Compass Points - Light Infantry?
Or much more than light infantry?
February 21, 2025
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Should the Marine Corps be just light infantry or should the Marine Corps be something much more than light infantry?
Confusion about Marine Corps roles and missions comes straight from the top. In his earliest testimony before Congress and continuing today, the current Marine Corps Commandant has often made the misguided claim that over the past decades the Marine Corps has grown "too heavy." and needs to get back to its "Naval roots."
The refrain that the Marine Corps is "too heavy" shows a misunderstanding of the capabilities the Marine Corps has traditionally brought to US policy makers. The Marine Corps is not the 82nd airborne that jumps in with little logistics or combined arms. The Marine Corps has been useful to global combatant commanders over the decades because it has always been "light enough to get there and heavy enough to stay."
The Marine Corps is more than just light infantry. Marines deploy as a combined arms force with the units, equipment, and logistics to kick open the door and sustain the fight. Saying the Marine Corps has "gotten too heavy" should immediately generate a counter question: "Too heavy for what?" The fully capable, combined arms, Marine Expeditionary Unit on Navy transport ships and supported by pre-positioning ships is not too heavy. It is heavy enough to deter, assist, fight, and win.
Intertwined with the issue of "too heavy" is the desire to get back to "Naval roots" What are these "Naval roots" the Marine Corps supposedly needs to get back to? The Marine Corps has zero Naval roots that involve small units of missile Marines sitting and waiting along the Pacific island chain. Over the last 75 years, the Marine Corps' real Naval roots have been Marines aboard amphibious ships stationed in critical areas around the world ready to respond to a wide range of contingencies.
It began when elements of 2nd Marines went aboard ships in the Mediterranean in 1948 and expanded when additional units were deployed to the Western Pacific and intermittently to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. In the case of the Mediterranean, Marines were on patrol in the Mediterranean 24/7/365 except for two brief periods until the early 2000s when commitments to OIF and OEF reduced their presence to six out of every 12 months.
If the Marine Corps wants to get back to its Naval roots, it needs to get an Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) back in the Mediterranean full time. How is this possible today? Lieutenant General David J. Furness writing for USNI Proceedings has advocated for a forward deployed naval force in the Mediterranean. This would give the Combatant Commanders in the region the constant access to the combined arms power of embarked Marines that they want and need. As General Furness writes:
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While the traditional amphibious warfare ship inventory has diminished, demand for the crisis-response capabilities provided by the versatile ARG/MEU team has not. In the past ten years, the nation’s ARG/MEUs have supported embassy evacuations in Yemen, recovered downed pilots in Libya, evacuated noncombatants in Afghanistan, and provided humanitarian assistance in Puerto Rico, Haiti, Pakistan, Japan, and the Philippines. They strengthened alliances and partnerships and participated in more than 100 bilateral and multilateral exercises throughout Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, Europe, and North Africa. Assessing the ongoing and future effects of COVID-19 on the economic and political stability of developing nations and the projected impacts of climate change in terms of more frequent natural disasters, population dislocations, and associated political unrest, the Navy and Marine Corps anticipate an increasing need for ARG/MEUs in the littoral regions of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPacom), European Command (EuCom), Central Command (CentCom), and Africa Command (AfriCom).
— David J. Furness
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The fully capable combined arms force of Marines embarked on an ARG/MEU is not too heavy. It is heavy enough and flexible enough to accomplish a variety of missions. If the new Secretary of Defense wants to make a rapid, powerful change involving the Marine Corps, Compass Points recommends he direct current Marine Corps leadership to focus less on having Marines sitting and waiting on islands and focus more on fully equipped, combined arms, Marine forces embarked on Navy ships in the Pacific and in the Med 24/7/365.
Compass Points salutes Lieutenant General Furness for his fine article and all those working to get Marines back on patrol around the globe. Marine combined arms, crisis response forces embarked on Navy ships are much more than mere light infantry. The Marine Air Ground Logistics Task Force is not too heavy. It is heavy enough to rapidly deter, assist, fight, and win.
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USNI Proceedings March 2022 Vol. 148/3/1,429
A Forward-Deployed Naval Force for the Eastern Mediterranean
By Lieutenant General David J. Furness, U.S. Marine Corps
Lieutenant General Furness was the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.
"More tha light infantry"...innovation and adaptability are key Marine Corps characteristics. When Marines needed artillery support during sweeps outside the range fan of the 105 and 155 howitzers in areas such as Phu Bai in 1965 and there were not Marine Corps heavy lift helicopters to pick up the guns, they turned to the Howtar. As the Fire Direction Officer, and later XO of Whiskey 2/12 in July 1965, the Howtar - a 4.2" mortar mounted on a pack 75mm frame - could be transported by an H-34 helicopter our into the field to support deep infantry missions. The Howtar fired the 107mm artillery shell they had excellent fragmentation characteristics becuase of the thin walls due to low-pressure requirements. The white phorphous round and the illumination round were exceptional. The 4-deuce traditonally has two elevations - 900 and 1100 mils, with adjustments in between made by adding or pulling off one or more of the playing card size charges. Whehn the tube was mounted on the pack 75 frame, now we could manually adjust the elevation hand. We converted the 4 deuce firing tables into slip sticks and the FDC now fuctioned the same as a 105 FDC.
When moveing on the fround, the Howtar was towed by a 3/4-ton truck. Adapt-improvise-overcome!
How light, is light? I hope CMC Smith realizes that the 82nd Airborne will have more firepower than a MarDiv, once they get their M10 Bookers. I bet the soldiers at Mogadishu wished they had some tanks and APCs after the Black Hawk Down fiasco. An Army Stryker BCT will be heavier armed than a Marine regiment. A standing military force of close to three divisions (if you want to call the 3rd Division a true division) and the Marine Corps will only have 7 batteries of artillery. The Marine Corps lacks sufficient artillery and direct firepower.
The Marine Corps (was) to my knowledge considered as a medium weight, general purpose, task organized, combined arms, naval expeditionary force. It was light enough to get to the battle and yet strong enough to stay in the battle. It had a little of everything needed for combat: infantry, mech, tank, and artillery. By being a task organized force means you can take what you need. Take the tanks, or leave the tanks. Take the missile force, or leave the missiles. The European nations which had eliminated their tanks, are now having second thoughts and are reacquiring tanks. Our Marines now have no heavy direct fire-support.