“We’re learning to iterate… There’s some bumps and bruises. We’re making some corrections.” In plain talk - - we screwed up. We’re trying to refloat a sinking ship.
Since the inception of FD 2030, the senior leadership has:
1. Retained the 4th Marines as an infantry regiment as opposed to converting it to a MLR (stopping at 2 purpose-built MLRs vice 3)
2. Partially activated only 2 of the 14 NMESIS/NSM batteries promised under FD by 2030. How many batteries will eventually be activated remains a work in progress.
3. Divested only 7 of the 14 cannon artillery batteries originally slated for divestment.
4. Brought back or will bring back 150 of the 200 aircraft divested in the active force.
5. Articulated a requirement for 38 or more large amphibious ships since sending the number into freefall until Congress stabilized it at 31.
6. Articulated global response as a core capability on par with EABO/SIF.
7. Articulated the need for expeditionary bridging, which was 100% divested.
8. Deactivated the sole TLAM battery on the west coast.
9. Began bringing back manpower that was divested.
All of this makes the Marine Corps stronger. We all applaud the senior leadership for stepping up to partially correct a strategic wrong. But it’s not enough. This piecemeal approach to restoring capabilities is like building a house without a blueprint. It’s also like putting lipstick on a pig. FD may look better but it’s still a pig. The Marines need a blueprint - - a new operating concept that will transition the Marine Corps from the wilderness of ambiguity to a ready, relevant and capable force for today and tomorrow. Only then can the Marines determine and field capabilities that are required, complementary, and sustainable. For more see my article at the link: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/16/rethinking_the_role_of_the_marine_corps_in_national_security_1165065.html
General, I think one of the biggest warning signs is that we're increasingly seeing other organizations pick up missions that Marines used to handle as a matter of course. That isn't because America suddenly decided it doesn’t need or want forward-deployed Marines. It's because when the call comes, there often aren’t Marines in position, or the force afloat no longer has the depth and flexibility it once did. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the Joint Force. If Marines aren't there to answer the phone, somebody else will.
I think the Corps should get back to giving the National Command Authority options across the entire range of crisis and conflict, not just one fight in one theater. That probably means accepting that no single formation is going to solve every problem. We'll need big-deck amphibs and ARG/MEUs, smaller, cheaper distributed platforms that can live in the littorals every day, and hard, expeditionary infantry formations tailored to different theaters and missions, much like LCF-24. The strength of Marines has always been when they've been able to show up anywhere, stay as long as needed, and bring enough ass-whipping to matter.
I believe the Corps is currently about 175,000 Marines. 1% is 1,750 Marines. 5% over six years would be 8,750 Marines.
The Corps currently has 21 Infantry Bns of three rifle companies per Bn. These 21 Bns are about 700 Marines per Bn. That totals 14,700 Marines in a force of 175,000.
Someone please correct me if I am wrong.
The Corps once had 27 Bns with four rifle companies per Bn. Those Bns were about 1000 Marines per Bn. That is 27,000 Marines. In short, a loss of 12,300 Marines who close with and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver. The other Marines who “closed with” were in tanks. That number is 0.
How many of the 8,750 Marine increase in end strength over six years will be riflemen? From 175,000 to 183,750 is wonderful. What will they be assigned to?
Any student of history knows full well that the fox hole strength of the Corps is insufficient. It is insufficient by any measure, in any conflict, anywhere.
I strongly suspect that today’s Corps has more Marines in administration than it has 0311’s in Rifle Companies.
Well, if we hadn’t discharged a regimental size force for refusing to get the Covid vax. Hmmm? They in turn went home to their cities and towns across America and for certain recruiting paid a price. “This is how your Marine leaders take care of their Marines.”
Now the fight is at home-to find quality Marine candidates before other services offer easy living. Even when we find eager candidates, the qualities of fitness and education is often a disqualifier. I am reminded we have a different kind of kid who desires to wear an EGA! Still, my retired life is teaching young people. Many 14 year olds cannot read well enough to take a multiple choice exam, cannot write, but can make an IPhone hula dance. I teach a survival course at the CC and even 20 something’s can ‘t follow an outline. The HS kids walk by my garage every afternoon and we talk eventually ending up talking, “what’s next after HS”. I have extolled a stint in any service to get them out of town, some adventure and a chance to be on their own. Have a USMA young man doing well, and had a girl ready to be an ARMY MP-FAILED THE ASVAB—TWICE. There will be an issue in recruiting to get all the services’ manpower requirements.
The fact that so many divested units and equipment types are being reconsidered suggests that FD was a hastily planned program. We know it did not pass through the combat development process. To me it appears that FD was a panic driven concept. The result was a regionally driven force organization at the expense of being globally responsive. HQMC needs to decide what is the true mission of the Marine Corps. Historically the Marine Corps has always been a naval expeditionary force. Since 1948, the Corps has been a naval expeditionary/crisis response force. As a robust crisis response force it can also be task organized to conduct anti-ship missions in the INDOPAC region. The same force can be utilized to attack enemy/PLA facilities worldwide wide.
Planning…in reference to Force Design is like “badges”in the 1948 film “The Treasure of the Sierra Madre”, “Badges? We ain’t got no badges! I don’t have to show you any stinking badges!”, Alfonso Bedoya, as the Mexican bandit “Gold Hat “. This apparently also applies to CG MCCDC when he “iterates” the 7 years and running Berger Smith debacle!
Wow, is that ever good news, let's hope that the growth of the Corps and the Navy start's soon. Hung Cao seems to know what he is doing and I am sure that all of us will be watching and I hope he reads Compass Points occasionally. We may not all agree, but we do come up with some good advice occasionally. Semper Fi
20 years ago USMC Active Duty end strength was 182,252. FY 2025 end strength was 172,606, a delta of ~10k. The Marine Corps lost many more than that in combat arms reductions resulting from FD2030. Beyond the 10k, not knowing exact numbers for the combat arms reductions, one would presume more Marines are serving in support billets.
Did he miss the 3 Legged Stool Class or is it something National War College deleted from its curriculum. Grok “Lt. Gen. Eric Erskine Austin, USMC (born c. 1969) is a United States Marine Corps lieutenant general serving as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC); Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I); and Portfolio Acquisition Executive, Marine Corps since August 9, 2024. cdi.marines.mil
Early Career and Education
• Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1991 upon graduating from the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering.
• Distinguished graduate of The Basic School (1992).
• Earned naval aviator wings in 1994 and selected to fly the AV-8B Harrier.
• Later earned a Master’s in National Security Strategy from the National War College (2010).
• Graduated from the Marine Corps University Senior Planner’s Course (2012) and the Harvard Business School Advanced Management Program (2013). cdi.marines.mil
Operational and Command Experience
Austin is a highly experienced AV-8B Harrier pilot with multiple deployments aboard amphibious shipping as part of Marine Expeditionary Units and combat tours in Kuwait and Iraq.
Key Commands:
• Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA-211) – May 2007 to November 2008.
• Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14 (MAG-14) – June 2014 to May/June 2016.
• Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Okinawa, Japan) – 2022 to 2024. cdi.marines.mil
Staff and Joint Assignments
• Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, CD&I.
• Deputy Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (2017–2018).
“We’re learning to iterate… There’s some bumps and bruises. We’re making some corrections.” In plain talk - - we screwed up. We’re trying to refloat a sinking ship.
Since the inception of FD 2030, the senior leadership has:
1. Retained the 4th Marines as an infantry regiment as opposed to converting it to a MLR (stopping at 2 purpose-built MLRs vice 3)
2. Partially activated only 2 of the 14 NMESIS/NSM batteries promised under FD by 2030. How many batteries will eventually be activated remains a work in progress.
3. Divested only 7 of the 14 cannon artillery batteries originally slated for divestment.
4. Brought back or will bring back 150 of the 200 aircraft divested in the active force.
5. Articulated a requirement for 38 or more large amphibious ships since sending the number into freefall until Congress stabilized it at 31.
6. Articulated global response as a core capability on par with EABO/SIF.
7. Articulated the need for expeditionary bridging, which was 100% divested.
8. Deactivated the sole TLAM battery on the west coast.
9. Began bringing back manpower that was divested.
All of this makes the Marine Corps stronger. We all applaud the senior leadership for stepping up to partially correct a strategic wrong. But it’s not enough. This piecemeal approach to restoring capabilities is like building a house without a blueprint. It’s also like putting lipstick on a pig. FD may look better but it’s still a pig. The Marines need a blueprint - - a new operating concept that will transition the Marine Corps from the wilderness of ambiguity to a ready, relevant and capable force for today and tomorrow. Only then can the Marines determine and field capabilities that are required, complementary, and sustainable. For more see my article at the link: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/16/rethinking_the_role_of_the_marine_corps_in_national_security_1165065.html
General, I think one of the biggest warning signs is that we're increasingly seeing other organizations pick up missions that Marines used to handle as a matter of course. That isn't because America suddenly decided it doesn’t need or want forward-deployed Marines. It's because when the call comes, there often aren’t Marines in position, or the force afloat no longer has the depth and flexibility it once did. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the Joint Force. If Marines aren't there to answer the phone, somebody else will.
I think the Corps should get back to giving the National Command Authority options across the entire range of crisis and conflict, not just one fight in one theater. That probably means accepting that no single formation is going to solve every problem. We'll need big-deck amphibs and ARG/MEUs, smaller, cheaper distributed platforms that can live in the littorals every day, and hard, expeditionary infantry formations tailored to different theaters and missions, much like LCF-24. The strength of Marines has always been when they've been able to show up anywhere, stay as long as needed, and bring enough ass-whipping to matter.
I believe the Corps is currently about 175,000 Marines. 1% is 1,750 Marines. 5% over six years would be 8,750 Marines.
The Corps currently has 21 Infantry Bns of three rifle companies per Bn. These 21 Bns are about 700 Marines per Bn. That totals 14,700 Marines in a force of 175,000.
Someone please correct me if I am wrong.
The Corps once had 27 Bns with four rifle companies per Bn. Those Bns were about 1000 Marines per Bn. That is 27,000 Marines. In short, a loss of 12,300 Marines who close with and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver. The other Marines who “closed with” were in tanks. That number is 0.
How many of the 8,750 Marine increase in end strength over six years will be riflemen? From 175,000 to 183,750 is wonderful. What will they be assigned to?
Any student of history knows full well that the fox hole strength of the Corps is insufficient. It is insufficient by any measure, in any conflict, anywhere.
I strongly suspect that today’s Corps has more Marines in administration than it has 0311’s in Rifle Companies.
Fox hole strength is zero. Fighting hole strength is greater than zero.
Well, if we hadn’t discharged a regimental size force for refusing to get the Covid vax. Hmmm? They in turn went home to their cities and towns across America and for certain recruiting paid a price. “This is how your Marine leaders take care of their Marines.”
Now the fight is at home-to find quality Marine candidates before other services offer easy living. Even when we find eager candidates, the qualities of fitness and education is often a disqualifier. I am reminded we have a different kind of kid who desires to wear an EGA! Still, my retired life is teaching young people. Many 14 year olds cannot read well enough to take a multiple choice exam, cannot write, but can make an IPhone hula dance. I teach a survival course at the CC and even 20 something’s can ‘t follow an outline. The HS kids walk by my garage every afternoon and we talk eventually ending up talking, “what’s next after HS”. I have extolled a stint in any service to get them out of town, some adventure and a chance to be on their own. Have a USMA young man doing well, and had a girl ready to be an ARMY MP-FAILED THE ASVAB—TWICE. There will be an issue in recruiting to get all the services’ manpower requirements.
The fact that so many divested units and equipment types are being reconsidered suggests that FD was a hastily planned program. We know it did not pass through the combat development process. To me it appears that FD was a panic driven concept. The result was a regionally driven force organization at the expense of being globally responsive. HQMC needs to decide what is the true mission of the Marine Corps. Historically the Marine Corps has always been a naval expeditionary force. Since 1948, the Corps has been a naval expeditionary/crisis response force. As a robust crisis response force it can also be task organized to conduct anti-ship missions in the INDOPAC region. The same force can be utilized to attack enemy/PLA facilities worldwide wide.
Planning…in reference to Force Design is like “badges”in the 1948 film “The Treasure of the Sierra Madre”, “Badges? We ain’t got no badges! I don’t have to show you any stinking badges!”, Alfonso Bedoya, as the Mexican bandit “Gold Hat “. This apparently also applies to CG MCCDC when he “iterates” the 7 years and running Berger Smith debacle!
Sgt Shultz: I see nothing, I see nothing
That's a good name for FD: the Berger-Smith debacle!
SHOOT….READY ! AIM!…….3 LEGGED STOOL
Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means (Military)
Ends
Military objectives / Desired end-state
(What victory looks like)
Ways
Courses of action & operational concepts
(How forces will fight to achieve the Ends)
Means
Combat power & resources (troops, weapons, logistics, intelligence, time)
Core Rule
Ends, Ways, and Means must be aligned. Any mismatch leads to defeat.
Quick Check
Clear objectives? Feasible ways? Adequate means? SSDD!
Wow, is that ever good news, let's hope that the growth of the Corps and the Navy start's soon. Hung Cao seems to know what he is doing and I am sure that all of us will be watching and I hope he reads Compass Points occasionally. We may not all agree, but we do come up with some good advice occasionally. Semper Fi
20 years ago USMC Active Duty end strength was 182,252. FY 2025 end strength was 172,606, a delta of ~10k. The Marine Corps lost many more than that in combat arms reductions resulting from FD2030. Beyond the 10k, not knowing exact numbers for the combat arms reductions, one would presume more Marines are serving in support billets.
This hasto get better. We will adapte and overcome
Did he miss the 3 Legged Stool Class or is it something National War College deleted from its curriculum. Grok “Lt. Gen. Eric Erskine Austin, USMC (born c. 1969) is a United States Marine Corps lieutenant general serving as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC); Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I); and Portfolio Acquisition Executive, Marine Corps since August 9, 2024. cdi.marines.mil
Early Career and Education
• Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1991 upon graduating from the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering.
• Distinguished graduate of The Basic School (1992).
• Earned naval aviator wings in 1994 and selected to fly the AV-8B Harrier.
• Later earned a Master’s in National Security Strategy from the National War College (2010).
• Graduated from the Marine Corps University Senior Planner’s Course (2012) and the Harvard Business School Advanced Management Program (2013). cdi.marines.mil
Operational and Command Experience
Austin is a highly experienced AV-8B Harrier pilot with multiple deployments aboard amphibious shipping as part of Marine Expeditionary Units and combat tours in Kuwait and Iraq.
Key Commands:
• Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA-211) – May 2007 to November 2008.
• Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14 (MAG-14) – June 2014 to May/June 2016.
• Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Okinawa, Japan) – 2022 to 2024. cdi.marines.mil
Staff and Joint Assignments
• Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, CD&I.
• Deputy Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (2017–2018).
• Deputy Director, Joint Training, Joint Staff J-7 (2018–2020).
• Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
• Various other roles including Weapons and Tactics Instructor (MAWTS-1), Executive Officer positions, and Joint Staff Pacific Command Action Officer.
He is a qualified Aviation Safety Officer, Landing Signals Officer, and Weapons and Tactics Instructor. cdi.marines.mil