To be clear and fair, the Statutory 31 amphibs are restricted by definition to amphibious warfare ships which is defined by this in the statute: "the term "amphibious warfare ship" means a ship that is classified as an amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA), an amphibious assault ship (multi-purpose) (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing ship (LSD).". (Source - uscode.house.gov)
Not to suggest the subject doesn't merit vigilance for 'tolerance' slip.
General - It appears we’ll get the LSM, like ‘em, or not. Seems to me a bit of unrepping will be needed as range is about 3,500 NM at 17 kts, and 7,500 NM at 10 kts. Do we have such an auxiliary capability?) Do these vessels have any add on capabilities that can provide some form of protection? One can almost imagine repelling boarding parties with broad swords, & cutlasses while wearing eye patches! Semper Fidelis!
While it'd be wonderful to have all the amphibious shipping needed to move our MAGTFs, will there be enough sailors to 'man' those ships? Seems we've, more-often-than-not, found the Navy unable to fully/properly staff the shipping we DO have.
I have noticed that Australia is building a nuclear submarine fleet when Australia is not a nuclear nation. Hmmm...Apparently, the deal is Great Britain builds the sub, the US equips the subs with our technology. The US also provides the technical expertise until Australia has the necessary knowledge to maintain their nuclear submarines.
The US President recently announce a plan to buy/build 11 icebreakers from Finland to cover the Arctic security mission. The believable boast is that Finland builds the best icebreakers in the world.
The US Navy is currently retiring the LSD fleet early. Why? The answer from a commenter on CP is “they are rotting from the inside out” and they don’t pass the return on investment test. Another reason is the US ship yards are backed logged and failing to meet contact deadlines.
We also have an ally that is 2nd in the global market (South Korea) for ship building (the PRC is first). Has the US Navy approached South Korea (or any other ally) to do the “return on investment test” to refurbishing a number of LSDs? It seems that if we could get some of the LSDs into maintenance (refurbishment), it would be beneficial for the Marine Corps and relieve some of the pressure on the US ship maintenance yards. Maybe, we then can get back to a four ship ARG/MEU or maybe Finland has an extra maintenance dock. S/F
So CMC Berger, in 2019, unilaterally ended the 38 amphib agreement. And divested the Corps of Armor, Artillery, and Air? Decided we needed to be island watchers with a useless missile and no plan of supply or egress? That General Berger? Seems to me General Berger and his follow-on , General Smith thought emasculation was the direction to take the Corps. How did we get two wrong-thinking commandants in a row? From 1980 through 2025 the Corps engaged in 22 major operations, 12 of which required the use of combat arms. That's 54% of the times the Corps has been dispatched on a major operation it required combat arms. The response from Generals Berger and Smith was to plan to make the USMC incapable of the mission that they were sent on 54% of the time. General Berger was commissioned in 1981, and General Smith was commissioned in 1987, so both were in service when the majority of these combat missions took place. It is an embarrassment to think that officers who led troops (both were infantry) would so poorly understand the mission and purpose of the Corps. It almost looks like FD was a purposeful act designed to damage the USMC. Sad.
The Reagan era LSD's are rapidly rotting out and need to be re-ligated to reserve service as still valuable well deck depot/base vessels.
The capacity could be restored by using two pairs of ESD/ESB ships that the Navy struggles to find a persistent value for. Instead of a dozen barely serviceable LSD's these four ships would materially re-inforce ARG's with a core LHA/LPD tandem. The other two ESB's are available for mine warfare and special forces support and perhaps far offshore air support for tiltrotors down to masses of missiles, rockets, and drones.
The next LHA is years away because the current capacity to build is poor. The situation with the LPD's is not much better. Moreover, the typical ARG with one of each type at its core has too many exquisite system complexes (to invent a term) and better rationalization of whole ARG's needs could be more efficiently and effectively served. Is it necessary to have one small squadron of manned jet fighters, or could the capacity be generated with one large squadron of CCA types ranging from 1-8 tons MTOW, further distributed among four hulls of LPD size ??? Add a big turbo-electric drive on a stretched 27-30,000t LPD to yield a future 40-ship/10-group force of 27knot Aviation Dock Cruisers (CVD), which could through fleet level autonomous aircraft and boat squadrons shift well to uncommon operations like ocean ASW escort.
Rationalizing down to one major type could leverage improvements in construction and design as well as wider sourcing of prime contractors and major supporting contractors. Specialized types based on the basic hullform and systems could scale in to practicality.
Right concept, wrong execution on the "battleships" though. The improved CVD vessel with four large very long 11" guns embedded in independent vertical gun houses in the center of the hull with a magazine of a thousand fed further by well deck supply barges is the present day iteration of the heavy fires battleship. Capable of delivering large sustained salvoes from intermediate to medium ranges, with a destroyer grade missile outfit a Ballistic Gun Cruiser (CBG) 4-ship force would provide strong support to amphibious and other offensive naval operations.
Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr. (1991–1995): 42–44 ships (Peak)
Gen. Charles C. Krulak (1995–1999): 41–42 ships (Decline begins)
Gen. James L. Jones (1999–2003): 39–40 ships
Gen. Michael W. Hagee (2003–2006): 37–38 ships
Gen. James T. Conway (2006–2010): 33–35 ships
Gen. James F. Amos (2010–2014): 31–33 ships
Gen. Joseph F. Dunford (2014–2015): 30–31 ships
Gen. Robert B. Neller (2015–2019): 30–32 ships
Gen. David H. Berger (2019–2023): 31 ships (Stabilized - set statutory floor as the Navy wanted to drop to mid twenties)
Gen. Eric M. Smith (2023–present): 31–32 ships (Poised to grow)
The AWS shortfall crisis began when Gen Krulak saw the number of ships drop under his watch; as did every other CMC until Gen Berger. He established the “no less than 31” statutory requirement. CMC is exploiting. Absolutely masterful.
Lots of happy talk from the 39th CMC about the need for 40 or more amphibious ships but the current ship building plan shows there is never more than 33 amphibious ships for the next ten years! (See page 43 of that plan.)
No excuses for the reason for abandoning the agreed upon 38 amphibious except the 38th CMC in his CPG said the requirement for a 2-MEB lift was removed. All the actions since then have been catch up.
“Happy talk” is what happened for decades while amphibious ship numbers steadily declined after Gen. Mundy.
Simply stating “the requirement is 38” while the actual fleet continued shrinking was noise without enforcement.
The historical reality is that every Commandant after Mundy presided over declining amphibious capacity until Gen. Berger established a minimum 31-ship floor tied to readiness assumptions and helped get it codified into law — preventing the Navy from dropping to 25 ships.
That was not abandoning amphibious capability. That was the first time in decades the decline was institutionally stopped.
Now Gen. Smith is openly pushing beyond that statutory floor toward the level required to sustain credible 3.0 ARG/MEU presence. The current discussion around “north of 31” and “closer to 40” is not evidence of retreat from Force Design — it is evidence that the Corps is simultaneously modernizing while restoring amphibious capacity.
You cannot honestly describe the current trajectory as “abandonment” when:
• the 31-ship floor is now law,
• ARG/MEU demand from Combatant Commanders is publicly driving force structure discussions,
• amphibious readiness has become a top Navy and Marine Corps priority,
• and senior leaders are actively arguing for growth beyond the statutory minimum.
That is not “happy talk.” That is materially different from what occurred over the previous three decades.
Numbers is relevant, but we don’t really cover if we have enough vehicle, cargo, aviation, and berthing in that mix. It would seem if we keep building bigger ships we should have more xapacity with fewer ships. In the sane way that might mean we need a smaller ship at some point to build numbers.
Hah, at our current rate, if there is an emergency, the Navy is going to wind up buy-an-deering a hundred Nordhavn's when a 'Little Ships' flotilla suddenly looks not so silly for a lack of other options...small ships/big numbers indeed.
Oh no, you're getting serious on me. I tend to think right now that the USN may be at risk in the Indo Pacom of suffering a "TF Falklands meets Evacuation of Dunkirk" with respect to needing something/anything/everything. Nordhavn 63 gave me a chuckle as a great COTS small solution (they have big legs for the Pacific) for the Little Ships of the 9 Dash Line. Thomaston is interesting...I wonder if at that size, an updated Newport LST wouldn't be better? They share some similar stats for load and speed...though the well deck on the LSD is more flexible for water based launch and recovery. Yeah, I know. I'm pretty bold about suggesting the big boy LST when I won't be cruising in it...
I think the Newports are a great answer so long as they can hit the beach and unload immediately. Its when they needed the barges which I think would be needed in the Ryukus at least if not in the Batanes. Plus, yeah, who wants to ride in one for a deployment. I'd rather have the wider beam of the LST for helo ops.
The Navy is already counting the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) as an amphibious ship - - not a support ship or auxiliary. According to the recent Navy Shipbuilding Plan, the LSMs are Battle Force Ships. You can check it out on pages 17, 18, 29, and 30 of the Plan. See https://media.defense.gov/2026/May/11/2003928909/-1/-1/1/NAVY%20SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20MAY%202026.PDF
To be clear and fair, the Statutory 31 amphibs are restricted by definition to amphibious warfare ships which is defined by this in the statute: "the term "amphibious warfare ship" means a ship that is classified as an amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA), an amphibious assault ship (multi-purpose) (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing ship (LSD).". (Source - uscode.house.gov)
Not to suggest the subject doesn't merit vigilance for 'tolerance' slip.
General - It appears we’ll get the LSM, like ‘em, or not. Seems to me a bit of unrepping will be needed as range is about 3,500 NM at 17 kts, and 7,500 NM at 10 kts. Do we have such an auxiliary capability?) Do these vessels have any add on capabilities that can provide some form of protection? One can almost imagine repelling boarding parties with broad swords, & cutlasses while wearing eye patches! Semper Fidelis!
While it'd be wonderful to have all the amphibious shipping needed to move our MAGTFs, will there be enough sailors to 'man' those ships? Seems we've, more-often-than-not, found the Navy unable to fully/properly staff the shipping we DO have.
Amphibs Again
I have noticed that Australia is building a nuclear submarine fleet when Australia is not a nuclear nation. Hmmm...Apparently, the deal is Great Britain builds the sub, the US equips the subs with our technology. The US also provides the technical expertise until Australia has the necessary knowledge to maintain their nuclear submarines.
The US President recently announce a plan to buy/build 11 icebreakers from Finland to cover the Arctic security mission. The believable boast is that Finland builds the best icebreakers in the world.
The US Navy is currently retiring the LSD fleet early. Why? The answer from a commenter on CP is “they are rotting from the inside out” and they don’t pass the return on investment test. Another reason is the US ship yards are backed logged and failing to meet contact deadlines.
We also have an ally that is 2nd in the global market (South Korea) for ship building (the PRC is first). Has the US Navy approached South Korea (or any other ally) to do the “return on investment test” to refurbishing a number of LSDs? It seems that if we could get some of the LSDs into maintenance (refurbishment), it would be beneficial for the Marine Corps and relieve some of the pressure on the US ship maintenance yards. Maybe, we then can get back to a four ship ARG/MEU or maybe Finland has an extra maintenance dock. S/F
Class Hull Number Ship Name Status
Whidbey Island LSD 41 USS Whidbey Island Retired
Whidbey Island LSD 42 USS Germantown Retired
Whidbey Island LSD 43 USS Fort McHenry Active
Whidbey Island LSD 44 USS Gunston Hall Active
Whidbey Island LSD 45 USS Comstock Active
Whidbey Island LSD 46 USS Tortuga Active
Whidbey Island LSD 47 USS Rushmore Active
Whidbey Island LSD 48 USS Ashland Active
Harpers Ferry LSD 49 USS Harpers Ferry Active
Harpers Ferry LSD 50 USS Carter Hall Active
Harpers Ferry LSD 51 USS Oak Hill Active
Harpers Ferry LSD 52 USS Pearl Harbor Active
So CMC Berger, in 2019, unilaterally ended the 38 amphib agreement. And divested the Corps of Armor, Artillery, and Air? Decided we needed to be island watchers with a useless missile and no plan of supply or egress? That General Berger? Seems to me General Berger and his follow-on , General Smith thought emasculation was the direction to take the Corps. How did we get two wrong-thinking commandants in a row? From 1980 through 2025 the Corps engaged in 22 major operations, 12 of which required the use of combat arms. That's 54% of the times the Corps has been dispatched on a major operation it required combat arms. The response from Generals Berger and Smith was to plan to make the USMC incapable of the mission that they were sent on 54% of the time. General Berger was commissioned in 1981, and General Smith was commissioned in 1987, so both were in service when the majority of these combat missions took place. It is an embarrassment to think that officers who led troops (both were infantry) would so poorly understand the mission and purpose of the Corps. It almost looks like FD was a purposeful act designed to damage the USMC. Sad.
The Reagan era LSD's are rapidly rotting out and need to be re-ligated to reserve service as still valuable well deck depot/base vessels.
The capacity could be restored by using two pairs of ESD/ESB ships that the Navy struggles to find a persistent value for. Instead of a dozen barely serviceable LSD's these four ships would materially re-inforce ARG's with a core LHA/LPD tandem. The other two ESB's are available for mine warfare and special forces support and perhaps far offshore air support for tiltrotors down to masses of missiles, rockets, and drones.
The next LHA is years away because the current capacity to build is poor. The situation with the LPD's is not much better. Moreover, the typical ARG with one of each type at its core has too many exquisite system complexes (to invent a term) and better rationalization of whole ARG's needs could be more efficiently and effectively served. Is it necessary to have one small squadron of manned jet fighters, or could the capacity be generated with one large squadron of CCA types ranging from 1-8 tons MTOW, further distributed among four hulls of LPD size ??? Add a big turbo-electric drive on a stretched 27-30,000t LPD to yield a future 40-ship/10-group force of 27knot Aviation Dock Cruisers (CVD), which could through fleet level autonomous aircraft and boat squadrons shift well to uncommon operations like ocean ASW escort.
Rationalizing down to one major type could leverage improvements in construction and design as well as wider sourcing of prime contractors and major supporting contractors. Specialized types based on the basic hullform and systems could scale in to practicality.
Right concept, wrong execution on the "battleships" though. The improved CVD vessel with four large very long 11" guns embedded in independent vertical gun houses in the center of the hull with a magazine of a thousand fed further by well deck supply barges is the present day iteration of the heavy fires battleship. Capable of delivering large sustained salvoes from intermediate to medium ranges, with a destroyer grade missile outfit a Ballistic Gun Cruiser (CBG) 4-ship force would provide strong support to amphibious and other offensive naval operations.
30 years ago I thought a vertical gun in a hull was brilliant. Now, I know better.
Amphibious Warship Fleet Size by Commandant
(Active L-class ships: LHAs, LHDs, LPDs, LSDs)
Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr. (1991–1995): 42–44 ships (Peak)
Gen. Charles C. Krulak (1995–1999): 41–42 ships (Decline begins)
Gen. James L. Jones (1999–2003): 39–40 ships
Gen. Michael W. Hagee (2003–2006): 37–38 ships
Gen. James T. Conway (2006–2010): 33–35 ships
Gen. James F. Amos (2010–2014): 31–33 ships
Gen. Joseph F. Dunford (2014–2015): 30–31 ships
Gen. Robert B. Neller (2015–2019): 30–32 ships
Gen. David H. Berger (2019–2023): 31 ships (Stabilized - set statutory floor as the Navy wanted to drop to mid twenties)
Gen. Eric M. Smith (2023–present): 31–32 ships (Poised to grow)
The AWS shortfall crisis began when Gen Krulak saw the number of ships drop under his watch; as did every other CMC until Gen Berger. He established the “no less than 31” statutory requirement. CMC is exploiting. Absolutely masterful.
Lots of happy talk from the 39th CMC about the need for 40 or more amphibious ships but the current ship building plan shows there is never more than 33 amphibious ships for the next ten years! (See page 43 of that plan.)
No excuses for the reason for abandoning the agreed upon 38 amphibious except the 38th CMC in his CPG said the requirement for a 2-MEB lift was removed. All the actions since then have been catch up.
“Happy talk” is what happened for decades while amphibious ship numbers steadily declined after Gen. Mundy.
Simply stating “the requirement is 38” while the actual fleet continued shrinking was noise without enforcement.
The historical reality is that every Commandant after Mundy presided over declining amphibious capacity until Gen. Berger established a minimum 31-ship floor tied to readiness assumptions and helped get it codified into law — preventing the Navy from dropping to 25 ships.
That was not abandoning amphibious capability. That was the first time in decades the decline was institutionally stopped.
Now Gen. Smith is openly pushing beyond that statutory floor toward the level required to sustain credible 3.0 ARG/MEU presence. The current discussion around “north of 31” and “closer to 40” is not evidence of retreat from Force Design — it is evidence that the Corps is simultaneously modernizing while restoring amphibious capacity.
You cannot honestly describe the current trajectory as “abandonment” when:
• the 31-ship floor is now law,
• ARG/MEU demand from Combatant Commanders is publicly driving force structure discussions,
• amphibious readiness has become a top Navy and Marine Corps priority,
• and senior leaders are actively arguing for growth beyond the statutory minimum.
That is not “happy talk.” That is materially different from what occurred over the previous three decades.
Numbers is relevant, but we don’t really cover if we have enough vehicle, cargo, aviation, and berthing in that mix. It would seem if we keep building bigger ships we should have more xapacity with fewer ships. In the sane way that might mean we need a smaller ship at some point to build numbers.
Hah, at our current rate, if there is an emergency, the Navy is going to wind up buy-an-deering a hundred Nordhavn's when a 'Little Ships' flotilla suddenly looks not so silly for a lack of other options...small ships/big numbers indeed.
I am thinking a Thomaston class size LSD, but in your example they should grab fast supply vessels. Or make a manned Marine version of a MUSV,
Oh no, you're getting serious on me. I tend to think right now that the USN may be at risk in the Indo Pacom of suffering a "TF Falklands meets Evacuation of Dunkirk" with respect to needing something/anything/everything. Nordhavn 63 gave me a chuckle as a great COTS small solution (they have big legs for the Pacific) for the Little Ships of the 9 Dash Line. Thomaston is interesting...I wonder if at that size, an updated Newport LST wouldn't be better? They share some similar stats for load and speed...though the well deck on the LSD is more flexible for water based launch and recovery. Yeah, I know. I'm pretty bold about suggesting the big boy LST when I won't be cruising in it...
I think the Newports are a great answer so long as they can hit the beach and unload immediately. Its when they needed the barges which I think would be needed in the Ryukus at least if not in the Batanes. Plus, yeah, who wants to ride in one for a deployment. I'd rather have the wider beam of the LST for helo ops.