Compass Points – CSIS Reveals

Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

Compass Points – CSIS Reveals

Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

December 27, 2024

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Why such a strange silence from the Marine Corps?

Years ago when the Marine Corps first began its plan to change its focus from offense to defense and from global to regional by placing small Marine missile units on Pacific islands, the plan received only cursory review. Back then there were constant changes in leadership at the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and above. And leaders at all levels were distracted by the COVID pandemic.

As the years went by, however, questions and controversy about the Marine missile plan grew and grew. A trickle of articles appeared with doubts about the plan. The trickle became a stream and then a torrent.

Then, early in 2023 Mark Cancian, a senior adviser in the CSIS Defense and Security Department, released a report on a comprehensive and authoritative series of wargames, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. The wargames tested the ability of the US and allies to defend against an attack by China on Taiwan. The executive summary begins:

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CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is therefore not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.

— Mark Cancian, et al., CSIS

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The 165 page report covering the full 24 invasion scenarios is worth reading in its entirety, including the findings about the usefulness of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR).

Three MLR findings from the report:

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1. “Although these units [MLRs and MDTFs] could contribute to the fight, neither played heavily in most scenarios. The problems of operating inside the Chinese defensive zone were insurmountable. In several games, the U.S. player tried to move an MLR onto Taiwan by air or sea, but in all cases the unit and transportation assets were destroyed while trying to transit the extensive Chinese defensive zones.301”

2. “Ground units will not provide a significant volume of fire. A squadron of bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles has a greater volume of fire than an entire MLR but without the challenges of transportation and logistics.”

3. “In another scenario, an MLR moved onto the Philippine islands north of Luzon. There, it could attack Chinese forces that moved south of Taiwan, but again resupply was impossible, limiting its value.302 All game iterations had an MLR and Army MDTF on Hawaii available for deployment by airlift, but no U.S. player called them forward.”

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More from the CSIS report on the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) and the invasion of Taiwan.

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. . . Although these units [MLRs and MDTFs] could contribute to the fight, neither played heavily in most scenarios. The problems of operating inside the Chinese defensive zone were insurmountable. In several games, the U.S. player tried to move an MLR onto Taiwan by air or sea, but in all cases the unit and transportation assets were destroyed while trying to transit the extensive Chinese defensive zones.301 In most scenarios, political assumptions prevented any U.S. forces from being pre-positioned on Taiwanese or Philippine territory before the conflict begins. (See Chapter 4 for a description of the base case assumptions and above for a recommendation on verifying war plan assumptions.)

However, one scenario assumed that that the United States was willing to risk provocation by putting U.S. forces onto Taiwan, whether because Chinese mobilization generated sufficient concern, or the U.S.-China relationship had changed. In this scenario, before hostilities began, an MLR deployed from Okinawa with its load of missiles and one reload, augmenting the shore-based fires of Taiwanese Harpoons. The NSM’s 100-nautical-mile range could easily enable attacks on Chinese amphibious ships from Taiwan. Assuming that the MLR deployed with a load of 72 NSMs on 18 launchers, modeling showed that the MLRs would sink an average of five major Chinese amphibious ships. Because of the MLR’s ability to conduct distributed operations, it was assumed to be survivable in the face of Chinese counteraction. However, resupply proved impossible. A resupply mission of C-17s escorted by fighters attempted to break through the Chinese CAP but was shot down. After that, no further attempts were made at resupply. The MLR became a ground infantry battalion, augmenting the 114 combat battalions of the Taiwanese ground forces.

. . . Ground units will not provide a significant volume of fire. A squadron of bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles has a greater volume of fire than an entire MLR but without the challenges of transportation and logistics. Ground-based anti-ship units must either deploy with a large number of missiles before the conflict begins or act as forward sensors for long-range air and naval power. Similar stories emerged from MLR deployments to the western Ryukyus and Philippines. In one scenario, the MLR was prepositioned in the western Ryukyus. In that location, it could attack Chinese naval forces that moved north of Taiwan, but resupply was deemed too risky. In another scenario, an MLR moved onto the Philippine islands north of Luzon. There, it could attack Chinese forces that moved south of Taiwan, but again resupply was impossible, limiting its value.302 All game iterations had an MLR and Army MDTF on Hawaii available for deployment by airlift, but no U.S. player called them forward. Instead, the U.S. player gave priority to Patriot battalions, which could add to the air defense of threatened airfields. These were needed because of repeated Chinese air and missile attacks.

Therefore, the project team recommends continuing to develop land-based forces to counter Chinese air and naval capabilities but also the need to recognize their employment challenges. While these new formations were more useful than traditional ground forces, multiplying these specialized units has limited value because only the first few can be deployed successfully. Others will sit unused. The maximum number is probably two or three. The acquisition of long-range ground-launched missiles might overcome this limitation. If ground launched Tomahawks have a similar range to their Vertical Launch System (VLS) counterparts, they could be employed from peacetime bases on Okinawa without moving in the Chinese defensive zone.

— Mark Cancian, et al., CSIS

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The non-partisan, unbiased CSIS wargames that studied the invasion of Taiwan exposed severe limits in the usefulness of Marine missile units. And yet the Marine Corps has had little to say. Those inside the leadership of the Marine Corps who still advocate for the island missile plan, should have produced over the last eighteen months a detailed response to the CSIS findings.

The experts at CSIS studied the invasion of Taiwan in depth using 24 separate scenarios. CSIS gained insights from each iteration, including insights about the Marine MLRs. Where is the response from HQMC that deftly dismantles the findings from CSIS? CSIS found that in most scenarios the MLRs played at best only a minor role. In other scenarios the Marines were destroyed or left unsupplied to surrender or die.

Compass Points salutes Mark Cancian and the entire CSIS team who have created such a thorough and professional wargame and report. CSIS has performed an invaluable service for the incoming administration, by revealing how little the Marine missile units contribute to deterring China. It is time for the Marine Corps to put is focus back on global, crisis response. If the Marine Corps is unwilling to turn its focus back to worldwide offensive operations, the incoming administration should direct it to do so.

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CSIS - Center for Strategic & International Studies - 01/09/23

The First Battle of the Next War:

Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

By Mark E. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, & Eric Heginbotham

https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan