Compass Points - Lacking Logistics
Marines need logistics.
January 11, 2024
.
Commanders in war can make all the plans they want, but without logistics nothing can happen.
.
Many news outlets are reporting that on Saturday 6 January, Ukraine military forces destroyed a Russian logistics bridge.
.
=================
.
Ukrainian forces have destroyed a key new Russian logistics link deep in Moscow-held territory, according to a Ukrainian official, in what may be a blow to Russia's future ability to move resources to and from southern Ukraine . Ukrainian fighters attacked a railway bridge, which is still under construction, in southern Donetsk on Saturday, Petro Andriushchenko, adviser to the exiled mayor of Mariupol, said in a post to messaging app Telegram on Sunday. Russia lost the "half-built railway bridge," along with fuel tanks around the village of Hranitne, northeast of Mariupol, Andriushchenko said. The bridge was intended to be part of a "direct railway from Russia," he said.
-- Newsweek
.
=================
.
Last year, Major General (Ret.) Christopher Owens wrote about the serious logistics flaws in the Marine Corps plan to place small units of Marines on islands in the Pacific. What has never been explained is how will these Marine units be supported? On rare occasions when senior Marine representatives are asked about logistics, they mumble some version of, we are working on it.
.
In his powerful article, Major General (ret) Christopher Owens takes a hard look at the issue of logistics, "The Radical Redesign and Restructuring of the United States Marine Corps." General Owens makes clear that logistics cannot be ignored:
.
=================
.
When Marines go ashore, they require maneuver, fire support, and sustainment. This creates the operational reach dilemma: No matter how you plan to support distributed forces, you require more assets to solve the problem, not fewer.
.
As an example of the challenges of operational reach, the stand-in forces in the Asia Pacific would have to maneuver to islands in and around the Philippines or Japan. To do this they must account for average distances of between 300 and 800 miles for insertion and sustainment. The logistics, casualty evacuation, and maneuver space in the Philippines alone encompasses over 1,000 miles from north to south. A cursory look at inserting a battalion of 800 Marines in one wave from Okinawa with the basic sustainment capabilities would take four MV-22 tilt rotor squadrons (40 aircraft) and 6-8 KC-130 cargo aircraft at those distances. To insert additional capabilities, such as rocket and missile launchers and munitions, would take another two squadrons of tiltrotor and heavy lift helicopters with the same number of KC-130s.
— Christopher Owens
.
=================
.
In addition, Major Daniel Katzman in his article, "Sustaining Stand-in Forces -- Evaluating the logistical supportability for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations" has provided a detailed and authoritative analysis of the lack of logistical supportability.
.
=================
.
In a modern, high-end conflict, EABO is not logistically supportable given the need to persist and operate within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone at a significant distance from friendly support bases. EABs used for fires in support of sea control or forward arming and refueling points (FARP) provide the required sustainment scope to appreciate the logistics dilemma. When these EABs operate simultaneously to realize operations at scale, a logistics distribution challenge arises that is greater than the Marine Corps or joint force can support.
.
. . . When scaled to the Lombok Strait and surrounding passages, the associated set of EABs would require a total of 63 shooting platforms, 84 supply vehicles, 63 security vehicles, and 630 personnel. For sustainment, the fires EAB vignette requires 37,800 pounds per day of subsistence, 69,673 pounds per day of fuel, and 7,048 pounds of ordnance per salvo or more likely 21,144 pounds per engagement with a 3-ship surface action group. Assuming one engagement per day, this vignette requires approximately 65 short tons per day of sustainment delivered to the 7 geographically separated sites.
.
. . . When you combine the support to Marine Corps and Navy aircraft, the subsistence requirement remains the same at 88,700 pounds per day, assuming supported aircraft crews require no subsistence. On a daily basis, the fuel requirement aggregates to 1,014,213 pounds while the total ordnance requirement is approximately 623,096 pounds. Therefore, the complete daily support for FARP EABs would be 863 tons.
-- Daniel Katzman
.
=================
.
With the strike on the Russian logistics bridge, Ukraine has shown it understands the importance of logistics. Does the Marine Corps? Compass Points salutes the Marine authors for their analysis and insights about the logistical challenges of Force Design 2030. Marines need logistics. Commanders can make all the plans they want, but without logistics nothing can happen. Congress needs to take a hard look at the logistical problems of the Marine Corps' radical restructuring.
.
- - - - -
.
Newsweek
Ukraine Destroys Key Rail Bridge Connecting Occupied Mariupol to Russia
By Ellie Cook
.
- - - - -
.
Real Clear Defense (realcleardefense.com) 05/13/2023
The Radical Redesign and Restructuring of the United States Marine Corps
By Christopher Owens
Major General (Ret.) Christopher Owens was a career Marine Corps aviator. From 2012-2013, he commanded 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the Western Pacific.
.
- - - - -
.
Marine Corps Gazette (mca-marines.org) December 2022
Sustaining Stand-in Forces
Evaluating the logistical supportability for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
By Maj Daniel Katzman
Maj Katzman is a Logistics Officer, currently serving as Plans Officer, 1st MLG.
https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Sustaining-Stand-in-Forces.pdf
.
- - - - -
.
Compass Points - Marines Need Logistics
Time to ask the hard questions.
May 15, 2023
https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-marines-need-logistics
As a young 0302 Aide de Camp to an 0802 Major General, one of the chief benefits among many, was his educational gentle teasing from time to time such as "you infantry guys never think of logistics.." or "you need to learn to think about how you will feed your Marines once you get there!" and on it would go. His drip drip method, which was wonderful in its manner and to the extent that it shaped my thinking cannot be under estimated. Every Friday around 1700 he would say "CSMO" or "Close Station March Order" which meant at the time okay lets go home, smoking lamp is lit. But more importantly as that young infantry officer thought on those words, and the logistics that the artillery needed just to support the infantry, it was clear, if one continued on in their career as an infantry officer, that they better learn to be damn good at understanding and planning for the logistics needed to support forward and sustained combat operations. Napoleon it is believed, is to have said, "An army fights on it's belly" meaning it had to be fed. Paragraph 4 of the 5 paragraph operations order Administration and Logistics (There's that L word again) is often memorized early on as Beans, Bullets, Band Aids and Bad Guys. One wonders on the notion that the designers of FD2030 who signed nondisclosure documents to hide their work from the rest of the Corps and any intelligent outside counsel like former Commandants and other General Officers, like General Van Riper, after 20 plus years of sustained combat operations in two theaters of conflict would have at least contended with the notion of supply and the armaments used. It seems like crazy street the more we learn and ruminate on the issue.
If we had a clean sheet of paper, and had to, in very short and pithy stokes say what the Corps ought to look like, basically ignoring for the moment, the politics of national foreign policy, how would it be constituted. That singular idea once solved would seem to lead to a reinvigorated Corps. It would no doubt meet the obligations of Title X or identify that Title X, needed a good looking at, and therefore say, we will need tanks, we will need more artillery tubes of every sort, we will need amphibious capability to go from the sea to the shore and inland, we will need Marines that know how blow stuff up, and build bridges to ford rivers and ravines. A robust air wing to provide the support that only Marine Air can provide. Higher active duty command owes the American taxpayer better explanations, other than we are working on it, hurrmph mumblity peg.
A bit off topic, but with all the commercials regarding CLNC and its water issue, I can’t help but notice the entry logo, “ Home of Expeditionary Forces in Readiness”….Should we adopt FD 2030, I suggest the logo, “ Home of Forces Stranded on Remote Sand Spits”. Doesn’t have the same impact, but it reflects the situation. For context, I started my career there ( 2lt, 1/6), and finished there almost 30 years later (O-6, deployed as a reservist with 2MEF)