Compass Points - Congress Wants to Know
Who lost Marine Corps capabilities?
January 12, 2024
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It is easy to speculate about the future, but eventually the future arrives -- rarely as expected -- but it arrives.
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The future has arrived for the Marine Corps.
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Back in the summer of 2019 with the publication of the Commandant's Planning Guidance, the Marine Corps began an experimental new program to reduce Marine Corps capabilities and focus instead on placing small units of missile Marines on islands in the Pacific. The idea was that in the event of full-scale war with China, these small Marine missile units would be able to shoot at passing Chinese naval ships.
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The plan to divest Marines of much or all of its armor, artillery, combat breaching and bridging, aviation, and more was that in future combat, combined arms infantry would no longer be needed. Almost immediately, the plan to divest capabilities and equipment, to move from offense to defense, and to move from a global, combined arms, maneuver force to a narrow, regional force drew criticism.
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Mark Cancian wrote an early article warning, "Don't Go Too Crazy, Marine Corps." Cancian tried to remain open to the new plan, but he still warned:
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. . . John Vrolyk recently made a similar argument that “insurgency, not war, is China’s most likely course of action.” He argued that the Marine Corps should not divest itself from capabilities geared toward low-intensity conflict. This article broadens that argument to look beyond insurgencies and include wars against regional and local powers and their armies. Dan Gouré of the Lexington Institute made a similar argument in apocalyptic terms. He argued that because “what has primarily occupied the Marine Corps over the last seventy-plus years are crisis response and low-to-medium conflicts against smaller regional powers,” it needs a full-spectrum amphibious capability.
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These critiques arise from the same concern. If the National Defense Strategy is successful in that it leads to the deterrence of China and Russia, then this history is likely to continue: avoiding great power conflicts and fighting regional and counter-insurgency conflicts. Yet, a Marine Corps that is custom-designed for distributed operations on islands in the Western Pacific will be poorly designed and poorly trained for the land campaigns it is most likely to fight.
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. . . The Marine Corps should also avoid completely eliminating capabilities. Although the new guidance implies such eliminations, this creates gaps that might need filling in future conflicts. Instead, the Marine Corps should maintain an extensive toolkit as a hedge against an uncertain future.
--Mark Cancian
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Cancian was particularly wise in cautioning that no matter what experiments Marine Corps leaders wanted, they, "should maintain an extensive toolkit as a hedge against an uncertain future."
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Sadly, Marine Corps leaders years ago did not listen to the cautions of Mark Cancian or anyone else. Instead, Marine Corps combined arms capabilities were hastily divested.
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Now, the future has arrived and combat in Ukraine and Gaza have shown the ongoing need for full, combined arms capabilities. Missiles are a useful weapon but they cannot substitute for a global, combined arms, force of expeditionary Marines onboard amphibious ships.
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As the years have gone by and as a wide variety of threats and challenges erupt around the world, the idea of making the Marine Corps a limited, defensive force on islands in the Pacific is revealed as a terrible mistake.
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Now Congress wants a full review of what the Marine Corps has done. Writing in The Defense Post, Gary Anderson reports, "Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know."
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. . . Force Design (FD) 2030, the brainchild of the former commandant General David Berger, has been loudly and persistently challenged by many senior retired general officers, former defense officials, and friends of the Corps.
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Congress somewhat belatedly woke up to this intellectual civil war with this year’s National Defense Authorization Act, which mandates a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) independently evaluate FD 2030.
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. . . The current National Defense Authorization Act attempts to rectify that, but it can only be done properly if the mandated study is unbiased and free of influence by the existing leadership of the two naval services.
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. . . The Navy and the current Marine Corps senior leadership is heavily invested in FD 2030. The Marine Corps has divested billions of the assets that made the Corps a balanced, combined arms team to buy anti-ship capabilities primarily devoted to deterring or fighting a war with China.
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. . . If these things can be accomplished competently within the study’s scope, it can be determined whether the Marine Corps is headed in the right direction. If not, both the administration and Congress should give the Marine Corps marching order to change direction as well as funding to restore lost capabilities . . . .
--Gary Anderson
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The Marine Corps' narrow, defensive, island approach was conceived years ago. Now, the future has arrived for the Marine Corps and Congress has questions. Compass Points salutes Mark Cancian, Gary Anderson, and Congress for digging into the details and asking the difficult questions that will ensure the Marine Corps is strong today and stronger tomorrow.
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War on the Rocks (warontherocks.com) 01/08/2020
Don’t Go Too Crazy, Marine Corps
By Mark Cancian
Mark Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.) is a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program where he writes about military forces, budgets, and operations. Colonel Cancian spent over three decades in the U.S. Marine Corps, active and reserve, serving as an infantry, artillery, and civil affairs officer and on overseas tours in Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq (twice). He holds a BA and MBA from Harvard University.
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/dont-go-too-crazy-marine-corps/
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The Defense Post (thedefensepost.com) 01/12/2024
Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know
If so, necessary changes and funding are needed to restore lost capabilities.
By Gary Anderson
Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area. He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/01/12/marine-corps-fd-2030-study/?expand_article=1
When I was at The Basic School, our tactics instructor told us the 60mm mortar was the company commanders "hip-pocket" artillery. Always, take it with you. You don't know when you'll need it! Now the Marine Corps has gotten rid of all our tanks, heavy bridging and 60% of our artillery. Someone did not listen in class!
Gary Anderson’s article, “Does the Marine Corps need Course Correction? Congress wants to know” raises a number of concerns. (Good job Gary!) The SECDEF has been tasked by the National Defense Authorization Act, to conduct an “independent”, Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) evaluation of FD 2030. I really wonder why the word “unbiased” was not part of that tasking. When I read the “Master Government List of Federally Funded R&D Centers” I do not see a lot of independence. https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/ IMO almost all these organizations, even the few related to war fighting, are operating and dependent on government dollars that are controlled by the SECDEF and the Service Secretaries. In addition, I feel that the SECDEF, SECNAV and the Commandant will be motivated to look for wiggle room on some of the issues related to Force Design 2030. Call me cynical.
Besides liking to know the who and when (start and finish dates) for this study, the requirements are going to be very important. All Request for Proposals or Request for Information and/or studies have a list of detailed requirements. These contractual documents also usually contain a short scope statement; five or six sentences stating the general boundaries of the study. Kind of a commander’s intent. I sincerely hope that a congressional staffer has reviewed these requirements and maybe even asked Chowder 2 to take a look. Semper Fi