Compass Points - Marine Readiness
Arrive fast and then keep arriving
July 26, 2025
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As former Navy Secretary Jim Webb wrote on Compass Points this week, the essence of the Marine Corps is readiness. Marines must be ready to arrive first and fast, to any global crisis or contingency. In a crisis, Marines may first send in a small unit, but that small unit is quickly reinforced as necessary by more Marines, and then by even more Marines.
Marine readiness is based on hard training, constant preparation, and the ability to rapidly mobilize.
In the long history of the Corps, no better example exists of how the Marine Corps can respond rapidly to an unexpected crisis anywhere around the globe than the quick response of the Marine Corps to North Korea's sudden attack in 1950.
In his article, "Mobilizing the Marine Corps" author and Marine, LtCol Douglas Toulette, takes a hard look at the Marine Corps and mobilization.
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Why the Service is incapable of repeating June 1950
When the Korea People’s Army stormed across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, the Republic of Korea Army and the U.S. Far East Command were caught off guard. The Marine Corps’ rapid response in July 1950 and the 15 September 1950 landing at Inchon are the pinnacle of Marine Corps history and lore. However, the tactical and operational victories in late 1950 were the ends of the lesser-known but critically important ways and means of Service-wide mobilization. Today, the Service is consumed by a focus on tactical-level technologies, experimentation, and endless pursuit of operations, activities, and investments while being hamstrung by years-long acquisitions, delays in production, and structure design based on how many things purchased and not the enemy. If the Marine Corps does not plan for total mobilization, the next large-scale, unexpected enemy attack will result in the Corps weathering the initial storm, then looking over its shoulder and finding nothing there to carry on the fight.
Tactical technologies and tactical-level victories are for naught if not woven into operational objectives to achieve strategic ends. The fundamental concept of massing combat power more quickly than the enemy and applying that combat power at a time and place of your choosing is how conflicts are won. When the size of the force in the conflict is insufficient, the force that can rapidly flow and sustain the most combat power seizes the advantage. Throughout the history of warfare, this is done via mobilization, defined today as “the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.”1 Often mistaken as the simple act of placing a reserve component (RC) Marine into an active-duty status, mobilization is in fact a whole-of-Service task tied to strategic and operational concepts and codified in the requirements of Title 10, U.S.C. §10208: Annual Mobilization Exercise.2 Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has lulled itself into the mistaken belief it is capable of mobilization because it has achieved battlefield successes over the last 85 years of modern conflict.
The reality of the last 85 years is that the United States has delayed entry into every major conflict except one, the Korean War. World War II began in September 1939, with the United States not officially entering until December 1941. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 with advisors, the number expanding in 1962, with major combat actions not occurring until 1965. DESERT STORMsucceeded thanks to DESERT SHIELD, a five-month buildup of combat power that the enemy was kind enough to sit and observe. Finally, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), authorized on 16 October 2002 via Congressional Joint Resolution, did not see combat operations commence until 20 March 2003.3 Each of these conflicts provided the Marine Corps with the benefit of time. Time to plan, build, and position forces to assure the successful commencement of combat operations. When the Marine Corps looks around the globe today, time is not a benefit. The United States’ competitors are positioned to strike quickly and with significant combat power. It is for this reason that the initial stages of the Korean War must be the priority case study if the Marine Corps wishes to wake from its mobilization slumber.
-- LtCol Douglas Toulette, "Mobilizing the Marine Corps"
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Douglas Toulette goes on to discuss how mobilization connects directly to combat power.
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Analysis beyond the simple numerical increase of AC personnel reveals that today’s Marine Corps has less relative combat power than the Marine Corps of 1950. This is evident when comparing the two most powerful arms of the MAGTF, the infantry battalions and fighter squadrons. In 1950, the AC had three infantry regiments (2d, 5th, and 6th) with a wartime structure of three battalions each. The RC had 21 infantry battalions with an additional 16 individual rifle companies.20 Assuming three rifle companies form a battalion, the combined AC and RC infantry battalion strength of the 1950 Marine Corps was approximately 35. Today, the combined AC and RC infantry battalion strength is 28, including 3d Littoral Combat Team, or 80 percent of 1950. Fighter squadrons in 1950 for the AC totaled 15, with another 30 in the RC for a combined total of 45. Today, the combined AC and RC fighter squadron strength is 19, or 42 percent of 1950. In terms of the Corps’ most recognized form of combat power throughout history, the modern Marine Corps is lacking in both when compared to the Corps of 1950.
In addition to the 20 percent fewer infantry and 58 percent fewer fixed-wing strike aircraft than in 1950, the modern Marine Corps risks being out of position when the next conflict begins. Relentlessly pushed outside CONUS in campaigns to deter, repositioning the 45,000+ personnel of I MEF or the 22,000+ personnel of III MEF would be significantly more challenging than the movement of only 800 outside CONUS personnel to complete the 7th Mar upon their arrival in-theater in September 1950. If the enemy chooses to begin the next rapidly evolving peer conflict outside the location where the Marine Corps has hedged its bets, the mobilization planning of 1950 will be dwarfed in complexity by the next iteration as the Service attempts to mobilize and aggregate forces from around the globe.
-- LtCol Douglas Toulette, "Mobilizing the Marine Corps"
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Over the last few years, the Marine Corps has reduced its combined arms units, equipment, and capabilities. As Douglas Toulette warns, it is time to rebuild and restore.
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If the Marine Corps wants to be relevant at the operational and strategic levels of war in the next peer conflict, it must learn and apply the lessons from June 1950 and establish a base mobilization plan and a properly equipped RC. Planning must include how the Service will execute seamless transition between initial response, RC call-up, end strength increase, arrival of volunteers and/or Selective Service System inductees, and rotation considerations. More importantly, a total force mobilization plan must identify key policy decisions and be rehearsed and exercised under Title 10 requirements. This sends a message to strategic competitors that the Marine Corps is not a tactical-level force with a handful of exquisite weapons, but a strategic-level consideration capable of rapid expansion and prepared to seamlessly flow combat power in a well-orchestrated symphony of destruction.
-- LtCol Douglas Toulette, "Mobilizing the Marine Corps"
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Marine readiness is based on hard training, constant preparation, and the ability to rapidly mobilize. Compass Points salutes author and Marine, Douglas Toulette, for his powerful article on mobilization and Marine readiness. When North Korea attacked in 1950, it shocked the world. The US called on the Marines and the Marines were ready. Today, the world is still a dangerous place. When the next attack comes that shocks the world, the Marines must be ready to mobilize, fight, and win.
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Marine Corps Gazette - 07/15/2025
Mobilizing the Marine Corps
By LtCol Douglas Toulette
LtCol Toulotte is currently assigned as the Inspector-Instructor for 3d Civil Affairs Group. He is an Infantry Officer who has served in both the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and Active Reserve (AR). In his previous assignment as an Operational Planner to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), he represented the command in both Service and Joint-level mobilization planning efforts.
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/mobilizing-the-marine-corps/
There are many salient points to today’s post. One item to add to the mix of ready or not ready, is a reading of the biography of General OP Smith. He was the CG of 1MarDiv with the North Koreans stormed south. We were in principal not ready. But there was just enough left over from the end of WWII in terms of T/E and a “reserve” T/O to make it all work. The polite way of calling the effort to mobilize is “bun fight.” The fight for logistics was a key component and here General Smith’s foresight and organizational capabilities came to the fore and shone brightly. Whilst the Corps has been distracted and deflected from the basics of meeting Title 10 mandates it leaves open the question could we in August of this summer of 2025 conduct a similar expeditionary effort. The writer will leave that question to be answered by the best and brightest here. But the hunch is not only no, we are able to do such an effort, but we may not even have the amphibious lift to support it, even if the Corps did have the capability. One good way to find out would be to run a dress rehearsal. No warning SecDef tells the 1st or 2nd MarDiv to gear and go and be ready to fight and part of this would be a call up and immediate integration of appropriate reserve units to augment the force. They could be sent to Pickle Meadows for all we care, but it would be a good test of our ability to be ready or not ready….Secretary of Navy Webb did something similar in 1985, maybe we could ask him how it went.
For 30 years prior to 2018, the Marine Corps was a combined arms, expeditionary force-in-readiness, capable of rapidly responding to global crises and contingencies across the spectrum of conflict as the nation’s premier 911 force. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) were forward deployed from the West and East coasts of the United States aboard amphibious ships and from forward bases in Japan and Hawaii. Other Marine Corps forces were trained and designated to fall in on equipment sets aboard three strategically positioned maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPSRONs). Each squadron was capable of supporting a 16,500-man Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for 30 days of combat. When necessary, these forces (forward deployed, maritime prepositioning, and fly-in from the United States and Japan) could quickly composite to form a 20,000-90,000-man Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
Marine Corps forces were lethal, flexible, adaptable, and persistent. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990-April 1991) is a case in point. In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Marines quickly began the deployment of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to northern Saudi Arabia. The lead element and first fully sustainable combined arms force to arrive in theater was the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from California, which began falling in on supplies and equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2 (having sailed from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean) on 15 August. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived in theater from Hawaii on 25 August and fell in on supplies and requirement from Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3 (having sailed from Guam and Saipan in the Western Pacific).
Using a combination of two MPSRONs, Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, and fly-in echelon forces, I MEF quickly built to a 45,000-man combined arms force of two Marine Divisions, one composite aircraft wing, and a composite combat service support group. I MEF was a fully capable, resilient Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of combined arms (infantry, armor, artillery, engineers with mobility and counter-mobility, and aviation). The Aviation Combat Element was robust enough to provide all tasked (apportioned) sorties to the Joint Force Air Component Commander, while retaining sufficient sorties to support I MEF.
Of note, MPSRON 2 also provided initial sustainment for the ready brigade of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division as it flowed into theater until the Army established its own logistics system.
Concurrently but separately, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB), an amphibious MEB, was preparing for an exercise in Europe when it was ordered to change mission and deploy to the Persian Gulf. The MEB notionally required 24 amphibious ships for the Persian Gulf mission but only 13 ships were available on the East Coast. The delta in lift was provided by 5 MSC ships. The MEB arrived on station outside the Persian Gulf during early September.