Compass Points - Limits of Defense

Marines must stay in the attack.

Compass Points - Limits of Defense

Marines must stay in the attack.

February 29, 2024

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The recent Compass Points post, "Battlespace" quoted Anthony C. Zinni,

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In the past, the Marine Corps never narrowly defined its battlespace or purpose-designed its forces for a specific geographic environment. Recently, however, the Corps’ senior leaders have declared that their operating forces must be dramatically restructured and reequipped for employment in the “littorals” of the world. This belief led to reorganizing the operating forces and divesting, or severely cutting, a great number of capabilities needed to fight and win today. A third of the Corps operational units are now or soon will be redesignated and reorganized (or to use the current term of art, “repurposed”) as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs). The remaining two-thirds of the operating force are being essentially “repurposed” to support the rotational requirements of the forward deployed MLRs.

-- Anthony C. Zinni

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The discussion about "Battlespace" has been lively and engaging. Compass Points is grateful for all readers who have jumped in -- online and off -- to discuss "Battlespace." Much of the discussion has focused on the Marine Corps creating the new, limited purpose, Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR). This in turn has led to a discussion of the Marine defense battalions in World War II.

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One reader recalled that early in World War II Commandant Holcomb went to Congress to get funding for "purpose-designed forces" i.e. Marine Defense Battalions, "with the mission of  ‘hold[ing] areas for the ultimate offensive actions of the Fleet.’ These battalions consisted of a HQ element, three anti-aircraft batteries, three seacoast batteries, and a section for weapons repair and administrative specialists. The battalions were equipped with the latest advances in radios, anti-aircraft artillery, sound ranging gear, *tanks*, and eventually the SCR-268 ground search radar."

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Author and Marine, Jerry C. McAbee, has written about the similarities and differences between the current Marine Littoral Regiment’s so called, "stand-in forces" and the Marine defensive units of World War II.

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Similarities between stand-in forces and defense battalions are easy to spot.

The defense battalions relied on state-of-the art technologies to accomplish missions, as will stand-in forces. Nascent radars, sound-ranging equipment and reliable communications allowed the battalions to identify and engage the enemy as far forward as possible, thus extending the eyes and ears of the fleet.

And like stand-in forces, the defense battalions had to integrate into a multifaceted command structure.

Perhaps the biggest similarity is also the elephant in the room: isolation and vulnerability to detection and defeat. The defense battalions could not persist in the “contested” areas, when strongly threatened, without immediate reinforcements. Navy and Marine Corps leadership learned this lesson after the capitulation of Wake and the narrow escape of Midway. Marine Corps leadership needs to relearn this lesson or face the reality of unnecessary casualties in the “contested” littorals.

-- Jerry C. McAbee

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Jerry McAbee has more than a professional interest in the Marine defense units in World War II. His father, also a retired Marine, was a gunner in the anti-aircraft battery on Johnston Island when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.

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Do Marine MAGTFs need missiles? How much of a contribution can Marine missiles make to a wider fight?

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In his March 28, 2023, statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, the now former Commandant of the Marine Corps asked Congress for 14 medium-range missile batteries and 774 subsonic Naval Strike Missiles (NSM), with an unclassified range of about 115 nautical miles. The Commandant also asked Congress for 3 long-range missile batteries and 153 subsonic Tomahawk (Land Attack and Maritime Strike) missiles, with an unclassified range of approximately 1000 nautical miles. More than 70% of the batteries will be based in the continental United States. Only 4 of the 17 batteries will be permanently forward deployed in the Pacific.

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The Marine Corps needs to field an updated, global, balanced force built around the Marine Air Ground Task Force. Some missiles are needed to protect against the threat posed by enemy long-range precision strike weapons. But the Marine Corps has never been and will never be the premier US missile force. Long-range air, land, and maritime attack missiles are already in Army, Navy, and Air Force arsenals. Each of these services have developed highly sophisticated and comprehensive operating concepts employing state of the art warfighting platforms that operate globally. For example, just one of the Navy’s four Ohio-class SSGN submarines carries 154 Tomahawk missiles.

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The larger question for the Marine Corps is should the Marine Corps today so drastically focus on narrow, regional, defense units at the expense of global, combined arms, maneuver forces? Whatever contributions the Marine Defense Battalions may have made in World War II, the Marine Corps won the war in the Pacific not by sitting on defense, but by using combined arms, maneuver forces to take the fight to the enemy.

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When it comes to new Marine defense units, Commandant Holcomb had a better approach than did the Marine Corps leadership that created today's Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR). Commandant Holcomb did not subtract forces or capabilities from the Marine Corps to stand up the new defense units. He went to Congress and won more funding. CMC Holcomb was careful to add to the Marine Corps, not subtract.

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As one Compass Points reader writes,

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The defense battalions were not drawn from the operating forces but were a Congressional "plus up" of 9,000 Marines requested by CMC. The MLRs will pretty much emasculate the rest of the Marine Corps, particularly the ability to conduct combined arms operations. 2nd MarDiv has already been drawn down to two-thirds of its former strength and, as we know, with full implementation of FD 2030, 3rd MarDiv will have no infantry regimental maneuver headquarters, which begs the question, what does the division headquarters do other than allocate forces?

An additional and important point. Wake Island fell because US forces were unable to support it logistically or operationally. Midway would have likely fallen also if the fleet had not been nearby. The Corps learned a hard lesson and made necessary changes to the remaining seven defense battalions. To date our Corps has not presented a solution to how the SIFs will fare any better than the defense battalions if they are not operationally and logistically supported.

-- P.K. Van Riper

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Compass Points salutes all readers for the professional discussion about "Battlespace" and salutes all the Marines who served in the Marine defense battalions of World War II -- including Jerry C. McAbee's father.

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Marine Times - 08/14/2022

Here’s how the Marine Corps should have approached stand-in forces

By Brig. Gen. Jerry C. McAbee (ret)

Brig. Gen. Jerry C. McAbee is a career artillery officer. He was the chief-of-staff of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, for three years. His father, also a retired Marine, was a gunner in the anti-aircraft battery on Johnston Island when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/14/heres-how-the-marine-corps-should-have-approached-stand-in-forces/