Compass Points - Congress is Right
Congress is right to investigate the Marine Corps
January 13, 2024
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As reported in Compass Points yesterday, "Congress Wants to Know" in the latest National Defense Authorization Act, Congress has required a full review of the recent radical restructuring of the Marine Corps.
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Congress is right to ask hard questions.
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The United States depends on Naval forces to project power and preserve the peace around the world. Naval aircraft carriers and naval amphibious ships give the US flexibility to respond to any crisis. Navy ships can remain off shore of troubled areas providing deterrence. If deterrence fails, the US can use Navy and Marine aircraft and missiles to conduct strikes. In addition, Marine forces onboard amphibious ships can conduct a wide variety of raids, patrols, and humanitarian rescues.
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Current US operations in and around the Middle East have required Navy ships on patrol, from the Persian Gulf, to the Red Sea, to the Mediterranean Sea. The need for Navy ships, including amphibious ships with Marines onboard, has stretched from days, to weeks, to months, and exposed a dangerous gap: the US does not have enough ships.
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Writing in Politico, Paul McLeary has provided a timely article, "As the Middle East heats up, the Navy struggles to deploy replacement ships."
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A group of warships led by the USS Bataan has done it all over the past six months.
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From warning off Iranian ships in the Persian Gulf to patrolling the Red Sea to filling in for an aircraft carrier off the Israeli coast, the workhorse amphibious ships Bataan and USS Carter Hall and their force of 2,000 Marines have been at the center of the action in a volatile Middle East.
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Yet the group is past the point that it should have started heading home for some much-needed rest, and is still on station because replacements are in short supply.
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“There is no end in sight” for the Bataan’s deployment, one Defense Department official said. The Bataan was “just extended again, and if the president wants to keep them there, they’re going to continue to be extended,” said the official, who agreed to speak about current operations under the condition of anonymity.
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. . . While neither the Bataan nor the Carter Hall were involved in those [recent Yemen] strikes, their presence is a key part of the U.S. and allied presence in the region, giving commanders options to conduct humanitarian missions, airstrikes or special operations raids.
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The ship that would likely replace the Bataan — the USS Boxer — has been delayed for two months and counting and is only now doing the training required to deploy at some point in the future.
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. . . The Bataan and Carter Hall moved into the Mediterranean last month to backstop the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, joining the USS Mesa Verde which was already in place. The Ford, the nation’s newest and largest carrier, had already been extended twice before turning for its home port in Virginia this month after eight months at sea.
-- Paul McLeary, Politico
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The larger problem is the Navy does not have enough ships -- particularly amphibious ships for Marines. In his article, Paul McLeary goes on to quote Bryan Clark, a retired submarine commander now at the Hudson Institute.
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“This is also the problem you have when the fleet gets older, you have no surge capacity, and with the ship repair capacity that is not aligned with Navy plans, which keep changing,” he added. “You’ve got a real shortfall in the number of amphibs you can deploy.”
--Bryan Clark
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How many amphibious ships does the Marine Corps need? In his posture statement to Congress in March of 2018, then Commandant General Neller said,
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38 L-Class Amphibious warships are required to meet a 2.0 MEB Joint Forcible Entry requirement, and upwards of 50 would be needed to meet CCDR demand.
-- General Neller, Posture Statement, 7 March 2018 (p. 5)
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In other words, to meet the demands of the regional Combatant Commanders, the Marine Corps would need "upwards of 50" amphibious ships. But instead of 50 ships, the Marine Corps would accept a reduced number of ships, 38. The 38 number had long been agreed to between the Marine Corps and the Navy.
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Unfortunately, in the summer of 2019, just months after General Neller testified to Congress about the 38 ship requirement, the new Commandant -- General Neller's successor -- suddenly withdrew support for the 38 ship requirement. Did the Marine Corps go back to the actual number, "upwards of 50" amphibious ships? No, the Marine Corps said it would no longer require 38 ships -- it would accept fewer ships!
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We will no longer use a “2.0 MEB requirement” [38 ships] as the foundation for our arguments regarding amphibious ship building, to determine the requisite capacity of vehicles or other capabilities, or as pertains to the Maritime Prepositioning Force.
-- Commandant's Planning Guidance - August 2019 (Gen Berger, p.4)
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The abandonment of the 38 amphibious ship agreement was so risky, the Commandant felt compelled to give a personal pledge:
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I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to ensure there are adequate numbers of the right types of ships, with the right capabilities, to meet national requirements.
-- Commandant's Planning Guidance - August 2019 (Gen Berger, p.5)
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Sadly, despite the pledge, when Turkey's earthquake victims needed help from Marines, there were no amphibious ships available and thus Marines were left standing at the pier unable to help. Now the Marines in the Mediterranean Sea are being left at sea because there are not enough amphibious ships to sail out and replace them.
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The Marine Corps is being forced to accept as few as 31 amphibious ships. But it gets worse. Incredibly, the Navy's 30-year future shipbuilding plan shows no period over the next three decades when the Navy will provide even 31 amphibious ships. To add to the amphibious ship problems, the actual availability of amphibious ships is even lower. Amphibious ships need regular overhaul and maintenance. The readiness rate is the percentage of ships fully available for deployment. The readiness rate has fallen to about 30%. That means, out of the 31 ships the Marine Corps is agreeing to, there may be as few as 10 ships available.
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The availability of amphibious ships is falling below the number needed to meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders, below the number agreed to for years between the Navy and Marine Corps, and now even below the number required by law.
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Congressional Research Service author Ronald O'Rourke lists some of the questions Congress needs to ask:
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Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
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-- Are the Navy’s plans for procuring amphibious ships and the Navy’s projected numbers of amphibious ships consistent with the requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) for the Navy to include not less than 31 amphibious ships? If not, why not?
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-- . . . As noted above, the Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan shows the projected number of amphibious ships remaining below 31 ships throughout the 30-year period. Has the Navy requested a legislative waiver of the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) for the Navy to include not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships? If the Navy has not requested such a waiver, why not?
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-- What changes to the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission would be needed to better align Navy plans with the amphibious ship force-level required by 10 U.S.C. 8062? How much additional funding for procuring amphibious ships and for operating and supporting amphibious ships would be needed to achieve and maintain a force of not less than 31 amphibious ships, including not less than 10 LHA/LHD-type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, as required by 10 U.S.C. 8062(b)? In a situation of finite defense funding, what impact might providing this additional funding have on funding available for other Navy or DOD priorities?
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-- What are the potential operational consequences of the projected numbers of amphibious ships shown in the Navy’s FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan?
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-- Is the Navy’s proposal to truncate the LPD-17 Flight II program to three ships, and not procure any more such ships during the five-year period FY2024-FY2028, consistent with the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8062(b)?
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-- If the Navy has not yet released a definitive new force-level goal to replace the 355-ship goal, how can the Navy know that the requirement for LPD-17s will be no more than 16 ships?
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-- What impact would the truncation of LPD-17 Flight II procurement to a total of three ships have on the shipyard that builds LPD-17 Flight IIs (HII/Ingalls—the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, which is part of Huntington Ingalls Industries) in terms of workloads, employment levels, and costs for building other Navy warships (including DDG-51 destroyers and LHA-type amphibious assault ships) that are built at that yard? What impact would the truncation of LPD-17 Flight II procurement have on supplier firms associated with construction of LPD-17 Flight II ships?
--Congressional Research Service
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The US is sailing into a danger zone by not having enough amphibious ships to keep Marines on patrol around the globe. It is not all the Navy's fault. It was radical and wrong when the former Commandant said the Marines would accept fewer amphibious ships going forward. That is just one of the many poor decisions that has left the Marine Corps today with too few amphibious ships and too few combined arms capabilities.
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Congress is right to ask questions about the radical restructuring of the Marine Corps.
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Compass Points salutes the 2,000 Marines and sailors onboard the amphibious ships USS Bataan and USS Carter Hall that have been at the center of the action in a dangerous Middle East. Compass Points also salutes author Paul McLeary for sounding the alarm in Politico over the lack of amphibious ships, and salutes the Congress for requiring a rapid and full review of the radical restructuring of the Marine Corps. With better leadership and more funding, the Marine Corps will once again be American's always ready 9-1-1 force with the amphibious ships and combined arms capabilities to arrive off any shore ready to deter, assist, and fight.
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Politico (politico.com) 01/12/2024
As the Middle East heats up, the Navy struggles to deploy replacement ships
Delays are emblematic of a wider issue with repair and maintenance in the Navy that has seen warships languish pierside for months after they had been scheduled to leave.
By Paul McLeary
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Congressional Research Service
Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress - Updated August 23, 2023
By Ronald O'Rourke - Specialist in Naval Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43543
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Statement of General Robert B. Neller before the House Appropriations Committee – Defense, on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps
7 March 2018
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20180307/106932/HHRG-115-AP02-Wstate-NellerR-20180307.pdf
As many CP readers and contributors know, long, demanding, and stressful deployments can have several phenomena:
1) Safety lapses.
2) Friendly fire incidents, collisions at sea, inadvertent engagement of neutral, non-combatant aircraft, and so on.
3) Rote, inertial thinking at times when alert and innovative responses need to be developed.
4) Spare part shortages, equipment fatigue, and attendant compromises to get “just one more day” from people and equipment.
5) Petty Officer, junior officer, and even senior officer lapses in supervision.
The list is long, and the refrain shows up in too many post-accident investigations. Regrettably, it is those closest to the incident, those who were striving the longest and the hardest to accomplish the mission that are held accountable. And, yes, it is those closest to the incident that suffer the loss of shipmates and fellow Marines … a loss and a feeling of culpability that will remain with them for the rest of their lives.
But, who is truly culpable? Perhaps, it is time to hold accountable the Admirals, Generals, senior DoD/DoN civilians, and senior officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches that for years have both under-resourced required operational capabilities and have squandered much needed and combat proven capabilities to chase the latest ideologies and technologies.
Where O’Where is the “Bonnie Dick”? Never forget that after a 250 million dollar modernization of this magnificent ship, it was lost not at sea in battle but burned beyond repair because the US Navy failed to “set the watch”! It was lost because the toxic Admiralty did not train, equip and supervise its Commanders and their crews concerning the absolute necessity of maintaining a competent responsive 24/7 fire watch ! Marines morn the loss of this faithful sea going super ship and pray for a proper fleet of her expeditionary amphibious sisters to rise from her ashes in order to STRIKE OUR ENEMIES from “The Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli”!