I was pleasantly surprised but more than pleased to see Dr. Antonoff’s contribution to the recent Compass Point’s discourse on EABO, SIF, Force Design 2030, and much more.
We co-taught seminars at Marine Corps University for a number of years. Often the late noted historian, Williamson “Wick” Murray, would join us. Those days were some of the most rewarding of my professional life. Among these seminars were “Clausewitz for the Warfighter,” “John Boyd: America’s Premier Military Theorist,” “Mastering Operational Art,” and “An Introduction to System Theory (How the World Works).
Dr. Antonoff is fluent in German and in seminar she would have her copy of Clausewitz’s On War in German in front of her helping me and our students understand puzzling phases as we read the Howard and Paret English translation. She was familiar with the works of Soviet officers Aleksandr Svechin, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and others, which enhanced discussions on operational art. And her strong mathematics background facilitated students’ grasp of the nonlinear aspects of Clausewitzian theory and system theory.
An exceptionally talented instructor, Dr. Antonoff’s primary interest was our students. In class, in her office hours, and with emails she endeavored to assist every student to reach his or her fullest potential.
Dr. Antonoff’s intellect and writing skills are of the highest order as is her knowledge of history. I learned much from every discussion we had. I do not exaggerate when I say she is an American treasure. I hope she continues to contribute to Compass Points.
Exceptionally thoughtful and positive contribution from Dr Antonoff. Among the several takeaways not always receiving enough attention is that even if the conceptual SIF/EABO force was fully deployed and marginally or better supported, its contribution in an exchange with China would be marginal at best. 'Hope she continues to present her ideas to Compass Points.
This was a very interesting read and looks like I will have to get to studying again. I may have a Phd, but it's never too late to learn more. Parris Island got me started on the Marine Corps way, and It taught me to be responsible for my actions. I never got to the Marine Corps University, but did get a ton of classwork on what Marines are responsible for and their role in leadership. Dr. Antonoff's contribution has given me a kick to learn more, even if I am now a bit old. I loved what I did as a Geologist after I got out of the Corps, and didn't retire until I was 74, even that was awhile ago now. Looking forward to more studies and hope to pass it on to my kids and other Marine friends. Thank you Dr. Antonoff for writing this and look forward to seeing more in Compass Points. Semper Fi.
Marine Corps Compass Points and Dr. Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD,
Outstanding series. Thank you for publishing this and for Dr. Antonoff’s clear-eyed, historically grounded critique. She is doing exactly what good educators at CSC should be doing — challenging assumptions, demanding operational and strategic depth, and refusing to let acronyms and buzzwords replace real thinking.
Her diagnosis is correct: we have largely lost operational art. Current concepts lean heavily on “inflict pain” through missiles and drones while skipping the hard questions: What is the strategic goal? How do we sequence actions in time and space to impose our will? What happens after the first salvos? “Get In & Get Out” is not a concept — it is a hope.
Dr. Antonoff is right to call out the misuse (and misunderstanding) of Corbett, Boyd, and historical precedent. A thin forward-deployed force on the enemy’s doorstep, lightly supplied and expected to deter through cost imposition alone, is not a fleet-in-being in the Corbettian sense. It is a tripwire with limited options once the shooting starts. China’s industrial base and willingness to absorb costs make simple “missile math” a dangerous illusion.
Most importantly, she highlights the deeper problem: Professional Military Education at the field grade level is not producing officers who can think operationally, orchestrate coalitions, or connect tactical actions to strategic ends. If our Majors are graduating CSC without deep study of Clausewitz, Boyd’s OODA loop in its full context, or historical case studies of successful operational campaigns, we are setting them — and the Corps — up for failure.
The Marine Corps needs leaders who can do more than employ the latest gadget. We need leaders who understand war as a contest of wills, who can design campaigns, and who are intellectually armed for the full spectrum of conflict — not just the opening moves.
Dr. Antonoff’s call to “bend the arc of future history” at CSC and beyond is exactly right. Restore real operational art. Restore rigorous historical and strategic education. Restore the intellectual ammunition Marines deserve.
Full salute to Dr. Antonoff and Compass Points for having the courage to say it plainly.
Bravo Zulu to Dr. Antonoff, who artfully and accurately waves the BS flag regarding Force Design. Her reference to Boyd highlights operational art making her insights both relevant and compelling. The essence of Boyd's work — laid out in 'Destruction and Creation' and elaborated across the Patterns of Conflict and Conceptual Spiral briefings — was about operational art, in Boyd's terms, operational art is the deliberate creation of mismatches: presenting the enemy with events (often both faster and unexpected) and most importantly generating considerable ambiguously whereby the enemy cannot orient or re-orient to, so that his mental/cognitive picture departs and diverges ever further from the reality the enemy is facing, and the enemy's orientation and decision making capability collapses marked of psychological into paralysis, panic, or internal friction and chaos. Speed matters only insofar as it serves orientation.
Antonoff's opening zinger, "We have zero operational art right now," is center mass. A stand-in force of missile lobbers, designed to "complicate targeting," is a static display for an adversary's orientation (read: China), not a generator of ambiguity, mismatches, or novelty. It asks the PLA to do more of what it already plans to do, with more of what it already builds cheaper and faster than we do. And do it in the PLA's backyard!!!!!
The Corps's engagement with and conceptualization of maneuver warfare operational art were profoundly different and were in direct antithesis to the Force Design's genesis. Gray deliberately sought input from junior officers and enlisted first, allowing respectful dissent and maverick thinking to emerge, and building trust relationships in which juniors had a professional duty to question and wire brush maneuver warfare ideas. Ideas were hotly challenged internally in study groups functioning as conceptual laboratories before being exposed to larger audiences, then tested (i.e., prototyped) in free-play, force-on-force exercises with candid, unvarnished after-action hot washes.
This bottom-up approach exemplifies how operational art fosters adaptability and innovation, in contrast to the top-down, technology-centric Force Design process. Unlike Force Design, maneuver warfare was subjected to years of bottom-up wire brushings and candid debates: this was reflected in Marine Corps Gazette debates, Ft Pickett free-play exercises where the enemy got a vote, and Gray institutionalizing the operational art rather than opting for overreliance on technology and technology-only solutions to war.
FD2030 arrived by the opposite route — a foregone and preordained outcome published at the four-star level, handed down with sources withheld and shielded by non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), information silos, and an unproven predilection for over-reliance on technology as the only solution. This contrast underscores the importance of operational art in fostering resilience and adaptability over purely technological solutions.
Antonoff's Schelling point lands here with full force: a sensing-and-shooting architecture can inflict pain, but pain without a cost will not change behavior. The follow-up question she keeps asking — then what? — is exactly the question a technology-first concept is structurally incapable of answering, because "then what" is operational art, and operational art is what was abandoned for a high-tech kill chain. Technology cannot close that gap, because the gap is not technological. It is a gap in orientation — and orientation was built the way Gray built it: open candid debate, bottom up wiring brushing, free play against a thinking enemy, junior Marines empowered to say the concept is failing, and an officer corps educated deeply enough in the study of war to recognize a bad idea before the shooting starts, the difference between a theory of victory and a very expensive way to become irrelevant and lose.
It was a pleasure to read Dr Antonoff’s comments. I am in full agreement. I am also fluent in German as I grew up there and attended German Schools. I read Clausewitz and other books in the original and direct translations are always deficient. The nuances can distort. Hence the need for guided discussion to obtain the full value.
That Dr Antonoff is on target is no surprise. The surprise is that we promoted an entire generation of General Officers so utterly clueless to large foundational parts of their profession. Any amateur can draw blue arrows. The professional understands the endless considerations involved in drawing a good one.
I am not sure how the senior leadership put the aircraft on the glide path it is on. For seven years the refrain “pull up, pull up…” has been coming through the head set to the deaf and blind. The harsh reality of airspeed and altitude cannot be wished away.
I am beating a dead horse. The current leadership cannot and does not want to face reality. Like a failing coach and staff, the whole group must be shown the door.
I was pleasantly surprised but more than pleased to see Dr. Antonoff’s contribution to the recent Compass Point’s discourse on EABO, SIF, Force Design 2030, and much more.
We co-taught seminars at Marine Corps University for a number of years. Often the late noted historian, Williamson “Wick” Murray, would join us. Those days were some of the most rewarding of my professional life. Among these seminars were “Clausewitz for the Warfighter,” “John Boyd: America’s Premier Military Theorist,” “Mastering Operational Art,” and “An Introduction to System Theory (How the World Works).
Dr. Antonoff is fluent in German and in seminar she would have her copy of Clausewitz’s On War in German in front of her helping me and our students understand puzzling phases as we read the Howard and Paret English translation. She was familiar with the works of Soviet officers Aleksandr Svechin, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and others, which enhanced discussions on operational art. And her strong mathematics background facilitated students’ grasp of the nonlinear aspects of Clausewitzian theory and system theory.
An exceptionally talented instructor, Dr. Antonoff’s primary interest was our students. In class, in her office hours, and with emails she endeavored to assist every student to reach his or her fullest potential.
Dr. Antonoff’s intellect and writing skills are of the highest order as is her knowledge of history. I learned much from every discussion we had. I do not exaggerate when I say she is an American treasure. I hope she continues to contribute to Compass Points.
Exceptionally thoughtful and positive contribution from Dr Antonoff. Among the several takeaways not always receiving enough attention is that even if the conceptual SIF/EABO force was fully deployed and marginally or better supported, its contribution in an exchange with China would be marginal at best. 'Hope she continues to present her ideas to Compass Points.
This was a very interesting read and looks like I will have to get to studying again. I may have a Phd, but it's never too late to learn more. Parris Island got me started on the Marine Corps way, and It taught me to be responsible for my actions. I never got to the Marine Corps University, but did get a ton of classwork on what Marines are responsible for and their role in leadership. Dr. Antonoff's contribution has given me a kick to learn more, even if I am now a bit old. I loved what I did as a Geologist after I got out of the Corps, and didn't retire until I was 74, even that was awhile ago now. Looking forward to more studies and hope to pass it on to my kids and other Marine friends. Thank you Dr. Antonoff for writing this and look forward to seeing more in Compass Points. Semper Fi.
Marine Corps Compass Points and Dr. Anne Louise Antonoff, PhD,
Outstanding series. Thank you for publishing this and for Dr. Antonoff’s clear-eyed, historically grounded critique. She is doing exactly what good educators at CSC should be doing — challenging assumptions, demanding operational and strategic depth, and refusing to let acronyms and buzzwords replace real thinking.
Her diagnosis is correct: we have largely lost operational art. Current concepts lean heavily on “inflict pain” through missiles and drones while skipping the hard questions: What is the strategic goal? How do we sequence actions in time and space to impose our will? What happens after the first salvos? “Get In & Get Out” is not a concept — it is a hope.
Dr. Antonoff is right to call out the misuse (and misunderstanding) of Corbett, Boyd, and historical precedent. A thin forward-deployed force on the enemy’s doorstep, lightly supplied and expected to deter through cost imposition alone, is not a fleet-in-being in the Corbettian sense. It is a tripwire with limited options once the shooting starts. China’s industrial base and willingness to absorb costs make simple “missile math” a dangerous illusion.
Most importantly, she highlights the deeper problem: Professional Military Education at the field grade level is not producing officers who can think operationally, orchestrate coalitions, or connect tactical actions to strategic ends. If our Majors are graduating CSC without deep study of Clausewitz, Boyd’s OODA loop in its full context, or historical case studies of successful operational campaigns, we are setting them — and the Corps — up for failure.
The Marine Corps needs leaders who can do more than employ the latest gadget. We need leaders who understand war as a contest of wills, who can design campaigns, and who are intellectually armed for the full spectrum of conflict — not just the opening moves.
Dr. Antonoff’s call to “bend the arc of future history” at CSC and beyond is exactly right. Restore real operational art. Restore rigorous historical and strategic education. Restore the intellectual ammunition Marines deserve.
Full salute to Dr. Antonoff and Compass Points for having the courage to say it plainly.
Semper Fi,
Cpl Dan USMC (Ret)
Bravo Zulu to Dr. Antonoff, who artfully and accurately waves the BS flag regarding Force Design. Her reference to Boyd highlights operational art making her insights both relevant and compelling. The essence of Boyd's work — laid out in 'Destruction and Creation' and elaborated across the Patterns of Conflict and Conceptual Spiral briefings — was about operational art, in Boyd's terms, operational art is the deliberate creation of mismatches: presenting the enemy with events (often both faster and unexpected) and most importantly generating considerable ambiguously whereby the enemy cannot orient or re-orient to, so that his mental/cognitive picture departs and diverges ever further from the reality the enemy is facing, and the enemy's orientation and decision making capability collapses marked of psychological into paralysis, panic, or internal friction and chaos. Speed matters only insofar as it serves orientation.
Antonoff's opening zinger, "We have zero operational art right now," is center mass. A stand-in force of missile lobbers, designed to "complicate targeting," is a static display for an adversary's orientation (read: China), not a generator of ambiguity, mismatches, or novelty. It asks the PLA to do more of what it already plans to do, with more of what it already builds cheaper and faster than we do. And do it in the PLA's backyard!!!!!
The Corps's engagement with and conceptualization of maneuver warfare operational art were profoundly different and were in direct antithesis to the Force Design's genesis. Gray deliberately sought input from junior officers and enlisted first, allowing respectful dissent and maverick thinking to emerge, and building trust relationships in which juniors had a professional duty to question and wire brush maneuver warfare ideas. Ideas were hotly challenged internally in study groups functioning as conceptual laboratories before being exposed to larger audiences, then tested (i.e., prototyped) in free-play, force-on-force exercises with candid, unvarnished after-action hot washes.
This bottom-up approach exemplifies how operational art fosters adaptability and innovation, in contrast to the top-down, technology-centric Force Design process. Unlike Force Design, maneuver warfare was subjected to years of bottom-up wire brushings and candid debates: this was reflected in Marine Corps Gazette debates, Ft Pickett free-play exercises where the enemy got a vote, and Gray institutionalizing the operational art rather than opting for overreliance on technology and technology-only solutions to war.
FD2030 arrived by the opposite route — a foregone and preordained outcome published at the four-star level, handed down with sources withheld and shielded by non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), information silos, and an unproven predilection for over-reliance on technology as the only solution. This contrast underscores the importance of operational art in fostering resilience and adaptability over purely technological solutions.
Antonoff's Schelling point lands here with full force: a sensing-and-shooting architecture can inflict pain, but pain without a cost will not change behavior. The follow-up question she keeps asking — then what? — is exactly the question a technology-first concept is structurally incapable of answering, because "then what" is operational art, and operational art is what was abandoned for a high-tech kill chain. Technology cannot close that gap, because the gap is not technological. It is a gap in orientation — and orientation was built the way Gray built it: open candid debate, bottom up wiring brushing, free play against a thinking enemy, junior Marines empowered to say the concept is failing, and an officer corps educated deeply enough in the study of war to recognize a bad idea before the shooting starts, the difference between a theory of victory and a very expensive way to become irrelevant and lose.
Well written! Bravo Zulu!
It was a pleasure to read Dr Antonoff’s comments. I am in full agreement. I am also fluent in German as I grew up there and attended German Schools. I read Clausewitz and other books in the original and direct translations are always deficient. The nuances can distort. Hence the need for guided discussion to obtain the full value.
That Dr Antonoff is on target is no surprise. The surprise is that we promoted an entire generation of General Officers so utterly clueless to large foundational parts of their profession. Any amateur can draw blue arrows. The professional understands the endless considerations involved in drawing a good one.
I am not sure how the senior leadership put the aircraft on the glide path it is on. For seven years the refrain “pull up, pull up…” has been coming through the head set to the deaf and blind. The harsh reality of airspeed and altitude cannot be wished away.
I am beating a dead horse. The current leadership cannot and does not want to face reality. Like a failing coach and staff, the whole group must be shown the door.
Anne Louise Antonoff, Almost war: Britain, Germany, and the Bosnia crisis, 1908–1909. Dissertation, Yale 2006. That's it. In 20 years.
Extraordinary. Great comments.