Compass Points – Balanced MAGTF
Time to upgrade and restore.
January 29, 2024
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There is a growing discussion about the Marine MAGTF. In recent years the Marine Corps has taken its focus off the global MAGTF and focused instead on small units of Marines on islands in the Pacific. What is the future of the MAGTF? Can it still be the powerful, flexible, crisis response force it was created to be? Compass Points invited General Krulak and General Zinni to discuss their view of the MAGTF and the future.
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THE NEED TO REBALANCE THE MAGTF
Charles C. Krulak and Anthony C. Zinni
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The crown jewel of the Marine Corps has been the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It was built to as a balanced combined arms team, easily tailored for any crisis or contingency. The close integration of the diverse elements gives the MAGTF a unique synergy and flexibility not found in rigid, fixed organizations.
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We have seen recent senior Marine Corps leaders unwisely degrade this critical national security treasure in pursuit of the so called “pacing threat.” They purposely gutted the MAGTF’s balanced organization and its expeditionary and rapid deployment capabilities. The rush to divest the MAGTF of needed and proven capabilities has created a dangerous void in our Nation’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to global crises and contingencies as recent events demonstrate. The Marine Corps and the Navy must rebuild and rebalance the crisis response force it once had.
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Those who were part of developing the MAGTF, witnessed the evolution of a unique combined arms force ideally suited for deterrence and global crisis response. Despite external pressures to “purpose design” the Corps or focus on one threat or region, these leaders opted for a unique global orientation and a flexible and scalable structure geared to be highly ready, quickly deployable, responsive, and effective across the spectrum of conflict. This was the nation’s 9-1-1 force. The key to such a force was then and continues to be maintaining a balanced air-ground-logistics team.
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The capability to meet unpredicted mission assignments at a moment’s notice coupled with the ability to operate within an unforeseen battlespace, requires a force possessing five resilient functions. These are the organic capabilities that enable the MAGTF to effectively maneuver, sense, fire, command and control, and logistically support its own operations and those of joint or combined elements under its control.
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Our previous leaders created a MAGTF on four levels, each with its own basic balanced structure and ability to combine with other forces or other MAGTFs to scale up (composite) to meet mission requirements. These levels were and remain the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and the Special Purpose MAGTF. Through design, training, and doctrine, these balanced forces could deploy and composite to meet any requirement. These forces possessed a balanced set of ground maneuver, air and indirect fires, sensing, logistics and engineering, and command and control capabilities.
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Balanced MAGTF’s could be employed as a corps-size force built around a multi-division ground combat element, or a brigade size force as an amphibious or Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), or a forward deployed MEU that is constantly deployed and positioned to immediately respond to crises. They could reinforce each with a ready fly-in echelon or an Air Contingency/Alert Force. These forces easily composited to form a larger force to gain the synergistic advantage of a balanced organization. The balanced MAGTF was expeditionary, capable of operating from sea bases or in sustained operations ashore.
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The essential components of a balanced MAGTF remain its air, ground, and logistics elements. Air elements, with fixed, tilt and rotary wing aircraft must be capable of operating from ships or specially designed expeditionary airfields. They must be capable of performing six designated functions: offensive air support, anti-air warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. Ground elements, consisting of infantry, artillery, armor, light armor, and combat engineers, must be trained and capable of task organized employment as light, medium, or heavy forces. Logistics elements must be capable of supporting the combined arms forces with supply requirements, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other combat service support. The command elements must be trained and capable of providing the necessary command and control for a wide variety of missions.
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The glue holding this organization together are the Marines, expert in combined arms, fire support coordination, and joint and combined operations. MAGTF officers must earn their spurs aboard amphibious ships, and when possible, alongside maritime prepositioning squadrons carrying equipment for a carefully structured brigade. Aviation officers must understand ground combat. Infantry officers must understand aviation operations. Logistics officers must understand combined arms. These qualifications are gained through experience, training, and education in MAGTF operations.
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In this age of advanced sensors and weapons with increased range and lethality, as well as the potential for replicators, onsite logistics, and 3D printing, the need for rebalancing becomes even more apparent.
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Now is the time for Marine leaders to work with the Congress as they take the steps needed to rebuild and rebalance the MAGTF.
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--General Charles C. Krulak, USMC, (ret) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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--General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, (ret) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as the Commander, US Central Command.
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Compass Points thanks General Krulak and General Zinni for their timely warning on the need to rebuild the MAGTF.
The ”Group Think” of Wargamers, Futurist and Costal/AI Elephant Defense
https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/trends-in-maritime-challenges-indicate-force-design-2030-is-the-proper-path/#:~:text=However%2C%20given%20what%27s%20in%20the,lighter%2C%20but%20lethal%2C%20mix%20of
I agree with Samuel W’s opinion of the above article. A quick review of the authors shows that they are smart guys but, in my opinion, the 2030 Design is a product of a group think. We now know a little something about the 2030 Design perpetrators (not illegal, maybe “USMC” immoral, but definitely harmful).
Thinking about the future of warfighting is important. This crew’s thinking, however, is more in the 2050 category vs 2030. First 2030 Design did not follow the Joint Strategic Planning Guidance leaving the Commandant open to Congressional questions and criticisms. No one can predict the future of war fighting accurately nor the counters to breakthrough warfighting technologies. For that reason you have to build a flexible fighting organization that can rapidly adapt and I am thinking the beauty of the MAGTF here.
We are currently watching Red Sea Arliegh-Burke Destroyers counter the missile based A2AD strategy. Yes the Army and Marine Corps were distracted by the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fortunately the US Navy was not and stayed focus on the A2AD problem.
Commandant’s mistake was the decision to trade combat power for experimental tactical techniques produced by a group think. I say group think because the only justification for the implementation of 2030 Design was a set of classified war games use to discourage creative thinking.
In 2016 the British Government conducted an Inquiry (multi-volume and 100s of pages) to determine how they got involved in the Iraq War. The inquiry was not flattering of the decision that got their commitment to the Iraq war. The simple answer was their government and military policy makers fell victim to group think. The British Defense Ministry produced a document that condensed the inquiry: “The Good Operation; A handbook for those involved in operational policy and its implementation.” The good news is the handbook offers a remedy for group think called a “Reasonable Challenge”:
“The Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot) Report tells us that it’s important to avoid ‘groupthink’ as we develop policy, and the best antidote to that is reasonable challenge. An environment in which challenge is expected and accepted is important. People should be receptive to reasonable challenge and assume that it is provided with the best of intentions, while those offering challenge should know how to do so effectively. Challenge isn’t about proving someone right or wrong; rather it’s about highlighting and exploring alternative options. These cultures and behaviors reflect a healthy organization and we have created the following guide to support their development.” P.62
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81f19440f0b62305b91a48/TheGoodOperation_WEB.PDF
I don’t think that the Commandant or the 2030 Design Staff allowed or accepted a “Reason Challenge”. I think the Commandant backed the wrong crew and I will take the names like Krulak, Zinni, Wilhelm and Van Riper over his crew any day. Semper Fi
PS: If you are wondering about “AI Elephants” here is a paper by Brian Strom explaining: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1178260.pdf
It is important paper, will thought out and should be read by any Marine Corps futurist.
Please use your preferred browser and look up this amateurish, nauseating, sycophantic word salad. War on the Rocks 29 Jan 2024
TRENDS IN MARITIME CHALLENGES INDICATE FORCE DESIGN 2030 IS THE PROPER PATH
C. TRAVIS REESE, IAN BROWN, ZACH OTA, TRAVIS HORD, LEO SPAEDER, AND BRIAN STROM
JANUARY 29, 2024