Compass Points - Creative Comments

Readers expand the discussion.

Compass Points - Creative Comments

Readers expand the discussion.

June 8, 2024

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As is the case every summer, the US is being challenged around the world by ongoing threats and conflicts. What will happen next? No one knows. No matter what happens, however, there is no doubt Compass Points readers will have insightful analysis and comment.

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Over the last week, Compass Points readers have responded online and off with a treasure load of comments, insights, and analysis. Only a few of the comments are re-posted below. Most of the full comments are available for reading on the Compass Points site. As always, comments have been edited for length and content. Several long, thoughtful comments have been reduced to just a sentence or two. Often the real enjoyment comes, not as much from the excerpt included below but, from reading the comment in full. Compass Points appreciates the full, insightful, and professional comments of all readers. Many thanks!

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J.E. Livingston

At the end of the day, the USMC is about killing bad guys. Anything that impacts that notion has been reduced by fateful mental fatigue. The nasty business of warfighting requires warriors properly trained, equipped, and organized. Sadly, the pathway forward is not clear.

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cfrog

Sooner or later, much as the IJN did, we all sit down for a buffet of consequences. I suspect, that if we are correct, the working part of the USMC will start to notice there is no 'there' there for Force Design as an operating concept. They'll be running face first into the logistical and operational shortfalls.

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Solomon

Have you been keeping up with some of the statements made by those that are ARDENT supporters of FD2030 talking against many that I consider some of the greats of the Marine Corps? Is "reasoned" debate even possible? The refusal to look at things as they are and not how they wish them to be makes debating the subject damn near possible.

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Jeffrey Dinsmore

I'll add for public consumption, and for all my active friends that lurk on these pages!

-After having been brought up in the Corps of the mid-80's and 90's, the stifling of internal discussion in the Corps' PME halls and professional publications was a new and developing phenomenon that I marked and recorded happening starting in about 2006, when the Long War and the political pressure to cower got really difficult for those leaders that may be unaccustomed to finding creative ways to stand up to it.

-The maturation of that discourse-stifling tendency into the info-ops shutdown of 2019 was alarming. I felt the evidence in the Fleet, saw it in the 2022 reaction to Chowder II, and would call it a "tectonic cultural shift" in the way we behave as Marines.

-In terms of "comments" driven content, CP is a well-moderated and professionally focused forum that has all the marks of a good afternoon at the Officer's Club in 1990. Or an afternoon in Reasoner Hall in 1996 with the Acolytes. Of course, there is always the one "springbutt;" the guy who everyone in the room knows, who has to take us on a non-relevant tangent...but what would the Corps be without that guy?

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

General Van Riper, I hope the next interview with the editor happens, and sooner than later. This whole focus on the reading lists and materials to begin locating, reading and digesting is enormously helpful. As mentioned, we really didn’t have anything nearly like a reading list back in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Partly our own fault, but guidance is always welcome. All of it can help refine and improve one’s ability to contribute to the ongoing dialog in a civil manner! Intelligence wins the debate!

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Samuel Whittemore

I just read General Van Riper’s Chapter 4 of “The Past as Prologue, edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich. It is exceptional.

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Mike Wyly

In my experience, extensive reading on the history and conduct of war began at the behest of Lieutenant General Victor Krulak at his Counterguerrilla / Counterinsurgency School. Required sources included Sun Tzu, B.H. Liddell Hart, Walter Laqueur , the U.S. Marine Corps "Small Wars Manual" of the 1930's and more. My subsequent experience in Vietnam told me "loud and clear" that General "The Brute" Krulak had it right. To understand the art of war, "professionals" MUST read - just as do the other classic professions: Medicine, Law, and the Clergy. In 1980 when General Bernard Trainor assigned me Head of Tactics at "Amphibious Warfare School" (now "Expeditionary Warfare School"), my first act was to create a required reading list. We required students to buy books and we worked with the Marine Corps Gazette Bookstore to stock the books that were on our list. Reading caught on. We must never let that fire die!   And it NEEDS periodic re-emphasis.

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Randy Shetter

I think the article of Fantasy Island, from May 28, was a good piece. The author, Niharika Mandhana, made it seem like FD was a good idea: Marines sinking Chinese ships: how cool is that? The author however, has no idea what the Nation is losing and what the Marine Corps is eliminating to achieve this concept. She probably has no clue that "divest to invest" has damaged the Marine Corps as a combined arms naval expeditionary force. Ms. Mandhana probably does not realize the importance such a force can have.

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Jerry McAbee

The horror that Stand-in Forces (SIF), isolated and unsupported on remote islands, will have inadequate on-scene medical and casualty evacuation support should not come as a surprise to anyone. Like the rest of Force Design 2030, the SIF concept was never vetted through the Combat Development Process. Had the SIF concept been properly vetted, it would have been exposed for what it is - - a fool’s errand. The entire area of logistics (medical, food and water, maintenance, transportation, etc.), survivability, positioning and repositioning, and even the effectiveness of the anti-ship missiles have never been sufficiently addressed, much less resolved. In the mad rush to appear revolutionary, the Marine Corps put empty words ahead of the mission and the welfare of the Marines needed to accomplish it. The entire SIF concept needs to be scrapped before Marines, isolated and unsupported on remote islands, are needlessly killed and maimed.

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Greg Falzetta

General Barrow was right “amateurs talk tactics, but professionals talk and PLAN (my addition) logistics." I’m afraid the Corps is being led by amateurs at this point.

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Douglas C Rapé

I recently had an email exchange with an individual I do not know who has his own Substack Account. (Amphibiosity) It appears that he is a Marine Colonel in the USMCR and currently a civilian employee in Quantico. He has actively defended FD-20XX. In one exchange, he claimed that the Chinese cannot deploy forces to threaten the missile batteries and that the “nearby” MAGTF can support them. Imagine my surprise. He also opined that the terms 'winning' or 'losing' have no meaning as the objective is to create a political situation in our favor. I will not engage any further with him because I simply lack the intellectual depth to understand what he is talking about. I relate this exchange for a simple reason. Try as I might, I simply cannot understand the viability of the FD concept. It is a concept that has no flesh and blood component.

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Alfred Karam

Of all that has been written about Force Design, the topic of logistics worries me the most. I haven’t read anything remotely feasible that speaks to how we will succeed in supporting our Littoral Marines once they are dropped off on the so called first island chain.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

FD2030 was, is, and will be considered in the fullness of time “Dereliction of Duty”. Full stop.

FD2030 never seems to address the fact that the Corps has a Title X mandate. It’s a federal statute. The fact was, even before the debacle of FD2020 the Corps was not meeting the requirements of Title X. Aging sealift capacity and capability are just one small subset of problems that FD2030 didn’t address properly,

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Samuel Whittemore

Regarding lack of Medical Support for FD 2030, Napoleon’s disastrous retreat from Acre during his Egyptian Campaign and his even more costly retreat from Russia are both examples of failed medical and other logistical catastrophes. Napoleon reportedly shot his prisoners in the retreat from Acre and administered fatal dosages of opium to his own soldiers who were dying from wounds and or the plague.

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Bob Whitener

The Afghanistan withdrawal was a military withdrawal. The responsibility for its success or failure rests on the shoulders of the CENTCOM Commander.

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Jerry McAbee

Today’s Marine Corps is the poster child for senior leader “delusion wrapped in denial.” Force Design is a flawed concept. It is a recipe for disaster. It has already destroyed the combined arms and global response capabilities of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps obviously knows it. The senior leaders have had five years to see the damage done to the operating forces and to the national defense. Yet, the Commandant doubled down on denial in his recent FRAGO 01-2024 where he vowed to “remain firmly committed to our current path.”

This denial has boxed the Marine Corps into a corner, which is evident by the absence of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance. In my humble opinion, the way out of this box could not be more clear - - scrub Force Design and replace it with an operating concept that restores global response in the age of precision weapons. The foundation for this concept have been clearly laid out by General Charles Krulak and General Tony Zinni in Vision 2035:

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vision-2035-global-response-age-precision-munitions-205995.

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Douglas C Rapé

While on active duty the quickest way for a senior flag officer to lose my respect was to state: “That is not politically possible” to explain a lack of candor based on truth. I would think to myself: “Why not give your best possible military advice and let politicians tell us what is not possible?”

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Polarbear

Pre-War War Games: Part I

“Winning A Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War” by Norman Friedman and “War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray. (The “Studies of Navies” was published in 1936 and is not available on Amazon, it will take a bit of work to find.)

In light of the 2030 design, I would highly recommend these two books for professional reading (as in “YOU GOTTA READ THESE BOOKS!”). Both books not only describe the method, development, and value of Naval War Gaming before WW2 but also the development of “War Plan Orange”. I should note that both books declare that naval offensive operations in order to block and/or capture SLOCs are the strategic objectives that will win the war.

Part II

“War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray in my estimation is an outstanding piece of strategic analysis. Especially since it was first published in 1936. It starts with chapters on Navy personnel, “Mission, Ships, Wings of the Fleet, the Fleet, and Bases and Shore Installations”. It then takes a look at the strategic “Geographic, Political, Social and Psychological, Economic, and the Nature of the Conflict”. I should note that in the “Geographic” Chapter there is a map of the Pacific with a network of lines labeled with distances to and from major ports and strategic islands. The reader is quickly given the realization of the size and distance problems presented by the Pacific Ocean.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

I understand senior leaders at Manpower are doing their best, but I cannot agree with the idea of instant E-7s. This effort to bring propeller heads into the Corps is damaging to the Ethos, and mindset of the warrior culture. It will create jealousy and rancor in the ranks and frankly justifiably so. The next step the consultants and make no mistake this has Bain and McKenzie hand prints all over it, is majors 04’s skipping OCS, TBS and so forth to come in a do their thing. It needs to stop. This whole thing is insulting, and shows just how miserable a lot of senior officers we have running the show. Sure there are some good ones, but better ones are leaving and this nonsense like instant E7s is just one example of why.

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Alfred Karam

Absolutely the wrong thing to do by enlisting people and promoting to GySgt right off the bat!

What a slap to the face of every Marine who worked, sweated and bled to earn his or her stripes and climb up the enlisted ranks. The pride in our achievements can’t be described!

This move by the MC pisses me off to no end! I sacrificed a lot in my 25 years of service and worked extremely hard to the determine of my family and my own personal well being to earn my stripes.

I don’t give a damn about the need for these talented individuals. Sure, recruit them. Pay them a damn bonus, BUT DON’T THROW RANK AT THEM LIKE THE ITS CONFETTI, you will be demeaning the entire rank structure! Hell, why not bring them in as Generals!

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Polarbear

Yes, the Marine Corps must get back to planning for 2 Major Regional Conflicts for adequate force levels. One issue for 2 MRC planning was two different Combatant Commanders each had a one MRC. Back in the years after Desert Storm the JSCP did a good job assigning combat units (Squadrons, Divisions, etc). Where the two MRC planning fell short was theater support units. There were enough for 1 MRC but for the second MRC there was a lot of empty flags.

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Tom Holton

The U.S. had better technology than our adversaries in the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But better technology did not result in victory. Perhaps we should put more resources toward "muscle" and less toward fancy machines and eyeglass lenses.

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Bud Meador

Concur with Tom’s perspective. Perhaps we should also press hard on our civilian counterparts to conceive of, & promulgate, a sound achievable STRATEGY!

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

The continuing issue seems to be a disconnect between a “National Strategy” and what the five branches of the military can deliver to meet the aims and interests of the United States. We have nearly a trillion dollar defense budget but to the jaundiced eye it really doesn’t support much, and when it does provide support the end results are generally poor or worse tragic.

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Ira

THIS essay makes sense.

It seems, however, that directionless double talk and disassociated ramblings, coming out of DC, that I see on TV and internet screens much of the time do not portend that the USA will reemerge as a nation that is well prepared to defend itself and its interests.

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Paul Van Riper

The members of Chowder Society II have no plans to stop voicing our concerns about the path the Corps appears to be continuing along, that is, Force Design 2030. We see it as an existential threat to the Corps.  General Gray told me when I became the Director of Command and Staff College that if the Corps' ideas and concepts could not withstand the criticism of its own Marines and those outside of the Corps (Bill Lind being most prominent), then it was likely there was something wrong with our ideas and concepts. Under General Gray and succeeding commandant's leadership, rich and heated debates were frequent and welcomed. We learned much from those "intellectual gunfights."

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cfrog

I am not CP, but I think we all understand the ad hominem attacks and hyperbole made as part of the IO campaign against the critics of FD (2030). We would do well to remember that the Active Duty is eating the 'buffet of consequences' right now that is the fallout of the implementation of FD(2030). They may be, on the whole, a lot more willing to consider the points we have been making consistently, provided we continue to present them rationally and free of excessive diatribe. Rome wasn't built / rebuilt in a day. It takes consistency and strategic patience.

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Keith Holcomb

I'm no great reader of social media, but publishing articles in a few places has exposed me to comments about both my articles and those of others. I have read political rants, ad hominem attacks, and seen trolls at work.

Those commenting on CP are exceptional. Look at this page as an example: reason, discourse (I much prefer that term to debate --- discourse can lead to a higher plane), the sharing of references, and so on.

CP readers have such a deep professional commitment to the Nation and its security that they make the effort to improve understanding, to share perspectives, and hard-earned combat experience. In short, they care enough to contribute ... and to do so in a meaningful way. Thoughts that will stand the test of time and combat.

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Compass Points salutes all readers who in their own ways are continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps.