The USMC public affairs offices routinely misleads by omission leading many to believe this is an operational and capable system. If it were a TV commercial the company would face law suits. This has been a routine violation of integrity for 6 years. The result is a complete lack of trust in the Corps’ senior leadership. That lack of trust undermines more than just FD-2030. It strikes right at the heart of the credibility of the institution.
The Corps needs to come clean: “This is what we can do. This is what we currently cannot do. This is when we expect to be have a fully functional capability.” Claiming capabilities you do not yet have would get your resume sent to the trash. Sadly, the Corps developed a bad habit of this with the Osprey, ACV and F/A 35. Yet, those looked like sterling integrity compared to EABO deceptions.
The Acting Secretary of the Marine Corps and Navy and his Undersecretary must understand and engage in terminating the long running FRAUD known as Force Design aka Force Disaster!
It isn’t surprising that these people cannot field an operational system for Force Design…Everything they’ve done in recent years has been substandard.
For years, the Corps has developed premiere technology in our amphibious tracked vehicles…The last one, the AAV7 series, served without a blemish for over 50 years. The operative word is “tracked”. For some unfathomable reason, these “modern Marines” decided that tracks were passé and replaced them with wheels, which they figured would be easier to maintain and ignored performance. Tracks obviously provide the superior tractability that can never be achieved by wheels. Tracked suspension systems are obviously heavier and provide the low center of gravity that is necessary for successful operations in sea conditions encountered around the globe. But they are heavy and require a measure of dedication, brawn and maintenance that our lightweights in the Corps, today, do not want to deal with anymore.
This quick fix attitude has already shown up in restricted operations and a lack of readiness…And, I suspect that the same applies to logistics; mount out supplies; and equipment necessary to support an actual, sustained expeditionary mission. Semper Fi
Marine officers are taught at the beginning of their careers to admit mistakes immediately and change course. Being a terminal Captain myself, perhaps this lesson does not apply once one reaches field grade?
The NMESIS is like the mystical magical dragon or unicorn. It can be whatever you want it to be. Except work! To HQMC, CMC, General Smith, and General Berger it can sink ships and stop the PLAN. Unfortunately, for many of us it is the Marine Corps version of the Maginot Line. After 6yrs it has not lived up to expectations and is non-functional. I did not know that in order to aim it, you have to maneuver the little remote-control car (unmanned JLTV) around. This is a boondoggle pure and simple. Give us our tanks and field artillery back and let us get back to being a robust, naval, combined arms, expeditionary warfare force.
Alright, standby. That frog guy is about to pay a compliment to Force Design. I know, unbelievable. After all, everyone knows I'm just a CP 'stan, haha. So, seriously....a long time concern has been the breakdown of C2 between various ground and sea components of maritime forces. The MLREX from two years ago highlighted the continuing issues with comms/C2 between naval vessels and ground units ashore. So one of the problems were a lack of service wide standard procedures; the exercise developers at the time noted that the comms piece was being solved locally with local standards. While good...it was not the long term solution. Note: "LtCol Hornfeck, in response to a question about doctrinal challenges, notes that coordination between MLR and Fleet Commands is on a ad-hoc / relationship basis and that a joint standard for MLR-Fleet Coordination remains to be created. " -from "Sea Denial in the High Desert..../Season 5, Episode 38 of “The #BruteCast"".
Also from the same source: ") In response to a question about the Air Defense testing, LtCol. Hornfeck notes that the AD battalion has become a center of gravity, both in it’s AD application and in the connective file (comms / networking) out to the joint force. This is due to USMC AD community having a legacy of working in the joint community. The collective opinion is that the number one sensor in the MLR is the AN/TPS-80 radar.".
Now looking at the MME in the CP post and making some strong assumptions, I suspect there may be credit to be given on addressing those issues. So, my hat's off to the USMC and USN for fixing the issue, and maybe improving it with current concepts and technology.
C2 is not just kill chains, though all kill chains are part of C2 and practical robust, agile comms across dirt and waves are going to be needed in order to support the applied dance of comms, units, ships, targeting, firing, ew, CSS, space, and strings between tin cans.
So good job. FD: 1, CP: 27. Of course that FP point counts for CP also, so (shrug emoji here)
The USMC public affairs offices routinely misleads by omission leading many to believe this is an operational and capable system. If it were a TV commercial the company would face law suits. This has been a routine violation of integrity for 6 years. The result is a complete lack of trust in the Corps’ senior leadership. That lack of trust undermines more than just FD-2030. It strikes right at the heart of the credibility of the institution.
The Corps needs to come clean: “This is what we can do. This is what we currently cannot do. This is when we expect to be have a fully functional capability.” Claiming capabilities you do not yet have would get your resume sent to the trash. Sadly, the Corps developed a bad habit of this with the Osprey, ACV and F/A 35. Yet, those looked like sterling integrity compared to EABO deceptions.
Amen.
The Acting Secretary of the Marine Corps and Navy and his Undersecretary must understand and engage in terminating the long running FRAUD known as Force Design aka Force Disaster!
It isn’t surprising that these people cannot field an operational system for Force Design…Everything they’ve done in recent years has been substandard.
For years, the Corps has developed premiere technology in our amphibious tracked vehicles…The last one, the AAV7 series, served without a blemish for over 50 years. The operative word is “tracked”. For some unfathomable reason, these “modern Marines” decided that tracks were passé and replaced them with wheels, which they figured would be easier to maintain and ignored performance. Tracks obviously provide the superior tractability that can never be achieved by wheels. Tracked suspension systems are obviously heavier and provide the low center of gravity that is necessary for successful operations in sea conditions encountered around the globe. But they are heavy and require a measure of dedication, brawn and maintenance that our lightweights in the Corps, today, do not want to deal with anymore.
This quick fix attitude has already shown up in restricted operations and a lack of readiness…And, I suspect that the same applies to logistics; mount out supplies; and equipment necessary to support an actual, sustained expeditionary mission. Semper Fi
You, sir, win the Golden End Connector for today. Wheeled victors have a place and purpose, but it is not all places and purposes.
Marine officers are taught at the beginning of their careers to admit mistakes immediately and change course. Being a terminal Captain myself, perhaps this lesson does not apply once one reaches field grade?
The NMESIS is like the mystical magical dragon or unicorn. It can be whatever you want it to be. Except work! To HQMC, CMC, General Smith, and General Berger it can sink ships and stop the PLAN. Unfortunately, for many of us it is the Marine Corps version of the Maginot Line. After 6yrs it has not lived up to expectations and is non-functional. I did not know that in order to aim it, you have to maneuver the little remote-control car (unmanned JLTV) around. This is a boondoggle pure and simple. Give us our tanks and field artillery back and let us get back to being a robust, naval, combined arms, expeditionary warfare force.
Alright, standby. That frog guy is about to pay a compliment to Force Design. I know, unbelievable. After all, everyone knows I'm just a CP 'stan, haha. So, seriously....a long time concern has been the breakdown of C2 between various ground and sea components of maritime forces. The MLREX from two years ago highlighted the continuing issues with comms/C2 between naval vessels and ground units ashore. So one of the problems were a lack of service wide standard procedures; the exercise developers at the time noted that the comms piece was being solved locally with local standards. While good...it was not the long term solution. Note: "LtCol Hornfeck, in response to a question about doctrinal challenges, notes that coordination between MLR and Fleet Commands is on a ad-hoc / relationship basis and that a joint standard for MLR-Fleet Coordination remains to be created. " -from "Sea Denial in the High Desert..../Season 5, Episode 38 of “The #BruteCast"".
Also from the same source: ") In response to a question about the Air Defense testing, LtCol. Hornfeck notes that the AD battalion has become a center of gravity, both in it’s AD application and in the connective file (comms / networking) out to the joint force. This is due to USMC AD community having a legacy of working in the joint community. The collective opinion is that the number one sensor in the MLR is the AN/TPS-80 radar.".
Now looking at the MME in the CP post and making some strong assumptions, I suspect there may be credit to be given on addressing those issues. So, my hat's off to the USMC and USN for fixing the issue, and maybe improving it with current concepts and technology.
C2 is not just kill chains, though all kill chains are part of C2 and practical robust, agile comms across dirt and waves are going to be needed in order to support the applied dance of comms, units, ships, targeting, firing, ew, CSS, space, and strings between tin cans.
So good job. FD: 1, CP: 27. Of course that FP point counts for CP also, so (shrug emoji here)