Generals Krulak & Conway are spot on in their assessment. Marines come from the sea … we should never have left the ships in the first place. Get our “Sea Legs” back, remain engaged abroad in other theaters beyond the Western Hemisphere, and, OBTW, I hope we are pitching this in PME settings at Quantico, Leavenworth, Carlisle, Maxwell, Newport, NDU, CSIS, and in any other “think-tank” where we can speak! Let history temper our judgment! Semper Fidelis!
Let’s clear up one point up front. Marines on Aircraft Carriers were FMF “ B” billets and organized as reinforced Rifle Platoons with the requisite weapons and ammunition. Everyone of the Marines in my Detachment of 78 enlisted and two officers were infantry Marines. While they did guard special weapons and run Brigs they were prepared to repel boarders or go ashore as might be needed to reinforce an embassy or ashore facility. Benghazi could certainly have benefitted from reinforcement by a ship’s detachment.
That said, a Marine Detachment on ships could still report to the Commanding Officer of that ship and be operationally detached as higher HQ determine. I would certainly suggest upgrading its weapons, equipment and size and would have Marines attend Sea School after Infantry Training Bn. Sea School would be expanded from its previous training objectives to include ship board combat and boarding other ships and the ability to call close air.
Assuming a Detachment of 160 on 20 ships we are talking about 3200 Marines and a staff at a reborn Sea School. Let’s assume a total of 3350 Marines from a Corps of over 160,000. About 2.2%.
We are missing a true global capability. I am not surprised. I made these exact points in the 1980’s, 45 years ago.
I do not know for a fact who pulled the Ship’s detachments and closed the Marine Barracks. I believe it was done to, among other things, to create the Chem Bio Unit and the Marine Special Ops organizations. All part and parcel to a 40 year old reduction in infantry Marine total numbers. At one time 0311 was the largest MOS followed by Admin. I would be surprised if 0311 is still the largest MOS.
This is a "yes and" problem. YES, the Navy needs to severely increase the readiness of existing amphibious warships / build new ones at pace; HOWEVER, the MARINES were the ones who did the greatest damage to the cause of amphibious warships with the mush mouth messaging of Force Design 2030, the prioritization of the LSM, and the GUTTING of the MAGTF. Even if we had the ships, do we have the Marines to pull off the floats? The Navy will NEVER build more amphibious warships than can be staffed by Marine Expeditionary Units, full stop. We had a great opportunity to press home the fight with the Future Amphibious Force CBA--opportunity lost due to the unforced existentialism that was going on with the Marines, and the institutional intransigence that it opened us up to with N81 and the rest of the CRUDES Navy. So, while I love to blame the Navy, MARINES, GET YOUR HOUSE IN ORDER FIRST.
Salty Gator - Self inflicted wounds. I don’t think you will find an argument about that here. A lot of us are offering what we have to correct our list! Hang in there with us, & let history temper our judgment. Semper Fidelis!
The worst thing about all of this is the ignorance of operational factor mass. You can have all of the exquisite kill webs in the world if you can't achieve mass, you have nothing. Massing fires by themselves means nothing if you cannot take the land in question--either with manned systems or unmanned systems. Something has to occupy the critical terrain, something has to replenish that occupying force. Distributed concepts have a time and place, but they further complicate the issue of achieving mass. Precision fires are not a substitute for mass and never have been. This is like first day of Naval War College / Expeditionary Warfare School type stuff.
but hey, who the F am I? Just a former Gator SWO / current engineer program manager lecturing the Gentlemen and Ladies in Green about stuff they know far better than I, regardless of which side of this argument you are on. Eventually, the next global war will kick off and all of the nonsense will peter out. It happens every time. Just a question of how much blood will need to be sacrificed before we reset.
General Krulak’s and General Conway’s recent article, “Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security,” is a proposal to enhance Marine Corps relevance in an increasingly unstable world. Force Design is largely an abject failure. The centerpiece of this concept is Stand-in Forces (SIFs), which brief well but are unsupportable. After six years of assurance that the SIFs are game changers in war with China, the Marines still have no capability to position, reposition, or logistically support them during a shooting war. There is no viable plan to support them in the future. SIFs are essentially irrelevant today and tomorrow.
Likewise, the number of operationally ready amphibious ships (12-14) has dramatically reduced the number of forward deployed ARG/MEUs. At times, there are no ARG/MEUs deployed. At other times, only one ARG/MEU is forward deployed. Seldom are more than one forward deployed (as opposed to forward based).
Admiring the problem will not fix it. I applaud the Commandant for his recent “Rapid Response Essay Contest - - MEU 2035.” I believe he recognizes the problem with the ARG/MEU and wants to fix it. The focus of the contest was to generate discussion on how “… the [three-ship] ARG/MEU should be task-organized, equipped, and what mission essential tasks should they be capable of accomplishing to meet the demands of Geographic Combatant Commanders across the globe?”
Still, 2035 is ten years from now. The Marines need to find a way to increase relevance today. SIFs are not the answer. Episodic ARG/MEU deployments can only do so much. General Krulak and General Conway have offered an option to increase relevance today. Hopefully, their article will generate a good faith discussion and debate in Compass Points, the Marine Corps Gazette, and USNI Proceedings. The clock is ticking.
The status of our large deck amphibs is abysmal. Of the East Coast big decks, the Kearsarge FINALLY got underway last week since entering the shipyard almost three years ago. The Bataan is looking horrible and definitely not on schedule. and the Wasp is in the shipyard after being delayed due to her being the only big deck able to get underway until the IWO finally did.
These ships have been run ragged and then through the wringer. Was talking with one of the original Port Engineers for the Wasp. He told me they were designed to be 25 yr ships...and they want 45 yrs out of them; the last 20 yrs are squarely on the sailors and shipyards backs to keep it up and moving.
The government owned shipyards do not work on "conventual" ships in their yards, only the nuke subs and carriers. That leaves it to the commercials shipyards who are all stretched thin on personnel.
"The Osprey has been a frequent presence in Northern Australia for nearly two decades." I don't think so. By pilot math that would be 2005. We didn't even have Ospreys in Iraq then, much less Australia.
The Corps needs to forward base & forward deploy MAGTF’s now.
Think out of the Embark Box.
The Corps needs to rethink and rearm.
Recall some of are retired Leaders/Thinkers and get moving.
The time is right now.
—>
It is just a matter of time before someone hits a trip wire and the ”green star” cluster is fired and there is no going back.
—>
“The mission of the Marine Corps rifle squad is to locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver or to repel the enemy's assault by fire and close combat.”
The “Close With” starts at CLNC, CamPen, Okinawa, and worldwide bases & stations.
The Marine Corps Achilles Heal is Strategic Mobility.
—>
Traditionally, Marines have tactically deployed on Phib ships with units equipment & supplies ready to fight upon arrival.
- Yes, we deployed a full MPF to ODS and built a mega MEF with the entire MPF and Marine units equipment & supplies from all over the World.
- Over the past 20 years we administratively deployed to the Iraq and Afghanistan with no air or sea threat.
- Also administratively deployed to Vietnam with no air or sea threat.
- Sure, MAU’s/MEU’s, BLT’s and Joint Forces opened the door.
Traditionally, the Army deploys administratively with troops and unit equipment & supplies in separate transport groups. Yes, there was D-Day, Sicily, Okinawa, etc. with Army amphibious assault.
The question is how do we kick-the-door-in rather knock on the door and get permission to enter with today’s limited Phib Ships?
We figured it out a “work around” in the 70’s with NTPF that evolved into MPF.
We must figure it out again.
What if we go to war today with peer China/Russia…
The first 6 to 8 weeks will be a hightech slugfest of Space, Air, Sea, and the electronic spectrum. What will be left? Back to bullets, bayonets, bombs, etc.
During that time we will nationalize every US ship/craft and plane for wartime use. Compare it to 1942.
We did not have to nationalized sealift for ODS because commercial sealift liked the $$$ and could get insurance because there was no sea or air threat. Commercial airlift fell under contract with the Civii Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a unique and significant part of the nations air mobility resources. Selected aircraft contractually committed to CRAF, augment Department of Defense airlift requirements
We might need to seize foreign flagged ships in our ports. Not sure how we will man them, but we will.
Training spins up real fast, when it as to (1942).
I MEF will not be used to forcibly enter China nor will the Army.
China is big but we will have to economically cut it off and isolate it to rot. Maybe we can turn China’s people against the CCP. All of this is very hard. The enemy will have a vote.
Remember how ever small we have the only “Blue Water” Navy. Add in allies, if they will volunteer, and we can cover more ocean.
As Col D’s has so wisely said, we will need to seize or control worldwide “choke points” to control sea & air channels.
We need “Lilly Pad” bases to span the ocean.
Slowly seize benign ports a with a SPMAGTF that grows to MEUs that grows to MEB’s to seize other theater ports that might resist. Some ports will have just have to be blocked.
Our internal threat from the hordes of Chinese and Muslims within will keep our reserves and guard very busy.
How does the Corps get ready for expeditionary operations with what we have?
Yes, traditional MEU’s and company size SPMAGTF embarked with the Fleet: Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Supply Ships, etc. With the rest of the MEU forward based (UDP) to shore bases in the: Mediterranean, Caribbean, Australia, Oki, Guam, and maybe the Persian Gulf (security concerns). This could be done in a few months. Put a MEU’s Equipment and Supplies on a RORO and get forward based. Use Intra Theater sealift to move the next leg. Train with allies. Won’t have the flexibility of a Phib MEU, but you will be much closer and trained up with specific theater missions.
Sends a message to China/Russia.
Peace through strength.
Each MEF have a light, SPMAGTF air alert force ready to move in hours to reinforce or be a reserve.
Marines will get to the next war by many means:
Traditional Transportation Means:
Phib Ships
MPF Ships
Fleet Combatants
US Flagged Commercial Ships
Military Air
US Flagged Commercial Air
Untraditional Transportation Means:
Foreign Flagged Commercial Ships
Foreign Flagged War Ships
Foreign Flagged Military Air
Foreign Flagged Commercial Air
We will have to use both US and Foreign Flagged intra-theater small ships, ferries, barges, etc.
While I was at HQMC, LPO, 1988-91, Brown & Root presented a concept of a convertible container ship that in peacetime was a casino ship and in wartime a 10,000 man troop transport.
Casino container and flatrack modules would be intermodal exchanged for troop berthing, heads, mess, and medical modules.
I told them the Marines would like the R&R on the casino variant, but we could move 10,000, 500 at a time, on 20 or so 747 in a few days. Within a year that is how we deploying to ODS.
I do think this concept has merit with smaller container ships using existing ISO containers, refrigerate containers and flat tracks. A field expedient MPS (NTPS).
There should be a “Think Tank” of Military, Merchant Marines, Industry, etc. thinking this stuffs up, sourcing, and testing/exercising it. Quantico should take the lead and host. Maybe TransCom is already doing this, but I doubt.
No it won’t be perfect. As best it barely works, but bridges the current gap in capability until more Phib ships can be built.
The status quo option is wait and see and when it happens say:
Should-a…Would-a…Could-a…
Grayism. “Take what you get and Make what you need.”
We must get off our ass and get started on:
- Drilling Oil & Gas
- Mining All, but especially Rare Earths and minerals needed for war.
- Adding Energy — Nuclear - MsMB & SMR can be produced fastest and provide dispersion.
- Expanding Technology
- Growing Industry
- Making Steel
- Building Ships
- To list the “long poles in the tent.”
What is the status our inactive yards:
Ships, Planes, & Ground Equipment?
We also need to replace the combined arm capability we have divested.
Remember Marines & their equipment do little good when we need them now half world away.
UDP SPMAGTF/MEU’s
Some History.
The Destroyer Turned Troop Ship, USS Colhoun | #history #story #fyp
Image removed by sender.
The Destroyer Turned Troop Ship, USS Colhoun | #history #story #fyp
if you are worried about blue shipping being found, fixed, tracked, targeted, engaged and destroyed--you don't want to see what happens to bases operating in the WEZ. Let's just get a reality check here.
In the not-too-distant past there was a SPMAGTF forward deployed to NAS Sigonella on a rotational basis. I visited Sigonella earlier this year and the Marines are gone. In its place there is some sort of liaison officer! If we are not going to get more amphibs quickly then we need to think out of the box. Not sure why the SPMAGTF was withdrawn.... probably to support the unbelievably bad idea called FD2030. Send the SPMAGTF back to Sigonella! They have the space and facilities to host them. Then deploy mini ARG (1-2 ships) that can be enhanced by the SPMAGTF while the mini ARG is in the Med. To get this done we need someone with vision and the intestinal fortitude to see it through. Regrettably, I don't see this in the current CMC & ACMC!
U.S. Ospreys to remain behind after Marines leave Darwin (Northern Territory News, by Harry Brill) - The Australian Government has authorized the permanent stationing of U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft in Australia. Previously, Ospreys deployed as part of the Marine Rotation Force-Darwin (MRF-D), established in 2012, were required to redeploy to the United States at the conclusion of each rotation. This new agreement allows for the on-site storage and maintenance of these aircraft, providing a significant operational enhancement for U.S. commanders and solidifying the Osprey’s role as the Marine Corps’ primary troop transport asset in the region. The Osprey has been a frequent presence in Northern Australia for nearly two decades.
How does that add to the survivability of an SIF? Are you seriously suggesting that the Corps is planning to use MV-22s in the support of isolated and surrounded SIF units? That’s your solution to solving the logistics problem?
Son, you need to go back to school and learn logistics.
China urges U.S., Japan to withdraw Typhon missile system (Economic Times from Agence France-Presse) - During the ongoing "Resolute Dragon" exercises—scheduled to conclude September 25th—Japan showcased the U.S.-developed Typhon missile system for the first time within its territory. While the system is participating in the drills, Japanese Self-Defense Forces have confirmed that no live-fire events are planned. This deployment has prompted a response from Beijing, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry issuing a statement urging the United States and Japan to remove the missile system.
Did you get kicked in the head? The protest and the efficacy of the system are not inherently related. Though notably, Typhon fires Tomahawks and SM-6s which gives a different operational capability. Also, Typhon is farther down the road to operational relevance. At least you didn't try to snow us with another 'chinese language junk article' article.
Bwahahaha. You’re just mad because CP called you out on your own nonsense about ignoring what the adversary is saying. The only thing better than watching you spin is watching you get called out on your spin via blue on blue fire. Keep backpedaling…
I’m glad we’re having this discussion, though. It’s about time you and your circle start actually studying what the adversary says and writes about the Joint Force, our allies, and our collective efforts to deter—and win if deterrence fails.
Did you even read CNA’s China & Indo-Pacific team’s assessment of 72 PRC media reports on Balikatan 2025?
1) Ok, you did get kicked in the head. "CP called you out...": you are completely making stuff up; you are an absolute phony and a hack. No backpedaling here, just the "Cpl G side step hustle". And it's "Mwahahahaha!" this week.
2) "Me and my circle...."; what are you talking about? If I have a circle, I am the only vocal one on here. I have spoken IRL with some other commentators, had good discussions and made some friends. But my circle? They read from afar and stay out of the bs. Though, the issues of FD(2030) and the practical reality are glaring and worrisome to them as well, and they are living with it.
3) Yeah, I've been reading the serious PRC stuff since 1999, at least. Before that, I studied more of what would now be Indo-Pacom history, other than what was published in professional journals. I can clearly answer more of the reality of the All Domain Joint Force than you can. (i.e. "How many Ospreys were left in Darwin?")
4) I am also much better at Helldivers 2 than you are.
Ah, they’re worried about the Typhoon weapons system and the Army. Not a peep about the fearsome NMESIS and its short range, subsonic obsolete NAM, THAT AFTER SIX YEARS HASN’T EVEN BEEN FIELDED!
No way to displace an SIF. No way to defend themselves. No supporting arms. No engineers. No survivable vertical lift capability.
Solved the logistics problem yet? Yep, the Corps’s plan is to have our Marines forage. I never learned foraging for Class V at TBS. I guess I slept through that one.
Sigh. See my comments from yesterday about PLA reflections on USMC led BK exercise and two most recent reveals of NMESIS in the PI and Japan. I can post things, but you have to read them, and then you have to try to comprehend them. . .
As for logistics, did you see the article about V22s being stored in Australia? I used it because it is one small example of how the JOINT force is getting after the logistics problem with prepositions assets. As this is in open source, it is an example I can use.
6 Ospreys from VMM-363 were deployed as part of MRF-D 25.3. So between 1 and 6 Ospreys will be 'stored' in Darwin. What actual maintenance disposition will they be stored under? Who is doing the routine maintenance and checks, if applicable? What is the enduring plan? What is the Squadron's composition going to be for sustained ops when they return to Hawaii, minus those airframes? Not really 'getting after it', more like 'something else made us decide to leave those airframe(s) in place'. God Bless Marine Air, but it wouldn't be the first time.
I think the PLA likes FD, the SIF, and NMESIS because it's a sub-par force and weapons system. They are more afraid of a globally oriented, combined-arms, naval expeditionary force called the United States Marine Corps!
2. Even a half hearted google search of PLA think tanks and journals will show you plenty of evidence that PRC analysis views USMC modernization (Force Design) as a growing threat, particularly concerning mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles disrupting China’s sea control and complicating PLA planning due to reduced reaction times. There are literally dozens of examples of how PRC commentary frames these deployments as potentially escalatory and provocative. One such example:
Translation: Raises the difficulty for PLA or Chinese defenses in detecting / intercepting low‑flying, stealthy or sea‑skimming missiles deployed from mobile land bases (like NMESIS). Argues that mobility (JLTV chassis), sea‑skimming missiles, stealth features etc. will make interception harder. Suggests that PRC must respond with better missile defense, sensor coverage, anti‑access / area‑denial (A2/AD) to counter these possibilities. Key concern: USMC’s ability to evade detection / strike first / complicate PLA counterstrike plans. Also concerns about early warning, missile defense, survivability of forward positions.
"come on man!" Wow, it's in Chinese so it must be some magic source. No way it could just be a regurgitation of AP Defense Media stories in Chinese! Except that is exactly what you linked.
I'm not buying it. I think the Chinese are using smoke and mirrors, and you're spreading their gossip.The Army, Navy, Air Force, Japan, and other nations are deploying anti-ship missile systems/units, and they're afraid of a Marine system which is behind schedule and mediocre at best. HIMARS can fire all range of missiles and is available now. Why are they so worried about NMESIS?
Bro, you’ve got to keep up. I already posted about PLA concerns over USMC actions a few days ago. This reveal wasn’t random—it was a deliberate comms plan to highlight JOINT assets in the WEZ. Couple that with the articles your beloved CP pushed on PLA reactions to other JOINT assets in theater, and it’s pretty clear the comms plan is working.
You are like a football fan that only cares about special teams (one service). It will take the entire JOINT team and our partners and allies to prevail in the next fight.
Yes, it is a JOINT team effort. However, one element of the Joint Force, the combined-arms naval expeditionary force, has been severely weakened, with the divestment of tanks, arty, and other assets. This limits our capability to take the battle to the enemy at a time and place of our choosing. A globally oriented Marine Corps is a more powerful force than a regionally oriented force.
Generals Krulak & Conway are spot on in their assessment. Marines come from the sea … we should never have left the ships in the first place. Get our “Sea Legs” back, remain engaged abroad in other theaters beyond the Western Hemisphere, and, OBTW, I hope we are pitching this in PME settings at Quantico, Leavenworth, Carlisle, Maxwell, Newport, NDU, CSIS, and in any other “think-tank” where we can speak! Let history temper our judgment! Semper Fidelis!
Let’s clear up one point up front. Marines on Aircraft Carriers were FMF “ B” billets and organized as reinforced Rifle Platoons with the requisite weapons and ammunition. Everyone of the Marines in my Detachment of 78 enlisted and two officers were infantry Marines. While they did guard special weapons and run Brigs they were prepared to repel boarders or go ashore as might be needed to reinforce an embassy or ashore facility. Benghazi could certainly have benefitted from reinforcement by a ship’s detachment.
That said, a Marine Detachment on ships could still report to the Commanding Officer of that ship and be operationally detached as higher HQ determine. I would certainly suggest upgrading its weapons, equipment and size and would have Marines attend Sea School after Infantry Training Bn. Sea School would be expanded from its previous training objectives to include ship board combat and boarding other ships and the ability to call close air.
Assuming a Detachment of 160 on 20 ships we are talking about 3200 Marines and a staff at a reborn Sea School. Let’s assume a total of 3350 Marines from a Corps of over 160,000. About 2.2%.
We are missing a true global capability. I am not surprised. I made these exact points in the 1980’s, 45 years ago.
I do not know for a fact who pulled the Ship’s detachments and closed the Marine Barracks. I believe it was done to, among other things, to create the Chem Bio Unit and the Marine Special Ops organizations. All part and parcel to a 40 year old reduction in infantry Marine total numbers. At one time 0311 was the largest MOS followed by Admin. I would be surprised if 0311 is still the largest MOS.
I do not know. The JFK had 5000 sailors and 102 aircraft. I note that crews are smaller and there are less aircraft.
Sir, is there room aboard a carrier for a company landing team and their equipment?
Wasn't it Gen Krulak that pulled the Marines off the carriers so he could build more rifle battalions?
Don’t confuse them with the facts, their minds are already made up. . .
Don’t think so.
This is a "yes and" problem. YES, the Navy needs to severely increase the readiness of existing amphibious warships / build new ones at pace; HOWEVER, the MARINES were the ones who did the greatest damage to the cause of amphibious warships with the mush mouth messaging of Force Design 2030, the prioritization of the LSM, and the GUTTING of the MAGTF. Even if we had the ships, do we have the Marines to pull off the floats? The Navy will NEVER build more amphibious warships than can be staffed by Marine Expeditionary Units, full stop. We had a great opportunity to press home the fight with the Future Amphibious Force CBA--opportunity lost due to the unforced existentialism that was going on with the Marines, and the institutional intransigence that it opened us up to with N81 and the rest of the CRUDES Navy. So, while I love to blame the Navy, MARINES, GET YOUR HOUSE IN ORDER FIRST.
Salty Gator - Self inflicted wounds. I don’t think you will find an argument about that here. A lot of us are offering what we have to correct our list! Hang in there with us, & let history temper our judgment. Semper Fidelis!
TheBudMan
The worst thing about all of this is the ignorance of operational factor mass. You can have all of the exquisite kill webs in the world if you can't achieve mass, you have nothing. Massing fires by themselves means nothing if you cannot take the land in question--either with manned systems or unmanned systems. Something has to occupy the critical terrain, something has to replenish that occupying force. Distributed concepts have a time and place, but they further complicate the issue of achieving mass. Precision fires are not a substitute for mass and never have been. This is like first day of Naval War College / Expeditionary Warfare School type stuff.
but hey, who the F am I? Just a former Gator SWO / current engineer program manager lecturing the Gentlemen and Ladies in Green about stuff they know far better than I, regardless of which side of this argument you are on. Eventually, the next global war will kick off and all of the nonsense will peter out. It happens every time. Just a question of how much blood will need to be sacrificed before we reset.
General Krulak’s and General Conway’s recent article, “Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security,” is a proposal to enhance Marine Corps relevance in an increasingly unstable world. Force Design is largely an abject failure. The centerpiece of this concept is Stand-in Forces (SIFs), which brief well but are unsupportable. After six years of assurance that the SIFs are game changers in war with China, the Marines still have no capability to position, reposition, or logistically support them during a shooting war. There is no viable plan to support them in the future. SIFs are essentially irrelevant today and tomorrow.
Likewise, the number of operationally ready amphibious ships (12-14) has dramatically reduced the number of forward deployed ARG/MEUs. At times, there are no ARG/MEUs deployed. At other times, only one ARG/MEU is forward deployed. Seldom are more than one forward deployed (as opposed to forward based).
Admiring the problem will not fix it. I applaud the Commandant for his recent “Rapid Response Essay Contest - - MEU 2035.” I believe he recognizes the problem with the ARG/MEU and wants to fix it. The focus of the contest was to generate discussion on how “… the [three-ship] ARG/MEU should be task-organized, equipped, and what mission essential tasks should they be capable of accomplishing to meet the demands of Geographic Combatant Commanders across the globe?”
Still, 2035 is ten years from now. The Marines need to find a way to increase relevance today. SIFs are not the answer. Episodic ARG/MEU deployments can only do so much. General Krulak and General Conway have offered an option to increase relevance today. Hopefully, their article will generate a good faith discussion and debate in Compass Points, the Marine Corps Gazette, and USNI Proceedings. The clock is ticking.
The status of our large deck amphibs is abysmal. Of the East Coast big decks, the Kearsarge FINALLY got underway last week since entering the shipyard almost three years ago. The Bataan is looking horrible and definitely not on schedule. and the Wasp is in the shipyard after being delayed due to her being the only big deck able to get underway until the IWO finally did.
These ships have been run ragged and then through the wringer. Was talking with one of the original Port Engineers for the Wasp. He told me they were designed to be 25 yr ships...and they want 45 yrs out of them; the last 20 yrs are squarely on the sailors and shipyards backs to keep it up and moving.
The government owned shipyards do not work on "conventual" ships in their yards, only the nuke subs and carriers. That leaves it to the commercials shipyards who are all stretched thin on personnel.
"The Osprey has been a frequent presence in Northern Australia for nearly two decades." I don't think so. By pilot math that would be 2005. We didn't even have Ospreys in Iraq then, much less Australia.
The VDH article ties very close the email below.
https://victorhanson.com/trumps-new-war-production-board/
The Corps needs to forward base & forward deploy MAGTF’s now.
Think out of the Embark Box.
The Corps needs to rethink and rearm.
Recall some of are retired Leaders/Thinkers and get moving.
The time is right now.
—>
It is just a matter of time before someone hits a trip wire and the ”green star” cluster is fired and there is no going back.
—>
“The mission of the Marine Corps rifle squad is to locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver or to repel the enemy's assault by fire and close combat.”
The “Close With” starts at CLNC, CamPen, Okinawa, and worldwide bases & stations.
The Marine Corps Achilles Heal is Strategic Mobility.
—>
Traditionally, Marines have tactically deployed on Phib ships with units equipment & supplies ready to fight upon arrival.
- Yes, we deployed a full MPF to ODS and built a mega MEF with the entire MPF and Marine units equipment & supplies from all over the World.
- Over the past 20 years we administratively deployed to the Iraq and Afghanistan with no air or sea threat.
- Also administratively deployed to Vietnam with no air or sea threat.
- Sure, MAU’s/MEU’s, BLT’s and Joint Forces opened the door.
Traditionally, the Army deploys administratively with troops and unit equipment & supplies in separate transport groups. Yes, there was D-Day, Sicily, Okinawa, etc. with Army amphibious assault.
The question is how do we kick-the-door-in rather knock on the door and get permission to enter with today’s limited Phib Ships?
We figured it out a “work around” in the 70’s with NTPF that evolved into MPF.
We must figure it out again.
What if we go to war today with peer China/Russia…
The first 6 to 8 weeks will be a hightech slugfest of Space, Air, Sea, and the electronic spectrum. What will be left? Back to bullets, bayonets, bombs, etc.
During that time we will nationalize every US ship/craft and plane for wartime use. Compare it to 1942.
We did not have to nationalized sealift for ODS because commercial sealift liked the $$$ and could get insurance because there was no sea or air threat. Commercial airlift fell under contract with the Civii Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a unique and significant part of the nations air mobility resources. Selected aircraft contractually committed to CRAF, augment Department of Defense airlift requirements
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Reserve_Air_Fleet
We might need to seize foreign flagged ships in our ports. Not sure how we will man them, but we will.
Training spins up real fast, when it as to (1942).
I MEF will not be used to forcibly enter China nor will the Army.
China is big but we will have to economically cut it off and isolate it to rot. Maybe we can turn China’s people against the CCP. All of this is very hard. The enemy will have a vote.
Remember how ever small we have the only “Blue Water” Navy. Add in allies, if they will volunteer, and we can cover more ocean.
As Col D’s has so wisely said, we will need to seize or control worldwide “choke points” to control sea & air channels.
We need “Lilly Pad” bases to span the ocean.
Slowly seize benign ports a with a SPMAGTF that grows to MEUs that grows to MEB’s to seize other theater ports that might resist. Some ports will have just have to be blocked.
Our internal threat from the hordes of Chinese and Muslims within will keep our reserves and guard very busy.
How does the Corps get ready for expeditionary operations with what we have?
Yes, traditional MEU’s and company size SPMAGTF embarked with the Fleet: Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Supply Ships, etc. With the rest of the MEU forward based (UDP) to shore bases in the: Mediterranean, Caribbean, Australia, Oki, Guam, and maybe the Persian Gulf (security concerns). This could be done in a few months. Put a MEU’s Equipment and Supplies on a RORO and get forward based. Use Intra Theater sealift to move the next leg. Train with allies. Won’t have the flexibility of a Phib MEU, but you will be much closer and trained up with specific theater missions.
Sends a message to China/Russia.
Peace through strength.
Each MEF have a light, SPMAGTF air alert force ready to move in hours to reinforce or be a reserve.
Marines will get to the next war by many means:
Traditional Transportation Means:
Phib Ships
MPF Ships
Fleet Combatants
US Flagged Commercial Ships
Military Air
US Flagged Commercial Air
Untraditional Transportation Means:
Foreign Flagged Commercial Ships
Foreign Flagged War Ships
Foreign Flagged Military Air
Foreign Flagged Commercial Air
We will have to use both US and Foreign Flagged intra-theater small ships, ferries, barges, etc.
While I was at HQMC, LPO, 1988-91, Brown & Root presented a concept of a convertible container ship that in peacetime was a casino ship and in wartime a 10,000 man troop transport.
Casino container and flatrack modules would be intermodal exchanged for troop berthing, heads, mess, and medical modules.
I told them the Marines would like the R&R on the casino variant, but we could move 10,000, 500 at a time, on 20 or so 747 in a few days. Within a year that is how we deploying to ODS.
I do think this concept has merit with smaller container ships using existing ISO containers, refrigerate containers and flat tracks. A field expedient MPS (NTPS).
There should be a “Think Tank” of Military, Merchant Marines, Industry, etc. thinking this stuffs up, sourcing, and testing/exercising it. Quantico should take the lead and host. Maybe TransCom is already doing this, but I doubt.
No it won’t be perfect. As best it barely works, but bridges the current gap in capability until more Phib ships can be built.
The status quo option is wait and see and when it happens say:
Should-a…Would-a…Could-a…
Grayism. “Take what you get and Make what you need.”
We must get off our ass and get started on:
- Drilling Oil & Gas
- Mining All, but especially Rare Earths and minerals needed for war.
- Adding Energy — Nuclear - MsMB & SMR can be produced fastest and provide dispersion.
- Expanding Technology
- Growing Industry
- Making Steel
- Building Ships
- To list the “long poles in the tent.”
What is the status our inactive yards:
Ships, Planes, & Ground Equipment?
We also need to replace the combined arm capability we have divested.
Remember Marines & their equipment do little good when we need them now half world away.
UDP SPMAGTF/MEU’s
Some History.
The Destroyer Turned Troop Ship, USS Colhoun | #history #story #fyp
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The Destroyer Turned Troop Ship, USS Colhoun | #history #story #fyp
By The Reliable Narrator
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WWII - High Speed Transport.
How many destroyers in the inactive fleet?
A standoff capability to make ready.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-speed_transport
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STORY OF A TRANSPORT WWII U.S. NAVY / COAST GUARD TROOP TRANSPORT USS WAKEFIELD FILM 24994
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STORY OF A TRANSPORT WWII U.S. NAVY / COAST GUARD TROOP TRANSPORT USS WAKEFIELD FILM 24994
By PeriscopeFilm
SteveB
Marine
if you are worried about blue shipping being found, fixed, tracked, targeted, engaged and destroyed--you don't want to see what happens to bases operating in the WEZ. Let's just get a reality check here.
In the not-too-distant past there was a SPMAGTF forward deployed to NAS Sigonella on a rotational basis. I visited Sigonella earlier this year and the Marines are gone. In its place there is some sort of liaison officer! If we are not going to get more amphibs quickly then we need to think out of the box. Not sure why the SPMAGTF was withdrawn.... probably to support the unbelievably bad idea called FD2030. Send the SPMAGTF back to Sigonella! They have the space and facilities to host them. Then deploy mini ARG (1-2 ships) that can be enhanced by the SPMAGTF while the mini ARG is in the Med. To get this done we need someone with vision and the intestinal fortitude to see it through. Regrettably, I don't see this in the current CMC & ACMC!
And in other news. . .
U.S. Ospreys to remain behind after Marines leave Darwin (Northern Territory News, by Harry Brill) - The Australian Government has authorized the permanent stationing of U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft in Australia. Previously, Ospreys deployed as part of the Marine Rotation Force-Darwin (MRF-D), established in 2012, were required to redeploy to the United States at the conclusion of each rotation. This new agreement allows for the on-site storage and maintenance of these aircraft, providing a significant operational enhancement for U.S. commanders and solidifying the Osprey’s role as the Marine Corps’ primary troop transport asset in the region. The Osprey has been a frequent presence in Northern Australia for nearly two decades.
https://www.ntnews.com.au/news/us-ospreys-to-remain-behind-after-marines-leave-darwin/news-story/684b6fd533ff4826c0acfaf019790a62
How does that add to the survivability of an SIF? Are you seriously suggesting that the Corps is planning to use MV-22s in the support of isolated and surrounded SIF units? That’s your solution to solving the logistics problem?
Son, you need to go back to school and learn logistics.
China urges U.S., Japan to withdraw Typhon missile system (Economic Times from Agence France-Presse) - During the ongoing "Resolute Dragon" exercises—scheduled to conclude September 25th—Japan showcased the U.S.-developed Typhon missile system for the first time within its territory. While the system is participating in the drills, Japanese Self-Defense Forces have confirmed that no live-fire events are planned. This deployment has prompted a response from Beijing, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry issuing a statement urging the United States and Japan to remove the missile system.
https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/china-urges-us-japan-to-withdraw-typhon-missile-system/amp_articleshow/123922540.cms
Just noise and more complaints that don’t mean anything, right, Cfrog?
Did you get kicked in the head? The protest and the efficacy of the system are not inherently related. Though notably, Typhon fires Tomahawks and SM-6s which gives a different operational capability. Also, Typhon is farther down the road to operational relevance. At least you didn't try to snow us with another 'chinese language junk article' article.
Bwahahaha. You’re just mad because CP called you out on your own nonsense about ignoring what the adversary is saying. The only thing better than watching you spin is watching you get called out on your spin via blue on blue fire. Keep backpedaling…
I’m glad we’re having this discussion, though. It’s about time you and your circle start actually studying what the adversary says and writes about the Joint Force, our allies, and our collective efforts to deter—and win if deterrence fails.
Did you even read CNA’s China & Indo-Pacific team’s assessment of 72 PRC media reports on Balikatan 2025?
Start there.
1) Ok, you did get kicked in the head. "CP called you out...": you are completely making stuff up; you are an absolute phony and a hack. No backpedaling here, just the "Cpl G side step hustle". And it's "Mwahahahaha!" this week.
2) "Me and my circle...."; what are you talking about? If I have a circle, I am the only vocal one on here. I have spoken IRL with some other commentators, had good discussions and made some friends. But my circle? They read from afar and stay out of the bs. Though, the issues of FD(2030) and the practical reality are glaring and worrisome to them as well, and they are living with it.
3) Yeah, I've been reading the serious PRC stuff since 1999, at least. Before that, I studied more of what would now be Indo-Pacom history, other than what was published in professional journals. I can clearly answer more of the reality of the All Domain Joint Force than you can. (i.e. "How many Ospreys were left in Darwin?")
4) I am also much better at Helldivers 2 than you are.
Ah, they’re worried about the Typhoon weapons system and the Army. Not a peep about the fearsome NMESIS and its short range, subsonic obsolete NAM, THAT AFTER SIX YEARS HASN’T EVEN BEEN FIELDED!
No way to displace an SIF. No way to defend themselves. No supporting arms. No engineers. No survivable vertical lift capability.
Solved the logistics problem yet? Yep, the Corps’s plan is to have our Marines forage. I never learned foraging for Class V at TBS. I guess I slept through that one.
Sigh. See my comments from yesterday about PLA reflections on USMC led BK exercise and two most recent reveals of NMESIS in the PI and Japan. I can post things, but you have to read them, and then you have to try to comprehend them. . .
As for logistics, did you see the article about V22s being stored in Australia? I used it because it is one small example of how the JOINT force is getting after the logistics problem with prepositions assets. As this is in open source, it is an example I can use.
Enjoy the readings, I’ll keep them coming!
6 Ospreys from VMM-363 were deployed as part of MRF-D 25.3. So between 1 and 6 Ospreys will be 'stored' in Darwin. What actual maintenance disposition will they be stored under? Who is doing the routine maintenance and checks, if applicable? What is the enduring plan? What is the Squadron's composition going to be for sustained ops when they return to Hawaii, minus those airframes? Not really 'getting after it', more like 'something else made us decide to leave those airframe(s) in place'. God Bless Marine Air, but it wouldn't be the first time.
I think the PLA likes FD, the SIF, and NMESIS because it's a sub-par force and weapons system. They are more afraid of a globally oriented, combined-arms, naval expeditionary force called the United States Marine Corps!
Great, the Chinese want the ARMY to remove their missiles. Nothing mentioned about Marines.
Our missiles aren't worth mentioning!
2. Even a half hearted google search of PLA think tanks and journals will show you plenty of evidence that PRC analysis views USMC modernization (Force Design) as a growing threat, particularly concerning mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles disrupting China’s sea control and complicating PLA planning due to reduced reaction times. There are literally dozens of examples of how PRC commentary frames these deployments as potentially escalatory and provocative. One such example:
https://www.wforum.com/news/weapons/2025/01/03/480324.html?utm
Translation: Raises the difficulty for PLA or Chinese defenses in detecting / intercepting low‑flying, stealthy or sea‑skimming missiles deployed from mobile land bases (like NMESIS). Argues that mobility (JLTV chassis), sea‑skimming missiles, stealth features etc. will make interception harder. Suggests that PRC must respond with better missile defense, sensor coverage, anti‑access / area‑denial (A2/AD) to counter these possibilities. Key concern: USMC’s ability to evade detection / strike first / complicate PLA counterstrike plans. Also concerns about early warning, missile defense, survivability of forward positions.
"come on man!" Wow, it's in Chinese so it must be some magic source. No way it could just be a regurgitation of AP Defense Media stories in Chinese! Except that is exactly what you linked.
I'm not buying it. I think the Chinese are using smoke and mirrors, and you're spreading their gossip.The Army, Navy, Air Force, Japan, and other nations are deploying anti-ship missile systems/units, and they're afraid of a Marine system which is behind schedule and mediocre at best. HIMARS can fire all range of missiles and is available now. Why are they so worried about NMESIS?
Bro, you’ve got to keep up. I already posted about PLA concerns over USMC actions a few days ago. This reveal wasn’t random—it was a deliberate comms plan to highlight JOINT assets in the WEZ. Couple that with the articles your beloved CP pushed on PLA reactions to other JOINT assets in theater, and it’s pretty clear the comms plan is working.
You are like a football fan that only cares about special teams (one service). It will take the entire JOINT team and our partners and allies to prevail in the next fight.
Yes, it is a JOINT team effort. However, one element of the Joint Force, the combined-arms naval expeditionary force, has been severely weakened, with the divestment of tanks, arty, and other assets. This limits our capability to take the battle to the enemy at a time and place of our choosing. A globally oriented Marine Corps is a more powerful force than a regionally oriented force.