Compass Points – Beyond Just Theory
The Battle of Dai Do and FD 2030
The study of actual combat helps to ground discussions of theory. Every conflict has its own unique aspects, but war also confirms lessons learned again and again. Compass Points will have much to say about Ukraine in the coming months. All military engagements, properly studied, provide a wealth of lessons for those interested in national security.
Marine Corps decisions made in conference rooms before the fighting in Vietnam, ensued Marines were ready for that challenge. Will the decisions being made in conference rooms today, ensure Marines are ready for the next challenge?
In their article, The Battle of Dai Do and Marine Corps Force Design 2030, Major General Livingston and Col Vargas examine the theory of Force Design against the battle of Dai Do.
Marine Corps Gazette (mca-marines.org) August 2022
The Battle of Dai Do and Marine Corps Force Design 2030
Looking at future operating concepts through the lens of past battles
By James Livingston and Jay Vargas
“For those who fight for it, life has a flavor the sheltered will never know.”
This quote, often attributed to Theodore Roosevelt, was reportedly posted on a handmade sign at the Khe Sanh Marine Base, Vietnam in 1968. Battles may be shaped deep, but they are decided up close. The two Marine Corps operational concepts most touted today as visionary (Force Design 2030 and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) are almost exclusively focused on long-range, precision rockets and missiles to win future battles. Marine infantry and the close and rear battles are virtually ignored.
The neglect of the close and rear battles is baffling for anyone who knows and appreciates Marine Corps history. The dogma that long-range, precision rockets and missiles can win future battles by themselves is even more perplexing. The conviction that Marines need only watch computer screens and push buttons to dominate the enemy, while appealing to some, will not survive first contact. It is an illusion based on a fundamental misunderstanding of warfighting. It is dangerous.
. . . Unless you have experienced prolonged close combat against a significantly larger and determined enemy, at times hand-to-hand and under almost constant artillery and mortar fire, you may wrongly assume that Marine infantry can fight and win without the help of robust and immediately available supporting arms. Long-range rockets and missiles are not substitutes for strong infantry battalions, sufficient cannon artillery, attack helicopters, and armor, capabilities that are essential to enable and sustain the close and rear fight.
Those of us who have fought a determined, much larger, and superbly equipped enemy have a deep, special, and abiding appreciation for artillery, close air, naval gunfire, and armor. But more than anything else, we have the undying admiration and respect for Marine infantry, whose fighting spirit, bravery, and tenacity are a national treasure. We know all this from experience.
For three days (30April, 1 May, and 2 May) in 1968, 2/4 Mar, the “Magnificent Bastards,” fought one of the fiercest, hotly contested but little-known battles of the Vietnam War. The battle was fought to keep 3rd MarDiv headquarters in northern Quang Tri Province from being overrun.
Outnumbered six-to- one or more at times, the Magnificent Bastards, fewer than 1,000 Marines, crippled three full regiments of the North Vietnamese 320th Division (estimated at 6,000-10,000 regular North Vietnamese [NVA] soldiers) during the Battle of Dai Do, sometimes known as the Battle of Dong Ha.
The Marines ultimately prevailed, but after suffering casualties so significant that most of the battalion’s four companies (Echo, Foxtrot, Golf, and Hotel) were reduced to fewer than 50 men per company. Those of us fortunate enough to survive owe our lives to our fellow Marines and to supporting arms. . . .
MajGen Livingston is a career Infantry Officer. He was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as the Commanding Officer, Company E, 2/4 Mar during the Battle of Dai Do.
Col Vargas is a career Infantry Officer. He was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as the Commanding Officer, Company G, 2/4 Mar during the Battle of Dai Do.
https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Livingston-Vargas-Aug22-WEB-REVISED-for-posting.pdf
I’m not sure 2/4 would be able to protect their division headquarters these days. Wouldn’t the North Vietnamese use long range indirect fires rather than infantry regiments if they located a division headquarters?
How would this fight change in light of advances in warfighting today? Add precision munitions, UAS, EW, etc on both sides....I would suggest that the nature of the fight would still remain the same. Units would be spread out more on average, they might have better awareness, they would move faster in time and space. They still would want "the close, continuous, and accurate support provided by artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed wing aviation, and naval gunfire. Marine tanks..." in addition to more UAS, CUAS, precision munitions, and EW capability. It would remain a contest of maximizing the strength of the Marines while maximizing the weakness and vulnerability of the NVA (from the Marine perspective).