Compass Points - Combined Arms Infantry
Marine infantry makes it happen.
May 17, 2024
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Recently, the Marine Times reported that one of the Marine Corps' most senior leaders had good things to say about Marine infantry.
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“You, as the ground combat element, are the purveyors of constitutional violence,” Mahoney said. “You are the righteous destroyers. If 2,500 years of military history points us in a direction, you are the deciders. You are the finishers.”
Corps leaders have said the war in Ukraine demonstrates Marines should be prepared to knock out ships with long-range fires, surveil adversaries in all domains and work to avoid detection themselves. Although Mahoney reiterated those points on Thursday, he also pointed out that the bloody, protracted fighting in Ukraine has taken place primarily on the ground.
-- Marine Times
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The Assistant Commandant seems to believe there are two separate kinds of fighting. First the deep battle with long range fires and then a separate close and rear battle where Marines fight, "primarily on the ground." For decades, however, the Marine Corps has focused on a single battle doctrine that unifies the deep, close, and rear battle. Many commentators have argued that this Marine focus on not only the single Marine battle across all domains and all terrains, but also on the single Naval battle has been critical to Marine success.
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For example, those wanting to fight and win in the Pacific against a determined peer competitor, would be wise to study the Marine Corps University case study about Operation Watchtower, a celebrated Navy and Marine Corps single battle campaign in the Pacific.
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Known as Operation WATCHTOWER, this protracted, multi-domain campaign offers many lessons to commanders as practitioners interested in the risks and opportunities of expeditionary advanced base operations at the far end of a long and fragile logistics chain. As America’s first counter-offensive against the unbroken chain of decisive Japanese land victories, WATCHTOWER tested the combined/joint forces’ ability to conduct and sustain amphibious operations; to seize, secure, protect, and control littoral terrain including islands, straits, and extensive shorelines; and to ultimately deny the use of this terrain to a determined enemy’s air-ground-naval force.
Although it took less than 48 hours to gain a foothold on Guadalcanal, it would take nearly six months of hard fighting and the lives of many thousands of Marines, soldiers, airmen, and Sailors as well as the loss of numerous ships and aircraft before the campaign was successfully concluded. As an early attempt at sea control and power projection by an integrated naval expeditionary force, WATCHTOWER offers a sobering and compelling case study on the importance (and difficulty) of executing the single naval battle concept.
-- Staff, Marine Corps University
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If the Marine Corps wants to be prepared to win in the Pacific today against a determined peer adversary, it will take a robust Navy fleet working closely with robust combined arms Marine infantry battalions. So-called Marine Stand-in-Force missile units on islands in the Pacific will never have the numbers or combat capabilities to fight the combined arms, single battle. It will take updated and enhanced Marine Corps infantry battalions.
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It is good that the Assistant Commandant took time to note that, "the bloody, protracted fighting in Ukraine has taken place primarily on the ground.“ Far from being less important in modern wars, the infantry is showing itself to be more important than ever. All Marines know that infantry is the heart of the Marine Corps, so much so that "every Marine a rifleman." The Marine Corps is built around and built for the infantry. The long and distinguished infantry focus of the Marine Corps makes it so difficult to understand why, over the last several years, the Marine Corps has voluntarily divested itself of so many infantry units, equipment, and capabilities.
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The cuts to Marine infantry have been so serious and so severe some of the Marine Corps most legendary commanders warn that the cuts threaten the success of Marines in combat today.
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Unless you have experienced prolonged close combat against a significantly larger and determined enemy, at times hand-to-hand and under almost constant artillery and mortar fire, you may wrongly assume that Marine infantry can fight and win without the help of robust and immediately available supporting arms. Long-range rockets and missiles are not substitutes for strong infantry battalions, sufficient cannon artillery, attack helicopters, and armor, capabilities that are essential to enable and sustain the close and rear fight. Those of us who have fought a determined, much larger, and superbly equipped enemy have a deep, special, and abiding appreciation for artillery, close air, naval gunfire, and armor. But more than anything else, we have the undying admiration and respect for Marine infantry, whose fighting spirit, bravery, and tenacity are a national treasure.
. . . Close combat is no less important to winning future battles than past battles. But Marine infantry cannot be expected to fight and win with one hand tied behind its back. The jettisoning of all tanks, the deactivation of three infantry battalions, the gutting of direct support cannon artillery, and the loss of two attack helicopter squadrons, all to self-fund new experimental capabilities, is unwise and dangerous. FD 2030 and the FD 2030 Annual Update are leaving Marine infantry vulnerable and dangerously isolated, stripped of the support needed to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Battles won in the past, such as Dai Do, will likely be lost in the future. Simply stated, we do not believe the Magnificent Bastards could win the Battle of Dai Do today, given the significant cuts in essential force structure and supporting arms. Even more damaging is the fact that we are unnecessarily and foolishly risking the lives and limbs of our most precious asset, the individual Marine.
-- Maj Gen Livingston and Col Vargas
>Maj Gen Livingston is a retired career Infantry Officer. He was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as the Commanding Officer, Company E, 2/4 during the Battle of Dai Do.
>>Col Vargas is a retired career Infantry Officer. He was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as the Commanding Officer, Company G, 2/4 during the Battle of Dai Do.
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While it is nice to hear the Marine Corps' senior leaders speaking up for Marine infantry, where was this attention and support over the last few years when Marine infantry battalions were being slashed? Marine battalions have been unwisely reduced in numbers of battalions, in numbers of Marines, and in combat capabilities. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are not reducing their infantry battalions. Why would Marine leaders reduce Marine infantry?
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It is time to own up to the errors of the past. Marine infantry battalions need to be upgraded and enhanced. They need to be increased in number, in number of Marines, and in combat capabilities. Marine leaders must take to heart the lessons from Guadalcanal, Dai Do, and Ukraine and re-prioritize the Marine combined arms infantry battalion. Before Marines find themselves deep in another struggle in the Pacific, let the call go out from the most senior leaders of the Marine Corps directly to the halls of Congress, the Marine Corps needs help today to rebuild, enhance, and restore its world famous, combined arms Marine infantry.
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Marine Times - 05/13/2024
No. 2 Marine, a pilot, insists on continued primacy of infantry
By Irene Loewenson
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Marine Corps Gazette - August 2022
The Battle of Dai Do and Marine Corps Force Design 2030
Looking at future operating concepts through the lens of past battles
By MajGen James Livingston (Ret) & Col Jay Vargas (Ret)
>MajGen Livingston is a career Infantry Officer. He was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as the Commanding Officer, Company E, 2/4 during the Battle of Dai Do.
>>Col Vargas is a career Infantry Officer. He was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as the Commanding Officer, Company G, 2/4 during the Battle of Dai Do.
https://mega.nz/file/hixlUKyD#yQbMjl9FenUSLNMA0jAe8QaqsHd8lVvHobp_ObQhGns
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Marine Corps Case Study - November 2018
How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle: Operation WATCHTOWER’s Relevance Today
By Staffs, Marine Corps University
Words are cheap. Action counts. We continue to hear a lot of wishful words about Marine Corps current capabilities. One would think senior leaders were talking about 2018 or earlier.
Marine infantry needs more than rousing speeches and empty words to remain the final arbiter in the close and rear fight. If the senior leadership truly believed in the primacy of the infantry, would they have destroyed the supporting arms that makes winning and surviving possible? I think not. But they did! And for what? For 14 short range and 3 mid-range subsonic missile batteries that are highly duplicative of other services’ capabilities and well on the path to obsolescence.
But the issue is not the size or even the number infantry battalions per se. For without armor and bridging; insufficient close, continuous, accurate, and all-weather cannon artillery support and assault breaching; and the necessary aviation for close in fire suppression and close air support, no infantry battalion is a match against a force that possesses resiliency in these capabilities, which most of our potential enemies do. The troops know this and no amount of bluster will deceive them.
History is replete with bad military decisions made by senior officers. The adverse impacts of many of these decisions only became apparent during war and almost always at great cost to those doing the fighting and dying. The terribly bad decision to strip Marine infantry of its support is so apparent to almost everyone that it’s a sin to wait until the next war before fixing the problem. Those who see the problem but remain silent are part of the problem. Speak out now before the next battle is lost and too many Marines are unnecessarily killed or wounded.
MARINES have long taken pride in the statement "We can do everything, with nothing, forever". Seems like the new generation of flag officers have taken that to a new level.