The keystone problem is a gross lack of integrity so egregious that it exposes virtually the entire senior leadership to the charge of outright lying over the last 7 years. Lying to Congress, the media, allies and Marines. Every one of these officers has violated their oath. This would make a used car salesman or carnival barker blush. Would any rational person accept this level of deception from their real estate agent, doctor, grocer, car dealer, teachers, police department, fire department or children? Of course not. There is simply no way to spin this. It is high time for charges under the UCMJ. ACCOUNTABILITY!!!
The idea of putting isolated and widely dispersed small units (SIFs) along choke points and islands throughout the First Island Chain is a fatally flawed concept. It does not matter how many NMESIS/NSM batteries are operational (currently less than 2 of 14 planned); how full the magazines are; how much Congress supports the concept; or how much money is thrown at it. Isolated and widely dispersed SIFs are not survivable, sustainable, or effective. Task organized forces built around F-35s, HIMARS, GATOR radars, etc. are more effective than purpose-built forces that are largely duplicative and inferior to other services’ capabilities. The Commandant knows this, which is why he has not stood up the third MLR and is slowly bringing back capabilities previously discarded. His renewed emphasis on amphibious shipping and forward deployed amphibious forces is a forceful acknowledgement that Marines must be offensive, globally responsive expeditionary forces in readiness to retain relevancy. EABO/MLR/SIF as stand-alone concepts will die a natural death. We are already witnessing it. A future Commandant will deliver the coup de grace.
I must be stupid because I'm still stuck on how "interdicting enemy naval forces at sea" is a USMC mission. Why nobody in congress is questioning this lunacy is even more confusing than the fairy dust capability being advertised as successful.
To be fair, giving expeditionary forces ashore / afloat a means to integrate into the anti ship / area denial mission isn't inherently bad. Guys at Guadalcanal probably would have liked some bigger / longer ranged 'FU' assets to support the ocean fight. They did have shore batteries that were heavily used. Unfortunately, the modern plan was to sell the cow for a short stick in low volume (NMESIS) and some magic beans.
"A Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) is displayed during the Balikatan exercise between U.S., Australian, Filipino and Japanese troops in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, on May 6, 2026."
Is displayed. What a horrid headline for the Corps. Displayed.
How many times has this thing been fired? How many time has it been fired with a LCpl in charge of it? How many time without all the factory tech reps gathered around? How many times has it been fired in conjunction with the G/ATOR radar system?
I think I can figure out the answer pretty easily because if it had been fired and exercised, PAO would have been shouting it from the rooftops. So....it hasn't.
Another question...how deep is the magazine of missiles for this thing to not shoot? How many of these things are in the current inventory? How many G/ATOR radar systems?
Utilizing Grok Expert: “USMC NMESIS (Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, often pronounced/spelled “NEMISIS”) is billed as the Marines’ mobile, ground-based anti-ship missile system: unmanned JLTV-based launchers firing Naval Strike Missiles to sink ships from islands or coastlines. It’s the flagship weapon of Force Design 2030’s lighter, distributed Marine Littoral Regiments meant to deny Chinese ships access to key Pacific waters. http://nationalinterest.org
I liken it to a Potemkin Village — the 18th-century Russian fake settlements with impressive painted facades but nothing real behind them, built purely to impress Catherine the Great. NMESIS gets the same label: flashy PR optics and staged displays that create an illusion of cutting-edge capability, but little actual substance or combat-proven punch. marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com
Why the comparison fits:
• All show, limited go: It’s deployed with great fanfare to forward islands for exercises, generating headlines about “sea denial” and deterrence. Yet procurement remains tiny (dozens of launchers total, far short of what a peer war would need), the system has never been fully live-fired in realistic Pacific scenarios, and wargames question its survivability once China starts hunting it. marinecorpstimes.com
• Most recent IndoPacom exercise proves the point: During Balikatan 2026 (the major U.S.-Philippines exercise under Indo-Pacific Command), NMESIS was airlifted to the Batanes islands (strategic choke point near Taiwan), positioned for Maritime Key Terrain Security Operations, and used in simulated fire missions. It was displayed and rehearsed — but no missiles were actually fired. Other allied systems conducted live fires; NMESIS stayed in static/show mode. instagram.cominquirer.netjanes.commarinecorpstimes.comnavalnews.com
In short, supporters see a smart, agile ship-killer for the first island chain. Facts reveal the whole thing as Potemkin theater and FRAUD!”..
Today, our senior Marine Officers on active duty will willingly cover up material and strategic inadequacies, when testifying in Congress (and to the American people). It’s left to those of us who have no axe to grind, to educate the politicians who are responsible.
In the dim past, at Camp Lejeune, we invited Congressmen and Senators to observe actual operations and equipment. We explained the processes and briefed them on the equipment in our inventory that they had just seen in action.
We actually displayed every piece of equipment in Force Troops on the main side parade deck, so they could see all of the ground weaponry and supplies in support of a Marine Amphibious Force. The same was accomplished at Cherry Point with the Aircraft Wing. All of this helped keep them informed and us honest.
Tragically, we have no informed, competent news people to keep everyone on their toes. A figure like David Hackworth could do wonders today. He stepped on a lot of toes in his time, but performed a necessary function. Semper Fi
I believe Col Hackworth coined the phrase "Perfumed Princes" in reference to the "flapole" sitters/politicians who where the uniform. . General Al gray ran most of them off during his tenure, but they're back and in force.............Sad
Grok Expert:FORCE DESIGN:Summary: Status of the Congressionally Mandated NDAA Study on USMC Force Design
• What Congress Required (FY2024 NDAA, Section 1076): Enacted December 2023 (P.L. 118-31), the law directed the Secretary of Defense to contract (within 90 days) with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for an independent review, assessment, and analysis of the Marine Corps’ Force Design modernization initiatives (originally called Force Design 2030). congress.gov
• Current Status (as of May 2026):
• No public report or findings have been released.
• No announcements from DoD, USMC, or Congress about the study’s completion or delivery.
• The FY2025 and FY2026 NDAAs contain no follow-up provisions or references to the study. congress.gov
• What Has Happened Instead:
• The Marine Corps dropped “2030” from the name in early 2024 and treats Force Design as ongoing/continuous modernization. congress.gov
• The Corps continues self-directed implementation and issues periodic updates (e.g., the October 2025 Force Design Update). marines.mil
• No reversal of major changes (e.g., force restructuring, capability shifts for peer competition). news.usni.org
Bottom Line:
The independent study was required by Congress in late 2023 but has produced no visible public output or policy impact. The Marine Corps’ own Force Design efforts remain the primary record of progress. For full details, see CRS Report R47614 (updated November 24, 2025).
It appears that the CMC wants his cake and eat it too. We are told that FD is now the prime mission of the Marine Corps and then he tells us that expeditionary warfare is an important capability. If a missile force is the prime mission, why after six years do we have maybe only two NMESIS batteries operational? If we are to be an expeditionary force, why has the CMC not come up with alternative ideas to get Marines back to sea like CP discussed two days ago? When General Berger was informed the Marine Corps could not meet the National Defense Strategy to counter China, he should have told DOD that the Marine Corps is the Nation's only naval expeditionary force. As an expeditionary force, the Marine Corps is always ready to fight China on the peripheries. No other military force does this. Also, as an expeditionary force the Marine Corps can conduct anti-shipping missions as a task organized force as needed. Sitting and waiting on some remote island is not expeditionary. To fight China does not mean we have to fight in the Western Pacific. There are other locations worldwide which are vital to China.
The Marine Corps is not a missile force. While it uses missiles, missiles operations have never been its primary mission. Leave that to the Army, Navy and Air Force.
FD “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” http://en.wikipedia.org
• Popularized by Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) in 1907, who attributed it to British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (though the exact origin is uncertain and likely predates him). quoteinvestigator.combookbrowse.com
This famous quote often critiques the misuse of data, selective facts, or misleading analysis to support an argument—highly relevant to debates over military force structure changes like USMC Force Design, where critics have accused leadership of cherry-picking wargame results, downplaying risks, or presenting optimistic projections without full transparency.
Relevant Quotes from the USMC Force Design Debate
Critics (often retired senior Marines) have implied or directly suggested that official narratives around Force Design involve selective truths, untested assumptions, or insufficient scrutiny:
• Retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (prominent critic): “We do not trust General Berger because he circumvented that process with a small cabal of supposed ‘thinkers’ whose ideas were never subjected to the needed professional scrutiny.” marinecorpstimes.com
• On the broader debate and perceived lack of rigorous testing: “Yet, I remain skeptical of the new force design, absent additional wargames and studies that test its core hypotheses.” (War on the Rocks analysis) warontherocks.com
• Gen. David Berger (former Commandant, responding to critics): “I wish they would have the trust in all Marines… I will have that degree of trust the day after I leave.” breakingdefense.com
• Retired officers’ collective pushback: Groups of retired generals published op-eds questioning whether Force Design changes were based on full analysis or risked “jeopardizing national security,” with some framing the process as insufficiently vetted. stripes.commarinecorpstimes.com
The Congressionally mandated independent study (FY2024 NDAA §1076) was intended to provide objective analysis amid these debates, but as noted previously, no public findings have emerged. Critics often point to this as part of a pattern where data or assurances supporting Force Design are presented without full independent validation.
These quotes capture the tension: proponents see necessary adaptation backed by analysis; detractors see potentially “damned lies” in the form of unproven assumptions or selective storytelling. The classic Twain/Disraeli line remains the sharpest shorthand for such skepticism in data-driven policy fights.
Let’s be clear on where Force Design actually stands:
• Supported by three consecutive administrations? Check.
• Congressional support? Check.
• Alignment with the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS)? Check.
• Reflected in the OPLANs? Check.
• Fully funded in the FY27 budget? Check.
• Alignment with the Secretary of Defense’s 2028–2032 Defense Planning Guidance (signed 12 May 2026) — especially its priorities on investments, trade space, and offsets (pages 13-15)? Check.
You may not like these facts. I know they run counter to the narrative you’ve pushed for six years. But facts remain facts.
The reality is that General Smith is successfully exploiting the conditions set by General Berger. Berger set the statutory floor for amphibious warships at 31 ships specifically to stop the Navy from dropping even lower (they were pushing toward 25). He then established the Stand-in Force concept to ensure the USMC modernized to meet the current threat. Smith is now executing on that foundation: the Stand-in Force is being actively fielded, we are achieving the balance of “modernization with crisis response” he directed in his CPG, and — for the first time since General Mundy — the Marine Corps is positioned to actually grow the number of amphibious warfare ships.
If the Commandant were truly backing away from Force Design as you state, he would not have asked for — and received — full funding for its key elements in the FY27 budget. The continued resourcing, strategic alignment, and integration into OPLANs tell a very different story than the one you are selling.
It's like Jiffy Lube telling you about the rigorous checklist when they forgot to put the bolt back in the drain pan and then claiming..."If we didn't leave the bolt out, Carl might have overfilled the engine oil"
Congress has zero hesitation calling out Service Chiefs when they’re unhappy with priorities, performance, or strategic direction.
A perfect recent example is Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK) publicly blasting Navy leadership for violating the 31-ship amphibious floor that Congress codified into law at the Marine Corps’ request:
This is just one of several recent examples showing that if Congress wants to apply pressure, they do it forcefully and in public.
The reason the Commandant and other Marine leaders often receive relatively comfortable questions is much simpler: Congress and the Administration are, by and large, comfortable with where the Marine Corps is headed.
We’ve seen this repeatedly in hearings:
• Strong bipartisan support for restoring and sustaining 3.0 ARG/MEU presence
• Continued funding for LSMs, NMESIS, and other Force Design capabilities
• Praise for the Corps’ recruiting success and three consecutive clean audits
• Clear alignment with the National Defense Strategy and INDOPACOM priorities
Comfortable questions are not always a sign of weakness. Sometimes they’re a sign that a Service is executing its mission, delivering results, and maintaining strong institutional credibility on the Hill, with the Administration, and with the Combatant Commanders.
And one final point: many of the members asking these questions — and their staffs — have access to the full classified picture, including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, posture testimony, and detailed briefings on the pacing threat. They are not operating in the same information environment as open-source debate. Some of you won’t appreciate that fact, but it does not change that fact.
"This post is misleading at best" - Corporal Grable.
Yes agreed, your posted comment is misleading at best.
You get a 1st Class PAO ribbon for conflating some bright spots with 'essential FD' initiatives.
-yes, Congress has a strong history of supporting the USMC initiatives, especially when politically or practically expedient to do so.
-Congress gladly paid to fund the training and equipping of Marine Dragon Gunners for years after that weapon system was grossly outdated. Did congressional support mean the system was somehow more effective than otherwise? Did that mean it was free from critique? (Please, I know someone is going to chime in and say the Dragon was great. Sorry, a high signature launch/flight missile that takes forever to get to 1000m maybe was better than nothing, nut that's like saying "at least tofu has protein". And there were other, better options available. Though yes, for it's time the thermal night sight was nice to have.)
-Congress gladly paid to fund the drive to a 202k USMC; then they gladly paid to reverse course. Which one was better?
-Congressional support has not magically solved the logistics dilemma.
“…Sometimes they’re a sign that a Service is executing its mission, delivering results…”.
Ok Cpl. what results? Please be specific. Have we embarked/offloaded an ENTIRE NMESIS battery from amphibious shipping? Even administratively? Has a NMESIS battery completed a full T/E issue? Has a NMESIS battery received a full training complement of NSMs? Has a NMESIS battery done ANY tactical emplacement, firing of an NSM and then displaced, occupied a new firing position, fired again and then displaced again? Has the Marine Corps displayed and or exercised ANY logistic capability to supply a NMESIS battery?
Even assuming that a NMESIS battery is a worthwhile unit to have, the inability of the Commandant to demonstrate, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, the maturation of a unit like this shows his and his staff’s gross incompetence. That alone screams relief for cause.
Your inability to answer these questions clearly shows that you’re a shill for HQMC.
Have Congressional members ever been briefed on the cons of FD? Have they ever listened to testimonies of the opposing viewpoint, or are they just briefed by the CMC? Do Congressional members realize that the Marine Corps is not a robust force it was six years ago?
Randy, they have. In addition to some members of Chowder 2 et al, as reported here in CP, The Library of Congress has the Congressional Research Service (CRS): "The CRS products collection includes CRS reports and other research products produced by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) for the United States Congress. By law, CRS works exclusively for Congress, providing timely, objective, and authoritative research and analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate.".
The CRS has produced many solid reports giving objective information and analytic questions regarding various aspects and concerns regarding Force Design. However, the CRS products are to inform regarding the subject and provide possible questions, concerns, and highlights. They don't take a position. What the individual members of Congress do with that information is their prerogative, should they even read the reports.
Frankly, the Congress tends to give the services what they ask for until it becomes politically untenable to do so, regardless of merit one way or another.
PS: Also, to be fair, even the last two CMCs have had to brief Congress on the inability to execute missions based on certain aspects of FD (Gen Berger famously had to speak to the inability to support missions with MEUs that the USMC had traditionally been able to support), as well as 'it's still in the campaign of learning' responses to Congress. Something I try to keep in mind: one of the hardest aspects of this debate is that there are good officers on the 'pro' side of FD; not every Marine supporting FD is doing it because they are just d-bags in it to be * holes. (D-bag is a reference to deloyment bag used by paratroopers;)
OK, thanks Cfrog. I guess I was hoping for Chowder II Marines to testify before Congress about the weakened state of the Marine Corps. The current CMC is all smoke and mirrors.
The keystone problem is a gross lack of integrity so egregious that it exposes virtually the entire senior leadership to the charge of outright lying over the last 7 years. Lying to Congress, the media, allies and Marines. Every one of these officers has violated their oath. This would make a used car salesman or carnival barker blush. Would any rational person accept this level of deception from their real estate agent, doctor, grocer, car dealer, teachers, police department, fire department or children? Of course not. There is simply no way to spin this. It is high time for charges under the UCMJ. ACCOUNTABILITY!!!
The idea of putting isolated and widely dispersed small units (SIFs) along choke points and islands throughout the First Island Chain is a fatally flawed concept. It does not matter how many NMESIS/NSM batteries are operational (currently less than 2 of 14 planned); how full the magazines are; how much Congress supports the concept; or how much money is thrown at it. Isolated and widely dispersed SIFs are not survivable, sustainable, or effective. Task organized forces built around F-35s, HIMARS, GATOR radars, etc. are more effective than purpose-built forces that are largely duplicative and inferior to other services’ capabilities. The Commandant knows this, which is why he has not stood up the third MLR and is slowly bringing back capabilities previously discarded. His renewed emphasis on amphibious shipping and forward deployed amphibious forces is a forceful acknowledgement that Marines must be offensive, globally responsive expeditionary forces in readiness to retain relevancy. EABO/MLR/SIF as stand-alone concepts will die a natural death. We are already witnessing it. A future Commandant will deliver the coup de grace.
General, I applaud your last sentence!
I must be stupid because I'm still stuck on how "interdicting enemy naval forces at sea" is a USMC mission. Why nobody in congress is questioning this lunacy is even more confusing than the fairy dust capability being advertised as successful.
To be fair, giving expeditionary forces ashore / afloat a means to integrate into the anti ship / area denial mission isn't inherently bad. Guys at Guadalcanal probably would have liked some bigger / longer ranged 'FU' assets to support the ocean fight. They did have shore batteries that were heavily used. Unfortunately, the modern plan was to sell the cow for a short stick in low volume (NMESIS) and some magic beans.
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2026/05/15/us-marines-practice-seizing-remote-islands-in-philippine-exercise/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-dnr
The picture on the headline picture says it all:
"A Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) is displayed during the Balikatan exercise between U.S., Australian, Filipino and Japanese troops in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, on May 6, 2026."
Is displayed. What a horrid headline for the Corps. Displayed.
How many times has this thing been fired? How many time has it been fired with a LCpl in charge of it? How many time without all the factory tech reps gathered around? How many times has it been fired in conjunction with the G/ATOR radar system?
I think I can figure out the answer pretty easily because if it had been fired and exercised, PAO would have been shouting it from the rooftops. So....it hasn't.
Another question...how deep is the magazine of missiles for this thing to not shoot? How many of these things are in the current inventory? How many G/ATOR radar systems?
Utilizing Grok Expert: “USMC NMESIS (Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, often pronounced/spelled “NEMISIS”) is billed as the Marines’ mobile, ground-based anti-ship missile system: unmanned JLTV-based launchers firing Naval Strike Missiles to sink ships from islands or coastlines. It’s the flagship weapon of Force Design 2030’s lighter, distributed Marine Littoral Regiments meant to deny Chinese ships access to key Pacific waters. http://nationalinterest.org
I liken it to a Potemkin Village — the 18th-century Russian fake settlements with impressive painted facades but nothing real behind them, built purely to impress Catherine the Great. NMESIS gets the same label: flashy PR optics and staged displays that create an illusion of cutting-edge capability, but little actual substance or combat-proven punch. marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com
Why the comparison fits:
• All show, limited go: It’s deployed with great fanfare to forward islands for exercises, generating headlines about “sea denial” and deterrence. Yet procurement remains tiny (dozens of launchers total, far short of what a peer war would need), the system has never been fully live-fired in realistic Pacific scenarios, and wargames question its survivability once China starts hunting it. marinecorpstimes.com
• Most recent IndoPacom exercise proves the point: During Balikatan 2026 (the major U.S.-Philippines exercise under Indo-Pacific Command), NMESIS was airlifted to the Batanes islands (strategic choke point near Taiwan), positioned for Maritime Key Terrain Security Operations, and used in simulated fire missions. It was displayed and rehearsed — but no missiles were actually fired. Other allied systems conducted live fires; NMESIS stayed in static/show mode. instagram.cominquirer.netjanes.commarinecorpstimes.comnavalnews.com
In short, supporters see a smart, agile ship-killer for the first island chain. Facts reveal the whole thing as Potemkin theater and FRAUD!”..
Today, our senior Marine Officers on active duty will willingly cover up material and strategic inadequacies, when testifying in Congress (and to the American people). It’s left to those of us who have no axe to grind, to educate the politicians who are responsible.
In the dim past, at Camp Lejeune, we invited Congressmen and Senators to observe actual operations and equipment. We explained the processes and briefed them on the equipment in our inventory that they had just seen in action.
We actually displayed every piece of equipment in Force Troops on the main side parade deck, so they could see all of the ground weaponry and supplies in support of a Marine Amphibious Force. The same was accomplished at Cherry Point with the Aircraft Wing. All of this helped keep them informed and us honest.
Tragically, we have no informed, competent news people to keep everyone on their toes. A figure like David Hackworth could do wonders today. He stepped on a lot of toes in his time, but performed a necessary function. Semper Fi
I believe Col Hackworth coined the phrase "Perfumed Princes" in reference to the "flapole" sitters/politicians who where the uniform. . General Al gray ran most of them off during his tenure, but they're back and in force.............Sad
Grok Expert:FORCE DESIGN:Summary: Status of the Congressionally Mandated NDAA Study on USMC Force Design
• What Congress Required (FY2024 NDAA, Section 1076): Enacted December 2023 (P.L. 118-31), the law directed the Secretary of Defense to contract (within 90 days) with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for an independent review, assessment, and analysis of the Marine Corps’ Force Design modernization initiatives (originally called Force Design 2030). congress.gov
• Current Status (as of May 2026):
• No public report or findings have been released.
• No announcements from DoD, USMC, or Congress about the study’s completion or delivery.
• The FY2025 and FY2026 NDAAs contain no follow-up provisions or references to the study. congress.gov
• What Has Happened Instead:
• The Marine Corps dropped “2030” from the name in early 2024 and treats Force Design as ongoing/continuous modernization. congress.gov
• The Corps continues self-directed implementation and issues periodic updates (e.g., the October 2025 Force Design Update). marines.mil
• No reversal of major changes (e.g., force restructuring, capability shifts for peer competition). news.usni.org
Bottom Line:
The independent study was required by Congress in late 2023 but has produced no visible public output or policy impact. The Marine Corps’ own Force Design efforts remain the primary record of progress. For full details, see CRS Report R47614 (updated November 24, 2025).
It appears that the CMC wants his cake and eat it too. We are told that FD is now the prime mission of the Marine Corps and then he tells us that expeditionary warfare is an important capability. If a missile force is the prime mission, why after six years do we have maybe only two NMESIS batteries operational? If we are to be an expeditionary force, why has the CMC not come up with alternative ideas to get Marines back to sea like CP discussed two days ago? When General Berger was informed the Marine Corps could not meet the National Defense Strategy to counter China, he should have told DOD that the Marine Corps is the Nation's only naval expeditionary force. As an expeditionary force, the Marine Corps is always ready to fight China on the peripheries. No other military force does this. Also, as an expeditionary force the Marine Corps can conduct anti-shipping missions as a task organized force as needed. Sitting and waiting on some remote island is not expeditionary. To fight China does not mean we have to fight in the Western Pacific. There are other locations worldwide which are vital to China.
The Marine Corps is not a missile force. While it uses missiles, missiles operations have never been its primary mission. Leave that to the Army, Navy and Air Force.
FD “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” http://en.wikipedia.org
• Popularized by Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) in 1907, who attributed it to British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (though the exact origin is uncertain and likely predates him). quoteinvestigator.combookbrowse.com
This famous quote often critiques the misuse of data, selective facts, or misleading analysis to support an argument—highly relevant to debates over military force structure changes like USMC Force Design, where critics have accused leadership of cherry-picking wargame results, downplaying risks, or presenting optimistic projections without full transparency.
Relevant Quotes from the USMC Force Design Debate
Critics (often retired senior Marines) have implied or directly suggested that official narratives around Force Design involve selective truths, untested assumptions, or insufficient scrutiny:
• Retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (prominent critic): “We do not trust General Berger because he circumvented that process with a small cabal of supposed ‘thinkers’ whose ideas were never subjected to the needed professional scrutiny.” marinecorpstimes.com
• On the broader debate and perceived lack of rigorous testing: “Yet, I remain skeptical of the new force design, absent additional wargames and studies that test its core hypotheses.” (War on the Rocks analysis) warontherocks.com
• Gen. David Berger (former Commandant, responding to critics): “I wish they would have the trust in all Marines… I will have that degree of trust the day after I leave.” breakingdefense.com
• Retired officers’ collective pushback: Groups of retired generals published op-eds questioning whether Force Design changes were based on full analysis or risked “jeopardizing national security,” with some framing the process as insufficiently vetted. stripes.commarinecorpstimes.com
The Congressionally mandated independent study (FY2024 NDAA §1076) was intended to provide objective analysis amid these debates, but as noted previously, no public findings have emerged. Critics often point to this as part of a pattern where data or assurances supporting Force Design are presented without full independent validation.
These quotes capture the tension: proponents see necessary adaptation backed by analysis; detractors see potentially “damned lies” in the form of unproven assumptions or selective storytelling. The classic Twain/Disraeli line remains the sharpest shorthand for such skepticism in data-driven policy fights.
To Cfrog and McAbee,
Let’s be clear on where Force Design actually stands:
• Supported by three consecutive administrations? Check.
• Congressional support? Check.
• Alignment with the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS)? Check.
• Reflected in the OPLANs? Check.
• Fully funded in the FY27 budget? Check.
• Alignment with the Secretary of Defense’s 2028–2032 Defense Planning Guidance (signed 12 May 2026) — especially its priorities on investments, trade space, and offsets (pages 13-15)? Check.
You may not like these facts. I know they run counter to the narrative you’ve pushed for six years. But facts remain facts.
The reality is that General Smith is successfully exploiting the conditions set by General Berger. Berger set the statutory floor for amphibious warships at 31 ships specifically to stop the Navy from dropping even lower (they were pushing toward 25). He then established the Stand-in Force concept to ensure the USMC modernized to meet the current threat. Smith is now executing on that foundation: the Stand-in Force is being actively fielded, we are achieving the balance of “modernization with crisis response” he directed in his CPG, and — for the first time since General Mundy — the Marine Corps is positioned to actually grow the number of amphibious warfare ships.
If the Commandant were truly backing away from Force Design as you state, he would not have asked for — and received — full funding for its key elements in the FY27 budget. The continued resourcing, strategic alignment, and integration into OPLANs tell a very different story than the one you are selling.
Cue the Dr Evil meme: "riiiiiiiight...".
It's like Jiffy Lube telling you about the rigorous checklist when they forgot to put the bolt back in the drain pan and then claiming..."If we didn't leave the bolt out, Carl might have overfilled the engine oil"
This post is misleading at best.
Congress has zero hesitation calling out Service Chiefs when they’re unhappy with priorities, performance, or strategic direction.
A perfect recent example is Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK) publicly blasting Navy leadership for violating the 31-ship amphibious floor that Congress codified into law at the Marine Corps’ request:
Senator Sullivan’s statement:
https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sullivan-blasts-us-navy-for-violating-law-putting-american-lives-at-risk
This is just one of several recent examples showing that if Congress wants to apply pressure, they do it forcefully and in public.
The reason the Commandant and other Marine leaders often receive relatively comfortable questions is much simpler: Congress and the Administration are, by and large, comfortable with where the Marine Corps is headed.
We’ve seen this repeatedly in hearings:
• Strong bipartisan support for restoring and sustaining 3.0 ARG/MEU presence
• Continued funding for LSMs, NMESIS, and other Force Design capabilities
• Praise for the Corps’ recruiting success and three consecutive clean audits
• Clear alignment with the National Defense Strategy and INDOPACOM priorities
Comfortable questions are not always a sign of weakness. Sometimes they’re a sign that a Service is executing its mission, delivering results, and maintaining strong institutional credibility on the Hill, with the Administration, and with the Combatant Commanders.
And one final point: many of the members asking these questions — and their staffs — have access to the full classified picture, including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, posture testimony, and detailed briefings on the pacing threat. They are not operating in the same information environment as open-source debate. Some of you won’t appreciate that fact, but it does not change that fact.
"This post is misleading at best" - Corporal Grable.
Yes agreed, your posted comment is misleading at best.
You get a 1st Class PAO ribbon for conflating some bright spots with 'essential FD' initiatives.
-yes, Congress has a strong history of supporting the USMC initiatives, especially when politically or practically expedient to do so.
-Congress gladly paid to fund the training and equipping of Marine Dragon Gunners for years after that weapon system was grossly outdated. Did congressional support mean the system was somehow more effective than otherwise? Did that mean it was free from critique? (Please, I know someone is going to chime in and say the Dragon was great. Sorry, a high signature launch/flight missile that takes forever to get to 1000m maybe was better than nothing, nut that's like saying "at least tofu has protein". And there were other, better options available. Though yes, for it's time the thermal night sight was nice to have.)
-Congress gladly paid to fund the drive to a 202k USMC; then they gladly paid to reverse course. Which one was better?
-Congressional support has not magically solved the logistics dilemma.
“…Sometimes they’re a sign that a Service is executing its mission, delivering results…”.
Ok Cpl. what results? Please be specific. Have we embarked/offloaded an ENTIRE NMESIS battery from amphibious shipping? Even administratively? Has a NMESIS battery completed a full T/E issue? Has a NMESIS battery received a full training complement of NSMs? Has a NMESIS battery done ANY tactical emplacement, firing of an NSM and then displaced, occupied a new firing position, fired again and then displaced again? Has the Marine Corps displayed and or exercised ANY logistic capability to supply a NMESIS battery?
Even assuming that a NMESIS battery is a worthwhile unit to have, the inability of the Commandant to demonstrate, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, the maturation of a unit like this shows his and his staff’s gross incompetence. That alone screams relief for cause.
Your inability to answer these questions clearly shows that you’re a shill for HQMC.
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_Update-October_2025.pdf
where's the armor, arty, Military Police and Grunts?
My point exactly, we have none!
Have Congressional members ever been briefed on the cons of FD? Have they ever listened to testimonies of the opposing viewpoint, or are they just briefed by the CMC? Do Congressional members realize that the Marine Corps is not a robust force it was six years ago?
Randy, they have. In addition to some members of Chowder 2 et al, as reported here in CP, The Library of Congress has the Congressional Research Service (CRS): "The CRS products collection includes CRS reports and other research products produced by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) for the United States Congress. By law, CRS works exclusively for Congress, providing timely, objective, and authoritative research and analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate.".
The CRS has produced many solid reports giving objective information and analytic questions regarding various aspects and concerns regarding Force Design. However, the CRS products are to inform regarding the subject and provide possible questions, concerns, and highlights. They don't take a position. What the individual members of Congress do with that information is their prerogative, should they even read the reports.
Frankly, the Congress tends to give the services what they ask for until it becomes politically untenable to do so, regardless of merit one way or another.
PS: Also, to be fair, even the last two CMCs have had to brief Congress on the inability to execute missions based on certain aspects of FD (Gen Berger famously had to speak to the inability to support missions with MEUs that the USMC had traditionally been able to support), as well as 'it's still in the campaign of learning' responses to Congress. Something I try to keep in mind: one of the hardest aspects of this debate is that there are good officers on the 'pro' side of FD; not every Marine supporting FD is doing it because they are just d-bags in it to be * holes. (D-bag is a reference to deloyment bag used by paratroopers;)
OK, thanks Cfrog. I guess I was hoping for Chowder II Marines to testify before Congress about the weakened state of the Marine Corps. The current CMC is all smoke and mirrors.