Compass Points - Fearful of Debate?
Robust discussion, discourse, and debate are important.
July 9, 2025
.
In the field, after every exercise and operation, Marines have traditionally been taught to engage in a robust hot wash-up, an immediate, frank review of what went right and what can be improved. One of the rules of a hot wash-up is all Marines who see an issue must speak up. No hiding behind silence.
One Marine who has never been accused of hiding behind silence, or anything else, has been conducting his own hot wash-up of Force Design for several years. Compass Points has received from Marine LtGen Paul K. Van Riper (ret) some thoughts on the importance to the Marine Corps of robust discussion, discourse and debate. Compass Points thanks LtGen Van Riper for insights and also for his continuing service to Corps and Country.
.
------------------
------------------
.
Why Haven’t Today’s Marine Leaders Entered the Debate About Force Design 2030?
Marines who served during the General Gray, General Mundy, and General Krulak era (1987-1999) were professionally very fortunate. In these years and for some time afterward there was an electric energy in the air throughout the Corps as new tactical and operational ideas and concepts were put forth and old ones challenged. A continual discourse played out in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico classrooms, SNCO and officer clubs, and Fleet Marine Force units. The eventual outcome of this rich activity was the adoption of the maneuver warfare philosophy and publication of the Warfighting manual.
These three generals were set up for success by three of their predecessors—General Leonard Chapman, General Louis Wilson, and General Robert Barrow—who following the end of the Vietnam War demanded a re-commitment to high standards across the board, introduced new training venues such as the Combined Arms Exercise at 29 Palms, and oversaw the standup of the Maritime Preposition Force.
General Gray established the tone for the following period when he mandated commanders grant critics—some very severe ones—access to the Corps’ bases and stations. And he urged Marines to engage these critics in open debates about the state of the Marine Corps and its future. To those who voiced objections to this policy, General Gray said that if new ideas couldn’t stand the scrutiny of opponents, perhaps those ideas lacked merit.
As the Director of Command and Staff College and later President of Marine Corps University from 1988-1991 I was in the midst of some very heated intellectual “gun fights” much of the time. Following General Gray’s instructions, I was to keep these debates civil but not to curtail robust discussions in any way.
The sharpest criticisms came from men whose names have begun to fade from the memory of today’s Marines—William “Bill” Lind, John Boyd, Jeffery Record, and Edward Luttwak. They and others gave no quarter in these arguments whether in person or in professional journal articles.
Having followed closely activities across our Corps for the past six years I am saddened to report that the wide ranging discourses of the past are gone. The evidence is overwhelming. In my own case there are several examples. In 2022 two Command and Staff College professors asked me to visit their seminars and discuss the retired general officer community’s concerns with Force Design 2030. When the professors forwarded their requests to the President of MCU my visit was denied. Subsequently, I asked the president personally to allow me to visit the university to discuss Force Design 2030 concerns with those students who were interested in the issue; I was clear that I was not asking for time out of any curricula. The president’s answer was no because I “did not have the expertise” to speak at MCU.
Other organizations also sought to host debates about Force Design 2030, but Marine Corps leaders refused to participate. One of these was a Washington DC think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which hosted a discussion “On the Future of the Marine Corps: Assessing Force Design 2030” on May 16, 2022. CSIS wanted a senior Marine in uniform to offer a defense of Force Design, but no uniformed representatives participated. Two civilian surrogates stood in for the missing Marine Corps representatives.
Similarly, the Board of Directors for the Marine Corps University Foundation asked for both a representative from the retired Marine general officer community to articulate that community’s apprehensions about Force Design 2030, and for an active duty general to share the Corps’ views supporting the concept. Originally, Headquarters Marine Corps said a colonel from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command would be its representative, but on the day of the event he was a no-show. The retired four-star general was left alone to describe his Force Design misgivings.
The Marine Corps also pressured the Editor of the Marine Corps Gazette to halt publication of three articles he had previously approved that questioned Force Design 2030. The Editor revealed this to me in an email on 30 November 2022 where he wrote: “Break, break, we (MCA/Gazette) have also started taking heavy fire from HQMC over this [the three articles].”
The authors of these articles were retired Generals John Sheehan, James Amos, Charles Krulak, and Anthony Zinni and former Marine and author of Warfighting John Schmitt. Thus, the Corps’ professional journal has never allowed a true debate of Force Design 2030. This is in stark contrast to the long-running series of articles debating maneuver warfare from the late 1970s into the late 1980s.
The value of open and informed discussions or discourse is well known. Among these are the opportunity to consider a wider range of options and to uncover potential and unexpected consequences. The atmosphere created by leaders who encourage debate often enables more creative and innovative solutions as participants consider new perspectives. This approach also promotes active learning and more effective communication of ideas and concepts. Done well, such debates create a sense of belonging or community. That was certainly the outcome of the Gray-Mundy-Krulak era.
Many have described the importance of engaging opponents, but I don’t believe any better than Nelson Mandela who said:
.
“A good leader can engage in a debate frankly and thoroughly, knowing that at the end he and the other side must be closer, and thus emerge stronger. You don't have that idea when you are arrogant, superficial, and uninformed.”
— Nelson Mandela
.
So, after all these years I have concluded, as have many other retired and former Marines, that recent and current Marine Corps senior leaders will not allow an open debate about Force Design 2030 because they inherently know it lacks merit and thus fear it will not withstand rugged scrutiny. It is far better, however, to use robust discussion, discourse, and debate to uncover the weaknesses in new operational ideas in peacetime, instead of waiting for those same weaknesses to be revealed in battle.
— Paul K. Van Riper, US Marine
.
------------------
------------------
.
Compass Points thanks LtGen Paul K. Van Riper for taking time to share his thoughts on the importance of robust discussion, discourse, and debate. LtGen Van Riper served more than four decades on active duty, including four combat tours, and command at every level from platoon to division. General Gray selected Van Riper to serve as the first President of the Marine Corps University. In addition, Van Riper’s creative exploits as the red team commander for the massive exercise, Millennium Challenge, have been studied at length, including in chapter 4 of Malcolm Gladwell's book, Blink.
The best article, by far, on the evolution (devolution?) of the Corps as it marched like lemmings toward the FD era. What mystifies me is the fact that Marine Officers have engaged such censorship. Hell, during “Officer’s Call” at the O’Club on Friday nights, we would beat the previous week to death, discussing our performance, both good and bad. The CG of the 3rd MarDiv would invite groups of officers to join his staff and him to his quarters on Saturday for lunch and questions. The discussions were priceless and valuable, as we were withdrawing from Vietnam…No subject was off the table. How in the world did we get where we are today? Semper Fi
It is crystal clear that the current and former Commandant (and their ilk) are very much aware of the innumerable deficits associated with FD 2030. General Van Riper along with many, many other very senior and talented officers and civilians have methodically and logically identified the failings of FD 2030. Yet, Marine Corps leadership continues on this insanely and dangerous path. One would think that with all these voices against FD 2030 that this would cause a pause to reflect and adjust course. But, instead of introspection and course correction we are faced with blind arrogance and unlimited hubris. It is full speed ahead......right over the cliff! God help our Corps!