I don't know about that...I think we could give Anthony Gale and 'the Tatoo Policy' a little more credit as elements of USMC destruction. Besides, the rank and file are still working the bolt with what they have, regardless of what we think about FD(2030).
I have to take strong exception with General Neller being lumped in here. The 'Senior Squad Leader' has expressly stated he would have hedged more, divested less, and experimented more.
### Comprehensive Breakdown: Impacts of Force Design 2030 Since 2020
Since its implementation in March 2020, Force Design 2030 (FD2030) has aimed to transform the U.S. Marine Corps into a lighter, missile-focused force for Indo-Pacific sea denial, primarily through the creation of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) of approximately 2,000 Marines each. However, this shift has come at a significant cost, both financially and operationally, undermining the Corps’ ability to execute its Title 10 role as a global force-in-readiness. The following breakdown details the financial waste, operational failures, missed missions, and strategic risks incurred since 2020, culminating in a diminished capacity to address escalating global threats.
#### Financial Waste: $18.092 Billion in Divestments and Reinvestments
FD2030 divested critical assets and reinvested in unproven systems, resulting in substantial financial waste:
- Infantry and Other Units: 5 infantry battalions and 2 assault amphibian companies, totaling $170 million.
- **Training Losses ($43.24 Million)**:
- Tankers: 800 personnel, with training costs of $25,000 each, totaling $20 million.
- Scout Snipers: 300 personnel, with training costs of $30,000 each, totaling $9 million.
- Military Police: 308 personnel, with training costs of $30,000 each, totaling $9.24 million.
- Bridging Engineers: 200 personnel, with training costs of $25,000 each, totaling $5 million.
- **Reinvestments ($3.9 Billion)**:
- MLR Setup: $1.5 billion to establish 3 MLRs.
- MADIS: $1.9 billion for 190 Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems.
- NMESIS: $500 million for the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, which has yielded zero operational units after 72 months.
- **Total Financial Waste**: $18.092 billion, diverting resources from proven capabilities to a strategy that has failed to deliver operational results, as evidenced by wargames showing 30,000 MLR casualties defending Taiwan compared to 9,000 for a combined-arms MAGTF.
#### Operational Failures: Fragmented Structure and Reduced Readiness
FD2030’s shift to MLRs has fragmented the unified MAGTF structure—comprising a Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and Logistics Combat Element (LCE)—that enabled the Corps’ global reach in 1991. Key operational failures include:
- **Amphibious Shortfall**: The Corps now has only 12–13 amphibious ships ready, down from 38–40 in 1991, with the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) program stalled due to cost overruns. This limits rapid deployment for NEOs, HADR, and deterrence operations.
- **Loss of Combined-Arms Capability**: Divestments of tanks, artillery, and aviation assets have left MLRs without the mass and versatility needed for sustained combat, as demonstrated by their poor performance in wargames.
- **Training and Personnel Gaps**: Elimination of MOSs like tankers, scout snipers, military police, and bridging engineers has wasted $43.24 million in training and reduced the Corps’ operational flexibility.
#### Missed Missions Since 2020
FD2030’s focus on Indo-Pacific sea denial has sidelined the Corps’ broader mission, leading to missed opportunities across multiple domains:
- **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)**:
- Turkey (2023–2024): Limited participation during the 2023 earthquake (2,000 evacuated, 3,000 at risk) and 2024 Incirlik security threat (500 evacuated, 1,500 at risk) risked 75 lives and $2 trillion in regional interests.
- Sudan (2023): Operation Promise evacuated 72 people, with the Corps contributing only 70 Marines, risking 100 lives due to inability to deploy a full MAGTF.
- Haiti (2024): Operation Secure Tomorrow evacuated 37 Americans, with a 50-Marine FAST team, risking 20 lives due to lack of amphibious support.
- **Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)**:
- Haiti Earthquake (2021): A small 100-Marine logistics team deployed, missing the chance to deliver 5,000 tons of aid and save 500 lives.
- Philippines Typhoon Rai (2021): A 200-Marine contingent assisted via airlift, missing 3,000 tons of aid and 300 lives.
- Pakistan Floods (2022): A 50-Marine team deployed, missing 2,000 tons of aid and 200 lives.
- **Deterrence Operations**:
- Europe (2022): The Corps failed to deploy an ARG at the onset of the Ukraine-Russia war due to maintenance issues, risking $1 trillion in European stability.
- Red Sea (2023–2025): Inability to counter Houthi attacks and Somali piracy cost $6 billion in trade losses, risked 77 lives, and endangered $2 trillion in trade interests.
- **Military Exercises (2025)**: Limited participation in Large Scale Exercise, Talisman Sabre, Bold Alligator, and Steadfast Dart cost training for 10,500–15,500 Marines and $2.25 trillion in deterrence value.
#### Strategic Risks: Vulnerability to Global Threats
FD2030’s failures have left the Corps unable to address escalating threats:
- **Red Sea Instability**: Houthi attacks (133 incidents, 22 MQ-9 Reapers downed) and Somali piracy (16 incidents) since 2023 have disrupted 15% of global trade, costing $6 billion and risking $2 trillion in trade interests.
- **Indo-Pacific Challenges**: China’s soft power gains in Micronesia, Melanesia, and the Solomon Islands, through dual-use infrastructure, have gone unchecked, risking U.S. influence in a critical region.
- **Broader Threats**: The Corps cannot counter hybrid threats like the 2023 Chinese surveillance balloon, and the China-Russia 1.6 million-troop axis, with 6 carriers offline and degraded readiness across services.
- **Total Impact**: Since 2020, FD2030 has risked 1,195 lives, missed training for 10,500–15,500 Marines, and endangered $7.75 trillion in U.S. interests, leaving the nation vulnerable to a degree not seen since the Carter administration.
#### The Path Forward: $150 Billion BEAST MAGTF
The $150 billion BEAST MAGTF, with 92,000 Marines, 40 amphibious ships, 13 MPS ships, 452 M1A2s, 360 M777s, and 450 aircraft, restores the unified MAGTF structure. It enables a six-hour global response, securing the Red Sea, conducting NEOs, leading HADR, deterring aggression, countering Chinese influence, and training in joint exercises. In 1991, I MEF crushed 300–350 Iraqi tanks in 100 hours—a similar presence would neutralize Houthi threats and enable global missions. The BEAST MAGTF generates a $512.41 billion surplus ($374.95 billion GDP, 300,000 jobs) while securing $13 trillion in U.S. interests.
#### Call to Action: Demand Accountability
FD2030’s $18.092 billion waste has compromised national security, risking lives and trillions in U.S. interests. Leadership must redirect resources to the BEAST MAGTF and implement broader Pentagon reforms to restore readiness.
Outstanding summary of the cost to the Marine Corps and the United States by this poorly thought out and untested decision. Why the secresy and NDAs of key Marines Corps field grade and general officers? What was the cataclysmic event that triggered the dismantling of the MAGTF and the implementation of a defense-minded posture?
In reading Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson’s series The Tactical Notebook, he discusses something that I think our Senior Marine leadership has missed. Gudmundsson is looking at the Commanders in Chief of the German and French armies circa 1905 and later in 1914-1918. He discusses how Moltke for the Germans and Joffre for the French toured what they thought would be the battlefields between the 2 countries in the next 10 years’ this was in 1905. They walked through areas of interest and rode horses through them numerous times to get a feeling of how to win battles on them. They did not sit at their desks and have others do their work. In the 1914-1918 period, Moltke the younger made some serious errors by not going to the front and talking to the troops and finding out what was going on. Joffre did talk to his field commanders and troops and made decisions on relevant data.
I am thinking that perhaps our current seniors are getting a bit too much desk work done instead of going out and talking to our field commander's and the troops. Perhaps even taking a trip and visiting the areas where we may actually fight in the future.
Would love to have a dollar (due to inflation) every time my CO told me I was too curious for my own good. Didn’t stop me, but dis get an occasional talk to.
Absolutely on point. In addition, the other audience General Berger should have been talking to is the Combatant Commanders, explaining how the US Marine Corps is a deployable force in readiness and how the US Marine Corps MAGTF is the adaptable and flexible Joint Force "Swiss Army Knife". S/F
Very interesting use of Hogan's Alley for this comparison. Notably, Hogan's Alley tests aspects of tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTPs). What it does not test, train, or develop, are policy and strategy. Law Enforcement that over emphasizes TTPs in the absence of coherent policy and strategy is doomed to struggle.
Much the same, there appears to be a disconnect between policy / strategy and the tactical level of operations. I think this is why our discussion, both for and against FD, has us all around the sand table playing with the conceptual models and picking at disjointed ideas. Talking about the MEU (or the USMC), without speaking to the COCOMS and National Policy/Strategy, is like going to Hogan's Alley and training without having an idea of the greater why and how. It is theater and also doomed to a ride on the struggle bus. Whether Pro FD or Anti FD, we cannot have 'our cake and eat it too'.
*(Bing West pointed this out a few years ago in "A Force in Readiness or in Stasis". I wish I had an easy answer...I don't. I am happy the Navy is finally moving to get something done to fill the LSM/LST/Connector mission).
How many of these systems did the Marine Corps order?
Integrated Air and Missile Defense System
The LTAMDS is part of the US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, which includes the Integrated Battle Command System developed by Northrop Grumman.
It is designed to work with the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 and PAC-3 interceptors to neutralize advanced cruise missiles, enemy drones, and other aerial threats.
PAC-3 is part of a modernization plan by the US Army after the service scrapped the Lower-Tier Future Interceptor initiative in October 2024 due to high costs.
Maybe, just maybe we are giving Generals Berger and Smith too much credit. Maybe just maybe these two are classic examples of too dumb to fail. Maybe they have high IQ but difficultly screwing in a lightbulb, or are still really confused about the workings of the barrel and receiver group on their assault rifle at OCS. They are good at survival like many rodents are at scurrying about for food and power. One is reminded of the James Clavell novel “King Rat” there are a lot of analogous levels between the POW’s in his book and the behavior of many of the participants in the FD2030 debacle. Running on the two rails whilst hoping the essentials of male human anatomy are not going to get scorched by the third rail running 11,000 volts through it, to power the subway is no way to go through life. (Yes, paraphrasing Dean Wormer’s famous Fat, drunk and stupid line here) The bad news about smart people, whom are actually really dumb is they refuse to reason. Supposedly, Secretary Robert McNamara was a genius, Mensa society bright, but that didn’t stop him from rolling out the Edsel when he was the boss at Ford Motor Company,. Once the USA was in a quagmire in Southeast Asia doubling and tripling down with more and more and more military involvement and coming up with his 100,000 to argument the matter of not enough manpower on the ground.
Can we cut to the chase, MAGTF, MAGTF MAGTF, can we stop the hemorrhaging of FD2030, we are burning daylight. Time to slap some bacon on biscuit, grab book, or shake a congressman and get busy.
Who in their right mind divests of important/needed equipment before the new equipment is ready to be fielded? Five years in, and we still do not have the new equipment. This defies logic and common sense and should be seen as malpractice and incompetentence at the highest level.
CMCs Neller, Berger and Smith have done what no enemy could do in 250 years, they destroyed Our Marine Corps!
I don't know about that...I think we could give Anthony Gale and 'the Tatoo Policy' a little more credit as elements of USMC destruction. Besides, the rank and file are still working the bolt with what they have, regardless of what we think about FD(2030).
I have to take strong exception with General Neller being lumped in here. The 'Senior Squad Leader' has expressly stated he would have hedged more, divested less, and experimented more.
Why can’t we see the planning documents that started this whole FD2030 change process that had to be approved up through CMC, CNO and DOD?
1. The Marine Corps replaced Mission Needs Document.
2. The Plan of Action a Milestones (POA&M) that justified the change.
3. The Operations Requirements (OR) document that should have been developed from the field up.
4. The Congressional Approved funding document that is made part of the Marine Corps Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
Was this process bypassed by a ADHOC procedure?
I agree, Neller started the ball rolling
### Comprehensive Breakdown: Impacts of Force Design 2030 Since 2020
Since its implementation in March 2020, Force Design 2030 (FD2030) has aimed to transform the U.S. Marine Corps into a lighter, missile-focused force for Indo-Pacific sea denial, primarily through the creation of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) of approximately 2,000 Marines each. However, this shift has come at a significant cost, both financially and operationally, undermining the Corps’ ability to execute its Title 10 role as a global force-in-readiness. The following breakdown details the financial waste, operational failures, missed missions, and strategic risks incurred since 2020, culminating in a diminished capacity to address escalating global threats.
#### Financial Waste: $18.092 Billion in Divestments and Reinvestments
FD2030 divested critical assets and reinvested in unproven systems, resulting in substantial financial waste:
- **Divested Assets ($14.149 Billion)**:
- Tanks: 400 M1A1 Abrams and 50 M88 recovery vehicles, totaling $925 million.
- Towed Artillery: 96 M777 howitzers, valued at $384 million.
- Aviation: 44 MV-22 Ospreys, 54 AH-1Z/UH-1Y helicopters, 48 CH-53K helicopters, and 54 F-35B fighters, totaling $12.62 billion.
- Bridging: 50 Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLBs), valued at $50 million.
- Infantry and Other Units: 5 infantry battalions and 2 assault amphibian companies, totaling $170 million.
- **Training Losses ($43.24 Million)**:
- Tankers: 800 personnel, with training costs of $25,000 each, totaling $20 million.
- Scout Snipers: 300 personnel, with training costs of $30,000 each, totaling $9 million.
- Military Police: 308 personnel, with training costs of $30,000 each, totaling $9.24 million.
- Bridging Engineers: 200 personnel, with training costs of $25,000 each, totaling $5 million.
- **Reinvestments ($3.9 Billion)**:
- MLR Setup: $1.5 billion to establish 3 MLRs.
- MADIS: $1.9 billion for 190 Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems.
- NMESIS: $500 million for the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, which has yielded zero operational units after 72 months.
- **Total Financial Waste**: $18.092 billion, diverting resources from proven capabilities to a strategy that has failed to deliver operational results, as evidenced by wargames showing 30,000 MLR casualties defending Taiwan compared to 9,000 for a combined-arms MAGTF.
#### Operational Failures: Fragmented Structure and Reduced Readiness
FD2030’s shift to MLRs has fragmented the unified MAGTF structure—comprising a Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and Logistics Combat Element (LCE)—that enabled the Corps’ global reach in 1991. Key operational failures include:
- **Amphibious Shortfall**: The Corps now has only 12–13 amphibious ships ready, down from 38–40 in 1991, with the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) program stalled due to cost overruns. This limits rapid deployment for NEOs, HADR, and deterrence operations.
- **Loss of Combined-Arms Capability**: Divestments of tanks, artillery, and aviation assets have left MLRs without the mass and versatility needed for sustained combat, as demonstrated by their poor performance in wargames.
- **Training and Personnel Gaps**: Elimination of MOSs like tankers, scout snipers, military police, and bridging engineers has wasted $43.24 million in training and reduced the Corps’ operational flexibility.
#### Missed Missions Since 2020
FD2030’s focus on Indo-Pacific sea denial has sidelined the Corps’ broader mission, leading to missed opportunities across multiple domains:
- **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)**:
- Turkey (2023–2024): Limited participation during the 2023 earthquake (2,000 evacuated, 3,000 at risk) and 2024 Incirlik security threat (500 evacuated, 1,500 at risk) risked 75 lives and $2 trillion in regional interests.
- Sudan (2023): Operation Promise evacuated 72 people, with the Corps contributing only 70 Marines, risking 100 lives due to inability to deploy a full MAGTF.
- Haiti (2024): Operation Secure Tomorrow evacuated 37 Americans, with a 50-Marine FAST team, risking 20 lives due to lack of amphibious support.
- **Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)**:
- Haiti Earthquake (2021): A small 100-Marine logistics team deployed, missing the chance to deliver 5,000 tons of aid and save 500 lives.
- Philippines Typhoon Rai (2021): A 200-Marine contingent assisted via airlift, missing 3,000 tons of aid and 300 lives.
- Pakistan Floods (2022): A 50-Marine team deployed, missing 2,000 tons of aid and 200 lives.
- **Deterrence Operations**:
- Europe (2022): The Corps failed to deploy an ARG at the onset of the Ukraine-Russia war due to maintenance issues, risking $1 trillion in European stability.
- Red Sea (2023–2025): Inability to counter Houthi attacks and Somali piracy cost $6 billion in trade losses, risked 77 lives, and endangered $2 trillion in trade interests.
- **Military Exercises (2025)**: Limited participation in Large Scale Exercise, Talisman Sabre, Bold Alligator, and Steadfast Dart cost training for 10,500–15,500 Marines and $2.25 trillion in deterrence value.
#### Strategic Risks: Vulnerability to Global Threats
FD2030’s failures have left the Corps unable to address escalating threats:
- **Red Sea Instability**: Houthi attacks (133 incidents, 22 MQ-9 Reapers downed) and Somali piracy (16 incidents) since 2023 have disrupted 15% of global trade, costing $6 billion and risking $2 trillion in trade interests.
- **Indo-Pacific Challenges**: China’s soft power gains in Micronesia, Melanesia, and the Solomon Islands, through dual-use infrastructure, have gone unchecked, risking U.S. influence in a critical region.
- **Broader Threats**: The Corps cannot counter hybrid threats like the 2023 Chinese surveillance balloon, and the China-Russia 1.6 million-troop axis, with 6 carriers offline and degraded readiness across services.
- **Total Impact**: Since 2020, FD2030 has risked 1,195 lives, missed training for 10,500–15,500 Marines, and endangered $7.75 trillion in U.S. interests, leaving the nation vulnerable to a degree not seen since the Carter administration.
#### The Path Forward: $150 Billion BEAST MAGTF
The $150 billion BEAST MAGTF, with 92,000 Marines, 40 amphibious ships, 13 MPS ships, 452 M1A2s, 360 M777s, and 450 aircraft, restores the unified MAGTF structure. It enables a six-hour global response, securing the Red Sea, conducting NEOs, leading HADR, deterring aggression, countering Chinese influence, and training in joint exercises. In 1991, I MEF crushed 300–350 Iraqi tanks in 100 hours—a similar presence would neutralize Houthi threats and enable global missions. The BEAST MAGTF generates a $512.41 billion surplus ($374.95 billion GDP, 300,000 jobs) while securing $13 trillion in U.S. interests.
#### Call to Action: Demand Accountability
FD2030’s $18.092 billion waste has compromised national security, risking lives and trillions in U.S. interests. Leadership must redirect resources to the BEAST MAGTF and implement broader Pentagon reforms to restore readiness.
Outstanding summary of the cost to the Marine Corps and the United States by this poorly thought out and untested decision. Why the secresy and NDAs of key Marines Corps field grade and general officers? What was the cataclysmic event that triggered the dismantling of the MAGTF and the implementation of a defense-minded posture?
That's the 18.092 Billion dollar question, not to mention the $7.75 trillion in national security
In reading Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson’s series The Tactical Notebook, he discusses something that I think our Senior Marine leadership has missed. Gudmundsson is looking at the Commanders in Chief of the German and French armies circa 1905 and later in 1914-1918. He discusses how Moltke for the Germans and Joffre for the French toured what they thought would be the battlefields between the 2 countries in the next 10 years’ this was in 1905. They walked through areas of interest and rode horses through them numerous times to get a feeling of how to win battles on them. They did not sit at their desks and have others do their work. In the 1914-1918 period, Moltke the younger made some serious errors by not going to the front and talking to the troops and finding out what was going on. Joffre did talk to his field commanders and troops and made decisions on relevant data.
I am thinking that perhaps our current seniors are getting a bit too much desk work done instead of going out and talking to our field commander's and the troops. Perhaps even taking a trip and visiting the areas where we may actually fight in the future.
Like first battery commander told me, “exercise your curiosity Lt.”.
Would love to have a dollar (due to inflation) every time my CO told me I was too curious for my own good. Didn’t stop me, but dis get an occasional talk to.
Absolutely on point. In addition, the other audience General Berger should have been talking to is the Combatant Commanders, explaining how the US Marine Corps is a deployable force in readiness and how the US Marine Corps MAGTF is the adaptable and flexible Joint Force "Swiss Army Knife". S/F
Very interesting use of Hogan's Alley for this comparison. Notably, Hogan's Alley tests aspects of tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTPs). What it does not test, train, or develop, are policy and strategy. Law Enforcement that over emphasizes TTPs in the absence of coherent policy and strategy is doomed to struggle.
Much the same, there appears to be a disconnect between policy / strategy and the tactical level of operations. I think this is why our discussion, both for and against FD, has us all around the sand table playing with the conceptual models and picking at disjointed ideas. Talking about the MEU (or the USMC), without speaking to the COCOMS and National Policy/Strategy, is like going to Hogan's Alley and training without having an idea of the greater why and how. It is theater and also doomed to a ride on the struggle bus. Whether Pro FD or Anti FD, we cannot have 'our cake and eat it too'.
*(Bing West pointed this out a few years ago in "A Force in Readiness or in Stasis". I wish I had an easy answer...I don't. I am happy the Navy is finally moving to get something done to fill the LSM/LST/Connector mission).
How many of these systems did the Marine Corps order?
Integrated Air and Missile Defense System
The LTAMDS is part of the US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, which includes the Integrated Battle Command System developed by Northrop Grumman.
It is designed to work with the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 and PAC-3 interceptors to neutralize advanced cruise missiles, enemy drones, and other aerial threats.
PAC-3 is part of a modernization plan by the US Army after the service scrapped the Lower-Tier Future Interceptor initiative in October 2024 due to high costs.
Maybe, just maybe we are giving Generals Berger and Smith too much credit. Maybe just maybe these two are classic examples of too dumb to fail. Maybe they have high IQ but difficultly screwing in a lightbulb, or are still really confused about the workings of the barrel and receiver group on their assault rifle at OCS. They are good at survival like many rodents are at scurrying about for food and power. One is reminded of the James Clavell novel “King Rat” there are a lot of analogous levels between the POW’s in his book and the behavior of many of the participants in the FD2030 debacle. Running on the two rails whilst hoping the essentials of male human anatomy are not going to get scorched by the third rail running 11,000 volts through it, to power the subway is no way to go through life. (Yes, paraphrasing Dean Wormer’s famous Fat, drunk and stupid line here) The bad news about smart people, whom are actually really dumb is they refuse to reason. Supposedly, Secretary Robert McNamara was a genius, Mensa society bright, but that didn’t stop him from rolling out the Edsel when he was the boss at Ford Motor Company,. Once the USA was in a quagmire in Southeast Asia doubling and tripling down with more and more and more military involvement and coming up with his 100,000 to argument the matter of not enough manpower on the ground.
Can we cut to the chase, MAGTF, MAGTF MAGTF, can we stop the hemorrhaging of FD2030, we are burning daylight. Time to slap some bacon on biscuit, grab book, or shake a congressman and get busy.
Who in their right mind divests of important/needed equipment before the new equipment is ready to be fielded? Five years in, and we still do not have the new equipment. This defies logic and common sense and should be seen as malpractice and incompetentence at the highest level.