Compass Points - Broken Chain

The Dutch East Indies Campaign

Compass Points - Broken Chain

The Dutch East Indies Campaign

July 13, 2024

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Beginning in the summer of 2019, the Marine Corps began to focus on a plan to place small missile units of Marines on isolated islands along the first island chain. In theory these Marines once in place would deter China. In five years of effort, the Marine Corps has no new missile units established on any Pacific island. Even if the Marine defensive units were in place and ready to fire on Chinese ships, would this approach work? Would China be deterred? And if open war erupted, would this neo–Maginot Line of small Marine defensive units defeat an attack? One way to answer the question is to look at World War II. Early in the war, the US and allied forces were faced with a powerful peer or near-peer adversary, the empire of Japan.

On Sunday morning December 7, 1941 Japanese forces not only bombed the US Pacific fleet at Hawaii's Pearl Harbor, Japan also struck Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Thailand, Shanghai and Midway. From that date, the Japanese military swept across the Pacific, suffering no substantial defeat until May 7-8, 1942 when Japan suffered its first defeat of the war during the Battle of the Coral Sea off New Guinea.

During these early months, the allies in the Dutch East Indies desperately tried to use a defensive, island chain strategy to halt the Japanese advance.

Compass Points reader, Polarbear, reviews the campaign for the Dutch East Indies.

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Polarbear

Japanese Naval Blitz of the Netherlands East Indies

or

How the Dutch Island Chain Strategy gets Blitzed!

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There has been a lot of criticism of the “Island Chain Defense” strategy. A major question: Is it really a military strategy? Another criticism is the “Maginot Line” defensive nature of the strategy that concedes the offense to the enemy. All defenses have gaps and weak points that can be exploited. Defensive lines can be penetrated and “rolled up”. The nature of naval warfare’s strategic mobility provides offensive opportunities not only to exploit gaps but also to isolate and neutralize by passed enemy forces.

The US Marine Corps role should be the capture of advanced bases and airfields to support the control of SLOCs. Reorganizing the Marine Corps to reduce combat power in order to experiment with the development and employment of anti-ship missiles with the excuse of increasing lethality is an extremely bad idea.

There is an example from the Pacific in World War II, where the island chain defense failed miserably. The Japanese naval blitz of the Dutch East Indies was a planned multi-operation campaign that was executed like clockwork.

First, look at this map that shows the offensive maneuver of the campaign:

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII%20Asia/ww2%2520asia%2520map%252010.jpg

Second, for some strategic context see: Campaign: Blitzkrieg in South East Asia - Japan's Conquest of Indonesia Animated (youtube.com)

www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpKTJGUSg6A

Third, for a longer discussion see, The Netherlands East Indies Campaign 1941-42, A Quest for Oil by Marc Lohnstewin; Osprey Publishing.

The December 1942 Pearl Harbor attack kicked off the Japanese War Plan, consisting of three major campaigns: Malaya, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies. Why the Dutch East Indies? Japan desperately needed the East Indies natural resources, primarily oil followed by rubber, tin and bauxite (alumina).

The Japanese also planned the Philippines and Malaya Campaigns to provide staging areas to launch the attack in the Dutch Islands. On Dec 8, 1941 Japanese conducted an air raid on Singapore. On Dec 9, the Prince of Wales (battleship) and Repulse (cruiser) Task Force departs Singapore without air cover to intercept the Japanese Malaya invasion force. Because the British Task Force Commander thought he lost the element of surprise, he ordered the task force return to Singapore. On 10 Dec, both the Prince of Wales and the Repulse are sunk by Japanese air attacks. The British defensive concerns now focused on Singapore and India, and they basically abandon their possession of Northern Borneo. Dec 16—24, the Japanese landed and occupy Northern Borneo.

The stage is now set for the take down of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch knew the Japanese were coming. The Dutch Commander set three defensive lines, an island chain, running west to east, building airfields and bases to support each defensive line. The Dutch declared war on Japan Dec 8 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor. Japan declares war on Netherlands on Jan 11, 1942 and makes their first landing on Borneo and Celebes.

Going from West to East: the chain of the 1st defensive line starts on the northern tip of Sumatra with the Sabang, Lo Nia and Medan Airfields. Then the chain moves east to Borneo with the airfield at Tanakan on the northern tip. The next link is Langoan Airfield on the northern tip of Celebes Island. And the next link in the chain is the island of North Maluku with the Djailolo Airfield. Finally, the 1st Island Chain defense finishes on the north tip of Western New Guinea with the Babo Airfield.

The 2nd defensive chain starts in the middle of the Island of Sumatra at the Pakan Barne Airfield; stretches to the Singkwang II Airfield on the western side of Borneo to the Samarinda II Airfield on the eastern side of the Borneo Island (both of these airfields were “secret”); from there to the southern Celebes airfield at Kendari II; Ambon is the next island with the Laha and Namlea Airfields. At Ambon the defensive line takes a hard right to the southwest to Timor Island.

The 3rd and final defensive line is the Island of Java that contains the government seat, key Naval and Army bases and commercial centers. For these reasons the final Japanese objective was the Island of Java.

The Japanese started the Campaign on 11 Jan 1942 with landings and capture of the airfield on Borneo (Tarakan) and landings (and parachute assault) on Celebes (Menado). The capture of the airfields are wrapped up in approximately 48 hours. The capture of these airfields also represents the breaching of the first defensive chain.

On 24 Jan the next operation began to capture the airfields at Balikpapan (Borneo) and Kendari (Celebes Island). Kendari was a quick capture. Balikpapan was an important oil port on eastern Borneo and the assault there was delayed for three days. The delay was caused by the delayed preparation of the Tarakan Airfield that was captured on Jan 11. On 15 Jan the America-British-Dutch Australian Command (ABDACOM) is formed and counter attacks with naval forces and air attacks on the Japanese transports headed for Balikpapan. Air attacks sink two and damage three transports, a seaplane tender and a destroyer. A Dutch submarine sinks a transport. After the Japanese landing boats depart for landing, four American destroyers catch the Japanese transports at anchor, sinking four and damaging two transports. With the Japanese landing complete, Balikpapan is captured with its damaged oil facilities. With the completion of the Balikpapan Operation the second defensive island chain is penetrated and Java is within Japanese bomber and fighter range.

The Japanese then completes the isolation of Java, taking Ambon Island on 31 Jan. On 19 Feb a Japanese Carrier Task Force attacks the Port of Darwin to prevent the Allies from using Darwin as a base to contest the invasion of Timor and Java. The attack kills 236, wounding 300-400, 30 aircraft destroyed, 11 vessels sunk, 3 vessels grounded, and 25 ships damaged. Timor was captured on 20 Feb. On 14 Feb the first landings and parachute assaults are conducted on southern Sumatra to capture Palembang. On 27 Feb the Battle of Java Sea results in significant Allie losses: 2 light cruisers sunk, 3 destroyers sunk, 1 heavy cruiser damages and 2300 sailors killed. Also the USS Langley (carrying a cargo of fighters) is sunk south of Java.

On Mar 1 the Japanese offensive to capture Java commences. On 12 Mar Allied Force on Java surrender. The final surrender of Dutch forces on Sumatra occurs on 28 Mar. Tada! The Japan military, in less than 90 days, secured a strategic oil supply and the southern approaches to the South China Sea. They accomplished this in a series of coordinated economy of force operations on a planned and well executed timeline that quickly shattered the island chain defense.

-- Polarbear

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Compass Points thanks reader Polarbear for providing a powerful example of the limits of an island chain defense. Should the US Marine Corps today focus on sitting and waiting on defense along an island chain? Or should the Marine Corps keep its focus on "locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver?" Congress should ask themselves the question, and should also ask the Marine Corps.