Compass Points - Can Allies Help?
Foreign allies have shipyards too.
Compass Points - Can Allies Help?
Foreign allies have shipyards too.
May 16, 2026
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As the US Commander-in-Chief returns from a visit to China, one thing has not changed. The US military needs more Navy ships available both to guard the Western Hemisphere and to deter and respond to US adversaries around the world.
The most important ships for the Marine Corps include both Navy amphibious ships, as well as pre-positioning support ships.
The acting Secretary of the Navy, Hung Cao, went to Congress on May 14, 2026, to explain that to build as many new ships as fast as possible, it will require not only expanding US ship construction, but also tapping ship building support from our allies.
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Cao told lawmakers that the service needed 540,000 jobs to build the ships in the Navy pipeline. He also stated that a youth movement in the U.S. was needed to bring the workforce up to where it needed to be to address demand.
The acting secretary said the Navy was not investing in foreign shipbuilding, but rather exploring whether foreign models would work for the U.S. fleet, especially with some foreign shipbuilders churning out one to two destroyers a year.
The Navy’s shipbuilding plan said that the service would “evaluate overseas options and whether allied and partner shipbuilding can supplement domestic production if U.S. industry cannot meet required timelines.”
-- Defense News
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The Marine Corps needs more amphibious ships, the ships that transport Marines around the globe for crisis response. The Navy and Marine Corps have long struggled to put enough amphibious ships on the water. That struggle was made much worse back in 2019 when the new Marine Commandant, General Berger, abruptly tore up the long term agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps for enough amphibious ships for a ‘two MEB lift.’
With the long term agreement suddenly gone, the Navy’s support for building amphibious ships crashed. The Secretary of the Navy went so far as to stop all amphibious ship building. Congress was so alarmed by the controversy it had to step in and set a floor for amphibious ships.
With his background in a variety of operations around the globe while in uniform, Hung Cao brings a deep understanding of the importance of the Navy’s amphibious fleet.
Hung Cao also brings a special connection to the need for a network of strong allies, particularly in the Pacific. As a young child Cao and his family escaped from Vietnam and started over in the US.
Less than a year ago, before Cao was named acting Secretary of the Navy, he returned to Vietnam as Navy Under Secretary to help build a new relationship with the nation that borders China.
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Cao’s visits in his first weeks reflects a fundamental reality: The United States cannot unilaterally ensure Pacific security. The region is too vast, challenges too diverse, and resources required to substantial for any single nation. But the United States benefits from an unmatched network of allies and partners sharing American concerns about coercion and erosion of the rules-based international order.
Vietnam’s evolution from adversary to partner represents one of the more remarkable transformations in this network. The relationship remains carefully calibrated, conscious of historical sensitivities. Vietnamese leadership has articulated the Four Nos: no participation in military alliances; no aligning with one country to oppose another; no foreign military bases in Vietnamese territory; and no use of force in international relations.
This policy, sometimes termed “bamboo diplomacy,” reflects the flexible yet resilient balancing act Vietnam maintains amid major power rivalry. The Hamilton-class transfers exemplify a broader American approach that sees capability building in partner nations as force multiplication, respecting Vietnam’s autonomy while addressing shared security concerns.
But shared concerns about Chinese maritime behavior, mutual interest in free trade and open sea lanes, and complementary strategic perspectives have created genuine common ground.
-- Breaking Defense
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In the Pacific, the US needs the help of a variety of allies to deter China. It will take additional shipyards and new technologies to get more US Navy ships on continuous patrol. Compass Points salutes Secretary Cao for his efforts to use every available asset to get more ships on the water quickly -- including getting all the Navy amphibious ships needed by Marines.
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Defense News - 05/14/2026
Lawmakers push for domestic shipbuilding fixes as US Navy explores overseas option.
By Riley Ceder
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Breaking Defense - 11/21/2025
Hung Cao and the new Pacific defense architecture
Robbin Laird and Edward Timperlake discuss newly-appointed Navy Undersecretary Hung Cao’s thoughts on Guam and Vietnam’s roles in the Indo-Pacific when it comes to deterring China.
By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/hung-cao-and-the-new-pacific-defense-architecture/
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I was a bit surprised by the "4 No's" articulated by Vietnam. History during their 2nd war of liberation didn't seem to exhibit that same reluctance to alliances. I understand less powerful countries want to straddle the fence at times but unless Vietnam wants the rest of the SE Asian countries to shoulder the burden of resisting Chinese expansionism and see their country forced to knuckle under, it seems their interests align more with the current alliances trying to deter China. As an aside, when I was assigned to the Joint Military Advisory Group in Thailand, (92-95) I had the opportunity to attend a lot of exercises and was heavily involved in competitions for arms sales. The Thai bought a lot of stuff from China even though they would quietly admit it was junk. A huge part of their effort to keep everybody happy (and save some $) was to buy Chinese frigates and put Western fire control and weapons on them. They made playing nice to everyone an art form but they were still part of ASEAN and hosted a lot of training and exercises with US forces.
My Choice would be to use foreign yards to recapitalize sealift. I also think we need a smaller LSD rather than LSM for work in the Americas and choke points. Plus, it would be exportable or more feasible for other countries to license build them.