Compass Points - MEB (WSO)
Bring back the fighting MEB
Compass Points - MEB (WSO)
Bring back the fighting MEB
April 19, 2024
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The Marine Corps needs more fighting MEBs. It does not need more MEB (WSO).
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A Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is notionally a combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Force ready to respond worldwide to any crisis or contingency with a force of infantry, air, and logistics. MEBs are ready to augment and reinforce the smaller MEU. MEUs patrol the ocean on Navy amphibious ships. They arrive at the crisis first and take action. If the crisis grows, a deployed MEU needs the help of a fighting MEB to arrive quickly with more forces and with the associated equipment and supplies from Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
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A fighting MEB is composed of a reinforced infantry regiment with 3 infantry battalions including armor, artillery, mortars and much more. The MEB would also have the organic aviation of an entire Marine Aircraft Group and the logistics support from a Combat Logistics Regiment.
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The MEB is commanded by a Brigadier General with a full headquarters staff to command, control, and fight the MEB.
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If the Marine Corps is going to build the fighting MEBs it needs, changes must be made. Fortunately, the Marine Corps Commandant has been quoted as being in favor of change.
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Refinements to Force Design, or any plan, are constant. We make those refinements from our campaign of learning where we develop concepts, evaluate them through wargames, experiment with the concept to improve it or reject it, and then provide feedback to the chain of command.
-- General Smith, CMC (quoted in Navy Science and Technology Strategy
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It is good news that changes to Force Design are expected. In fact, already significant changes have been made. The Marine squadron HMLA-269 which was deactivated under the old Force Design 2030 is being reactivated this summer. In the same way, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 will not be deactivated. The Marine Times reports,
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But the Marine Corps has adjusted how many heavy-lift helicopter squadrons it anticipates having on the East Coast, Fleeger said Tuesday. The Corps’ previous plan had been to deactivate Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464, keeping Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, but now the plan is for both North Carolina-based squadrons to remain in the fleet . . . .
-- Marine Times
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For the Marine Corps to respond to crises in the future will require a new emphasis on the combined arms capabilities of not just the small MEU but also the larger MEB, and the largest force, the MEF.
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Long before a crisis arrives, the joint Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) survey their region of the world and look for forces that can respond. For every mission, CCDRs identify US forces that can accomplish the mission. Forces are put into two categories, Preferred Forces and Contingency Sourcing.
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(1) Preferred Forces. CCMD planners identify preferred forces as a planning assumption necessary to continue planning and assess the feasibility of a plan. The amount/quantity of identified preferred forces should be within the quantities of those force types apportioned. Preferred forces are planning assumptions only and do not indicate that these forces will be contingency or execution sourced. The degree to which the CCDR makes appropriate planning assumptions when identifying preferred forces improves the feasibility of a plan.
(2) Contingency Sourcing. Contingency sourcing is a part of the plan assessment. It entails the Joint Force Coordinator and joint force providers identifying forces that meet the sourcing guidance communicated in the contingency sourcing message, which is based on assumptions, and represents a snapshot of sourcing feasibility for senior leaders . . . .
-- CJCS Guide 3130
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Which categories do the CCDRs place the current Marine MEB? Neither. CCDRs today are not looking at Marine MEBs as forces that are ready to respond. Why? There are no fighting Marine Corps MEBs. For example, the web site for 3D MEB in Okinawa Japan proudly describes 3D MEB as:
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RESILIENT. READY. RELEVANT.
3D MEB maintains a forward presence in the Pacific Theater, responding to contingencies and strengthening alliances in support of the U.S. national security strategy. When a mission in the Indo-Pacific region requires a large MAGTF, but doesn’t require the full force of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, 3D MEB answers the call.
--3D MEB website
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Unfortunately, the 3D MEB does not have a regiment of infantry, an air group of aviation, or a full logistics regiment. 3D MEB does not even have a full headquarters staff to command, control, and fight the MEB. Sadly, 3D MEB is a "Web Site Only" MEB.
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Any service that does have forces identified by CCDRs as either "Preferred Forces" or "Contingency Sourcing" means that service does not have what the CCDR needs to accomplish difficult missions around the world. If the CCDRs do not sign up the forces from a service in advance, why should the Congress continue to pay for those forces? The CCDRs does not identify Marine MEBs as forces that can be tapped for difficult missions because the MEBs are not ready.
Another example is the 5th MEB in Bahrain, part of Task Force 51-5. The 5th MEB is very busy, and it does great work, but it is not a full and fighting MEB. The 5th MEB is a MEB headquarters only, but at least it has a full headquarters staff.
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The 3D MEB website is right in one thing. The Marine Corps needs to concentrate more on being, "RESILIENT. READY. RELEVANT." Those are good words, but where are the fighting MEBs? The "Web Site Only" MEBs do not fool China, do not fool the CCDRs, and do not fool Congress. Compass Points salutes all those working to build the fighting MEBs again that the Marine Corps and the Nation need.
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Naval Amphibious Force, TF 51-5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Naval Support Activity Bahrain
https://www.tf515.marines.mil/
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Marine Times - 04/09/2024
Marine Corps Delays 1st Deployment Of New Heavy-Lift Helicopter To 2026
By Irene Loewenson
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CJCS Guide 3130 - 04/12/2023
JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION
OVERVIEW AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
I have always found it curious that the senior leadership restructured and reorganized the entire Marine Corps to promote stand-in forces (SIF), while continuing to call the MEU the “crown jewel” of the Corps. One would think the generals would consider the SIF the “crown jewel” since the bill payers to fund it were amphibious lift, maritime prepositioning ships, and a resilient and effective combined arms capability.
But... if one really understood warfighting, would they not logically consider the MEF the “crown jewel” of the Marine Corps? Only a truly combined arms MEF has the combat power and sustainment to fight and win globally or to contribute significantly to a larger joint or combined fight.
A combination of amphibious and MPS MEBs is needed to quickly composite to a MEF size force. The problem, as CP points out, is that the Marine Corps currently lacks the amphibious and MPS ships and a robust and resilient combined arms capability to deploy an effective amphibious or MPS MEB. Bumper stickers are not a substitute for the real McCoy.
Today’s Marine Corps is unable to keep two MEUs continuously forward deployed, much less deploy a combined arms MEB with 30 days of combat sustainment. If General Smith is serious about “balancing crisis response with modernization,” restoring the capability to quickly deploy a warfighting MEB is a good place to start. This will require rethinking the amphibious ship requirement, the number and location of MPS ships, and the combined arms capability needed to fight our adversaries worldwide. Chowder II’s Vision 2035 is a good starting point for developing an operating concept which can be vetted through an integrated combat development process to determine the requirements.
Exceptional analysis and comment. We have watched the FD 2030 train wreck unfold under Berger and Smith’s dictate. We know the deteriorated state of all the necessary elements required to reconstitute “Supremacy of the MEF”. We also know from the study of history and from today’s operational realities that the Marine Corps of April 2024 is incapable of performing its mission as stated in US Code. This is a direct result of the destruction of the Marine Corps orchestrated by Generals Berger and Smith. Why should we believe anything that CMC Smith writes or states? America’s Amphibious Navy sits rusting in port unable to sail. Our Navy cannot meet its recruiting goals. The USNS Bobo returned to port due to fire unable to transport a flawed resupply gaggle to Gaza. 2 CMCs unilaterally gave away our armor, bridging capabilities, snipers, towed cannon artillery, etc etc and destroyed the Marine Division by turning Regiments in MLRs. Our armories were stripped of anti tank weapons, Javelins,Carl Gustaf Recoilless Rifles that along with the M777s and their ammunition were sent to the Ukraine. Have they been replaced and or replenished? The Commander in Chief does not know the difference between the location of Haifa, Israel and Rafah in Gaza or that it is on the border of Egypt not Mexico. These are facts not “ad hominem” attacks. Semper Fidelis!