Marine Corps Compass Points

Marine Corps Compass Points

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polarbear's avatar
polarbear
Dec 18Edited

This article appeared on Real Clear Politics Defense a few days ago. “Taiwan and Mahan: What Determines Seapower?”

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwan-and-mahan-what-determines-seapower-213928

IMHO opinion a worthwhile read regarding Naval Strategy. Mahan advance Clausewitz’s land based strategy into the realm of Naval Strategy, hence the establishment of the decisive naval battle strategy in order to exercise sea control. There is an alternate naval strategy establish by the noted Naval Strategist Julian Corbett based on his historical study books of England in the Seven Year’s War, Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War 1904–05 and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. The eye opener for this paper is the single statement; “The conventional wisdom, which is almost certainly in alignment with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s wishful thinking, is naval historian Julian Corbett’s proposition that local and temporary sea control is sufficient for producing a strategic effect.” Corbett’s take on sea control is command of the sea is a relative concept, not an absolute one. Corbett distinguished between general and local, temporary and permanent control. If we ignore the words of “wishful thinking” in the above statement, my question is: Has the CCP adopted the naval strategy of Corbett?

This statistical study (which is not complete) is “A survey of every war with a significant naval campaign since 1200 validates the theory of nineteenth-century naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan that a decisive naval battle dramatically increases the prospects of winning a war.” However, the author’s thesis is the US must ”resist the temptation to use its blue-water fleet to intercept a sudden Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan proper and instead concentrate on luring China’s fleet into a decisive battle under more favorable circumstances… Furthermore, the United States should not risk its blue water fleet, which needed to enforce a blockade, against a regional brown water fleet, the possible outcome of which could be a Chinese victory and the United States’ loss of naval supremacy in the Pacific.”

This study created three datasets. “The first comprises seventy-five wars involving a major maritime theatre, coded with thirty-one variables, ranging from the 1213-14 Anglo-French War to the 1982 Falklands War… The second dataset is drawn from Colomb’s 1891 Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practices. Its units of analysis are the seventy-one planned amphibious landings, executed or not, between the Spanish Armada of 1588 to the 1879–1883 War of the Pacific … The third dataset consists of ninety-three planned modern amphibious operations from the Japanese landings at Wuhan in 1938 to the 2012 Kismayo Battle between Kenya and Somalia and primarily focused on the U.S. Pacific Theatre of the Second World War.” Impressive to say the least.

A question that pops into my head after reading this article is how can two Canadian academics beat the US military analysis companies (CSIS, ISW, etc.) and military education systems (NWC and the USMC University) to a timely study like this? Has the NWC and the USMC University ask for access to these databases? The authors state “All of these datasets are freely available by email on the condition that improvements are shared with the authors.”

The author’s thesis is the US must ”resist the temptation to use its blue-water fleet to intercept a sudden Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan proper and instead concentrate on luring China’s fleet into a decisive battle under more favorable circumstances.” The study historical statistics shows that the CCP has a 5% chance of achieving a surprise invasion of Taiwan… and “a 24 percent likelihood of being undeterred and taking the risk of conducting an amphibious attack against Taiwan. There is a further 24 percent likelihood that the United States would unadvisedly intercept, in which case China would have only an 11 percent chance of capturing Taiwan using only local sea control. If the conquest of Taiwan is successful, then China has a 17 percent chance of being able to leverage its new bases against any approach by the U.S. Navy.”

As I stated before, what got my attention is the authors statement: “The conventional wisdom, which is almost certainly in alignment with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s wishful thinking, is naval historian Julian Corbett’s proposition that local and temporary sea control is sufficient for producing a strategic effect.” Julian Corbett’s thesis on Naval Strategy is very different from Mahan’s decisive battle strategy. I remember a gentlemen by the name of Bill Lind recommending that all Marine Officers should read Corbett’s book: England in the Seven Year’s War (the first Global War) that demonstrates how to win a war by controlling the SLOCs vs the decisive battle. I have to wonder if Col John Boyd (and USMC Warfighting Doctrine) would be more comfortable with Corbett than with Mahan. Seems to me the flexibility and adaptability of the MAGTF is the best counter to either Mahan or Corbett. I am also beginning to wonder if the CCP is reading Corbett.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.'s avatar
Charles Wemyss, Jr.
Dec 18

This post certainly highlights why a real hard look at not only ongoing procurement, but future process's for procurement, for the Corps and DOD in the main need to be looked at in a stern manner.

First the good news. Marines will get an increase in pay and apparently a cost of living expense increase. It would appear some admission that the Navy ergo the Marine Corps needs more amphibious lift. So more dollars for ships. But, caveat, not really more, just newer. Net net? Zero gain? Happy to be schooled up, if this an incorrect understanding. The new fixed wing aircraft, doesn't fly well. Hmmm billions for a jet that doesn't fly well. How long before someone somewhere is held accountable? Right, don't hold out collective breath.

Better news, the LSM is dead for the moment. Making SIF and MLR harder to justify. Fear not the consultants are standing by, to advise that we really need armor, artillery, engineers etc., so let's go dialing for those dollars! It would seem to make FD2030 harder to justify and execute. Fear not the same guy that brought you "Being a Marine is bonus enough" is unlikely to admit the error of the plan.

As the specter of a new administration looms, and much talk has been generated about the use of fiscal disciplines for the Federal Government, is there anything in this post that says, we don't need a DOGE, or OMB, or GAO (the good ole honest GAO, we can trust them, they're not like the others!), that we don't need just a top to bottom, bottom to top review of a nearly trillion dollar annual defense budget? Further to Douglas Rape's analogy about a brick in the wall, a good house builder knows in his head, even before looking at the detail plans, what the house is going to look like when finished. What is our house going to look like when finished? When it is said the military can't run like a business that is sort of true, but a military as an entity must be held to a very much higher standard than most businesses. How can a military that cannot count, maintain, retain or care for the resources it is allocated, be trusted with more of those precious resources? It apparently can not, so now the wise guys are coming in to hold it accountable. People are not going to like the down sizing. Let's hope General Victor Krulak was correct, and American's will want a Marine Corps when all is said and done.

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