Compass Points – Marines Left at the Dock
‘Divest to Invest’ has Weakened the Corps
10 U.S. Code § 8063 - United States Marine Corps: composition; functions
(a) . . . The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. . . .
As America's 911 force-in-readiness, it is the responsibility of the Marines to immediately get to the scene of the crisis whenever and wherever the crisis may be. It takes intense focus by Marine Corps leadership to make sure Marines have the capabilities to face any challenge and the ability to get there. LtGeneral Heckl has spoken candidly about a time recently, as the war in Ukraine was beginning, when the Marines were called and they could not answer. See excerpt and link below to the article in Defense One.
As war was breaking out, why were Marines unable to get where they were needed? The problem was lack of amphibious lift. When the Marines received the call, amphibious ships were not ready to embark the Marines. It is easy to blame the Navy. But the Navy should not bear all the blame.
Ever since the start of the entire Force Design 2030 'divest to invest' approach, Marine Corps leadership has de-emphasized the need for traditional amphibious lift. The National Defense Authorization Act specifically puts the responsibility for amphibious lift requirements on Marine Corps leadership, not on the Navy. Marine Corps leadership has told Congress it no longer wanted or needed as much amphibious lift. Instead of enough current amphibious ships, Force Design 2030 has left Marines standing at the dock.
This pernicious 'divest to invest' approach has made the Marine Corps weaker. Instead of 'divest to invest' Marine Corps leadership should be 'upgrading and augmenting' proven Marine capabilities. The Marine Corps needs more infantry Marines, air support, armor, artillery, amphibious lift, and more, to meet the new challenges our nation will face tomorrow.
When the Ukraine war was breaking out, Marines were called, but they were unable to answer the call. Unthinkable. This should never be allowed to happen. Force Design 2030 has taken the Marine Corps on a road to nowhere. It is long past time for the Marine Corps to find a better path forward. US Code, Title 10 demands, and Americans everywhere expect, a strong and capable Marine Corps ready to answer every call. That is the meaning of Semper Fidelis.
Defense One (defenseone.com) 04/29/22
‘We Should Have Been There:’ Marine General Laments the State of the Amphib Navy
A failure to deploy in February illustrates the low readiness of the nation’s amphibious warships, a Marine three-star tells Defense One.
By Caitlin M. Kenney
. . . On Feb. 15, the Joint Staff sent prepare-to-deploy orders to the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and to its associated Naval amphibious ready group. Their purpose: “provide bridging solutions” to Gen. Tod Wolters, the commander of U.S. European Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, according to Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command and deputy commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
The 22nd MEU was already prepared to go. However, the maintenance status of the three warships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group was “so bad” they were not prepared to leave then or after the invasion, Heckl told Defense One on Thursday. They were even late to meet their original deployment date. . .
. . . “The bottom line is we should have been there and had that available to the combatant commander and we weren't,” he said.
Heckl, who has served for 35 years as a Marine, said he was unaware of any previous time a MEU was told to deploy early and they could not respond.
He told lawmakers on Tuesday that the Marine Corps needs at least 31 traditional amphibious ships: 10 LHA/LHD “big-decks” and 21 LPDs. The number is based on the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which assumes the ships have an 80 percent readiness rate, Heckl said Thursday.
“The 10-year running average for the amphib Navy is 63 [percent]. Last month, it was 46 [percent],” he said. “So the number is only valid if the readiness rates are achieved and maintained, which today is simply not the case.”
The Navy currently has 32 ships. Last week, Heckl said, only 15, or 47 percent, were available.
Defense One asked Navy and 2nd Fleet officials about Heckl’s comments, the deployment of the 22nd MEU and the Kearsarge ARG, and the general readiness of the amphibious fleet. No response was received before publication.
Planned decommissioning will soon reduce the total number of active amphibs, he said.
“If we don't have intervention from Congress, we will absolutely go down to 24 or 25 amphibs in the next three to four years. Period. So, you can do the math there. We simply will not have Marine Expeditionary Units and ARGs out, or even available,” he said. . . .
Caitlin M. Kenney is a staff reporter for Defense One.
Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl is the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
This train wreck is not a recent development. It is only made worse. Let’s tie in the shortfalls in MPS and USAF strategic lift capacity. The combined problem is geometric vice arithmetic. These are the issues the senior leadership of the Corps has failed to focus on while distracted by trivial garbage, poorly developed strategies and politically correct, self inflicted face shots. Amateurs are unable to differentiate between deep thinkers, harsh reality and scatter brains.
The Corps, does indeed not carry all of the blame. We cannot expect a healthy Corps in a sick Department of Defense. But, we could divest ourselves of the Typhoid Marys.
"Not enough amphibious shipping for Marine Forces here in the present? You think that's a problem and it's going be really hard to overcome? Actually, it's going to be super easy, barely an inconvenience. You see, we have written down on paper, in ink, that in the future, we will have more ships. How many? Unclear, but we will have enough...in the future. What if something happens now, tomorrow, or next year? Unknown...but in the future, we will have enough." - Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Apr/20/2002980535/-1/-1/0/PB23%20SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%2018%20APR%202022%20FINAL.PDF