony and peace may be effectually restored, and truth and justice, religion and piety, prevail and flourish amongst the people. Preserve the health of their bodies and vigor of their minds; shower down on them and the millions they here represent, such temporal blessings as Thou seest expedient for them in this world and crown them with everlasting glory in the world to come. All this we ask in the name and through the merits of Jesus Christ, Thy Son and our Savior.

Amen.

Reverend Jacob Duché

Rector of Christ Church of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

September 7, 1774, 9 o’clock a.m.

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Nearly one hundred years later, in just a few words at Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln described what was at stake.

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. . . that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion -- that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

-- A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (excerpt)

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From our founders in 1776, to Lincoln at Gettysburg, to today, why is an experiment in self-government important? Why do human beings instinctively value and strive for freedom? One answer is that freedom is the gift that links God to nations and links God to man. Every animal, tree, and rock of the physical world comes pre-programmed. Each can only do as their programming dictates.

Humans are the exception. Humans possesses the divine spark, not only of life, but of choice. Each person and each nation has the power to choose. Both nations and individuals at times, choose merely to indulge their own selfish whims, wants, and passions, but, sometimes, humans choose to struggle toward their divine destiny.

Both nations and individuals must be free to seek and free to choose the better path forward. Will they choose to align with a lower power or with a higher power? Every free person is an ambassador of something. A person might be an ambassador of avarice and ambition. Or, a person might choose to be an ambassador of light.

It was 250 years ago yesterday when the founders of the United States made a dangerous choice. They choose to be free. In the 250 years since then, the citizens of the United States have struggled to make good choices in their own lives and good choices for the Nation. The journey continues. The struggle continues. Despite the struggle, will Americans choose freedom for the next 250 years? If the United States continues “with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence,” the future will still be messy, but the outcome is assured.

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Compass Points - Happy 250

Marine Corps Compass Points — Sat, 04 Jul 2026 14:46:27 GMT

Compass Points - Happy 250

A very special 4th of July

July 4, 2026

Happy 250th Independence Day!

On July 4, 1776 the world was a very different place than now. Or was it? In 1776 the fledgling United States was surrounded by adversaries in a dangerous world. On July 4, 2026, the United States is surrounded by adversaries in a dangerous world. Compass Points salutes the heroes of 1776 who, against all odds, took on the challenge of forging a new nation and won. We who come after them are blessed beyond measure because of their courage and boldness. Today is a day of reflection and celebration. Next week, we return to the work of preserving, protecting, and improving what has been given to us.

Happy 4th of July! Happy 250th!

When our founders put their names to the Declaration of Independence, it marked the official break with Great Britain and the start of the bloody journey toward victory against the world’s foremost military power. Those who signed the Declaration concluded the document with a call for divine assistance: “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”

The Declaration of Independence begins with words that for 250 years have rallied oppressed peoples around the globe.

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WHEN in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.

-- US Declaration of Independence, (excerpt)

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The struggle for independence was brutally difficult. It often seemed the colonists would fail. Even after independence was achieved, and the US took its place as a free nation, the founders were often criticized. Today, the founders of 1776 are still criticized by some. Some say the Declaration of Independence and those who signed it should be reviled not revered. Yet the founders only got the US experiment started; they did not solve every issue in advance.

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Our Founders and Neil Armstrong

Our founders made their leap, in their own time.

Just like Armstrong, they leaped for mankind.

Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Jay

Franklin, Madison, and Samuel Chase.

These early founders and so many more,

They risked all they had, to open a door.

These men were not perfect. They were not saints.

But the plan they began, became 50 states.

Hancock, Pat Henry, and Anthony Wayne,

George Mason, Revere, and Thomas Payne.

It makes little sense, to destroy and erase,

Our founders, whose lives touched the whole human race.

The U.S. founding was a start, not an end,

And we who come next must improve it again.

Adams, Ross, Randolph, and Nathaniel Greene,

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and George Read.

Who would condemn Armstrong’s steps on the moon?

‘Cause he just started, the good we will do?

It’s silly to chastise the very first steps,

Neil got us started. We do what’s next.

Nathan Hale, Floyd, Hall, Smith, Witherspoon,

John Paul Jones, Morgan, and Jacob Broom.

Our founders made their leap, in their own time,

Just like Armstrong, they leaped for mankind.

All the good they started, it’s not finished yet.

So let’s praise the ones who took the first steps.

-- JDK

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Across 250 years, the American experiment has always relied on the sweat and blood of warriors in uniform, because there is always some new danger at the All-American Cafe.

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A 4th of July Fable

Danger at the All American Café

At the All American Café, all the people from the silly to the heroic, are in danger.

It was lunchtime at the All American Café, the best spot in town for a wide selection of delicious American food, including tacos, pizza, burgers, bulgogi, and kabobs. It was a peaceful scene. For now, the danger simmering just outside gave no warning. For now, there was no need for a warrior.

At all the tables, people from every background, every color, and every composition were talking, eating, laughing and enjoying themselves. It was a special day of celebration. It was a day to remember and a day to be grateful.

As usual at lunchtime, the busy, noisy place was just about full. And yet it was not absolutely full. There was one large table in the heart of the restaurant that still had many empty seats. The table was round with a gleaming white tablecloth and special silverware. At the exact center of the table was carefully placed a small, elegant silver framed sign. Even though it was a large table, with room for 8 or even 10 people, just one solitary young man sat there slowly eating a burger and fries.

He was a fit young man with a short haircut. He was dressed plainly in jeans and t-shirt, with athletic shoes. He sat relaxed but had a readiness about him as if he might jump up at any second. While he did not draw attention to himself, he repeatedly scanned the entire restaurant. Then, satisfied for the moment, he would take another bite. From time to time, he would sip his glass of water.

As he scanned the room again, the young man’s eyes were drawn to a commotion. One person, dressed in a showy way, was at the waiter’s stand loudly demanding a table, while filming the interaction on his cell.

“I am the world-famous influencer, Sillie N. Selphish.” Sillie paused and looked at the Head Waiter expectantly. The Head Waiter tried to explain there were no tables currently available and he would have to wait.

“I need a table!” yelled Sillie. Although Sillie looked like he was at least in his late thirties, he acted like a bratty 12-year-old.

Soon, the loud, flamboyant individual caught sight of the large table where the young man sat alone. Sillie began pestering the Head Waiter to be seated there. The Head Waiter shook his head firmly and said, “I’m sorry that table is strictly reserved. I cannot seat you there.” The Head Waiter seemed to point toward the small, elegant, silver framed sign at the center of the table.

But Sillie insisted, “Look at all those seats. It’s perfect.”

The Head Waiter said, “I’m sorry, but that table is reserved. You do not qualify to sit there.”

Sillie laughed, “Oh, I qualify. I am hungry and want to eat right now. I qualify.”

Finally, the Head Waiter looked over at the young man at the table as if to say, “What do I do?”

The young man nodded, “It’s okay.”

Picking up a menu, the Head Waiter said, “follow me” and led Sillie to the large, reserved table.

Instead of sitting down at the table, though, Sillie said to the waiter, “Excuse me just a minute. I like to be seen.”

Sillie began to walk throughout the restaurant in an extravagant and ostentatious way, calling attention to himself and waving at people he did not know. Once he had allowed everyone in the restaurant to glimpse him, he returned to the large table.

Sillie N. Selphish seated himself across from the young man. The Head Waiter handed Sillie a menu, rolled his eyes and left. The young man -- still eating his lunch -- looked across the table at Sillie in an amused way, as if to say, “Who are you and why are you at my table?”

The young man looked across the white tablecloth and studied Sillie. Sillie was dressed strangely in a garish red robe and over-sized costume jewelry. He had wild, unkempt hair. Sillie reached out and picked up the small, silver framed sign at the center of the reserved table.

The elegant, silver framed sign read: “Reserved – Table of Heroes.”

Sillie just shrugged his shoulders, put the sign down, looked at the young man and said, “I am the world famous, Sillie N. Selphish.”

The young man looked at Sillie and nodded. He was just about to introduce himself when a rumble of reporters came over and began asking questions and taking photos of Sillie, who luxuriated in the attention.

The young man was ignored by the press and sat looking amused as he continued with his lunch. Once the press had moved on, Sillie said to the young man, “Sorry for the interruption; they follow me everywhere. You were about to tell me ...”

“There you are!” A loud voice boomed. Sillie found himself at the center of attention again as a contingent of men and women in expensive suits shook his hand, patted him on the back, and showered him with attention. Each of the men and women in expensive suits had a large button on their lapel, “Vote for Me!”

“We want to have you over for more hearings,” said one politician.

“Yes, and we put something for you in appropriations!” said another.

After a time, the suit wearing crowd moved on, and the large table was quiet again.

Sillie said, “They just won’t leave me alone. They use me to get themselves votes”

A waiter came to take his order. “Let me take a few more minutes,” said Sillie.

Sillie looked over at the young man and asked, “What is good here? What is the best?”

“There are lots of good things here,” the young man began, “we have, Opportunity Fajita’s.”

Sillie wrinkled up his nose and said, “that’s one of those things you have to put together yourself. Too much work.”

“Besides,” add Sillie, “it’s probably only rough opportunity. I only like super smooth opportunity.”

“It may only be rough opportunity,” said the young man, “but people come from all over to get it.”

“There’s Freedom Field Greens,” continued the young man.

“Too healthy,” said Sillie.

“Or maybe Creativity Casserole?”

“Oh no,” said Sillie, “there’s no guarantee it will be good.”

“And, of course, we have, Faithful Burgers and Productivity Pizza.”

With a shake of the head, Sillie said, “those old dishes are not exciting.”

“When it’s your turn to cook,” said the young man, “you can prepare whatever you want.”

“What?” Sillie asked.

“Here at the All American Cafe,” explained the young man, “we take turns. Some days you are served, other days you do the serving. Some days others cook for you. Sometimes you cook for others.”

“That sounds horrible,” said Sillie.

“And for dessert, there’s Prosperity Pie.”

“That sounds better.” said Sillie.

Just about then, the Head Waiter returned to the table and after nodding respectfully to the young man, told Sillie that some people at the restaurant had asked if Sillie would give a short speech. Of course, Sillie agreed.

In short order, a podium and microphone were set up. Sillie stood and faced the crowd.

“Life can be hard,” began Sillie. “There are many challenges in the world, many ways that you can work to help others and make the world better.”

The was not a sound in the entire café. Sillie paused and looked at the entire crowd. Finally, with a smile he spoke, “But,” he said, “What fun would that be!” Everyone laughed.

“Be silly! Be selfish!” Everyone cheered as Sillie raised his arms in the air.

The crowd applauded and everyone was excited.

Many teenagers in the Café were particularly excited by Sillie’s words. Most older people, though, had heard the same silly and selfish words many times.

Back at the large round table, Sillie and the young man sat for a moment on opposite sides of the table, not saying anything. Finally, Sillie ordered his typical meal, not some elegant gourmet banquet, but his actual sustenance, a bleak meal of narcissism, envy, and despair. The noxious gruel was set before him in a small, ugly bowl. The concoction was thin, bitter, and, of course, cold. Sillie seemed to like it. As Sillie spooned his gruel, the young man finished his Faithful Burger.

All at once, everyone in the restaurant froze as a loud explosion was heard outside. Conversation ceased. Waiters stopped moving. Laughter was cut off in mid laugh.

After only a brief delay, everyone went back to their conversations. Still, the noise from outside the restaurant never really went away. Outside the Café, artillery rounds impacted, engines revved, and voices screamed. Slowly, oh so slowly, the noises grew.

Everyone in the All American Café kept one ear on the noise outside while pretending to go on with their lunch. The noise from outside grew even louder and, after some time, could no longer be ignored.

The Head Waiter came over to the big table and said, “Once again, there is trouble outside. We need someone to go out there and take care of it.”

At first, no one spoke.

Then Sillie smiled and said, “I would be happy to help, but I’m wearing by newest robe and I can’t get it dirty.”

The Head Waiter did not smile at Sillie’s comment. Both Sillie and the Head Waiter looked over at the young man.

The young man was gone.

Both of them stared at the place where the young man had been.

“Where did he go?” asked Sillie.

The Head Waiter somberly raised his arm and pointed toward the outside.

After a moment, the noise outside doubled itself. Then, it redoubled again.

There was a terrible battle in progress.

The young man was out there fighting alone. As relentless, unreasoning evil swarmed just outside, the entire Café relied on their solitary champion. Most people prayed.

Sillie, for once, had nothing to say. He nervously wondered if the young man would have the strength to keep the unseen horror from crashing through the walls? Almost in unison, everyone in the Café, held their breath. The battle sounds were ferocious. After long, hesitating halts, the sounds faded, and everyone breathed again.

Things returned to normal in the Café. Conversations restarted and people noshed on their meals. Once again, it was lunchtime at the All American Café.

Sillie rarely noticed anything except himself, but he had been frightened by the danger and was stunned by the way the young man had so quickly rushed into battle.

Sillie said, “Is he coming back? I want to thank him.”

The Head Waiter said, “No, not today. Once he finishes up out there, he will clean his weapons, and get some rack time.”

The Head Waiter smiled, “Fortunately, he will be back tomorrow.”

Sillie said, “Can I at least buy his lunch? Someone has to pay.”

“True, someone always has to pay,” the Head Waiter agreed, “but that young man has already paid for your lunch.”

“He paid for me?” asked Sillie. “He doesn’t even know me. Why would he pay for me?”

“Yes, he paid for you,” said the Head Waiter.

“In fact,” the Head Waiter continued, “he paid for everyone in the Café.”

As Sillie watched, the Head Waiter reverently picked up the small, silver framed sign, “Reserved – Table of Heroes” carefully polished it, and set it back down, precisely in the center of the table.

“He always pays for everyone.”

Sillie N. Selphish was silent for a moment, almost as if he was thinking.

Finally, Sillie said, “After all he has done for us, what we should do is ...” Sillie paused, “... let’s all take selfies!”

It was lunchtime at the All American Café. As a waiter carefully brought to one table a cupcake with a lighted candle, the people at the table began to sing, “Happy Birthday.” Soon, others joined in. It was the 4th of July.

— JDK

----------------------------

Compass Points - Eve of 250

Marine Corps Compass Points — Fri, 03 Jul 2026 14:17:05 GMT

Compass Points - Eve of 250

The Marine Corps prepares for the next 250 years.

July 3, 2026

It is time to take the pledge.

On this day, the Nation has arrived at a crucial moment. Today is the eve of the 250th anniversary of the signing of the US Declaration of Independence. What began 250 years ago as a risky experiment with, at best, a narrow chance of success, has overcome every challenge and matured into the most powerful and productive Nation in world history.

Even before the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress called to life the fledgling United States Marine Corps. Down through the decades of war and peace, Marines have distinguished themselves around the globe as stalwart guardians of the Nation.

Tomorrow, as the Nation celebrates its 250th anniversary, leaders of Marines would do well to both celebrate the Nation’s birthday, and also take inventory of what the Marine Corps is today and how the Marine Corps can best serve the Nation across the next 250 years.

For the Marine Corps to move into the next 250 years stronger than it is today, it is important for Marine leaders to understand what has happened in recent years.

Over the last seven years the Marine Corps has badly distracted itself between two priorities. First, a controversial plan to place small sensor and missiles units off the coast of China. Second, a continuing need for Marine combined arms, crisis response forces around the globe.

Instead of using the last seven years, to enhance, upgrade, and strengthen Marine crisis response, however, the Marine Corps has, on its own volition, degraded and destroyed far too many crucial combined arms weapons, equipment, and capabilities.

This week, as we count down to the 250th celebration, Compass Points began on Monday with a summary from General Zinni on crisis response essentials, which will be discussed below. That was followed Tuesday and Wednesday with the publication of R.S. Hicks’ “What I Saw at the Revolution” Parts 1 and 2, as well as, on Thursday, a review of the crucial role undertaken by the Chowder Society II.

The articles have stimulated tremendous feedback and discussion online and off from Marines of every rank and MOS who have grown concerned in recent years about the direction of the Marine Corps.

To cite just one of dozens and dozens of comments.

----------------------------

Mr. Hicks has done this nation a great service. He has exposed the shallowness of the process that tried to transform this nation’s global force-in-readiness to a single dimension static force that lacks the combined arms and maneuver capability this nation has relied upon for the last fifty years.

Since Force Design was published, the Marine Corps has failed to provide a real presence to the Combatant Commanders when needed.

Force Design architects have watched events in the Ukraine and in the Middle East demonstrate the value of a true Combined Arms force. The authors of this untested concept are not surprisingly silent to explain how a static one dimensional force is relevant in today’s crisis response requirement.

-- John Joseph “Jack” Sheehan, (USMC ret) concluded 35 years of Marine Corps service as both NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and as Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM).

----------------------------

General Sheehan goes straight to the heart of the matter. No Marine ‘one dimensional force is relevant’ when the Nation needs crisis response Marines. The Marine Corps has ensnared itself in its misguided focus on a string of sensor and missile units off the coast of China. With each passing year, the plan for Marine sensor and missile units is exposed as duplicative, damaging, and unnecessary. Now is the time for the Marine Corps to refocus on providing the Nation with forward deployed, combined arms, air, ground, logistic, task forces of Marines. Marine crisis response MAGTFs can be reinforced with sensors and missiles, as appropriate.

The Nation has depended on Marine crisis response forces for decades and will need enhanced, upgraded, and expanded crisis response forces across the next 250 years.

What are the essentials of a crisis response force of Marines?

----------------------------

What Is a Crisis Response Force?

By General A.C. Zinni (USMC ret)

I have been involved in over a dozen crisis response operations. As a combatant commander, JTF commander, staff member, and operational planner, I have experienced how crisis response forces are organized, deployed, and employed. From those experiences, several key requirements stand out as necessary to be a true crisis response force:

-- Closure Time – To a combatant commander, time is a critical factor. Crises do not get better with time. You do not get much unambiguous warning, if any, when a response is required.

-- Deployability – A crisis response force must have a means to deploy that is in place, exercised, and ready to go. Forces should be trained, organized, and exercised to rapidly deploy.

-- Adaptability – We cannot anticipate the nature of crisis responses. The response force must be flexible and able to task-organize for multiple potential missions. Purpose‑designed organizations do not have the ability to adapt.

-- Ability to Expand the Force – Initial forces must be compatible and easily expandable to meet crises as they grow. Forces that are trained and can rapidly composite, especially with forward‑presence forces, and combine into a growing, larger force are ideal.

-- Fully Capable Force – The ability to meet the requirements of command and control, maneuver, fires, logistics, and intelligence should be inherent in the force.

-- Readiness – A crisis response force must maintain a constant state of readiness to deploy and do as much pre‑deployment preparation and planning as possible.

-- Mission Preparation – Combatant commands have a great sense of their areas of responsibility and the potential threats and crises that could arise. A crisis response force should have a planning relationship with COCOM and component commands to understand potential missions in each theater.

-- Exercise the Force – Crisis response forces need to exercise in potential theaters of operation and rehearse the potential missions they may face.

-- Spectrum of Conflict Missions – A crisis response force should be prepared for all types of potential missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to full combat operations or combinations of missions.

-- Joint and Combined Operations – The crisis response force should be capable of seamlessly expanding to a Combined/Joint Task Force.

-- General A.C. ‘Tony’ Zinni (USMC ret) an author, speaker, and policy advisor, served as the Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and, later, as a special envoy for the United States to Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

----------------------------

Compass Points salutes the Nation on the eve of the 250th anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence, and also salutes all the Marines today working to make sure the Marine Corps is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the Nation’s premier crisis response force for the next 250 years.

The start of Fourth of July weekend is a good time for the Marine Corps to pledge itself to a renewed focus on global crisis response, and for all Americans to pledge a renewed love and loyalty to the oldest constitutional republic on the planet, the U.S.A.!

----------------------------

Why the Pledge?

.

I pledge allegiance to the flag

Of the United States of America

And to the Republic for which it stands

One Nation, under God, indivisible,

With liberty and justice for all.

.

“I pledge allegiance”

What does that mean?

.

Survey the globe beyond our shores.

So many tyrants. So many poor.

So little peace. So many wars.

So much squalor, hurt, and pain.

No escape. So inhumane.

.

But with our pledge,

We all invest

In our land where

Dreams grow best.

.

Not perfection,

Not all we should,

But an everlasting

Search for good.

.

To pledge allegiance,

Means pledging our best.

.

“To the flag

Of the U.S.A”

Salutes the symbol

Of a better way.

.

Yes, we argue,

But courteously,

And never act out

Murderously.

.

We all work.

We strive together,

With liberty,

We make life better.

.

“To the Republic

for which it stands,”

We distrust all mobs,

They turn insane.

And don’t deliver

What they claim.

.

To pledge allegiance,

Means pledging our best.

.

“One Nation

Under God indivisible”

Means we are bound

By sacred principles.

.

Improve our principles

As much as you please

But don’t let the cure

Make worse the disease

.

“With liberty

And justice for all”

We strive together

Or together we fall.

.

To pledge allegiance,

Means pledging our best.

.

Supporting the pledge

And rejecting extremists

Means pursuing our dreams

With peaceful allegiance

.

We still pledge allegiance.

We still make mistakes.

We still build the future,

For the whole human race.

-- JDK

----------------------------

Compass Points - Chowder II Steps Up

Marine Corps Compass Points — Thu, 02 Jul 2026 14:58:13 GMT

Compass Points - Chowder II Steps Up

Experienced Marines begin to push back.

July 2, 2026

For the Marine Corps to move into the future stronger and better able to serve the Nation, it is important for Marine leaders to understand what has happened in recent years.

This week, Compass Points has published R.S. Hicks’ “What I Saw at the Revolution” Parts 1 and 2. In the two parts, Hicks reviews what he saw in the early days of the Marine Corps’ controversial Force Design. General David H. Berger publicly revealed Force Design when he issued his Commandant’s Planning Guidance in the summer of 2019. Very quickly Marine leaders throughout the broad Marine community grew concerned and began to ask questions.

Marine leaders began to discuss together the dangers they saw in Force Design. Eventually the discussions among a group of senior retired Marines coalesced into what became known as, The Chowder Society II.

----------------------------

The

Chowder Society II:

Origins, Evolution, and Significance

By Chowder Society II

Purpose

This paper provides a concise overview of the formation, evolution, and objectives of “Chowder Society II,” an informal group composed primarily of retired Marine Corps general officers and senior leaders, but supported by a much larger group of active and retired Marines of all grades, concerned about the development and implementation of Force Design 2030 under the 38th Commandant, General David H. Berger.

The purpose is not to re-litigate Force Design, but to explain how and why a large segment of the retired Marine leadership community became involved in the debate and why many ultimately chose the unprecedented step of publicly opposing decisions made by an active Commandant.

Origins

The origins of the controversy lie in Force Design 2030 itself. While many members of Chowder Society II accepted the need for modernization and adaptation to emerging threats, they believed that the process used to develop Force Design departed from the Marine Corps’ traditional combat development system.

Many participants viewed Force Design as the product of a small group operating outside the normal Marine Corps Combat Development Process rather than the result of broad institutional analysis, experimentation, and debate.

They believed major force-structure decisions—including the divestment of tanks, reductions in artillery, aviation, engineering, and infantry capabilities—were made before sufficient analysis and validation had occurred.

Their concerns centered on several recurring themes:

· Whether the future force could continue to satisfy the Marine Corps’ Title 10 responsibilities.

· Whether the Corps was becoming optimized for a single contingency in the Western Pacific at the expense of its global role.

· Whether reductions in combined-arms capabilities would undermine the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the Marine Expeditionary Force as the Corps’ principal warfighting formations.

· Whether the Corps was sacrificing flexibility and adaptability in favor of specialization.

· Whether the process itself had bypassed the institutional mechanisms designed to test major force-development decisions.

Efforts to Work Within the Institution

A critical point often overlooked is that Chowder Society II did not begin as a public opposition movement. The origins of Chowder Society II were informal and largely organic. Following publication of the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance in July 2019 and the subsequent release of Force Design 2030, individual retired Marines—many of whom had held senior leadership positions within the Corps—began independently contacting one another to discuss their concerns.

Through phone calls, emails, personal meetings, and small group discussions, they discovered that many shared similar concerns regarding both the substance of the proposed changes and the process by which they were being developed. What began as a series of private conversations among former Marines evolved into a loosely organized network dedicated to understanding Force Design, exchanging information, and seeking constructive engagement with Marine Corps leadership. The group’s initial instinct was not public opposition but rather private dialogue with the Commandant and other senior leaders in hopes of influencing the process from within the institution.

As the network became more organized, members adopted the name “Chowder Society II,” consciously invoking the original Chowder Society of the late 1940s, whose members played a key role in preserving the Marine Corps against efforts that threatened its future existence and relevance.

By choosing that name, the group signaled its belief that the issues surrounding Force Design 2030 were not merely disagreements over force structure, but questions touching the future identity, role, and effectiveness of the Marine Corps itself. Like their predecessors, they viewed themselves as acting out of loyalty to the institution and a duty to ensure that concerns were fully aired before irreversible decisions were made.

From 2020 through early 2022, retired generals and former senior leaders repeatedly sought to engage privately with General Berger. Numerous phone calls, emails, meetings, and discussions took place. The objective was to understand the rationale behind Force Design and to communicate concerns that were being voiced by retired Marines, active-duty Marines, and others with long experience in national defense.

This effort culminated in formal letters from retired Marine generals in December 2021 and January 2022. The January letter, signed by twenty-two retired four-star generals and supported by additional former senior leaders, outlined detailed questions regarding Force Design, Title 10 responsibilities, future force structure, amphibious operations, global readiness, talent management, and institutional ethos.

The retired leaders approached these discussions respectfully and in the spirit of service to the Corps. Their intent was not to reverse modernization, but to understand the analysis supporting the changes and to encourage broader institutional examination of the decisions being made.

Meeting materials prepared for discussions with the Commandant demonstrate that the retired generals sought explanations regarding process, assumptions, experimentation, wargaming, force-structure decisions, and the relationship between Force Design and long-standing Marine Corps responsibilities. Their questions reflected a desire for dialogue rather than confrontation.

The Turning Point

The turning point occurred in early 2022.

A planned meeting in January between General Berger and retired four-star generals was delayed. A subsequent meeting was held in March 2022 with Generals Krulak, Zinni, Conway, and Dunford representing the larger group.

Participants concluded that the Commandant was unwilling to reconsider any major element of Force Design. In follow-on communications, General Berger indicated that he intended to continue implementation without significant changes.

For many members of Chowder Society II, this was decisive. After nearly two years of private engagement, they concluded that internal dialogue had failed. They believed Force Design posed an existential risk to the Marine Corps’ traditional role as a globally deployable combined-arms force, and they felt they had exhausted institutional avenues for influence.

Only at this point did the group decide to engage publicly.

Public Advocacy

Beginning in 2022, members of Chowder Society II published articles, engaged with news media, briefed congressional staffs, met with members of Congress, and later began to work with the Marine Corps Compass Points platform.

Their objectives were to:

· Stimulate informed debate.

· Encourage congressional oversight.

· Preserve what they regarded as the essential character of the Marine Corps.

· Ensure that major force-design decisions received independent review.

Importantly, the group generally did not attempt to provide its own detailed force design as an alternative. Members argued that creating a replacement design outside the formal combat development system would repeat the very error they believed had occurred. Instead, they advocated returning major force-development decisions to a rigorous institutional process.

Relationship with the 39th Commandant

When General Eric Smith became Commandant in 2023, Chowder Society II temporarily reduced its public activity in hopes that the new leadership would reassess Force Design. However, after subsequent engagements and the publication of the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, many members concluded that fundamental concerns remained unresolved.

The group therefore continued outreach to Congress, the Department of Defense, and other policymakers.

One significant result was congressional directive in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act requiring an independent review of Marine Corps modernization efforts by a federally funded research and development center.

Lessons for the Future

The principal lesson of the Chowder Society II experience is not whether Force Design was right or wrong. Rather, it is that major institutional change in the Marine Corps requires broad participation, transparent analysis, rigorous testing, and a willingness to engage dissenting views.

Members of Chowder Society II believe they acted not as opponents of the Marine Corps, but as stewards of it. They consistently maintain that they sought private dialogue first, pursued internal avenues for nearly two years, and only moved into the public arena after concluding that meaningful discussion within the institution was no longer possible.

Regardless of one’s position on Force Design, the episode demonstrates the importance of maintaining trust among serving leaders, retired leaders, Congress, and the wider Marine Corps community. Future Commandants should view this experience as a reminder that durable institutional change depends not only on bold ideas, but also on an inclusive process that builds confidence across the Corps.

— Chowder Society II - Origins, Evolution, & Significance

----------------------------

Compass Points salutes the Chowder Society II for their leadership in war and peace across many decades, and also salutes all the Marine leaders throughout the broad Marine community who are working to make sure that the Marine Corps of tomorrow is stronger than the Marine Corps of today.

- - - - -

Compass Points - Revolution - Part 2

Marine Corps Compass Points — Wed, 01 Jul 2026 14:43:37 GMT

Compass Points - Revolution - Part 2

Moving forward with a look back at Force Design.

July 1, 2026

Where does the Marine Corps go from here?

This week, Compass Points is publishing two insider accounts detailing the poisonous roots of Force Design 2030. We continue today with Part 2 of R.S. Hicks’ report on, “What I Saw at the Revolution.” The author is a former Marine non-commissioned officer who served on the HQMC staff for 13 years and departed as a GS-14 in 2020.

Mr. Hicks has been appreciative of the strong response to his, “What I Saw at the Revolution” Part 1

----------------------------

Just a quick note to say thanks so much for the really kind feedback on the first half of this. I know we’re seven years into this now, and I honestly didn’t know how valuable or even how interesting this history would be at this point ... but I thought there were probably a couple of important points to be made about the very flawed process that got us Force Design. These points have been under-emphasized in all the discussions about outcomes.

In the second half, below, I tried to connect the dots between the key personalities (who all fatefully ended up at CD&I together in the summer of 2018) and the 38th Commandant’s CPG that was published the following summer and formally put FD 2030 in motion.

I’ve personally been stunned and so disappointed at the lack of Congressional oversight. If this were 40 years ago, could you imagine, in your wildest dreams, an active-duty Marine 3-star speaking at a prominent DC think tank about modernization and saying, “It actually is a brilliant move in that we did not get it right. He [the Commandant] told us we got it 60-70% right” That’s is what DC CD&I just said at CSIS on 18 June.

If Senator Nunn and Senator Warner (chair and ranking member of the SASC 40 years ago) had heard that, they would have summoned the Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy to the Hill for a private meeting the next day, and then probably would have scheduled a public hearing later that same week.

The biggest thing I hope future generations take away is that we should never approach a Marine Corps modernization effort in this way ... using this process ... ever again.

-- V/R, Hicks

----------------------------

Now, Compass Points presents, R.S. Hicks’ “What I Saw at the Revolution” Part 2

----------------------------

What I Saw at the Revolution - Part 2

By R.S. Hicks

The Oxygen: Lieutenant General Berger and the PLS Colonel Both Come to Combat Development & Integration (CD&I)

From 2016-2018, Lieutenant General Berger served as the commander of our INDOPACOM Service component (U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command), which meant that he spent each and every day for two years immersed in the 5000-series family of plans, the realities of China’s economic growth and military modernization, and the threat China increasingly posed to the world order. In 2018, he was renominated as a three-star to serve as the Deputy Commandant (DC) for CD&I and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). In the summer of 2018, he made the move from Camp Smith to the Davis Building, and who do you suspect also moved to CD&I that same summer? The PLS colonel who was advocating for radical change.

The PLS colonel became the Director of CAP, the division within MCWL where Art Corbett and a team of planners had been working on new Service concepts to enable naval expeditionary operations. Importantly, my vantage point on this 2018-2019 period was the Pentagon, not Quantico, but in very broad terms, this is what I saw:

● In 2018, CAP began developing a new Service Concept for Stand-In Forces (SIF), which called for small formations of forces inside of adversaries’ (particularly China’s) weapons engagement zones to act as the eyes and ears of the naval and joint force.

● On 27 March 2019, Lieutenant General Berger was nominated to be the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps. The very next day, on 28 March, Major Leo Spaeder published an article in War on the Rocks titled “Sir, Who Am I? An Open Letter to the Incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps.” The article argued, in effect, that the Marine Corps had lost its way in recent years and become unmoored from its core identity. The Service’s GFM allocations were becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the Army’s, efforts to modernize were too little, too late, and the incoming Commandant should go all in on a single Service identity. Major Leo Spaeder was, at the time, a planner within CAP.

● Shortly after his nomination, Lieutenant General Berger selected the colonel leading CAP as the lead author for his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG).

● On 11 July, General Berger took the battle colors from General Neller, and on 16 July he published his CPG. Among the many seismic statements in the document, a few stood out:

We will divest of legacy defense programs and force structure that support legacy capabilities.

[W]e must divest of the past to modernize for the future.

This design effort includes making the necessary divestments from the current force and current program to accelerate the funding and modernization of the future force.

● From July through September, the Commandant personally led what he described as a “small OPT” in a focused effort to frame the force design problem.

● In the early fall, after the Commandant transitioned the effort to DC CD&I (Lieutenant General Smith), CD&I established 12 functionally and organizationally focused integrated product teams (IPTs). I know from firsthand experience that IPT membership was kept small, and IPT members were all directed to sign non-disclosure agreements to keep their work confidential. We were told at the time that this was because the Commandant was meeting privately with key members of the administration and House and Senate Armed Services Committees to gain their support before the implications of the initiative were made public.

● Also in the fall, the contracting activity that supports HQMC posted a notice of intent to sole-source a five-year Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract to a Northern Virginia-based professional services firm for “CMC Service-level strategic analyses and advisory services.” The description of the requirement in the notice was somewhat vague, but it referenced “analyses and advisory support to the Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps on Service-level issues, to include Title 10 responsibilities and Marine Corps roles and missions.”

● A few months later, the sole-source contract was awarded, and the award notice provided a bit more information about the requirement: the contractor would support “force design planning and implementation.” The justification and approval for the sole-source contract stated that the award was made using FAR Part 6.302-1, which is the FAR part used when only one responsible source can satisfy a requirement.

● Shortly after he retired in the summer of 2019, the colonel who’d been advocating for radical change in PLS and who’d led CAP and authored General Berger’s CPG went to work at the company that was awarded the sole-source contract to support force design planning and implementation for the Commandant.

This, I believe, illustrates the third and final key seed of Force Design, as well as the third and final ingredient for the fire: the intellectual chemistry within CD&I during the 11-month period leading up to General Berger assuming the commandancy. This chemistry supplied the oxygen needed to ignite the Force Design fire.

Force Design’s Fatal Flaws

If we could ask Thomas Kuhn to identify what the major paradigm shifts in warfare were from the beginning of the 20th century through the present day that likely would have necessitated large-scale Marine Corps force-structure changes, I imagine he may identify several. One may be the shift to industrial firepower and amphibious warfare in the early 20th century. Another may be the dawn of the nuclear era during World War II. Another may be the concept of vertical envelopment that the helicopter ushered in. The Marine Corps adapted imaginatively and highly effectively for each of these paradigm shifts, and in each case it did so through an innovation process that sought ideas from many sources and broke down organizational communication barriers.

If we look specifically at the board led by Major General Hogaboom in the mid-1950s and the long-range study panel led by Colonel Gayle in the early 1960s, we can see this innovation process at work. Unfortunately, years later the 38th Commandant and his planners seemed to presuppose that the innovation process the Marine Corps had used with great success in the past was no longer sufficient.

Speed was the new watchword, and planners were quick to invoke the Silicon Valley mantra of “Move fast and break things,”

Perhaps instead, they should have invoked John Milton, John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, who would have argued the merits of debate and falsification to sharpen some ideas and discard others. In addition, it is not even clear that the rise of precision weapons is an actual paradigm shift. Every new threat is not a paradigm shift.

The Force Design planning timeline suggests another major flaw: If we were still doing problem framing in August and September (as the timeline in General Berger’s Force Design Phase I and II Report indicates), then how could we have known in July (when the CPG was published) that large-scale force-structure divestiture was the right COA? It seems that we got the steps in the Marine Corps Planning Process slightly out of order.

And I think it’s worth making a few quick points about the sole-source contract here as well:

1. Didn’t the Commandant have a sizable HQMC staff, authorized for him by Title 10, to provide the type of professional assistance and advice he sought?

2. Just as we have a command whose mission it is to execute global force management for the Service (U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command), don’t we have a command (MCCDC) and HQMC staff agency (CD&I) purpose-built to execute force development and design planning and implementation for the Service?

3. If the Commandant wanted additional advice beyond what CD&I could give him, couldn’t he have consulted some of the other 64 General Officers that Title 10 authorizes for billets inside the Marine Corps?

4. What skills did this particular company have that were apparently so scarce in the Marine Corps that we had to outsource to get them? And what rationale was put forward to justify this $10M contract in the Marine Corps’ Service Requirements Review Board process, which requires an analysis of contract requirements that can’t be fulfilled with military and civilian personnel?

The current DC CD&I, LtGen “Smash” Austin, recently joined Dr. Seth Jones of CSIS for a conversation as part of CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute’s long-running Maritime Security Dialogue series. In his remarks, LtGen Austin noted that the Marine Corps is planning to grow the force by 4-5% over the next few years. When Dr. Jones mentioned a past CSIS discussion with the 38th Commandant about force design, LtGen Austin asked if he could provide a comment on that: “It’s a study in change management,” he said. “And it actually is a brilliant move in that we did not get it right. He [the Commandant] told us we got it 60-70% right, and I need you to iterate and improve and make it better.” LtGen Austin also acknowledged that planned force-structure increases over the next few years will help to “make corrections and make us whole in some of the gaps we may have created in our force design journey.”

If you hired a contractor to remodel your kitchen and he didn’t measure correctly and ordered expensive custom cabinetry that was too small, I think he’d have a tough time convincing you that the error was a brilliant move.

Like the classic 1990s commercial in which chocolate milk-loving kids scream, “More Ovaltine, please!” these statements from LtGen Austin should scream to our Congress, “More oversight, please!”

As Force Design began to stand up, the editor and publisher of the Marine Corps Gazette made what I felt was an unfortunate editorial decision several years ago. He effectively squelched the Force Design debate in the pages of our Corps’ professional journal, which had been a key forum for debate during the maneuver warfare revolution of the 1980s. Over the past few years, Substack has emerged as a key forum, with Force Design ideas being debated in Marine Corps Compass Points and other sites.

With few editorial guardrails, Substack allows for a free exchange of ideas, which can be a double-edged sword in debate, as it can encourage ad hominem and name-calling instead of substantive discussions about the central points of a particular argument. In Adam Grant’s book Think Again: The Power of Knowing What You Don’t Know, Grant includes a great diagram depicting a hierarchy of argument styles. Too much of the discourse around Force Design has been happening at the bottom of Grant’s pyramid, name-calling. We all need to challenge ourselves to elevate it back up toward the top: discussion of the central points.

Substack also invites the use of pseudonyms to advance arguments and points of view. I don’t believe this is inherently wrong. After all, since we’re in the season of our semi quincentennial, it’s worth remembering that the Federalists and Anti-Federalists engaged in a massive epistolary debate using pen names. While pseudonyms are OK, they shouldn’t unmoor us from our personal and professional ethics – perhaps chief among them is to attack ideas, not people.

While this article has focused on the tangibles of Force Design, I’d like to close with a thought about the intangibles and what I personally feel is the saddest part of our 38th Commandant’s legacy: the strained bonds among Marine leaders. Our readiness metrics measure the tangibles (people, training and equipment), and while our units may be C-1/C-2 ready, where we’re strained is with the intangibles, particularly with the bonds between our generations. These are the priceless intangibles, such things as regiments hand down forever.

Nearly seven years ago, the Marine Corps embarked on its “campaign of learning” to redesign the force, and the campaign not only ripped large pieces out of our reservoirs of combat power, but it also purged some of our best General Officers from the force and stonewalled others who asked critical questions.

In a recent interview about his firing from CBS News, longtime 60 Minutes correspondent Scott Pelley was asked how he didn’t think posing tough questions to his new leadership could have repercussions. “We used to be able to have conversations like that at CBS News,” he said. We used to be able to have tough discussions inside the Marine Corps as well. If an organization is intolerant of dissent and assumes a defensive crouch when pressed with critical questions, is it a healthy organization? Is it a “learning” organization, as its “campaign of learning” suggests?

In the coming months, the process for vetting, selecting and nominating the 40th Commandant of the Marine Corps will formally begin. The Corps’ civilian leaders have an opportunity to nominate an officer who will prioritize not just readiness and all of the traditional Title 10 responsibilities, but also an officer who can restore the soul of the Marine Corps. For the sake of the Nation and for the sake of our Corps’ future generations, I hope our civilian leaders choose the next Commandant carefully and wisely.

— R.S. Hicks’ “What I Saw at the Revolution” Part 2

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Compass Points salutes R.S. Hicks’ for his account of the poisonous roots of Force Design. Tomorrow, the review continues with an insider’s account of how senior Marines first began to push back on the excesses of Force Design.

The Marine Corps was too quick to get into Force Design, and too slow to get out. By understanding how Force Design began, Marine leaders today, who are preparing for greater responsibilities in the future, can help make sure the Marine Corps never again veers into such a disappointing detour. The Marine Corps never rests on its history; it builds on its history. In the near future, a stronger Marine Corps will do more to serve the Nation better.

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Compass Points - Revolution - Part 1

Marine Corps Compass Points — Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:13:38 GMT

Compass Points - Revolution - Part 1

Moving forward with a look back at Force Design.

June 30, 2026

Where does the Marine Corps go from here?

There is no question the Nation needs Marine 9-1-1 crisis response units. Marine air, ground, logistics, forces, usually embarked on Navy amphibious ships, have long served as the Nation’s immediate crisis response solution. The US regional combatant commanders have consistently expressed a need for more Marines.

Now, with the establishment of the US Army’s Multi-Domain Command - Pacific, and other developments, the Marine Corps’ controversial plan for its own sensor and missile units has become even more duplicative and unnecessary.

It is time for the Marine Corps to turn away from the Force Design folly and focus once again on global crisis response. To move forward and make sure no similar lapse ever occurs, it is necessary to understand how the misguided Force Design came to be.

This week, Compass Points will publish two insider accounts detailing the poisonous roots of Force Design 2030. We begin today with Part 1 of R.S. Hicks’ report on, “What I Saw at the Revolution.” The author is a former Marine non-commissioned officer who served on the HQMC staff for 13 years and departed as a GS-14 in 2020.

Compass Points and members of Chowder Society II have long known the broad outlines of Rich Hicks’ narrative of how the 38th Commandant created Force Design 2030. Mr. Hicks has performed an important service by supplying the details - dates, times, locations, and people - of this sad story.

The identities of the now retired officers, along with the name of the company that later hired these officers to support its concept development contract with the Marine Corps, have been known for years. The sources of that knowledge include information provided by Marine Corps officers on active-duty, recently retired officers, the editor of a professional journal, faculty of PME schools, and a member of a well known think tank. It is not necessary today to publish the names of the officers who pushed for the misguided Force Design plan. The former officers were well paid to produce a product, which they did. The sole responsibility for Force Design 2030 and its adverse impact on the Marine Corps rests with the 38th Commandant alone.

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What I Saw at the Revolution

The Marine Corps’ Failed Attempt to Modernize in the Berger Era

By R. S. Hicks

In 1990, Peggy Noonan published her memoir, What I Saw at the Revolution, about her two years as a speechwriter and special assistant in the Reagan White House. The title drew on the “Reagan Revolution” movement, led by our 40th President, that reshaped the nation across the 1980s.

From 2019-2023, our 38th Commandant, David H. Berger, led a revolutionary movement to reshape the Marine Corps. I wasn’t as close to the Commandant as Noonan was to the President, but I served as a civilian staff officer at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) in the years leading up to the “Berger Revolution.” For those of us who were in the Pentagon during those years, we can recognize in hindsight the planting of some key seeds along the way.

My intent in writing this article is to document some of those key seeds in the most objective and fact-based manner possible in order to create a shared understanding of how the Marine Corps’ 2019 force design revolution materialized.

I want to be transparent about my biases and motives upfront.

First, I had, and continue to have, respect for the key individuals who advised the 38th Commandant. In then-Major General Van Riper’s brilliant “Words of Advice to Subordinates” memorandum that he issued to his staff and subordinate commanders shortly after taking command of 2nd Marine Division in 1991, he charged officers to “think.” While I have strong disagreements with much of the thinking that went into force design, I believe the initiative was the result of imaginative thinking on the part of some of our bright officers who had the best interests of the Marine Corps at heart.

Where I believe we went wrong was in not debating the thoughts and subjecting them to criticism and falsification in our Corps’ “marketplace of ideas.”

Once the ideas were embraced by the 38th Commandant and promulgated in his guidance, they became sacrosanct, and officers were denied the opportunity to debate or challenge them. They could only salute smartly and execute.

Second, just as I have respect for the individuals who advised the 38th Commandant, I have tremendous respect for the members of what’s come to be known as Chowder Society II. They’re sometimes described as a small group of intellectually entrenched graybeards who are upset about having been left out of the decision-making process, but the reality is that Chowder Society II is made up of more than 120 retired General Officers, 26 of whom are retired four-stars, and six of whom are former Commandants. This group comprises the true living giants of our Corps. Several of them engaged with the Commandant privately on multiple occasions to express their deep concerns about the Corps’ direction, and they made the unprecedented decision to voice their concerns publicly after deep reflection about what they viewed as an existential threat to the institution they’d spent decades of their lives working to strengthen and enhance.

I believe our collective response to them has reflected a great deal of hubris and a lack of intellectual humility on our part.

And finally, while I have strong disagreements with many of the discrete force design outcomes, my strongest bias is against the process that produced those outcomes. I believe the process is one of the most important aspects of this story, as process is often the linchpin in successful organizational innovation (as General Zinni’s doctoral research on innovation in the Pacific theater during World War II bore out). The focus of this article will therefore be on process, not outcomes or individuals.

Setting the Scene: The Force Management and Force Development Environment in 2015-2018

When General Neller took the battle colors of our Corps from General Dunford in September 2015, the institution faced some significant readiness challenges. During General Dunford’s short tenure as Commandant, he’d worked to put the Marine Corps on a readiness recovery glide path following more than a decade of sustained combat operations and readiness consumption in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the steep sequestration budget cuts implemented during General Amos’s commandancy. Management of this readiness recovery, though, fell largely on General Neller, whom we viewed at the time as the “readiness Commandant,” given that aviation readiness was in crisis and we had comparable challenges on the ground side of the force across the personnel, training and equipment spectrum.

This period was not unlike the post-Vietnam period, in that readiness and budgets had hit a floor, and we had a pair of great Commandants (Generals Dunford and Neller) who, like Generals Wilson and Barrow, worked aggressively to reconstitute the force and recenter it on an identity and central organizing concept.

During General Neller’s commandancy, as force providers worked to recover warfighting readiness, generate Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) and support home-station training, the global force management (GFM) sourcing demands on them steadily increased.

Steady demand signals from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), driven by crisis response, counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and security force assistance requirements across the theater, consumed much of I Marine Expeditionary Force’s (MEF’s) capacity. For II MEF, crisis-response demands in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), coupled with rotational-force requirements in Norway and the Black Sea region and steady demands in CENTCOM, stretched resources and readiness. And U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) demands on III MEF increased as well, as our rotational-force commitment in Darwin grew significantly and the maximum-pressure campaign on the Korean peninsula energized our “fight tonight” MEF. Our Reserve Component was a major player in the CENTCOM and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility during this period as well.

Quarterly Force Synchronization Conferences and Force Management Summits became increasingly pressurized during this period. At one Force Management Summit in 2017, after several of the MARFOR/MEF G-3/5s expressed concerns about increasing pressures on the force, then-Brigadier General “Moe” Mahoney (who was the Director of Plans in HQMC’s Plans, Policies & Operations [PP&O] Department at the time), tried to ease concerns by saying,

“Just remember who’s sitting upstairs: Mattis and Dunford.”

On the force development side of the house, the Service’s Amos-era Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21) capstone concept was giving way to a new Neller-era Marine Operating Concept (MOC), and with the transition came a conceptual shift in how Marine forces would operate. Where the central idea of EF21 was about providing global crisis response and forward presence, the MOC drove the Service’s force development focus toward more expeditionary operations in contested environments. (Some would argue that this shift formed some of the intellectual scaffolding of the Berger-era force design effort that would follow three years later.)

The major force development initiative of the Neller era was the Marine Corps Force (MCF) 2025 operational planning team (OPT). The OPT comprised two groups: a group of seasoned colonels from across HQMC and the MEFs to design an evolutionary modernization course of action (COA), and a group of younger officers to develop a more revolutionary COA. The OPT’s central problem was how best to translate the new, emergent MOC into concrete force-structure changes, with a heavy emphasis on integration of new information and cyber warfare capabilities into the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). While there were two formal groups working the OPT problem set, a third group emerged, led by a lieutenant colonel and planner who was regarded as one of HQMC’s most imaginative (and often provocative) critical thinkers. His perspective was that the two chartered OPT groups weren’t going far enough in their design COAs, and the Marine Corps had an opportunity to carve out a more unique role for itself that the joint force could bring to bear in a powerful way against a peer adversary like China.

General Neller ultimately opted to reject the third group’s proposals and instead synthesize the recommendations from the two formal groups into a hybrid COA that was later implemented. But the officer who led that third group would become a key part of the force design story a couple of years later.

In summary, the 2015-2018 period was characterized by heavy GFM sourcing demands that challenged Service readiness recovery, stretched resources and raised questions about the Marine Corps’ role and contribution to the joint force. Given all of our force allocations in CENTCOM, did the Marine Corps just exist to provide additional capacity for sustained operations ashore? Were we just a second, smaller land army? Compounding these concerns, many viewed our MCF 2025 modernization as too little, too late, and there was increased concern about the Marine Corps’ viability in a new era of great-power competition and high-end capabilities. If the Marine Corps was to survive in this new era, some thought, more radical change was needed.

This, I believe, was the first key seed of force design: a mini identity crisis. If we think of force design as a fire, this identity crisis provided the first key ingredient: the heat.

The Incubators of Force Design: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL)’s Concepts and Plans (CAP) Division and PP&O Plans Division’s Strategy Branch (PLS)

During General Neller’s commandancy, CAP was working hard to operationalize the MOC with new Service concepts to complement emerging naval concepts like Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE). The late Art Corbett was instrumental in this work. He and his team developed the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, which was viewed as both innovative and also deeply rooted in the Marine Corps’ early 20th century Advanced Base Force concept.

Up I-95 at the Pentagon, the lieutenant colonel who’d developed the radical MCF 2025 modernization COA was now a colonel leading the Strategy Branch within PP&O’s Plans Division. One of PLS’s key missions is to serve as the institutional architect for aligning broad national security guidance with Service strategy, posture and policies. In this vein, the PLS team carefully monitored the development of all strategic documents above and adjacent to the Marine Corps Service level. They often briefed key Service audiences on the evolution of strategic guidance, and they called out incongruencies between the Service’s force management/development priorities and what higher strategic guidance was signaling.

In 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis assembled a writing team to develop his National Defense Strategy (NDS). When the NDS was published in January 2018, it became a watershed document for the joint force, in that it drove a priority shift from the counterterrorism operations that had occupied the Services since 9/11 to a new era of great-power competition and conflict. Talented thinkers like Frank Hoffman and Elbridge Colby (now the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) participated in the development of the document, and . . .

. . . the colonel leading the PLS team used the document to argue for more radical change within the Service.

In 2017-2018, PLS routinely produced information papers that were intended to serve as think pieces for some on the HQMC staff and the MARFOR/MEF G-3/5 staffs. Some of the papers drew on the ideas of people like Thomas Kuhn to suggest that the Service was witnessing a paradigm shift in the character of war and needed to radically adapt or face the prospect of irrelevance and eventual extinction. The colonel produced a long paper for one of General Neller’s Executive Offsites (EOSs) that went into the read-ahead binders for all the 3-stars. PLS’s papers were well received by some but often viewed as too radical and heretical to gain widespread institutional support.

This, I believe, was the second key seed of force design: the sea change in strategic guidance for the joint force that some in the Marine Corps over-indexed and used as a basis to propose radical change to the composition of the MAGTF. If the identity crisis supplied the heat for the force design fire, the 2018 NDS, CAP’s work and the thinking incubated within PLS during this period supplied the fuel.

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END OF PART I, “What I Saw at the Revolution”

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What happened next when LtGen Berger arrived at Quantico? How did Force Design come to life? The answer and more will come tomorrow in “What I Saw at the Revolution” Part 2.

Compass Points salutes author and Marine, R.S. Hicks, for his account of the early roots of the Marine Corps’ misguided Force Design.

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Compass Points - New Pac Cmd?

Marine Corps Compass Points — Mon, 29 Jun 2026 16:39:13 GMT

Compass Points - New Pac Cmd?

Marines can now focus on crisis response.

June 29, 2026

The US faces a variety of threats, conflicts, and challenges around the world. It always has; it always will. To deter threats and respond to conflicts and challenges, the US requires a wide range of military capabilities. For the US, the Navy focuses on sea based capabilities, the Army on land based capabilities, the Air Force on sky based capabilities, and the Space Force on space based capabilities.

Only one US military service is defined, not by where it fights, but by how it fights. Traditionally, the US Marine Corps has been an always ready, first to fight, 9-1-1, crisis response force. Forward deployed around the globe, US Marines can arrive to any crisis prepared to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight. When a crisis erupts, the Marine Corps is ready, not with only a few special operators, but with a much larger, much more powerful air, ground, logistic force.

Some senior Marines, today, are deeply concerned by the US Army’s new command in the Pacific.

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U.S. Army Pacific has created a new command that will link Stryker brigades, long-range missile launchers, unmanned vessels and attack drones to break adversary area denial networks, such as those fielded by China.

Combining the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams of the 7th Infantry Division with the long-range precision fires, air defense and intelligence capabilities assigned to the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, the Multi-Domain Command – Pacific is the result of years of experimentation across the first island chain.

-- USNI News, “U.S. Army Stands Up New Command to Counter China’s Area Denial Strategy with Lethal Drones, Long-Range Missiles”

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The USNI news report goes on to describe how the Army’s new Multi-Domain Command - Pacific may help deter China.

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Beijing has heavily invested in denial networks, designed to counter the U.S. military’s conventional forces. Among the most pressing challenges facing American forces positioned along the first and second island chains are China’s vast arsenal of anti-ship cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles. These missile forces are further bolstered by increasingly modern and capable Chinese naval and air forces, which have been training east of the first island chain.

Any potential conflict between the U.S. and China, such as a Taiwan invasion, would have to contend with the People’s Liberation Army’s extensive long-range strike capabilities.

For the Army, countering these dilemmas has manifested in a plan that seeks to blind and paralyze the enemy from being able to mount a strike against American forces. A briefing at the 2026 Land Forces Pacific Symposium and Exposition last month from the Multi-Domain Command – Pacific’s deputy commander explained that the formation will be a “covering force” for American and allied units.

“[Multi-Domain Commands] are self-contained and operating independently from the main body, developing the situation, preventing enemy observation and preventing the enemy from directing indirect fires,” reads a service release.

-- USNI News, “U.S. Army Stands Up New Command to Counter China’s Area Denial Strategy with Lethal Drones, Long-Range Missiles”

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Why are some Marine Corps senior leaders so concerned by the Army’s new Multi-Domain Command - Pacific? The concern is for the last 7 years the Marine Corps has been focused on building its own chain of sensor and missile units off the coast of China. In those 7 long years, the Marine Corps has had very little success. Today, there is no operational chain of Marine sensor and missile units off the coast of China.

Instead of being concerned, Marine senior leaders should be elated. With the establishment of the Army’s Multi-Domain Command - Pacific, the Marine Corps, at last, can return its focus back to what the Nation needs the Marine Corps to focus on, global crisis response.

The military history of the United States, at least since the Korean War, reveals example after example of the power of Marine Corps crisis response. The Congress, in US Code Title 10 designated the Marine Corps to be the military experts in, “those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.”

What is crisis response? What are the requirements? The requirements for crisis response depend on the crisis. When the US regional combat commanders are faced with a crisis, they should be able to call on the Marine Corps to quickly arrive with the right force for that crisis.

Compass Points sought out one distinguished Marine with deep experience in crisis response and asked, ‘what is the essence of a crisis response force?’

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What Is a Crisis Response Force?

By General A.C. Zinni (USMC ret)

I have been involved in over a dozen crisis response operations. As a combatant commander, JTF commander, staff member, and operational planner, I have experienced how crisis response forces are organized, deployed, and employed. From those experiences, several key requirements stand out as necessary to be a true crisis response force:

-- Closure Time – To a combatant commander, time is a critical factor. Crises do not get better with time. You do not get much unambiguous warning, if any, when a response is required.

-- Deployability – A crisis response force must have a means to deploy that is in place, exercised, and ready to go. Forces should be trained, organized, and exercised to rapidly deploy.

-- Adaptability – We cannot anticipate the nature of crisis responses. The response force must be flexible and able to task-organize for multiple potential missions. Purpose‑designed organizations do not have the ability to adapt.

-- Ability to Expand the Force – Initial forces must be compatible and easily expandable to meet crises as they grow. Forces that are trained and can rapidly composite, especially with forward‑presence forces, and combine into a growing, larger force are ideal.

-- Fully Capable Force – The ability to meet the requirements of command and control, maneuver, fires, logistics, and intelligence should be inherent in the force.

-- Readiness – A crisis response force must maintain a constant state of readiness to deploy and do as much pre‑deployment preparation and planning as possible.

-- Mission Preparation – Combatant commands have a great sense of their areas of responsibility and the potential threats and crises that could arise. A crisis response force should have a planning relationship with COCOM and component commands to understand potential missions in each theater.

-- Exercise the Force – Crisis response forces need to exercise in potential theaters of operation and rehearse the potential missions they may face.

-- Spectrum of Conflict Missions – A crisis response force should be prepared for all types of potential missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to full combat operations or combinations of missions.

-- Joint and Combined Operations – The crisis response force should be capable of seamlessly expanding to a Combined/Joint Task Force.

-- General A.C. Zinni (USMC ret)

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Compass Points salutes General A.C. Zinni for his decades of service to Country and Corps. A career Marine infantry officer, General Zinni served as the Commander of US Central Command. Besides his ongoing work as an author, speaker, and policy advisor, General Zinni was written the definition of crisis response on the pages of Marine Corps history.

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USNI News - 06/22/2026

U.S. Army Stands Up New Command to Counter China’s Area Denial Strategy with Lethal Drones, Long-Range Missiles

By Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

https://news.usni.org/2026/06/22/u-s-army-stands-up-new-command-to-counter-chinas-area-denial-strategy-with-lethal-drones-long-range-missiles

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