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Charles Wemyss, Jr.'s avatar

It seems that there are a couple of large themes running throughout. Manage rather than lead. “Joint” services that don’t act jointly (army ships and Marines as stand in forces) “peer” foes who aren’t peers or even necessarily foes. A lack of clarity in the lines between public foreign policy and a military that can prosecute the foreign policy if needs be.

Dumbing it down for one’s own sake and sanity if the Marine Corps sticks to what it has done best or well over the last decades meaning a MAGTF concept that allows very good flexible response to many different crises large and small. Real humanitarian relief operations, sustained combat operations and the mere threat of Marines “going across the beach” in a short sharp action of some sort. The rest can take care of itself. We did not even have an equal seat at the JCS table until General Wilson achieved that status when he was CMC. But, somehow the Corps was able to conduct and meet Title X requirements. Focus on what you can do, be obnoxious about sealift, both the necessary amphibious support and long term prepositioning of ships for sustained operations. Focus on leadership, find quality over quantity and sometimes be bloody well rude about it. No Congress person XY or Z we aren’t doing that, we are not lowering standards to meet arbitrary recruitment standards. As General Wilson told Congress at some sort of hearing, if it came down to he and his driver being the only Marines qualified to be Marines then the T/O of the Corps would be 2. China maybe belligerent because it has plenty of problems at home. Defeating China is defined how? What is the military option for China that brings them global dominance. Once dominant what have they gained and can they hold on to that dominance? Doubtful on all accounts. So let China be China and let the Marine Corps be the Marine Corps. It all flows down hill from the simplest of concepts. Gravity works.

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Bob Whitener's avatar

Managing China as a military and economic peer competitor is similar in precept to Chamberlin managing Hitler before WW ll.

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