Compass Points – Insights from Readers
Readers Broaden the Ongoing Discussion
Compass Points readers are experienced and thoughtful. They contribute tremendously insightful comments. Among the many valuable, recent comments received online and off are the comments below. Compass Points does not agree with every part of every comment, but Compass Points appreciates them all. Many thanks to all our readers and particularly to those who take the time to comment. Thanks to readers, C.O., Cfrog, and R.S.!
C.O. commented on the post:
Compass Points – Marines Left at the Dock.
One fallacy often heard as the Corps dropped the 38-ship requirement was that it was solely grounded in the need to conduct a two-MEB amphibious assault. While this capability headlined the argument for 38, it was only part of the story.
Laboring along at 31-33 ships early last decade also meant that the Navy could only support scheduled MEU-ARG deployments, which meant few if any ships available for a contingency requiring a SPMAGTF, to reinforce a MEU-ARG, or for training outside of MEU workups. The only Marines who got experience aboard ship were those assigned to MEUs, so the familiarity of working aboard, and from, amphibious shipping waned even after the OIF deployments ended.
Congress understood this. In fact, they understood it better than some of the Marines making the argument that we don't need so many amphibs. They continued to fund new LPDs outside of Navy budget requests to see that the Corps got what it needed, and by the middle of the decade we approached 38, and got approval for the replacement for the soon-to-retire LSDs.
As soon as the Corps dropped the 38-ship requirement, however, the Navy cashed that check, and is both decommissioning LSDs, delaying the LAW, and trying to end the planned buy of the LSD replacement. LAWs and any more LPD's must now compete with DDGs, frigates, subs, and aviation for blue dollars.
And the Corps is fighting for them from a weakened fiscal and strategic position. Pleading for an inadequate fleet of 31 ships now only means that we will settle for fewer. It also means the Corps will have less ties to the sea and to the Navy, and less ability to get to the fight. ARGs deploying late or without a necessary ship is our present; our future may look a lot worse, and the shame of it is that this was a problem we didn't have to solve.
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Cfrog commented on the post:
Compass Points – Beyond Just Theory.
How would this fight [Dai Do] change in light of advances in warfighting today? Add precision munitions, UAS, EW, etc on both sides. I would suggest that the nature of the fight would still remain the same. Units would be spread out more on average, they might have better awareness, they would move faster in time and space. They still would want "the close, continuous, and accurate support provided by artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed wing aviation, and naval gunfire, Marine tanks..." in addition to more UAS, CUAS, precision munitions, and EW capability. It would remain a contest of maximizing the strength of the Marines while maximizing the weakness and vulnerability of the NVA (from the Marine perspective).
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R.S. commented on the post:
Compass Points – Beyond Just Theory.
I agree with the sentiments and the [Dai Do] history lesson. Questions - Is there a FMFM that lays out the strategy for fighting a large enemy force with little more than small arms and some missiles? How much missile firepower will be part of the T/O and T/E of the "new" infantry battalion? What about resupply? Has the fighting strategy been incorporated in USMC schools?
After all, the tanks are gone, some infantry battalions are being eliminated, some artillery is gone and some air assets are gone. And, China is flying dozens of aircraft over/around Taiwan almost daily, while Russia is trying to take over another country and Iran is developing a nuclear capability while helping to arm the Russians. North and South Korea are exchanging more than just rhetoric. And our clueless president has allowed at least 5 million illegals into the United States, not including about 1 million gotaways which does include a significant number on the Terrorist Watch List. So, how does the future fighting strategy for the USMC match up with those threats?
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The discussion of Dai Do and its applicability to current doctrine is excellent, but inclusion of a comment describing our current Commander-in Chief as "clueless" is a gratuitous injection of politics into a professional military discussion. It has no place in Compass Points.
"taken as fact"...not having been on the ground at Dai Do, I take my information from three or the four TBS 367 (* herein) officers who were. The fourth was KIA in the action. And the considerable reading, prompted by the conversations with the officers noted, conversation with BG (then Lt Col.) Wm Weise OC 2/4and toa limited extent Lt Gen (then Capt) Livingston.
Traks were used to bring *B/1/3 up from Dong Ha,and then ferry casualties and ammo.
*Tanks were placed and then "forgotten". 2/4's attached *Recon Plt was assign support of tanks.
The "flat"of Dai Do bears no similarity to the "mountains" of Serbia. Revisit your comparison of the use of A/C.
All of the above distracts from the "Mission at Hand".. OUT