When I read the report a couple of days ago, I came to the conclusion that the USMC is doomed as a broad spectrum capable MAGTF. We now how two CMCs in a row stuck on stupid groupthink and a SOW and congress unwilling to get them to shape up and follow the law.
Two Commandants in succession locked into the same groupthink has taken the Corps from a broad-spectrum MAGTF to a narrower, specialized force built around one set of assumptions. The GCE 2040 language and the CRS report only confirm what the force structure changes already showed: less combined-arms density, less flexibility, and less ability to answer the full range of crises the nation used to expect from its 911 force.
When the Secretary and Congress decline to force a course correction, the institution keeps driving in the same direction. That is how a service loses the very capability that made it unique. The MAGTF worked because it was balanced and ready for the unknown. What is being built now is something else.
Unlike positive learning, which builds upon hard-earned experience and principles repeatedly validated in war, negative learning occurs when organizations abandon proven doctrine in favor of shiny technology, with over-reliance on costly technology usurping people and ideas. Force Design represents not simply misconceived innovation but the replacement of enduring combat-tested principles with relentlessly bad, top-down ideas, fairy-dusted war games that have yet to be validated/tested under combat conditions, and logistics notably abandoned. The five pillars of GCE 2040 may be understood not as milestones on the road to transformation, but as signposts marking a pilgrimage to perdition.
Positive learning builds on what combat has already proven. Negative learning discards those principles for technology that has not been validated under fire, top-down concepts that skip the development process, and logistics treated as optional. That distinction is the heart of the problem.
Force Design and the five pillars of GCE 2040 are presented as transformation. What they have delivered so far is a narrower force: reduced combined-arms density, an eroded offensive ethos, and a MAGTF reoriented around one theater and one set of assumptions. Sensors, long-range fires, and AI have value. They do not replace the ability to close with, fight, and sustain when the next crisis looks nothing like the war game.
“Signposts marking a pilgrimage to perdition” is strong language. It is also earned. When proven doctrine is set aside for untested ideas and fairy-dusted exercises, the institution is not innovating. It is forgetting. The Marine Corps earned its place as the nation’s 911 force by remaining ready for the unknown. Narrowing that aperture is not progress.
Appreciate you putting it in writing. The record is already speaking.
All the superficial, incoherent nonsense, regurgitated by HQMC, et al, can conceal their tunnel vision. Remember General Westmoreland’s comments to the press in Vietnam? “There’s light at the end of the tunnel”. The usual response by Marines in the field: “Yeah, a freight train bearing down on you!” Semper Fi
HQMC language about transformation and the five pillars keeps promising light at the end of the tunnel. The Marines who have actually closed with the enemy know the difference between a light and a freight train. Superficial talking points and untested concepts do not conceal tunnel vision; they advertise it.
When proven combined-arms principles are set aside for technology and war games that have not been validated under fire, the force is not getting stronger. It is getting narrower. The field has seen this movie before. The freight train does not care about the briefing slides.
Appreciate the clarity
Semper Fi Brother and have a Blessed evening Sir!!!
In my opinion, the "Five Pillars of the Ground Combat Element" should read like this:
The Marine Corps has recently embarked on a Force Design program which the Marine Corps now realizes was poorly organized and planned. As part of the Joint Force the Marine Corps will assist the Navy with antiship fires from its traditionally organized artillery. But as an expeditionary force, the Marine Corps will return to its unique status as a medium-weight, combined-arms, naval expeditionary force. Thus the Marine Corps will:
1) Enhance its infantry force with more lethal infantry weapons. The infantry squad will maintain 3 fire teams. A drone/counter drone squad will be integrated into the rifle plt.
2) Marine artillery will return to 3 regiments of 4 battalions each. There will be 3 field artillery bns of 155 tubes, and one HIMARS bn per regiment. Field artillery will focus on increased range and mobility. Mobility will be based on wheeled self propelled guns. Additional firepower in the form of 120mm mortars or 105mm howitzers will be introduced to infantry regiments.
3) Direct fire support in the form of medium tanks or fire-support vehicles will be brought back to the Marine Corps. The gun caliber will be 120mm. Speed and lethality will be utmost.
4) Combat Support/Engineer support will again be robust in the form of in-stride breaching and armored launched bridging and will be brought back to support the force.
The Marine Corps will return to its unique position as the Nation's naval expeditionary crisis response force.
When I read the report a couple of days ago, I came to the conclusion that the USMC is doomed as a broad spectrum capable MAGTF. We now how two CMCs in a row stuck on stupid groupthink and a SOW and congress unwilling to get them to shape up and follow the law.
Robert,
You’re not wrong on the trajectory.
Two Commandants in succession locked into the same groupthink has taken the Corps from a broad-spectrum MAGTF to a narrower, specialized force built around one set of assumptions. The GCE 2040 language and the CRS report only confirm what the force structure changes already showed: less combined-arms density, less flexibility, and less ability to answer the full range of crises the nation used to expect from its 911 force.
When the Secretary and Congress decline to force a course correction, the institution keeps driving in the same direction. That is how a service loses the very capability that made it unique. The MAGTF worked because it was balanced and ready for the unknown. What is being built now is something else.
Appreciate the plain assessment
Semper Fi Sir and have a Blessed evening!!!
Cpl Dan, your second paragraph sums it quite well.
Oooh-rahh Sir, Semper Fi, it's unfortunate to be this way but if it's not identified it won't change. Have a Blessed evening!!!
Unlike positive learning, which builds upon hard-earned experience and principles repeatedly validated in war, negative learning occurs when organizations abandon proven doctrine in favor of shiny technology, with over-reliance on costly technology usurping people and ideas. Force Design represents not simply misconceived innovation but the replacement of enduring combat-tested principles with relentlessly bad, top-down ideas, fairy-dusted war games that have yet to be validated/tested under combat conditions, and logistics notably abandoned. The five pillars of GCE 2040 may be understood not as milestones on the road to transformation, but as signposts marking a pilgrimage to perdition.
Colonel Wilson,
You named it exactly.
Positive learning builds on what combat has already proven. Negative learning discards those principles for technology that has not been validated under fire, top-down concepts that skip the development process, and logistics treated as optional. That distinction is the heart of the problem.
Force Design and the five pillars of GCE 2040 are presented as transformation. What they have delivered so far is a narrower force: reduced combined-arms density, an eroded offensive ethos, and a MAGTF reoriented around one theater and one set of assumptions. Sensors, long-range fires, and AI have value. They do not replace the ability to close with, fight, and sustain when the next crisis looks nothing like the war game.
“Signposts marking a pilgrimage to perdition” is strong language. It is also earned. When proven doctrine is set aside for untested ideas and fairy-dusted exercises, the institution is not innovating. It is forgetting. The Marine Corps earned its place as the nation’s 911 force by remaining ready for the unknown. Narrowing that aperture is not progress.
Appreciate you putting it in writing. The record is already speaking.
Semper Fi, Sir and have a Blessed evening!!!
All the superficial, incoherent nonsense, regurgitated by HQMC, et al, can conceal their tunnel vision. Remember General Westmoreland’s comments to the press in Vietnam? “There’s light at the end of the tunnel”. The usual response by Marines in the field: “Yeah, a freight train bearing down on you!” Semper Fi
Raymond,
You nailed the analogy.
HQMC language about transformation and the five pillars keeps promising light at the end of the tunnel. The Marines who have actually closed with the enemy know the difference between a light and a freight train. Superficial talking points and untested concepts do not conceal tunnel vision; they advertise it.
When proven combined-arms principles are set aside for technology and war games that have not been validated under fire, the force is not getting stronger. It is getting narrower. The field has seen this movie before. The freight train does not care about the briefing slides.
Appreciate the clarity
Semper Fi Brother and have a Blessed evening Sir!!!
https://cpldanusmcret764175.substack.com/p/crumbling-pillars?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=ohc7t
Semper Fi
In my opinion, the "Five Pillars of the Ground Combat Element" should read like this:
The Marine Corps has recently embarked on a Force Design program which the Marine Corps now realizes was poorly organized and planned. As part of the Joint Force the Marine Corps will assist the Navy with antiship fires from its traditionally organized artillery. But as an expeditionary force, the Marine Corps will return to its unique status as a medium-weight, combined-arms, naval expeditionary force. Thus the Marine Corps will:
1) Enhance its infantry force with more lethal infantry weapons. The infantry squad will maintain 3 fire teams. A drone/counter drone squad will be integrated into the rifle plt.
2) Marine artillery will return to 3 regiments of 4 battalions each. There will be 3 field artillery bns of 155 tubes, and one HIMARS bn per regiment. Field artillery will focus on increased range and mobility. Mobility will be based on wheeled self propelled guns. Additional firepower in the form of 120mm mortars or 105mm howitzers will be introduced to infantry regiments.
3) Direct fire support in the form of medium tanks or fire-support vehicles will be brought back to the Marine Corps. The gun caliber will be 120mm. Speed and lethality will be utmost.
4) Combat Support/Engineer support will again be robust in the form of in-stride breaching and armored launched bridging and will be brought back to support the force.
The Marine Corps will return to its unique position as the Nation's naval expeditionary crisis response force.