Compass Points - Four Marines
Four brothers always protecting each other.
Compass Points - Four Marines
Four brothers always protecting each other.
August 10, 2024
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In a recent exercise, junior officers discovered an old lesson: infantry needs tanks and tanks needs infantry. While the mutual dependence of infantry and tanks is well known by experienced warriors, the lesson always needs to be relearned. The two junior officers have provided an after-action report about the lesson they learned about infantry and tanks.
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A U.S. Army combined arms battalion deployed to Vekaranjärvi, Finland for the first time in history to participate in combined arms maneuver training with the Finnish Army’s Karelian Brigade earlier this year.
The U.S. 1st Battalion “Mustangs,” 8th Cavalry Regiment deployed in support of Operation Lock 2023 to eastern Finland from May 28 to June 10, 2023. This was also the first time the allied Finnish Karelian Brigade conducted maneuver training east of the Kymi River. Task Force (TF) Mustangs included 400 Karelian soldiers who were attached and fought with their U.S. allies as a multinational battlegroup against a mechanized battlegroup from the Finnish Army’s Armoured Brigade in four force-on-force battle periods. As the Mustangs prepared for Operation Lock, they faced a training problem that armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) have not focused on recently: how do infantry and armor integrate and conduct large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in severely restricted terrain?
The Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, published in 2016 is the current U.S. Army doctrine for company teams. However, there is no discussion on how a company teams operate in severely restrictive terrain or standing operating procedures (SOPs) for infantry and tank integration.
1 Older U.S. Army doctrine Field Manual (FM) 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Company Team, states SOPs for defile operations in restrictive terrain; however, this was published in 1998.
2 The lack of infantry and tank doctrine was identified by the School of Advanced Military Studies in 2001.
3 As a result of this gap in doctrine, U.S. Marines 1st Tank Battalion had to relearn how to integrate their infantry and tanks during their combat operations in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004.
4 Similarly, TF Mustangs had to reeducate and retrain their company teams on infantry and tank integration before Operation Lock.
-- Akuszewski and Tran,"Tanks Need the Infantry to Lead the Way"
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It is interesting the young Army officers report that, "As a result of this gap in doctrine, U.S. Marines 1st Tank Battalion had to relearn how to integrate their infantry and tanks during their combat operations in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004." Today, of course, the Marine Corps has, not only a gap in infantry and tank doctrine, it has a gap in infantry and tanks.
No matter how much technology advances, the old lessons remain and must be relearned.
The old story of the four Marine brothers illustrates the point in a different way. Once upon a time there were four Marine brothers. The youngest and weakest brother was the brother called Infantry. But even though he was young and appeared weak, Infantry could go anywhere he wanted, if he took with him his three stronger brothers, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation. When all four were together, nothing could stop them.
The strange thing was, however, that though Infantry always needed his stronger brothers, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation around him, they also needed him. Armor always needed Infantry in front and beside him. Artillery needed Infantry all around him. And Aviation needed expeditionary airfields protected by Infantry. All four Marine brothers needed each other.
What did the young Army officers conclude from their infantry and tank force-on-force exercise?
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Conclusion
The Mustangs were lethal in Operation Lock due to their implementation of company teams and the deployment of the infantry before the tanks. Their successes provide an opportunity to address a gap within ATP 3-90.1 on infantry and tank integration SOPs and company teams operating in a severely restrictive terrain. The gaps addressed in this article follow. Team Assault’s doctrinal template and execution matrix (Tables 2 and 3) are example products that enabled success and can be potentially added to ATP 3-90.1 as an appendix focused on company teams operating in severely restrictive terrain.
The highlight from both products is that company teams must conduct a slow, deliberate maneuver of dismounted infantry through severely restrictive terrain allowing the conditions to be set for the tank platoons’ fast assault through the objective. Team Assault’s infantry deployed ahead of the tanks and the Javelin teams always initiated the contact with OPFOR tank crews, who were unable to observe the dismounts within the forest due to their reduced situational awareness inside the tank with the engine running. The smallest element of the company team must initiate contact with the enemy.
-- Akuszewski and Tran,"Tanks Need the Infantry to Lead the Way"
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Compass Points salutes the young Army officers who relearned an old lesson in their force-on-force exercise in Vekaranjärvi, Finland: infantry needs tanks and tanks need infantry.
The fighting in Ukraine and in Gaza is also teaching the same lesson: infantry needs tanks and tanks need infantry.
It is time for the Marine Corps to go beyond just "infantry needs tanks and tanks need infantry." It is time for the Marine Corps to recall the story of the four Marine Brothers. The four Marine brothers, Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation need each other. Alone, each brother is in constant danger of defeat. Together, the four Marine brothers are powerful and unstoppable.
For the two young Army officers, it took the forests of Vekaranjärvi, Finland to teach them an old lesson. What clime and place will it take to teach the Marine Corps, once again, the old story of the power and importance of the four Marine brothers? The time is coming soon when Marines will need once again – not one brother, two brothers, or three – but all four brothers working together again.
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US Army
Tanks Need the Infantry to Lead the Way
By 1LT Brandon Akuszewski and CPT Larry D. Tran
https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/eArmor/content/issues/2023/Fall/3%20Akuszewski_Tran.pdf
My actual experience with tank and infantry teams is long standing from my days as an Infantry Officer in 8th Marines with the Maj Van Riper at the Regt S-3, then Maj Sutton as BLT 3-1’s S-3 and then BGen Gray as the MAB Cmdr. The culminating exercise was in a Tank and Mech heavy environment after a few years of lead up training and exercises in Norway and Denmark. As the XO and S-3 for BLTs 3/1 and 2/1 with similar lead up training but vastly different environments from Adak Alaska, the dense jungles in Thailand to Korea, open spaces of Australia and mountainous terrain in S Korea.
One of those deployments included RPVs. As the Marine LNO to the Army’s 9th Infantry Div (MTZ) I spent three years deeply involved in the coordination of motorized, armored, aviation and artillery operations with the added benefit of the constant integration of commercial, off the shelf technology like ground and air RPVs, advanced communications, experimental ammunition, advanced logistical concepts and air defense technology. As CO 25th Marines I led two exercises as a Regimental MAGTF Cmdr with attached Tank Company’s at 29 Palms and the standard aviation elements, logistics and a Naval Expeditionary Hospital. Years later I was the PEO-STRI rep at Ft Bliss responsible for simulators, simulations, digitized ranges and training devices for the 1st Armored Division from 2011-2014. During this time we built the largest, most complicated range on earth. The DAGIR, a vast range that allowed for live fire and maneuver of Armor, Mechanized, Artillery (rocket and Tube) attack helicopter and fixed wing air craft in combined arms scenarios. The TACAir was provided by various USAF aircraft and German Tornados out of Alamagordo, NM.
Over that 40 year period it was obvious to me that Combined Arms, when orchestrated properly is far greater than the sum of its component parts. It is an irresistible combat force. Watching lesser forces with poor coordination, poor training or missing pieces makes it easy for the amateur to conclude some things are obsolete. Infantry, Tanks, tube artillery, Combat Engineers are not obsolete.
For those who have been engaged in insurgencies with forces that do not have armor or air or artillery the drawing of the wrong conclusions is possible. Add to that the reading of near peer enemy capabilities ( propaganda) can be equally misleading. While the German V-1 and V-2 rockets were revolutionary in their time, their impact on the outcome of WWII were inconsequential. The most advanced piloted aircraft of the Pacific ( Kamakazi) did not change the outcome.
While some deep thinkers might declare the bayonet obsolete the infantryman knows its value even if he never had to use one.
Revolution is an overused word. Evolution is the winner across history when professionals do the educated analysis. Change is important. The right change being the key. The wrong change is catastrophic.
I guess to say, it's been at least four years since Marine infantry has trained with tanks? Once the skill is gone, it's hard to replace.