For over 100 years pundits have declared tanks obsolete. Virtually every analysis talked about the cost of the tank killing technology. The tank survives and thrives. Attacks from the air seemed to be the solution but they were not.
The proper employment of tanks and icw anti air weaponry remains powerful and fearsome.
When Gen Berger “ divested” the Corps of tanks I knew immediately that he was historically ignorant, technologically lost and intellectually deficient or he was getting very bad advice. He doubled down on tube artillery removing all doubt.
The tank will remain viable for another hundred years. It will be around long after most anti tank promises are gone.
For every weapons system that is developed sooner or later there will be a counter to that system. The same way with drones. Already there are AA systems being developed with small caliber munitions to take on drones. One old system which is bring used in Ukraine is the German Gepard SPAA gun.
Critics of the tank fail to realize that the tank by itself is a vulnerable weapon, just like any weapon. Infantryman by themselves are vulnerable. Field artillery by itself is vulnerable. A military force with just drones would also be a vulnerable force. However, the combined force of infantry, armor, artillery, and now drones when used properly is a tough force to beat. The synergy of all four elements is what makes it so dynamic. That's why it's called the combined-arms team. That is what the Marine Corps used to have.
The loss of armor is not the only devastating blow struck against Marine infantry by the 38th and 39th Commandants. Also taken away were expeditionary bridging, assault breaching, and school trained snipers. Perhaps the greatest hit was the emasculation of cannon artillery, which is the infantry’s main source of close, continuous, accurate, and all-weather fire support. The loss in artillery support is more than just the number of batteries available. It’s also the destruction of habitual relationships between the artillery battery/battalion and infantry battalion/regiment that foster trust and cooperation with forward observers, liaison officers, and communication links. These relationships have been severed and replaced by “pick-up” teams.
Marine infantry has been stripped of much of the support needed to fight and win the close and rear battles. A recent article in Military.com reported that the 38th Commandant “assessed the original plan [Force Design] as 60 to 70 percent right and directed the team to iterate and improve.’’ Responding to that statement, a senior Marine went on record stating, “It actually is a brilliant move in that we did not get it right.” See: https://www.military.com/marine-corps-plans-5-percent-force-growth-as-attack-drones-expand
Are you kidding me? I wonder how well that absurd statement would play with a young infantryman in the thick of a close fight with a peer competitor. Exposing Marine infantry to an unfair fight should not be applauded. It should be condemned.
The 40th Commandant will have the opportunity to fix these and other problems. The parents of young infantrymen sent into close combat will judge him accordingly.
General, that’s why my battery when on a battery FIREX, constantly practiced danger close fire missions. Section Chiefs always had their gunners quadrant ready.
Even with drones present on the battlefield, they will be/are susceptible to counter-drone measures, plus drones cannot deliver the volume of fire required for the entire battle space, both on offense or defense.
The Ukraine 🇺🇦 invasion by Russia 🇷🇺 has proven the need for both tanks and artillery, as both sides are desperately still trying to rearm with these... while I do agree with the experts who decry the high logistics footprint and maintenance costs for the current M1 Abrams, the Corps especially should pursue a lighter, more agile, and lethal tank and restore tanks to our MAGTF!
FD2030 has ruined our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
I would like to see a similar comprehensive study of artillery to include the latest results from the Ukraine! Artillery has always been the on-call, go-to support of the infantry, and when it is foggy, rainy, snowy, or too much smoke and fire and the little bomb-birds are grounded, a battery of 155mm guns can give you a very nice edge!
Excellent article and comments. Those who view drones and other cheap weapons as some sort of replacement for tanks and other armor, have obviously not fought in Southeast Asia and other jungle clad areas. Drones would have had little use, if available. Their effectiveness in Monsoon weather is severely limited. Triple canopy completely negates their use.
The below photos are the attack on an underground, enemy occupied complex surrounded by a dense, bamboo hedgerow, with RPG and machine gun positions burrowed in the bamboo roots…Very difficult to locate and take out. The place was dealing 3/7 fits and too many casualties.
My platoon of LVTE1s was tasked with organized with both gun and flame tank support.
My vehicles were Assault Amphibian Vehicles…This version was designed to lead the amphibious assault and take out mines and other underwater obstacles; proceed ashore and take out inland positions. They carried 1700 pound, 300’ long line charges of C4; propelled to the targets by modified Sidewinder missiles that were converted to rockets. Each of my 11 vehicles carried two line charges.
Infantry, gun tanks and flame tanks protected my light-skinned vehicles as we maneuvered and fired. Made quick work of the bamboo and underground positions.
Drones wouldn’t have been effective for or against us.
Grok Expert:”USMC tank employment since WWI, drawn exclusively from official U.S. Marine Corps sources: Marine Corps University Press (MCUP) journals and publications, History Division campaign histories (e.g., multi-volume U.S. Marines in the Korean War and U.S. Marines in Vietnam series), marines.mil unit/campaign records, and after-action-derived accounts. No general encyclopedic sources were used.
Pre-WWII and WWI
The Marine Corps had no organic tanks in combat during World War I. Marines operated as infantry in France (e.g., Belleau Wood). Interwar development (1920s–1930s) included limited experiments with early tanks in fleet exercises and Quantico training, plus planning for light tank companies. Doctrine emphasized integration with amphibious operations rather than independent armor. No significant combat employment occurred until World War II. usmcu.edu
World War II (Pacific Theater)
USMC tank battalions (primarily 1st through 6th) provided close support to infantry divisions in amphibious campaigns. Early operations relied on limited doctrine from the 1934 Tentative Manual of Landing Operations. Post-Tarawa reviews led to improved guidance in Amphibious Operations: Employment of Tanks (1946).
Equipment evolution:
• Initial: M2A4/M5 Stuart light tanks (e.g., 1st Tank Battalion at Guadalcanal).
• Primary: M4A2 (diesel) and later M4A3 Sherman medium tanks. Flame-thrower variants (“Ronsons” or improved models with larger reservoirs) on Saipan and Iwo Jima. M32 recovery vehicles.
Key campaigns and employment (from MCUP analysis of 4th Tank Battalion as case study, with references to others):
• Guadalcanal (1942): 1st Tank Battalion companies supported infantry (e.g., along Tenaru River, crushing positions). Limited success on Edson’s Ridge due to jungle visibility and reconnaissance issues.
• Tarawa (1943): 2nd Tank Battalion faced severe challenges (no deep-wading kits; many tanks lost or immobilized in surf; poor initial coordination).
• Marshall Islands (Roi-Namur, 1944): 4th Tank Battalion used wading stacks and early modifications for close support with assault waves.
• Saipan and Tinian (1944): Major Japanese armored counterattack on Saipan defeated through combined tank-infantry action. 4th Tank Battalion innovations improved coordination.
• Iwo Jima (1945): Multiple battalions (3rd, 4th, 5th) operated in “armored phalanx” tactics. Flame tanks proved highly valuable against bunkers despite mechanical issues. Heavy losses but critical for breaching and suppression. Lt. Henry L. Bellmon (4th Tanks) earned Silver Star for actions under fire.
• Okinawa (1945): 1st and 6th Tank Battalions; high damage rates (dozens knocked out or damaged) but many repaired and returned to action. Supported sustained fighting. usmcu.edu
Tactics and adaptations: Tanks landed with or near assault waves for immediate infantry support. Bottom-up ingenuity was widespread due to “Depression-era mechanical aptitude.” Common field modifications included:
• Communications (improvised tank-infantry telephones on fenders/sponsons, extra radios).
• Mobility/vision aids (extended periscopes, wading kits for deeper surf).
• Other (flail mine-clearing experiments, supplemental water/ammo storage).
These addressed Japanese magnetic mines, satchel charges, anti-tank guns, and terrain. Effectiveness improved markedly after early campaigns through these adaptations and better coordination. Tanks were subordinate to divisions and focused on neutralization, breaching, and morale support rather than independent maneuvers. usmcu.edu
Korean War (1950–1953)
The 1st Tank Battalion deployed rapidly with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and later the full 1st Marine Division.
Equipment: Initially M4A3 Shermans (including flame and 105mm variants). Rapid transition to M26 Pershing tanks (90mm gun) in summer 1950, followed by M46 Pattons. Pershings became the backbone of Marine armor for much of the war.
Key operations:
• Pusan Perimeter: Early combat; Pershings helped stabilize lines and engage North Korean armor.
• Inchon landing and Seoul: Tanks supported advances through urban barricades and against anti-tank guns. Pershings provided decisive firepower in street fighting.
• Chosin Reservoir and subsequent operations: Supported infantry in breakout and defensive actions despite extreme cold and terrain. Multiple tank-infantry actions against North Korean and Chinese forces.
Official histories note effective use in combined arms, including support for rifle companies with artillery and air. Tanks helped defeat enemy armor and strongpoints while facing challenges from mines, anti-tank weapons, and harsh conditions. marines.mil
Vietnam War (1965–1973)
1st and 3rd Tank Battalions operated primarily in I Corps Tactical Zone supporting the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.
Equipment: M48A3 Patton tanks (90mm) and M67A2 flame (“Zippo”) tanks. Upgrades included night vision and some protection enhancements.
Employment: Primarily infantry support, convoy escort, perimeter defense, road security, and blocking positions (e.g., around Da Nang, Hue, Con Thien, Khe Sanh). Infantry frequently operated with tanks in combined teams. Flame tanks used for bunker reduction. Official Vietnam histories document their role in operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces, including urban fighting in Hue City and defensive actions along the DMZ. Tanks delivered heavy firepower (including beehive rounds) but faced terrain, ambush, and RPG challenges in jungle and rice-paddy environments. marines.mil
Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm, 1991)
Marine tank units (elements of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and reserve 4th Tank Battalions) participated in the ground offensive.
Equipment: Primarily upgraded M60A1 RISE tanks with reactive armor and other improvements. The 2nd Tank Battalion and select elements employed M1A1 Abrams tanks (some borrowed from the Army; total USMC Abrams in theater around 76).
Actions: Supported Task Force Ripper and other mechanized advances. Breached Iraqi defenses and advanced toward Kuwait City and the international airport. Official accounts credit Marine M60s and Abrams with destroying numerous Iraqi tanks, APCs, and T-72s through direct fire and maneuver. Marines emphasized combined-arms integration with infantry and supporting arms. gulflink.osd.mil
Iraq and Afghanistan (2003–2021)
M1A1 Abrams equipped active tank battalions (1st and 2nd).
• Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom): Supported 2003 invasion and subsequent operations, including urban combat in Fallujah (breaching and suppression roles). Used in patrols and infantry support during counterinsurgency.
• Afghanistan: Limited deployments (small detachments of ~14 M1A1s in Helmand Province, 2010–2013) for heavy firepower and overwatch in support of infantry operations against Taliban forces. Effective in open terrain but constrained by logistics and small numbers.
Deactivation (2020–2021)
All USMC tank battalions were deactivated under Force Design 2030 to prioritize lighter, more distributed forces suited to Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and long-range precision fires in the Indo-Pacific. All M1A1 Abrams were transferred to the U.S. Army. Official announcements and ceremonies emphasized the shift from heavy armor formations. iimef.marines.mil
Overall Assessment from Official Sources
USMC tanks consistently served in a supporting role within combined-arms teams, emphasizing close coordination with infantry. Success relied on crew adaptability, field modifications (especially in WWII), and integration with artillery and air support. They excelled in providing protected firepower and shock effect across diverse environments but faced recurring challenges from terrain, anti-armor threats, and logistics. Official histories highlight bottom-up innovation and the evolution from early doctrinal gaps to highly effective support in later conflicts.”. WOT…YAS!
IDF and Tanks Grok Expert:”IDF Tank Use Against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon: An Examination
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have relied heavily on Merkava main battle tanks (primarily Mk 4 and Mk 4M variants, many equipped with Rafael’s Trophy active protection system) in ground operations against Hamas in Gaza (intensified from late 2023) and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon (major ground phase from March 2026 onward). Tanks provide mobile protected firepower, breaching capability, and direct fire support in contested terrain. Their performance underscores that main battle tanks remain relevant in modern hybrid warfare when integrated into combined-arms operations, despite threats from anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), RPGs, IEDs, and drones. israel-alma.org
Gaza Operations Against Hamas (2023–2026)
Gaza features dense urban environments (cities like Gaza City, Khan Yunis, Rafah) with narrow streets, fortified buildings, extensive tunnel networks, and high civilian density. Hamas employs asymmetric tactics: ambushes with RPGs (including thermobaric warheads), Kornet and other ATGMs, IEDs, snipers, and drones (including quadcopters and loitering munitions).
Tactics and Role of Tanks:
• Merkava tanks operate as part of tightly integrated combined-arms teams at platoon/company level, alongside infantry, combat engineers (notably D9 armored bulldozers), artillery, and drones.
• Primary roles: Breaching barriers and walls, clearing rubble and tunnel entrances, demolishing structures used by Hamas, providing suppressive/direct fire support, and enabling infantry advances.
• Armored bulldozers often lead assaults to create paths, detonate IEDs, and collapse booby-trapped buildings.
• Infantry repositioned into a tight ~100-meter “bubble” around tanks for mutual protection after Trophy APS reduced long-range ATGM threats. Tanks act as mobile cover; infantry screens close-range threats. henryjacksonsociety.org
Adaptations and Performance:
• Trophy APS proved highly effective, intercepting dozens (or more) of ATGMs and RPGs, sometimes cueing counterfire via the tank’s systems and networked command (e.g., Elbit Torch).
• Rapid tactical evolution: Lessons-learned cells disseminated changes army-wide within hours/days (e.g., adjusting dismount timing after ambushes).
• Drone integration for real-time ISR, targeting, and loitering munitions.
• High operational tempo with tanks and engineers advancing aggressively to maintain momentum and deny Hamas regrouping, rather than slow room-by-room clearing.
• Survivability: Tanks withstood numerous hits that would disable older designs. Early phases saw claims of surviving over 1,000 AT attacks with minimal total losses. Some later losses occurred from massive IEDs or close-range ambushes, but many damaged tanks were repaired and returned quickly. Tanks collectively logged over 1 million km in operations. army-technology.com
Challenges:
• Narrow streets and rubble complicated movement and created ambush opportunities.
• Tunnel infiltration and short-range attacks.
• High ammunition and fuel consumption in prolonged urban fighting.
• Logistical strains in devastated terrain.
Overall, Merkava tanks enabled effective degradation of Hamas capabilities in built-up areas but at the cost of significant urban destruction and prolonged operations.
Lebanon Operations Against Hezbollah (2024–2026, Major Ground Phase from March 2026)
Southern Lebanon features hilly/rural terrain mixed with villages and prepared defenses. Hezbollah poses a more conventional hybrid threat with advanced ATGMs (Kornet and others), coordinated ambushes, drones (FPV and attack drones), rockets, and underground infrastructure. Operations aimed to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River, destroy border infrastructure, and create a buffer zone.
Tactics and Role of Tanks:
• Multiple IDF divisions (e.g., 36th, 91st, 98th, 162nd) conducted ground incursions with tanks supporting advances into towns like Taybeh, Bint Jbeil, Khiam, and toward the Litani.
• Tanks used for maneuver in more open/hilly areas, fire support, and accompanying demolitions of buildings/infrastructure suspected of military use.
• Combined-arms approach similar to Gaza, with air/artillery support and engineering elements.
• Slower, methodical advances with systematic clearing of villages. en.wikipedia.org
Adaptations and Performance:
• Trophy APS and networked systems again key for countering ATGMs.
• Drone and air support critical for countering Hezbollah ambushes.
• Tanks crossed terrain features (e.g., Litani River crossings) and supported ridge seizures (e.g., Beaufort Castle area).
Challenges and Claims:
• Hilly terrain and villages favor ambushes and long-range AT fire.
• Hezbollah frequently claims successful strikes on Merkava tanks using guided missiles and drones, often releasing videos of burning or hit vehicles (e.g., claims of 3 tanks destroyed in one action near Ali al-Taher hill, 5–6 in other incidents in Taybeh, Yahmar al-Shaqif, Bint Jbeil, etc., throughout 2026). aa.com.tr
• IDF reports lower overall casualties (around 39 soldiers killed in the ground phase per available tallies, some from vehicle strikes including tanks/bulldozers hit by drones/rockets). Independent visual confirmation of tank losses is limited compared to Hezbollah claims, which serve propaganda purposes.
Performance appears resilient due to APS and support, but exposure in maneuver operations leads to more publicized claims of losses than in the more static urban clearing of Gaza.
Comparative Analysis
Similarities:
• Merkava tanks central to combined-arms doctrine emphasizing close infantry-armor integration, engineering support (D9 bulldozers), and drone augmentation.
• Trophy APS significantly enhances survivability against ATGMs/RPGs in both environments.
• Primary threats: ATGMs, RPGs, IEDs, and drones (with drones playing a growing role).
• Tanks provide irreplaceable mobile firepower and protection for seizing/holding ground; not replaced by drones or lighter vehicles.
• Rapid adaptation and low-level combined arms proved decisive.
Differences:
• Terrain & Tactics: Gaza = dense urban demolition and breaching in confined spaces (higher close-range ambush risk). Lebanon = hilly/rural maneuver with village fighting (more long-range AT/drone ambushes).
• Enemy Capabilities: Hamas = asymmetric, tunnel/IED-heavy urban guerrilla. Hezbollah = better-coordinated conventional hybrid force with sophisticated ATGMs and drones.
• Loss Patterns: Gaza shows high exposure but strong survivability and quick repairs (few total losses publicly emphasized). Lebanon features more frequent Hezbollah claims of multiple tanks hit/destroyed in single actions, though verification is lower.
• Operational Tempo: Gaza often grinding and attritional; Lebanon involves advances with infrastructure destruction to create buffers.
Broader Lessons:
• Tanks are not obsolete. When properly equipped (APS, modular armor) and integrated, they remain essential for ground combat against determined opponents.
• Infantry must operate in close proximity to armor for mutual support.
• Drones and loitering munitions are force multipliers but complement, rather than replace, heavy armor.
• Engineering vehicles and subterranean capabilities are critical in both urban and prepared defensive environments.
• Institutional agility (rapid lessons-learned cycles) and combined-arms training at the lowest levels provide a decisive edge.
• Logistics and sustainment under fire remain challenges in prolonged operations. henryjacksonsociety.org
In both theaters, IDF tank operations demonstrate the enduring value of heavy armor in hybrid warfare while highlighting the need for ongoing upgrades in protection, counter-drone systems, and integration with emerging technologies. Claims of tank obsolescence (from various analysts) have been challenged by battlefield results, though vulnerabilities to massed cheap threats and the high cost of operations persist.“.
Whatever the benefits of drone technology, a mobile protected firepower asset on the battlefield is a necessary and integral part of a combined arms capability. Marine Corps combined arms capabilities were the standard. Our CAX program at 29 Palms provided world class combined arms training. We divested much of this capability to invest in "sensing" and "detecting" from small islands the Pacific. Similar arguments as Schmidt's can be made for carriers. Standing alone it is surely vulnerable, but as a task force it provides a capability no other nation can match. Another good reason not to become enraptured by Silicon Valley insights on the nature of war. Schmidt was appointed to the Defense Innovation Advisory Board in 2016. I fear our senior leadership including the previous and current CMC are listening to the Schmidts rather than the Zinnis, Krulaks, and Van Ripers.
The big issue facing modern heavy combat vehicles, particularly the apex type the main battle tank, is the balance between offensive and defensive fires that the type has available when in contact. Too much emphasis is placed on main gun kinetic performance among a range of anti-tank options, Bradley TOW's have destroyed more tanks than Abrahms APFSDS. A 120mm, or 130mm, or 140mm, and automated turrets, a 50 ton tank to haul a couple dozen heavy darts is the result. Equipped with a rapid fire 60mm revolver or chain cannon and a stern vls/pop-up battery of CKEM, TOW, Javelin, Hellfire, APKWS, Stinger, or other AA/AT/HE weapons, the guns AHEAD, APFSDS, and SAPEE programmable effects rounds in an indexed magazine would provide a wide range of offensive and defensive fires that would increase survivability of the vehicle and Marines operating in close co-operation. A 60mm L60 smoothbore could be derived from the 57mm L70, same bore volume, but with a more compact digitally connected propellant casing, mounted on a 25 ton chassis at light standard transportable by C-130 class tactical transports with capacity to add-on kit up to 35-40 tons. Other types in an AFV family could include 120mm SPM's, 120mm Stug Alligator drone SPG's, strike missile and support, automated ammunition re-supply, and armored carriers and logistic transports with broad, varied and upgradeable margins.
For over 100 years pundits have declared tanks obsolete. Virtually every analysis talked about the cost of the tank killing technology. The tank survives and thrives. Attacks from the air seemed to be the solution but they were not.
The proper employment of tanks and icw anti air weaponry remains powerful and fearsome.
When Gen Berger “ divested” the Corps of tanks I knew immediately that he was historically ignorant, technologically lost and intellectually deficient or he was getting very bad advice. He doubled down on tube artillery removing all doubt.
The tank will remain viable for another hundred years. It will be around long after most anti tank promises are gone.
Spot on!
For every weapons system that is developed sooner or later there will be a counter to that system. The same way with drones. Already there are AA systems being developed with small caliber munitions to take on drones. One old system which is bring used in Ukraine is the German Gepard SPAA gun.
Critics of the tank fail to realize that the tank by itself is a vulnerable weapon, just like any weapon. Infantryman by themselves are vulnerable. Field artillery by itself is vulnerable. A military force with just drones would also be a vulnerable force. However, the combined force of infantry, armor, artillery, and now drones when used properly is a tough force to beat. The synergy of all four elements is what makes it so dynamic. That's why it's called the combined-arms team. That is what the Marine Corps used to have.
Exactly 💯 Semper Fi
The loss of armor is not the only devastating blow struck against Marine infantry by the 38th and 39th Commandants. Also taken away were expeditionary bridging, assault breaching, and school trained snipers. Perhaps the greatest hit was the emasculation of cannon artillery, which is the infantry’s main source of close, continuous, accurate, and all-weather fire support. The loss in artillery support is more than just the number of batteries available. It’s also the destruction of habitual relationships between the artillery battery/battalion and infantry battalion/regiment that foster trust and cooperation with forward observers, liaison officers, and communication links. These relationships have been severed and replaced by “pick-up” teams.
Marine infantry has been stripped of much of the support needed to fight and win the close and rear battles. A recent article in Military.com reported that the 38th Commandant “assessed the original plan [Force Design] as 60 to 70 percent right and directed the team to iterate and improve.’’ Responding to that statement, a senior Marine went on record stating, “It actually is a brilliant move in that we did not get it right.” See: https://www.military.com/marine-corps-plans-5-percent-force-growth-as-attack-drones-expand
Are you kidding me? I wonder how well that absurd statement would play with a young infantryman in the thick of a close fight with a peer competitor. Exposing Marine infantry to an unfair fight should not be applauded. It should be condemned.
The 40th Commandant will have the opportunity to fix these and other problems. The parents of young infantrymen sent into close combat will judge him accordingly.
General, that’s why my battery when on a battery FIREX, constantly practiced danger close fire missions. Section Chiefs always had their gunners quadrant ready.
Even with drones present on the battlefield, they will be/are susceptible to counter-drone measures, plus drones cannot deliver the volume of fire required for the entire battle space, both on offense or defense.
Exactly 💯 Semper Fi sir
The Ukraine 🇺🇦 invasion by Russia 🇷🇺 has proven the need for both tanks and artillery, as both sides are desperately still trying to rearm with these... while I do agree with the experts who decry the high logistics footprint and maintenance costs for the current M1 Abrams, the Corps especially should pursue a lighter, more agile, and lethal tank and restore tanks to our MAGTF!
FD2030 has ruined our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
I would like to see a similar comprehensive study of artillery to include the latest results from the Ukraine! Artillery has always been the on-call, go-to support of the infantry, and when it is foggy, rainy, snowy, or too much smoke and fire and the little bomb-birds are grounded, a battery of 155mm guns can give you a very nice edge!
Excellent article and comments. Those who view drones and other cheap weapons as some sort of replacement for tanks and other armor, have obviously not fought in Southeast Asia and other jungle clad areas. Drones would have had little use, if available. Their effectiveness in Monsoon weather is severely limited. Triple canopy completely negates their use.
The below photos are the attack on an underground, enemy occupied complex surrounded by a dense, bamboo hedgerow, with RPG and machine gun positions burrowed in the bamboo roots…Very difficult to locate and take out. The place was dealing 3/7 fits and too many casualties.
My platoon of LVTE1s was tasked with organized with both gun and flame tank support.
My vehicles were Assault Amphibian Vehicles…This version was designed to lead the amphibious assault and take out mines and other underwater obstacles; proceed ashore and take out inland positions. They carried 1700 pound, 300’ long line charges of C4; propelled to the targets by modified Sidewinder missiles that were converted to rockets. Each of my 11 vehicles carried two line charges.
Infantry, gun tanks and flame tanks protected my light-skinned vehicles as we maneuvered and fired. Made quick work of the bamboo and underground positions.
Drones wouldn’t have been effective for or against us.
Eric Schmidt is not to be confused with John Schmitt, who actually knows a thing or two about warfighting ....
Correct. If you look at Eric Schmidt's resume, other than a scientific think tank, he has zero military credibility.
Force Design 2030 was crafted by people who looked great on paper.
Grok Expert:”USMC tank employment since WWI, drawn exclusively from official U.S. Marine Corps sources: Marine Corps University Press (MCUP) journals and publications, History Division campaign histories (e.g., multi-volume U.S. Marines in the Korean War and U.S. Marines in Vietnam series), marines.mil unit/campaign records, and after-action-derived accounts. No general encyclopedic sources were used.
Pre-WWII and WWI
The Marine Corps had no organic tanks in combat during World War I. Marines operated as infantry in France (e.g., Belleau Wood). Interwar development (1920s–1930s) included limited experiments with early tanks in fleet exercises and Quantico training, plus planning for light tank companies. Doctrine emphasized integration with amphibious operations rather than independent armor. No significant combat employment occurred until World War II. usmcu.edu
World War II (Pacific Theater)
USMC tank battalions (primarily 1st through 6th) provided close support to infantry divisions in amphibious campaigns. Early operations relied on limited doctrine from the 1934 Tentative Manual of Landing Operations. Post-Tarawa reviews led to improved guidance in Amphibious Operations: Employment of Tanks (1946).
Equipment evolution:
• Initial: M2A4/M5 Stuart light tanks (e.g., 1st Tank Battalion at Guadalcanal).
• Primary: M4A2 (diesel) and later M4A3 Sherman medium tanks. Flame-thrower variants (“Ronsons” or improved models with larger reservoirs) on Saipan and Iwo Jima. M32 recovery vehicles.
Key campaigns and employment (from MCUP analysis of 4th Tank Battalion as case study, with references to others):
• Guadalcanal (1942): 1st Tank Battalion companies supported infantry (e.g., along Tenaru River, crushing positions). Limited success on Edson’s Ridge due to jungle visibility and reconnaissance issues.
• Tarawa (1943): 2nd Tank Battalion faced severe challenges (no deep-wading kits; many tanks lost or immobilized in surf; poor initial coordination).
• Marshall Islands (Roi-Namur, 1944): 4th Tank Battalion used wading stacks and early modifications for close support with assault waves.
• Saipan and Tinian (1944): Major Japanese armored counterattack on Saipan defeated through combined tank-infantry action. 4th Tank Battalion innovations improved coordination.
• Iwo Jima (1945): Multiple battalions (3rd, 4th, 5th) operated in “armored phalanx” tactics. Flame tanks proved highly valuable against bunkers despite mechanical issues. Heavy losses but critical for breaching and suppression. Lt. Henry L. Bellmon (4th Tanks) earned Silver Star for actions under fire.
• Okinawa (1945): 1st and 6th Tank Battalions; high damage rates (dozens knocked out or damaged) but many repaired and returned to action. Supported sustained fighting. usmcu.edu
Tactics and adaptations: Tanks landed with or near assault waves for immediate infantry support. Bottom-up ingenuity was widespread due to “Depression-era mechanical aptitude.” Common field modifications included:
• Armor add-ons (planks, sandbags, concrete-filled lumber, spaced armor, track blocks, “birdcages”).
• Communications (improvised tank-infantry telephones on fenders/sponsons, extra radios).
• Mobility/vision aids (extended periscopes, wading kits for deeper surf).
• Other (flail mine-clearing experiments, supplemental water/ammo storage).
These addressed Japanese magnetic mines, satchel charges, anti-tank guns, and terrain. Effectiveness improved markedly after early campaigns through these adaptations and better coordination. Tanks were subordinate to divisions and focused on neutralization, breaching, and morale support rather than independent maneuvers. usmcu.edu
Korean War (1950–1953)
The 1st Tank Battalion deployed rapidly with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and later the full 1st Marine Division.
Equipment: Initially M4A3 Shermans (including flame and 105mm variants). Rapid transition to M26 Pershing tanks (90mm gun) in summer 1950, followed by M46 Pattons. Pershings became the backbone of Marine armor for much of the war.
Key operations:
• Pusan Perimeter: Early combat; Pershings helped stabilize lines and engage North Korean armor.
• Inchon landing and Seoul: Tanks supported advances through urban barricades and against anti-tank guns. Pershings provided decisive firepower in street fighting.
• Chosin Reservoir and subsequent operations: Supported infantry in breakout and defensive actions despite extreme cold and terrain. Multiple tank-infantry actions against North Korean and Chinese forces.
Official histories note effective use in combined arms, including support for rifle companies with artillery and air. Tanks helped defeat enemy armor and strongpoints while facing challenges from mines, anti-tank weapons, and harsh conditions. marines.mil
Vietnam War (1965–1973)
1st and 3rd Tank Battalions operated primarily in I Corps Tactical Zone supporting the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.
Equipment: M48A3 Patton tanks (90mm) and M67A2 flame (“Zippo”) tanks. Upgrades included night vision and some protection enhancements.
Employment: Primarily infantry support, convoy escort, perimeter defense, road security, and blocking positions (e.g., around Da Nang, Hue, Con Thien, Khe Sanh). Infantry frequently operated with tanks in combined teams. Flame tanks used for bunker reduction. Official Vietnam histories document their role in operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces, including urban fighting in Hue City and defensive actions along the DMZ. Tanks delivered heavy firepower (including beehive rounds) but faced terrain, ambush, and RPG challenges in jungle and rice-paddy environments. marines.mil
Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm, 1991)
Marine tank units (elements of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and reserve 4th Tank Battalions) participated in the ground offensive.
Equipment: Primarily upgraded M60A1 RISE tanks with reactive armor and other improvements. The 2nd Tank Battalion and select elements employed M1A1 Abrams tanks (some borrowed from the Army; total USMC Abrams in theater around 76).
Actions: Supported Task Force Ripper and other mechanized advances. Breached Iraqi defenses and advanced toward Kuwait City and the international airport. Official accounts credit Marine M60s and Abrams with destroying numerous Iraqi tanks, APCs, and T-72s through direct fire and maneuver. Marines emphasized combined-arms integration with infantry and supporting arms. gulflink.osd.mil
Iraq and Afghanistan (2003–2021)
M1A1 Abrams equipped active tank battalions (1st and 2nd).
• Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom): Supported 2003 invasion and subsequent operations, including urban combat in Fallujah (breaching and suppression roles). Used in patrols and infantry support during counterinsurgency.
• Afghanistan: Limited deployments (small detachments of ~14 M1A1s in Helmand Province, 2010–2013) for heavy firepower and overwatch in support of infantry operations against Taliban forces. Effective in open terrain but constrained by logistics and small numbers.
Deactivation (2020–2021)
All USMC tank battalions were deactivated under Force Design 2030 to prioritize lighter, more distributed forces suited to Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and long-range precision fires in the Indo-Pacific. All M1A1 Abrams were transferred to the U.S. Army. Official announcements and ceremonies emphasized the shift from heavy armor formations. iimef.marines.mil
Overall Assessment from Official Sources
USMC tanks consistently served in a supporting role within combined-arms teams, emphasizing close coordination with infantry. Success relied on crew adaptability, field modifications (especially in WWII), and integration with artillery and air support. They excelled in providing protected firepower and shock effect across diverse environments but faced recurring challenges from terrain, anti-armor threats, and logistics. Official histories highlight bottom-up innovation and the evolution from early doctrinal gaps to highly effective support in later conflicts.”. WOT…YAS!
Semper Fidelis! Hand Salute!
IDF and Tanks Grok Expert:”IDF Tank Use Against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon: An Examination
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have relied heavily on Merkava main battle tanks (primarily Mk 4 and Mk 4M variants, many equipped with Rafael’s Trophy active protection system) in ground operations against Hamas in Gaza (intensified from late 2023) and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon (major ground phase from March 2026 onward). Tanks provide mobile protected firepower, breaching capability, and direct fire support in contested terrain. Their performance underscores that main battle tanks remain relevant in modern hybrid warfare when integrated into combined-arms operations, despite threats from anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), RPGs, IEDs, and drones. israel-alma.org
Gaza Operations Against Hamas (2023–2026)
Gaza features dense urban environments (cities like Gaza City, Khan Yunis, Rafah) with narrow streets, fortified buildings, extensive tunnel networks, and high civilian density. Hamas employs asymmetric tactics: ambushes with RPGs (including thermobaric warheads), Kornet and other ATGMs, IEDs, snipers, and drones (including quadcopters and loitering munitions).
Tactics and Role of Tanks:
• Merkava tanks operate as part of tightly integrated combined-arms teams at platoon/company level, alongside infantry, combat engineers (notably D9 armored bulldozers), artillery, and drones.
• Primary roles: Breaching barriers and walls, clearing rubble and tunnel entrances, demolishing structures used by Hamas, providing suppressive/direct fire support, and enabling infantry advances.
• Armored bulldozers often lead assaults to create paths, detonate IEDs, and collapse booby-trapped buildings.
• Infantry repositioned into a tight ~100-meter “bubble” around tanks for mutual protection after Trophy APS reduced long-range ATGM threats. Tanks act as mobile cover; infantry screens close-range threats. henryjacksonsociety.org
Adaptations and Performance:
• Trophy APS proved highly effective, intercepting dozens (or more) of ATGMs and RPGs, sometimes cueing counterfire via the tank’s systems and networked command (e.g., Elbit Torch).
• Rapid tactical evolution: Lessons-learned cells disseminated changes army-wide within hours/days (e.g., adjusting dismount timing after ambushes).
• Drone integration for real-time ISR, targeting, and loitering munitions.
• High operational tempo with tanks and engineers advancing aggressively to maintain momentum and deny Hamas regrouping, rather than slow room-by-room clearing.
• Survivability: Tanks withstood numerous hits that would disable older designs. Early phases saw claims of surviving over 1,000 AT attacks with minimal total losses. Some later losses occurred from massive IEDs or close-range ambushes, but many damaged tanks were repaired and returned quickly. Tanks collectively logged over 1 million km in operations. army-technology.com
Challenges:
• Narrow streets and rubble complicated movement and created ambush opportunities.
• Tunnel infiltration and short-range attacks.
• High ammunition and fuel consumption in prolonged urban fighting.
• Logistical strains in devastated terrain.
Overall, Merkava tanks enabled effective degradation of Hamas capabilities in built-up areas but at the cost of significant urban destruction and prolonged operations.
Lebanon Operations Against Hezbollah (2024–2026, Major Ground Phase from March 2026)
Southern Lebanon features hilly/rural terrain mixed with villages and prepared defenses. Hezbollah poses a more conventional hybrid threat with advanced ATGMs (Kornet and others), coordinated ambushes, drones (FPV and attack drones), rockets, and underground infrastructure. Operations aimed to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River, destroy border infrastructure, and create a buffer zone.
Tactics and Role of Tanks:
• Multiple IDF divisions (e.g., 36th, 91st, 98th, 162nd) conducted ground incursions with tanks supporting advances into towns like Taybeh, Bint Jbeil, Khiam, and toward the Litani.
• Tanks used for maneuver in more open/hilly areas, fire support, and accompanying demolitions of buildings/infrastructure suspected of military use.
• Combined-arms approach similar to Gaza, with air/artillery support and engineering elements.
• Slower, methodical advances with systematic clearing of villages. en.wikipedia.org
Adaptations and Performance:
• Trophy APS and networked systems again key for countering ATGMs.
• Drone and air support critical for countering Hezbollah ambushes.
• Tanks crossed terrain features (e.g., Litani River crossings) and supported ridge seizures (e.g., Beaufort Castle area).
Challenges and Claims:
• Hilly terrain and villages favor ambushes and long-range AT fire.
• Hezbollah frequently claims successful strikes on Merkava tanks using guided missiles and drones, often releasing videos of burning or hit vehicles (e.g., claims of 3 tanks destroyed in one action near Ali al-Taher hill, 5–6 in other incidents in Taybeh, Yahmar al-Shaqif, Bint Jbeil, etc., throughout 2026). aa.com.tr
• IDF reports lower overall casualties (around 39 soldiers killed in the ground phase per available tallies, some from vehicle strikes including tanks/bulldozers hit by drones/rockets). Independent visual confirmation of tank losses is limited compared to Hezbollah claims, which serve propaganda purposes.
Performance appears resilient due to APS and support, but exposure in maneuver operations leads to more publicized claims of losses than in the more static urban clearing of Gaza.
Comparative Analysis
Similarities:
• Merkava tanks central to combined-arms doctrine emphasizing close infantry-armor integration, engineering support (D9 bulldozers), and drone augmentation.
• Trophy APS significantly enhances survivability against ATGMs/RPGs in both environments.
• Primary threats: ATGMs, RPGs, IEDs, and drones (with drones playing a growing role).
• Tanks provide irreplaceable mobile firepower and protection for seizing/holding ground; not replaced by drones or lighter vehicles.
• Rapid adaptation and low-level combined arms proved decisive.
Differences:
• Terrain & Tactics: Gaza = dense urban demolition and breaching in confined spaces (higher close-range ambush risk). Lebanon = hilly/rural maneuver with village fighting (more long-range AT/drone ambushes).
• Enemy Capabilities: Hamas = asymmetric, tunnel/IED-heavy urban guerrilla. Hezbollah = better-coordinated conventional hybrid force with sophisticated ATGMs and drones.
• Loss Patterns: Gaza shows high exposure but strong survivability and quick repairs (few total losses publicly emphasized). Lebanon features more frequent Hezbollah claims of multiple tanks hit/destroyed in single actions, though verification is lower.
• Operational Tempo: Gaza often grinding and attritional; Lebanon involves advances with infrastructure destruction to create buffers.
Broader Lessons:
• Tanks are not obsolete. When properly equipped (APS, modular armor) and integrated, they remain essential for ground combat against determined opponents.
• Infantry must operate in close proximity to armor for mutual support.
• Drones and loitering munitions are force multipliers but complement, rather than replace, heavy armor.
• Engineering vehicles and subterranean capabilities are critical in both urban and prepared defensive environments.
• Institutional agility (rapid lessons-learned cycles) and combined-arms training at the lowest levels provide a decisive edge.
• Logistics and sustainment under fire remain challenges in prolonged operations. henryjacksonsociety.org
In both theaters, IDF tank operations demonstrate the enduring value of heavy armor in hybrid warfare while highlighting the need for ongoing upgrades in protection, counter-drone systems, and integration with emerging technologies. Claims of tank obsolescence (from various analysts) have been challenged by battlefield results, though vulnerabilities to massed cheap threats and the high cost of operations persist.“.
Semper Fidelis, Hand Salute!
Whatever the benefits of drone technology, a mobile protected firepower asset on the battlefield is a necessary and integral part of a combined arms capability. Marine Corps combined arms capabilities were the standard. Our CAX program at 29 Palms provided world class combined arms training. We divested much of this capability to invest in "sensing" and "detecting" from small islands the Pacific. Similar arguments as Schmidt's can be made for carriers. Standing alone it is surely vulnerable, but as a task force it provides a capability no other nation can match. Another good reason not to become enraptured by Silicon Valley insights on the nature of war. Schmidt was appointed to the Defense Innovation Advisory Board in 2016. I fear our senior leadership including the previous and current CMC are listening to the Schmidts rather than the Zinnis, Krulaks, and Van Ripers.
Exactly 💯 Semper Fi
The big issue facing modern heavy combat vehicles, particularly the apex type the main battle tank, is the balance between offensive and defensive fires that the type has available when in contact. Too much emphasis is placed on main gun kinetic performance among a range of anti-tank options, Bradley TOW's have destroyed more tanks than Abrahms APFSDS. A 120mm, or 130mm, or 140mm, and automated turrets, a 50 ton tank to haul a couple dozen heavy darts is the result. Equipped with a rapid fire 60mm revolver or chain cannon and a stern vls/pop-up battery of CKEM, TOW, Javelin, Hellfire, APKWS, Stinger, or other AA/AT/HE weapons, the guns AHEAD, APFSDS, and SAPEE programmable effects rounds in an indexed magazine would provide a wide range of offensive and defensive fires that would increase survivability of the vehicle and Marines operating in close co-operation. A 60mm L60 smoothbore could be derived from the 57mm L70, same bore volume, but with a more compact digitally connected propellant casing, mounted on a 25 ton chassis at light standard transportable by C-130 class tactical transports with capacity to add-on kit up to 35-40 tons. Other types in an AFV family could include 120mm SPM's, 120mm Stug Alligator drone SPG's, strike missile and support, automated ammunition re-supply, and armored carriers and logistic transports with broad, varied and upgradeable margins.