Compass Points - Discerning Comments

Readers expand the discussion

Compass Points - Discerning Comments

Readers expand the discussion

June 29, 2024

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Good news! Marines are back in the Mediterranean. As one reader has commented, "The 24 MEU is on station in the Med, a great glass of water in the capability desert. Thank you to the Marines and Sailors of the Wasp ARG doing Gator squares."

What global challenges will the US face next? No one knows. No matter what happens, however, there is no doubt Compass Points readers will have insightful analysis and comment.

Over the last week, Compass Points readers have responded online and off with a treasure load of comments, insights, and analysis. Only a few of the comments are re-posted below. Most of the full comments are available for reading on the Compass Points site. As always, comments have been edited for length and content. Several long, thoughtful comments have been reduced to just a sentence or two. Often the real enjoyment comes, not as much from the excerpt included below but, from reading the comment in full. Compass Points appreciates the full, insightful, and professional comments of all readers. Many thanks!

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Alfred Karam

I learned long ago, great military leaders exhibit not only strategic brilliance but also the humility to acknowledge and rectify their mistakes. When they make a bad decision, admitting their shortcoming and apologizing demonstrates strength of character and fosters trust among the ranks. I wish today’s Marine Corps leaders admit their mistake concerning FD and work hard to restoring our Marine Corps to its former fighting strength before it is too late.

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Douglas C Rapé

I have two thoughts that are indirectly related to the last two Compass Point pieces.

1. The term Esprit de Corps seems to have fallen out of favor. Exactly when I cannot pin point but I do not believe I ever heard it from either Gen Neller, Gen Berger or Gen Smith. Esprit de Corps is a fragile thing that can evaporate rather quickly in a high turn over military organization. Esprit de Corps implies an elan of elite organizations that are offensive in nature and remarkable in their performance. Coastal Artillery hiding on remote coral atolls do not lend themselves to Esprit de Corps.

2. The world’s troublemakers were recently defined as China, North Korea, Iran and Russia and were examples of where MAGTF’s might be deployed. I think that is too narrow. Granted, the Houthis are funded and supported via Iran, as is Hamas, Hezbollah and ISIS and each could be a Marine adversary overnight. Little attention has been paid to Cuba, Venezuela and the vast reach and capabilities of the multinational drug cartels that will eventually be a military target. Law Enforcement has had 50 years and has been unable to prevail while the cartels grow stronger. I see many potential scenarios for the USMC being deployed and EABO is immaterial to all of them and not viable in the very scenario it is being designed for.

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cfrog

General Dunford's CPG-36 included the following: "Combining the best virtues of both sailors and soldiers, our Marines have developed a sense of elitism forged in the crucible of our shared training experiences and reinforced by the **esprit de corps** (asterisks added by me for emphasis) and cohesiveness of our small units.

This idea of being an elite force was captured by General Krulak, our 31st Commandant, in Leading Marines: “A sense of elitism has grown ... from the fact that every Marine, whether enlisted or officer, goes through the same training experience. Both the training of recruits and the basic education of officers... have endowed the Corps with a sense of cohesiveness enjoyed by no other American service.”.

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Martin Belcher

As I continue read and study all of the discussions around 2030 ,I am beginning to see a disturbing trend from actively serving offices which is at best unprofessional and at worst insultingly juvenile.

The core concerns of 2030, as I view it are simple. Can a small, isolated ambuscade force with a narrow mission scope be effective (able to, hopefully, fire and survive the first shot), be undetected (especially with the scope of the PLA's surveillance capabilities), and be easily resupplied, reinforced, displaced / evacuated (slow, unstealthy, and as of yet unfunded or constructed shipping).

The current stakeholders of 2030 are betting the house, heritage, and possibly the future on a theory designed and gamed out in a questionable manner. The great stress test that forged the MAGTF has not been applied to 2030. The existing brain trust of Marines is being dismissed in a most alarming manner.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

How can the Marine Corps meet the mandate under Title X when there is neither the Table of Organization nor Table Equipment to support it?

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cfrog

 "USMC, as the singular inherently Joint Service, provides the initial Forces around which supporting and follow on Joint Forces will form." The NDS 2018 had the following guidance, and I've always wondered why the USMC of 2019-2020 did not lean into this more since it was tailor made for the robust modern MAGTF:

"Dynamic Force Employment. Dynamic Force Employment will prioritize maintaining the capacity and capabilities for major combat, while providing options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force. A modernized Global Operating Model of combat-credible, flexible theater postures will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options."

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Alfred Karam

The bottom line is this, instead of reducing the Marine Corps capabilities to fund FD, the Corps needs to grow, and grow exponentially to meet the threat of peer and near peer competitors.

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Jerry McAbee

The question no one is asking is where was the Marine Littoral Regiment’s NSM anti-ship missile in the SINKEX (Marine F/A-18Cs did participate). My guess is the Marines still don’t have an initial operational capability (IOC) after almost 5 years.

As to the larger issue of global response -- global response is more that the episodic presence of a MEU or truncated MAGTF. Global response requires persistent forward presence; the capability to quickly deploy a robust combined arms MEB and rapidly composite into a sustainable MEF; the wherewithal to fight any foe, anywhere, and win. Saying it’s so in congressional testimony and in written documents does not make it so.

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Randy Shetter

Since the Army has the largest budget and the most resources, why does the Marine Corps want to eliminate its most unique contribution to National Defense, that as a combined arms naval expeditionary force, and duplicate what the Army is doing?

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Douglas C Rapé

The US ship building/repair and modernize industry is moribund, in large part due to US contracting anarchy. Yet, we need ships. Buy them until we can rejuvenate the broken shipping building industry.

We cannot plan to be ready for war in 2035. We must be ready tomorrow.

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cfrog

That's the rub. Are we at our Canberra / QE2 moment (UK Falklands TF) where risk of not being able to execute a mission outweighs the risk of using repurposed commercial shipping? Do we need to seriously consider converted liners, repurposed cargo ships, leased RO/RO ferries, and more MV Ocean Traders(built as MEU Ops support vessels vice Special Operations)? In the short term, since we have to prioritize Surface Warfare Vessels and Submarines, the answer, however undesirable, is clear. To keep the MAGTF globally viable and rebuild amphib capability in the short term (6mo / 2yr), we need to supplement the Amphib Fleet with repurposed commercial shipping.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

One thought which comes to mind is the Table of Organization.this a semi wild idea, but even if at the moment we do not have rolling stock armor, why can’t we begin training the armor MOS’s? Can we get older Abrams from the Army, or National Guard units? Is there some sort of federal statue that would prevent the Corps from buying Leopard or Centurion tanks? Even if we just had one company of armor per division to start it seems better than none. Same applies especially to the Engineer MOS’s, get the Marines trained up, as the T/O is being upgraded.

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Michael Johnson

Here are 3 points on amphibs.

-- Amphib readiness and Marine Unit readiness appear significantly disconnected. Marine units (MEU) appear capable of generating a ready force on a 1:3 personnel/training/maintenance timeline. Amphib (ARG shipping) readiness appears a 1:5 personnel/training/maintenance timeline.

-- To generate an ARG/ MEU persistent presence in the Pacific and either the Med or Arabian Gulf requires a minimum baseline of 15 appropriate sized amphibious on the east and west coast. Assumes the Okinawa ARG/MEU not counted as satisfying the Pacific requirement

-- ARG/ MEU deployments need to be reviewed looking to reduce transit times to destinations. As an example Pacific ARG/MEU spends 50 percent of its deployed time in transit if deployed to CENTCOM. Appears inefficient.

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Coffeejoejava

The former Commandant apparently did not read or consult with other services before he "war gamed" this fiasco and embarked on the disastrous FD2030. He planned this entire cataclysmic change to the very culture of our Corps in a vacuum, thinking the Corps was the only one thinking this way.

He consulted no Combatant Commander, it appears he read no Oplans that deal with how the Marine Corps is to SUPPORT the COMBINED war fighting effort. He took the Corps straight back to the early 20th century where there were no Joint Chiefs of Staff, there were no combatant commanders, and every service planned itself in a vacuum.

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Randy Shetter

Imagine a LRASM loaded onto a seaplane. A seaplane can use the whole ocean as a base in which to hide or take off.

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Barry Knutson

A note on the Battle of Okinawa. Because of the kamikaze’s there were more USN KIA than USMC or USA together -- only time that happened, My wife's father, 19 year old from NY was on one of the Navy ships ,,,, did not get hit.

Knute

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Samuel Whittemore

We are the United States Marine Corps! We are NOT United States Missiles Cruise!

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Paul Van Riper

Hey Marines, publishers are looking for articles from Marines other than retired generals. I've read all your posts, and Chowder Society II can assist with editing and finding outlets for articles. Hit "Reply" to any Compass Points email with a paragraph or two or a draft article. Topics should all connect to the way ahead for our Corps. We know how a few former leaders screwed things up, now how can today's leaders fix it?

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Compass Points salutes all readers who in their own ways are continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps.