Compass Points - MAGTF Drones
Readers comment on drones.
February 22, 2024
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Drones in the news and discussions about drones continue.
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In an article in the Air Force Times, Jonathan Lehrfeld reports, "US drone goes down off Yemen; underwater Houthi drone taken out.”
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U.S. forces recently struck an unmanned underwater drone amid a busy few days in the Middle East, marking the first observed employment of an underwater drone by the Houthi militants since they began their attacks in October, according to U.S. Central Command. The Department of Defense also acknowledged that an American MQ-9 Reaper drone went down on Monday in the Red Sea off the coast of Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. “Initial indications are that it was shot down by a Houthi surface-to-air missile,” Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh said Tuesday during a press briefing, adding that at that time it had not been recovered.
-- Jonathan Lehrfeld, Air Force Times
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Drones operating near Yemen are nothing new. In years past it was reported that what appeared to be a US underwater drone was captured by the Houthis.
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The Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit System (REMUS) 600 is an intelligent marine robot manufactured by Hydroid, a division of Kongsberg, with a service history dating back to the 1990s. It features a terrain avoidance sonar, wet and dry payload bays, and a maximum rated depth of nearly 2000 feet. . . . Two variants are in use by the U.S. Navy. The Mod 2 Kingfish, a high-endurance version with improved sonar, has been deployed in the Middle East for search, mapping and mine countermeasures. Three Littoral Battlespace Sensing variants have also been acquired by U.S. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in San Diego.
-- Maritime Executive "Houthi Rebels Capture Unmanned Submersible"
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On February 20, 2024, "Drone Cult" Compass Points reported on a recent article authored by Professor Paul Lushenko, Assistant Professor and Director of Special Operations, US Army War College. His article in The Conversation, is "Cult of the drone: At the two-year mark, UAVs have changed the face of war in Ukraine – but not outcomes"
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From his study of the fighting in Ukraine, Professor Lushenko concluded that while drones are powerful at the tactical level, and sometimes useful at the operational level, at the strategic level, they are "strategically inconsequential." Professor Lushenko went on to say, that as powerful as drones are, for strategic results, "countries must rely on time-tested combined arms maneuver."
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Professor Lushenko's article stimulated much good discussion on Compass Points and beyond (comments have been edited for length and content).
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Douglas C Rapé made the point that "drones" is a vague term. "It is time for specificity, agreed definitions, common terminology and details. Just saying “drones” doesn’t mean anything. It is like saying “planes” or “ships”. It was just as bad with “IED’s.” It is time for groupings based on payload, range, pilot operated, reconnaissance, speed, altitude, single use, multiple use etc."
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Samuel Whittemore recalled the equation: "Ends+Ways+Means = Strategy" and said, "Platforms, ie drones, arty, ew, etc etc are means. We are back to the inescapable 3 legged stool." He went on to cite sources discussing the use of drones by Israel in Gaza, "The report provides some more granularity on what kind of strikes were called for. In Gaza, warplanes and UAVs were called upon to carry out 7,000 “lightning strikes,” a term meaning forces in the field called in the strikes in response to an immediate threat or urgent request."
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Phil commented, "Drones are like airplanes. They do not win wars."
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Michael T Gerdau urged, "Let's get back to a strong MAGTF and enhance it with drones. We need more tools!"
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Travis Hord took issue with the way Professor Lushenko appeared to tie drones primarily to the tactical level. ". . .The lesson to learn here is about the martial use of robotics in all domains. A capabilities centric approach to integration enables a family of robotic systems to enhance the combined arms effect of every formation. Attempting to link a platform to a level of war misses the value proposition and portends a rigid approach to integrating. Actions are strategic, not platforms. . . . Today, aerial robotics can be organic to ground formations - giving commanders better options while saving the sorties of crewed platform for tasks of greater operational relevance. I don’t see a downside here."
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Bob Whitener commented on drones and the MAGTF. "What does exist tactically, operationally and strategically is the ARG/MEU that can become the MEB or MEF. These MAGTF levels will need to incorporate drone employment, as well as the means to counter them. But just as the longbow did not end ground combat, the arrival of the swarming drone threat will not end the need for a combined arms force to be trained and equipped to close with and destroy an enemy."
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Randy Shetter reviewed the entire discussion by saying, "Everyone has made great points regarding the use of drones. The Ukrainians and Russians seem to be using drones as if they are artillery rounds. So many questions on the usage of drones. Are drones an air asset or ground asset? They will probably not win a battle by themselves. But they will be an important asset. How they will be used is the important question. During the Second World War, the Germans and French each had tanks, but each country used them differently. Drones should be used in a way which will enhance the MAGTF."
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P.K. Van Riper enjoyed the discussion so much he commented, "Keep writing. I'm learning!"
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The discussion about how best to use drones is only beginning. For Marines the use of drones will never be considered in isolation but always as part of the Marine global, crisis response force. Compass Points thanks everyone participating in the ongoing discussion about how best to integrate the extensive variety of ground, air, surface, and sub-surface drones into the upgraded and enhanced Marine MAGTF.
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Air Force Times - 02/21/2024
US drone goes down off Yemen; underwater Houthi drone taken out
By Jonathan Lehrfeld
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Maritime Executive - 01/02/2018
Houthi Rebels Capture Unmanned Submersible
https://maritime-executive.com/article/houthi-rebels-capture-unmanned-submersible
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The Conversation - 02/16/2024
Cult of the drone: At the two-year mark, UAVs have changed the face of war in Ukraine – but not outcomes
By Paul Lushenko - Asst Prof and Dir of Special Operations, US Army War College
The discussions in this post and those of other recent posts offer the kinds of thoughts that used to appear in the Corps professional journal, the Marine Corps Gazette. They are informative, provide diverse views, and suggest ways ahead. Furthermore, the manner in which the site presents them invites the viewer to read, re-read, and weigh in with additional discernment. Congratulations to the Compass Points editor and staff and most importantly to the many contributors to this increasing vibrant and important site.
The Wolf believe that the Marine Corps Association and the Marine Corps Gazette are overdue for change if the Gazette is to return to its glory days when the late retired Colonel John Greenwood guided it during the Corps-wide discourse on maneuver warfare. The Wolf wonders how the daily readership numbers of the Gazette’s online site compare to those of Compass Points. Likely they pale.
Re Future of CCP/PRC from Peter Zeihan, visit his site. “TRANSCRIPT
Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Now, last week, I released a video on why none of us should be really surprised if the Chinese system falls apart. We’ll leave the link here for those of you have not seen it. But the most common follow up question that I’ve received from viewers has been wouldn’t this justify in the Chinese mind a diversionary war or distraction war to increase public support?
I can’t rule it out, but I don’t think that’s going to go down for three reasons. Number one, this is not a democracy. This is an autocracy where the CCP has control of the public space is huge and their ability to shape public opinion is massive. And in that sort of an environment, you don’t get the same relative effects and you also don’t have the same in stability from economic problems that you might have in a more pluralistic society.
So I don’t want to say no, but the government’s ability to shape public opinion and to stir up nationalism is pretty robust. If anything, the government sometimes has a bit of a problem containing the nationalism, not not getting it going. So from a legitimacy point of view, I don’t think it’s really necessary. Second, anyone in China who can read a map and do math knows that if they launch a war for Taiwan, it will it will not end well, not the war itself, but what happens to the next day.
China is dependent upon the international community for roughly three quarters of their energy sources, and most of that comes from a continent away. On top of that, China is in terms of absolute volumes, the most dependent on imports and exports of any country in the world. And they import the vast, vast, vast majority of the materials that allow them to grow their own food.
So if you have even a moderate effort by a small number of countries to go after Chinese commerce in the aftermath or because of a war, this country will be facing a industrial collapse in just a matter of months and a famine that will kill half the population in a couple of years. And I have no doubt that at least several years ago that the Chinese leadership understood that.
And so they primarily used Taiwan as a rhetorical issue. And most of the threats that we’re seeing now are not necessarily coming from the decision makers. Well, a third let’s assume that the Chinese can capture Taiwan in a matter of weeks with minimal damage. That doesn’t really give them anything. I mean, yes, it technically is a break in the first island chain, but the Chinese are still dependent on the international system to get everything that they need, and they’re dependent on the U.S. Navy to patrol the global oceans so that their commercial cargo can come and go.
In fact, this would actually put their potential sea lanes by Taiwan in greater risk from the Japanese, who have a better, longer range navy than anything that the Chinese have. And then there’s talk of the semiconductor industry that the Chinese would be able to scoop. But the Chinese can’t operate their own semiconductor industry. It’s not just run with foreign equipment and software.
It’s run by foreign personnel. And the Taiwanese facilities are the most advanced in the world. And honestly, the Chinese wouldn’t know what to do with it. I don’t mean that as a slam to the Chinese. I don’t think any country that took them over would be able to operate them in anything less than a decade timeframe for the Chinese would take a lot longer than that.
So it really doesn’t check any boxes now saying that it wouldn’t work, saying that a diversionary war would be unwise and would achieve nothing for the Chinese is not the same as me saying. I don’t think it would happen, but the rationale would be very, very different. So two things. Number one, it could be a miscalculation, not in the traditional sense that, you know, we don’t think anyone will do anything but a miscalculation by JI.
Remember that JI has formed such a tight cult of personality that no one’s bringing him information. So he’s literally making information, making decisions in a box without any idea of the information that flows in or the reality of the world around him in that sort of decision making structure. Sure, he could pull the trigger, but it wouldn’t be because of any of the reasons that you would normally expect.
So whether it’s economic, strategic, political or whatever, whatever we would say, you know, this might force a country to pull the trigger. None of that applies to Xi because it’s all in his head. And it’s not something that we can really guess at because we don’t know what’s shaping his decision making, because we know he’s not being fed the information he needs to run the country.
The second reason is quite darker. If you’re like me and you believe that we’re looking at the end of the Chinese system over the next decade for demographic reasons alone. Forget politics, forget energy, forget vulnerability, forget the debt, forget trade wars, forget everything else. Then there’s something to be said for pulling the trigger. Because if the Chinese system is facing that same industrial collapse and that same population collapse for other reasons, and there’s nothing that the Chinese government can do to stop that, maybe buy a little bit of time, and that’s it.
Then pulling the trigger, choosing the time and the place of a war, even if you think you’re going to lose, even if you know it’s going to result in the death of half of your countrymen, if it allows you to command the narrative of the future. Well, that means that the CCP for the low, low price of half the country’s population might be able to rule into the next era of Chinese history.
And if you’re completely amoral about it, you got to admit that might be a compelling reason to launch a war that you know what will destroy you for dark. Not saying that’s happening, but we can’t rule it out at this point.”….THIS IS ANOTHER REASON FOR NOT LETTING USMC BE a Indo-Pacom…ONE TRICK PONY.