Compass Points - MAGTF Snapshot
Why should the Marine Corps ever be weaker?
Compass Points - MAGTF Shapshot
Why should the Marine Corps ever be weaker?
September 24, 2024
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The world is on the precipice of war in the Middle East, in the South China Sea, and elsewhere. Does the Marine Corps have the muscle to help deter these crises and, should deterrence fail, fight and win key battles? Over the last five years, the Marine Corps has lavished time, attention, and resources on the idea of placing small, narrow, Marine missile units on islands in the Pacific.
Critcs contend the focus on isolated Marine missile units has weakened the Marine Corps and in particular weakend the global, combined arms, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In reply, the island missile proponents have begun to criticize the MAGTF. They claim the MAGTF was always full of equipment problems and never was particularly useful or capable. But is that true? Were the MAGTFs of years gone by useful and capable or not?
Let’s look at an actual snapshot of MAGTF operations. Marines arriving in Iraq, Luzon, Oman, Somalia, Bangladesh, Guantanamo, Sicily, and even South Central LA. Marines arrived to all these locations on short notice to help in a crisis. And they accomplished all these operations across just 30 months. That was then. Does the Marine Corps have the same ability to respond globally today?
If the Marine Corps of today and tomorrow is going to be able to accomplish more than the Marine Corps of yesterday, then Marines must understand what the Marine Corps of the past could accomplish. Study the past to leap beyond the past. Study what has gone before to make what is to come even better.
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Marine Corps Global Response
What the Marine Corps Was in the Past Is Not What It is Today
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General Anthony Zinni, USMC (ret)
Brigadier General Jerry McAbee, USMC (ret)
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- - - - - - - - - - The Past - - - - - - - - - -
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For 30 years prior to 2018, the Marine Corps was a combined arms, expeditionary force-in-readiness, capable of rapidly responding to global crises and contingencies across the spectrum of conflict as the nation’s premier 911 force. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) were forward deployed from the West and East coasts of the United States aboard amphibious ships and from forward bases in Japan and Hawaii. Other Marine Corps forces were trained and designated to fall in on equipment sets aboard three strategically positioned maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPSRONs). Each squadron was capable of supporting a 16,500-man Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for 30 days of combat. When necessary, these forces (forward deployed, maritime prepositioning, and fly-in from the United States and Japan) could quickly composite to form a 20,000-90,000-man Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
Marine Corps forces were lethal, flexible, adaptable, and persistent. A 30-month snapshot from July 1990 to December 1992 is a case in point.
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Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990-April 1991). In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Marines quickly began the deployment of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to northern Saudi Arabia. The lead element and first fully sustainable combined arms force to arrive in theater was the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from California, which began falling in on supplies and equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2 (having sailed from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean) on 15 August. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived in theater from Hawaii on 25 August and fell in on supplies and requirement from Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3 (having sailed from Guam and Saipan in the Western Pacific).
Using a combination of two MPSRONs, Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, and fly-in echelon forces, I MEF quickly built to a 45,000-man combined arms force of two Marine Divisions, one composite aircraft wing, and a composite combat service support group. I MEF was a fully capable, resilient Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of combined arms (infantry, armor, artillery, engineers with mobility and counter-mobility, and aviation). The Aviation Combat Element was robust enough to provide all tasked (apportioned) sorties to the Joint Force Air Component Commander, while retaining sufficient sorties to support I MEF.
Of note, MPSRON 2 also provided initial sustainment for the ready brigade of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division as it flowed into theater until the Army established its own logistics system.
Concurrently but separately, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB), an amphibious MEB, was preparing for an exercise in Europe when it was ordered to change mission and deploy to the Persian Gulf. The MEB notionally required 24 amphibious ships for the Persian Gulf mission but only 13 ships were available on the East Coast. The delta in lift was provided by 5 MSC ships. The MEB arrived on station outside the Persian Gulf during early September.
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Luzon Earthquake (July 1990). When Iraq attacked Kuwait, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (West Coast) was in the Philippines providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the victims of an earthquake that had struck the island of Luzon. The MEU was ordered to the Persian Gulf, arriving in theater on September 9 where it was integrated into the 4th MEB.
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Operation Sharp Edge (August 1990). Operation Sharp Edge was the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) of the U.S. embassy in Liberia. The 22nd MEU (East Coast) conducted the NEO and remained on station for security until relieved by the 26th MEU (also East Coast). A few days later, the 26th MEU (embarked on 5 amphibious ships), reconfigured at sea. Part of the MEU, embarked on two ships, remained off Liberia while the rest of the MEU returned to the Mediterranean for duty.
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5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Task Force 158. In early December 1990, the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which was also an Amphibious MEB, embarked in 12 amphibious ships sailed from the West Coast. Transiting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the MEB arrived off Oman on January 3, 1991. Seventh Fleet immediately established Task Force 158 and placed 4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU under the command of 4th MEB. Embarked in 30 amphibious ships, TF 158 was the largest amphibious forces assembled for combat since the landing at Inchon in 1950.
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Operation Eastern Exit (January 1991): On January 1, the U.S. Ambassador in Somalia requested military assistance for the immediate evacuation of non-combatants from the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. The following day two amphibious ships from 4th MEB with embarked Marines sortied from Oman toward Somalia. Two helicopters launched from 450 miles at sea and landed inside the embassy compound at dawn of January 5, just as insurgents were preparing to scale the compound’s outer wall. Both helicopters returned to the ships with 60 evacuees. Other follow-on helicopters flew into Mogadishu and rescued the remaining evacuees, including 9 ambassadors and 214 civilians from 30 countries.
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Operation Provide Comfort (April-July 1991): Operation Provide Comfort was a multi-national Coalition under authority of U.S. European Command. The Coalition’s main task was to enter northern Iraq, clear the designated area of any Iraqi threat and establish a safe environment for the Kurdish refugees to return to their homes. The first conventional units to cross into Iraq were Marines from 24th MEU (East Coast). The MEU was 3 months into a 6-month routine Mediterranean deployment when it was transferred to Combined Task Force Provide Comfort on 14 April. The MEU left northern Iraq on July 15 and returned home.
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Operation Sea Angel (May 1991). On 30 April 1991, one of the worst cyclones on record struck Bangladesh. Much of the county was devastated. The U.S. response (Joint Task Force Sea Angel) was built around a nucleus drawn from III MEF in Okinawa and Marines embarked on amphibious ships returning from the Persian Gulf (redesignated 5th MEB). The amphibious ships were redirected to Bangladesh on their way back to San Diego.
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Operation Fiery Vigil (June 1991). Operation Fiery Vigil was the evacuation of Americans from the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Marines from 15th MEU (West Coast) and 1st Battalion 24th Marines (United States Marine Corps Reserve) provided security augmentation, heavy equipment support, clean-up, medical and generator support as well as food and water and evacuated over 21,000 Americans.
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Operation Victor Squared and Joint Task Force Guantanamo (November 1991-April 1992). Operation Victor Squared was the planned evacuation of U.S. nationals from Haiti in the wake of a military coup that ousted President Aristide on 30 September 1991. Joint Task Force 129 (later JTF Guantanamo Bay) was activated to assist in the possible evacuation of 7,000 U.S. citizens from Haiti. The JTF commander and staff were drawn from the staff of the II MEF in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. On 1 October, a contingent of 300 Marines departed Camp Lejeune for Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to begin mission planning and preparations. The mission was later changed to provide humanitarian assistance to Haitian refugees who were being sent by the U.S. Coast Guard to Guantanamo. On 16 December, an additional 300 Marines deployed from Camp Lejeune to augment JTF Guantanamo Bay and provide humanitarian assistance to more than 6,000 Haitian refugees.
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Mount Etna Lava Flow (April 1992). The Marines of the 24th MEU were called to assist Italian authorities in saving the Sicilian town of Zafferana Etna from an advancing lava flow by Mount Etna, Europe’s largest volcano. Marine heavy lift helicopters from the USS Inchon helped carry over 200,000 pounds of concrete slabs to the perimeter of a vent in the side of the volcano, which helped alter the lava’s course.
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LA Riots (May 1992). Fifteen hundred Marines from Camp Pendleton were deployed on 2 May to assist law enforcement officers and California National Guard troops in quelling deadly riots in South Central Los Angeles. Rioting began on 29 April after a jury acquitted four Los Angeles police officers charged with using excessive force in the arrest and subsequent beating of Rodney King.
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Operation Provide Relief (August-December 1992). Operation Provide Relief was a United States spearheaded humanitarian relief airlift that ran from August to December 1991 in response to the famine in Somalia. The Marine Corps provided the commander and key staff for the JTF, which was established in Kenya to coordinate the airlift of emergency supplies into the region. On 15 September, the 11th MEU (West Coast) arrived off the coast of Somalia to provide command and control and communications for the U.S. Air Force’s airlift of 500 Pakistanis and their equipment into Mogadishu. Deteriorating security in Somalia forced an end to this initial phase of operations in early December 1992.
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Operation Restore Hope (December 1992 – May 1993). Operation Restore Hope was a United States led, multi-nation effort to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in Somalia. Operation Restore Hope was credited with saving tens of thousands of lives.
The first forces ashore were Marines and Sailors from the 15th MEU, who came ashore at Mogadishu on 9 December to establish security for follow-on forces. The MEU was embarked aboard three amphibious ships and accompanied by a maritime prepositioning ship from MPSRON 3. The ship had been backloaded by Marines and Sailors in Saudi Arabia after supporting Operations Desert Storm and deployed from there. The combination of the amphibious ships and maritime prepositioning ship gave the JTF a sea-based logistics, medical, and airbase capability, which reduced the footprint ashore.
The following day, the I MEF staff began arriving and would make up the core of the Combined JTF Somalia (later named United Task Force Somalia). Deploying by airlift from bases in California and supported by the arrival 3 additional maritime prepositioning ships from MPSRON 2 from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Marine Forces quickly built to a robust Marine Air Ground Task Force of almost 16,000 Marines and Sailors organized around the First Marine Division. Much of the airlift ashore was accomplished by Marine Corps C-130 aircraft, which could land and take off on small, remote dirt airstrips.
Due to damage to port of Mogadishu, Army forces in Somalia were initially supplied from the maritime prepositioning ships (which could be offloaded at sea) until the Army was able to open the port.
Note: On 20 June 1993, the 24th MEU would be ordered to cut short an exercise in Kuwait and return to the vicinity of Mogadishu, Somalia to stand ready to assist United Nations forces in maintaining peace in the war-torn country.
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- - - - - - - - - - Today - - - - - - - - - -
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The Navy and Marine Corps no longer possess the full range of capabilities needed for effective global response in an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world. The loss of combined arms, the reduced number and availability of amphibious ships, and the emasculation of the maritime prepositioning squadrons have severely limited the persistence, reach, and lethality of the nation’s 911 force. The Marine Corps no longer has a continuous forward deployed MEU presence in the Mediterranean and in the Western Pacific/Indian Ocean areas, citing operational readiness of sufficient amphibious ships. One of the three maritime prepositioning squadrons was deactivated in 2018 and the other two squadrons have been reduced in size and capability. Reductions in Marine Corps infantry, artillery, aviation, and combat service support and the loss of all armor, bridging, and in stride breaching have crippled the Corps’ combined arms capabilities.
Also, during 2021 and 2022, the Marine Corps ended the rotational deployments of three forward based special purpose MAGTFs, focused on crisis response missions in the Southern Command, Africa Command, and Central Command areas. The units were stood down as bill payers for Force Design 2030 initiatives.
As a result of these losses, the Marine Corps is unable today to respond quickly and effectively to the full range of global crises and contingencies. A 21-month snapshot from February 2022 to October 2023 shows how far the Navy and Marine Corps have fallen since 2018:
February 2022. The Marine Corps was unable to meet a U.S. European Command request to surge a MEU to the Mediterranean in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Why? No MEU in the Mediterranean or nearby.
February 2023. The Marine Corps was unable to send a large disaster relief force to Turkey after a devastating earthquake. Why? No MEU, MPS squadron, or Crises Response force in the Mediterranean or nearby.
April 2023. The Marine Corps was unable to support a NEO from Sudan. Why? No MEU or Crises Response force in the Mediterranean or nearby.
Oct 2023. In response to the fighting in Gaza, the 26th MEU (East Coast) was moved from the northern Persian Gulf toward the eastern Mediterranean to assist in operations if directed by U.S. Central Command. The forward presence and repositioning demonstrate the utility and flexibility of the MEU. But it also highlights the need for a continuous presence in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific/Indian Ocean areas. The movement of the 26th MEU left the Persian Gulf uncovered, at a time when U.S. embassies and other interests in the surrounding countries are most vulnerable.
These are the facts. The wise words of John Adams are as applicable today as when he spoke them in 1770: Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence. And these stubborn facts lead to an unalterable conclusion—what the Marine Corps was until as recently as 2018 is not what the Marine Corps is today.
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General Zinni is a career infantry officer, who participated in or has first-hand knowledge of many of the operations presented. His last assignment was Commander, US Central Command.
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Brigadier General McAbee is a career artillery officer, who participated in or has first-hand knowledge of many of the operations presented. His last assignment was Deputy Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command.
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Compass Points salutes General Zinni and Brigadier General McAbee for taking the time to review the actual record of Marine Corps accomplishments of yesterday so the Marine Corps of tomorrow can be better, stronger, and more capable.
Just one MAGTF snapshot shows Marines arriving in Iraq, Luzon, Oman, Somalia, Bangladesh, Guantanamo, Sicily, and even, South Central LA, California. Marines arrived to all these locations on short notice to help in a crisis. And they accomplished all these operations across just 30 months. That was then. Does the Marine Corps have the same ability to respond globally today? Abolutely not.
Over the last five years, the Marine Corps has lavished time, attention, and resources on theoretical, islolated, island missile units, while at the same time degrading the capabilities of the global MAGTF. The world today is on the precipice of war. Why should the Marine Corps ever be weaker? When Marine leaders are promoted into the most senior leadership billets, they make a promise that they will make the Marine Corps stronger. It is past time to keep that promise.
This is typical of people who lack historical Knowledge and the fundamentals of what the modern Marine Corps ought to be.
“…In reply, the island missile proponents have begun to criticize the MAGTF.” So, when the intellect is devoid of concrete reasons why their “idea for FD” is better than the MAGTF, they resort to the tried and true concept of isolating what you hate, attack it and eliminate it…“Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.” Cut off the support network and isolate the target from sympathy. Go after people and not institutions; people hurt faster than institutions.”
This is exactly what the proponents of FD are intent on doing. Attacking “graybeards” and the MAGTF is the same tenant and ideology we guarded and fought against in the past and here it is on full display by the current crop of cadres who are too afraid to engage highly experienced, accomplished and tactful warriors…the question is, why are they fearful to have a robust debate and allow others in uniform to learn for themselves the value of the MAGTF vs SIF.
My advice to our active duty comrades, rebuilt the Marine Corps as it used to be pre 2019. AND, add other lethality to meet the pacing threat in the Pacific. If rebuilding is about money, hell, let’s join forces and pressure Congress to fund the Corps properly and have them force the navy in bolstering its Amphibs to meet the Corps needs.
There is one topic the MAGTF Snapshot missed, that of the successful role of deterrence the deployed MAGTF played from the mid 80s thru the 90s. Although hard to measure it's easy enough to look at today's world and how we are always reacting instead of shaping events as we had in the past. Our Nation's leadership continues to react to world events as if a strong military deterrence force still exists. As an example look at US policy & actions post Oct 7th ME in an attempt to keep Iran & its proxies in line and in the Pacific restraining China's expansionist objectives. It's obvious with the failures to stop the Houtis from threatening maritime shipping and China from threatening and taking Filipino shoals that our ability to deter our adversaries has greatly diminished.