The perspective of JCM is right on in every case. Of particular note is the reference to diplomacy and economics. Additionally, there is a focused effort in psyop given the CCP influence within the U.S media, large-cap entities, entertainment and universities. The CCP will continue to campaign to discover, dominate and direct surrogates in order to garner decisive power in international trade. Given the current exports in consumer goods and raw material, will the CCP soon be able to specify the currency in which trade is conducted? How will alliances with Russia, Iran, etc. in the BRICS club work to dominate trade and currency?
The CCP will not enter direct military conflict with any adversary as they will employ surrogate dictatorships under their control to block sea lanes, harbor terrorists and orchestrate international trade. Remember when Ruhollah Khomeini expressed the desire to restrict all U.S. shipping in the Red Sea. Then he was reminded of the probability of a Marine Amphibious Brigade visit to Bandar Abbas. Game over. There is the requirement for expeditionary forces and supporting sealift.
The operational word in the acronym “BRI” is initiative. When you have the initiative, you are inside the adversary’s decision cycle. MCWL’s reference to “the fundamentals of maneuver warfare” brings to mind the question: In what manner or form? The sort of maneuver warfare in Vietnam in April 1975? The sort of maneuver warfare in Afghanistan in August 2021? It appears that “the fundamentals of maneuver warfare” MCWL seeks to employ are to set up defensive positions inviting the enemy to attack and then “maneuver” off. Even Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Heinz Guderian had a better grasp of “fundamentals” than that.
Thank you to the G3O for his views and to Compass Points for sharing the discussion here. I empathize with his position; he is in a day to day operational and development knife fight at a relatively higher level. For him orders, policies, and procedures are the rule of the day. FD2030 is the official policy of the USMC and has been implemented. By default, I can see why he would take his position because on a daily basis, in the context of his job, he is probably participating in process development, combat development exercises, and looking for solutions to emerging crisis related tasking / supporting Combatant Command requirements. To him, the operation and exercise planning, preparation, and execution looks like the foundational concept of FD 2030 applied in a learning organization. As always, Marines doing the best with what they have. On an individual level, maybe he really believes in FD 2030 top to bottom, maybe it's the current policy of the USMC and therefore seen as valid, maybe it's just simpler to support it and move on with getting stuff done.
For me, I am looking at a bigger picture of current and future capability set and how to manage the tool set that would best position current and future G3O's. As an example, I guarantee the current Amphib issue spoken of many times here and elsewhere is not helping him optimally posture for Crisis Response and support Global Combatant Command requirements. I would love to be factually proven to be wrong (but please, no shallow articles about UAS, using modern sensors to employ fires, or war-game references without any context). A bit long winded, but I am glad for G3O willingness to challenge our take...it's part of the development process.
The perspective of JCM is right on in every case. Of particular note is the reference to diplomacy and economics. Additionally, there is a focused effort in psyop given the CCP influence within the U.S media, large-cap entities, entertainment and universities. The CCP will continue to campaign to discover, dominate and direct surrogates in order to garner decisive power in international trade. Given the current exports in consumer goods and raw material, will the CCP soon be able to specify the currency in which trade is conducted? How will alliances with Russia, Iran, etc. in the BRICS club work to dominate trade and currency?
The CCP will not enter direct military conflict with any adversary as they will employ surrogate dictatorships under their control to block sea lanes, harbor terrorists and orchestrate international trade. Remember when Ruhollah Khomeini expressed the desire to restrict all U.S. shipping in the Red Sea. Then he was reminded of the probability of a Marine Amphibious Brigade visit to Bandar Abbas. Game over. There is the requirement for expeditionary forces and supporting sealift.
The operational word in the acronym “BRI” is initiative. When you have the initiative, you are inside the adversary’s decision cycle. MCWL’s reference to “the fundamentals of maneuver warfare” brings to mind the question: In what manner or form? The sort of maneuver warfare in Vietnam in April 1975? The sort of maneuver warfare in Afghanistan in August 2021? It appears that “the fundamentals of maneuver warfare” MCWL seeks to employ are to set up defensive positions inviting the enemy to attack and then “maneuver” off. Even Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Heinz Guderian had a better grasp of “fundamentals” than that.
Thank you to the G3O for his views and to Compass Points for sharing the discussion here. I empathize with his position; he is in a day to day operational and development knife fight at a relatively higher level. For him orders, policies, and procedures are the rule of the day. FD2030 is the official policy of the USMC and has been implemented. By default, I can see why he would take his position because on a daily basis, in the context of his job, he is probably participating in process development, combat development exercises, and looking for solutions to emerging crisis related tasking / supporting Combatant Command requirements. To him, the operation and exercise planning, preparation, and execution looks like the foundational concept of FD 2030 applied in a learning organization. As always, Marines doing the best with what they have. On an individual level, maybe he really believes in FD 2030 top to bottom, maybe it's the current policy of the USMC and therefore seen as valid, maybe it's just simpler to support it and move on with getting stuff done.
For me, I am looking at a bigger picture of current and future capability set and how to manage the tool set that would best position current and future G3O's. As an example, I guarantee the current Amphib issue spoken of many times here and elsewhere is not helping him optimally posture for Crisis Response and support Global Combatant Command requirements. I would love to be factually proven to be wrong (but please, no shallow articles about UAS, using modern sensors to employ fires, or war-game references without any context). A bit long winded, but I am glad for G3O willingness to challenge our take...it's part of the development process.