In a recent comment on Compass Points, I applauded the 39th Commandant for making significant changes to Force Design to get the Marine Corps back on track. I also pointed out that despite these changes, much more needs to be done. The best place to start should be obvious: kill the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR); the current concept for small, isolated and widely separated Stand-in Forces (SIFs); the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)/Naval Strike Missile (NSM); and the Landing Ship Medium (LSM).
The purpose-built MLR and ineffective NMESIS/NSM are neither relevant today nor in the future. The NSM is ill-suited for attacking ships from fixed positions ashore given its slow speed and short range. Isolated and widely separated SIFs and 14-knot, lightly armed, and unprotected LSMs are not survivable in contested waters. Were none of the NMESIS/NSM and LSM tactical limitations bad enough, the programmatics should be a coup de grace for both programs. Consider the following:
1. According to the FD 2025 update: “The Service fielded the first six NMESIS launchers to 3rd MLR in 2023 and continues to build capacity toward 18 launchers per medium-range missile system launcher (MMSL) battery, which will be full realized in FY 33.” Note: not said is when the 12th MLR will receive its full complement of launchers.
2. The fielding schedule for the first nine LSM/LSV type vessels that Congress authorized for “testing and experimentation” is well into the future. The lead ship is not expected to be delivered until 2029 or later. At best, these ships will compete with traditional amphibs for funding and manning. At worst, they will count against the 31amphibious ship requirement.
The Marines have a lethal, supportable, and sustainable solution to these ill-conceived programs - - task organize for any mission from the Corps’ traditional toolkit of capabilities, augmented with new and better equipment as appropriate. Consider the following:
The U.S. Army recently conducted a live-fire test of the precision strike missile (PrSM), increment 2 in Australia. See https://www.foxnews.com/politics/next-gen-missile-shows-off-first-pacific-test-us-expands-long-range-arsenal. This version of the ballistic PrSM has an unclassified range of 300 miles and can hit moving targets on land or at sea. Future increments are expected to increase the range to 600 miles. The missile was fired from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) vehicle owned by the Australian Defense Force. The Marine Corps has seven batteries of HIMARS in the active force and three batteries in the Reserves. Each battery consists of six missile launchers, for a total of 60 launchers.
And the Marines have other anti-ship options in their toolkit that are better than the ground launched subsonic, 115-mile range Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
One option is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), which is the air-launched joint version of the NSM. The JSM can be carried in the F-35C’s internal weapons bay, which allows the aircraft to maintain its stealth capabilities. Capable of attacking both land and sea targets, the JSM has an unclassified range of 200 miles. When coupled with the combat range of the F-35C (600 miles), targets can be struck at distances approximating 800 miles. The Marines have six squadrons of F-35Cs in the active force and 2 squadrons in the reserve force. Each squadron has a Primary Aircraft Authorization of 12 aircraft, for a total of 96 aircraft. The JSM can also be carried externally by the F-35B, which degrades some of the aircraft’s stealth capabilities. The combat range of the F-35B is 450 miles, which is 150 miles less than the F-35C. The Marines have twelve squadrons of F-35Bs in the active force, with a PAA of12 aircraft per squadron, for a total of 144 aircraft.
Another anti-ship option available to the Marines is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (AGM-158 LRASM). The LRASM is designed to strike targets at significantly greater range than other older air-delivered anti-ship missiles. The exact range is classified, although the US Navy states the range is “greater than 200 nautical miles.” The LRASM can be carried by both the F-35C and F-35B but externally on both aircraft. See https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-f-35-fighter-can-now-sink-your-battleship/
Clearly, the Marine Corps has better options than the purpose-built MLR, small and isolated SIFs, and the subsonic, short-range NSM. There is no need to continue down the current path of a largely purpose-built, regional defense force that is neither survivable nor sustainable inside hotly contested areas. The Marines already have the HIMARS and F-35s and can task-organize for an anti-ship mission if necessary. The same case can be made for a “sense and make sense” mission.
And if the Marines need a SIF, task-organize it to be a combined arms MEB or MEF size force, supported by traditional amphibious ships and MPF.
It's not too late for the senior leaders to change course and do the right thing for the Marine Corps, the combatant commanders, and the Nation. Simply stated, reorganize III MEF into a traditional division, wing, and CSS structure; divest the MLR and NMESIS/NSM; replace the LSM with traditional amphibious ships; and task organize for missions from a robust and resilient toolkit of MEF capabilities.
BGen McAbee is on point. Of particular concern is the LSM. This version of a WW2 LST - although with fewer self defense weapons - should be a nonstarter. It does not solve any problem and will never survive high intensity combat. It will be counted against the 31 amphib requirement without doubt. CMC/CNO need to recalculate the shipping requirement and tell DoD and Congress the "real" requirement. We cannot be a 911 force/force in readiness if we can't maintain MEUs at sea 24/7/365; don't have sufficient lift for a MEB/MEF; and don't have a robust MPF capability.
I'd love to see CP readers reimagine the SIF. What kind of low-signature forces could the Marines actually bring to bear that might move the needle? If the answer is none, at least we would have steel-manned the argument: instead of just shitting on it, we tried to make the SIF as good as it could get within some realistic constraints and restraints.
I truly believe (I have no actual experience) that a traditional MEU equipped with HIMARS could perform the anti-ship mission. Instead of tanks load up with HIMARS. Maybe even a manned JLTV HIMARS/PrSM for a smaller footprint aboard ship. They could be landed as needed. By conducting spontaneous landings, will keep the PLA guessing. I'm sure PLA forces know where the SIF will deploy to now, and have these spots zeroed in. The Marine Corps did not have to be reorganized and given a new mission statement in order to sink ships.
TANSTAAFL (There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch). The famous acronym used by legendary economist Milton Friedman reminds us that everything has a price, even if it is deferred or hidden. Much like the Fram Oil Filter commercial of old – you can pay me now, or you can pay me later!
Simple question that I hope has a simple answer. 2 regiments? The entire Marine Corps was stripped of combat power to field 2 regiments that are glorified defense battalions from WW2? Was the original plan to convert the entire Marine Corps to this new formation? If the advocates are now "falling back" then why is there any doubt that rebuilding the GCE back to fighting shape is now needed? Keep the answers simple. I didn't go to Harvard or the War College.
Very good question, Solomon. The whole Marine Corps was turned upside down, just to change two regiments. Yet, 6 yrs later we still do not have a complete NMESIS battery!
Agree that there is reason for modest optimism in signs that the Marine Corps is now acknowledging the need for course correction to begin the return to once again becoming the nation's force in readiness, a force requiring a true combined arms capability that can be task organized to expand and be sustained per the challenge at hand. Compass Point contributors, often led by BGen McAbee, have time and again through the months clearly articulated the fundamental flaws in the original 2030, both as conceptualized and in the fragmented attempts at implementation. If Marine Corps leadership is truly invested in righting the ship, it needs to be honest in acknowledging a degree of misjudgment (no doubt problematic) and a strong desire to get back on track. Should there be an acknowledgement it must be included in pending testimony before the Congress. Returning to true relevance will obviously be long and require support from this and future administrations as well as a Congress that is more willing to accept their fundamental role in meaningful oversight. The previous Commandant took full advantage of the long forthright actions of those ahead of him to convince an at best casually engaged Congress that he was to be trusted in his dramatic refocus that required only level funding. I can assert with a degree of first hand experience that few had even a modest appreciation for the true impacts of what was taking place, but as always most 'trusted the Marines.' Time for the Congress, authorizers and appropriators, to become part of the solution in assisting the Marine Corps in returning to once again becoming a viable force in readiness. Long, long road back, but it must begin with more meaningful engagement.
The Marines are supposedly the most analytical service by virtue of operations research investment in the US Military; however, the decisions made by leadership betray that investment. Like so many other Force Design decisions, the choice to eliminate Scout Snipers will probably be reversed--like the mortgaging of tubed artillery, creation and dissolution of the third MLR, and the slow-bleed death of both the MEBs and amphibious warships. The cost will be high, the capability returned to the Fleet will be less than what was lost--this is the reality of fixing mistakes. You are never made whole, let alone better than what you were. You find yourself with a new baseline, and that will be hard. If long range reconnaissance wasn't important, JSOC would not have a Ranger Reconnasissance Company. The Marines need this capability to support the MEUs, MEBs and MEFs, and REALLY need this capability if you want to have a SIF! The proliferation of low-cost, high-impact unmanned systems does not eliminate the need for LRRP, it simply adds a new dimension to it! Remember, while the 'character of warfare' evolves, the nature of war does not. This is something that is beat into the heads of every Marine from OCS to TBS, IOC, EWS and beyond. DO NOT FAIL YOUR EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
I appreciate the comments of T.X. Hammes, Ph.D., distinguished research fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, 30-year Marine Corps veteran.
I also remember when he used to contribute to this site.
"The emerging operational environment of AI-assisted command and control, precision mass and pervasive surveillance in all spectrums directly challenges two of the Marine Corps’ signature missions — amphibious assault and forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units.
Both rely on big amphibious ships operating close to shore.
This year, a reinforced carrier strike group strained to defeat attacks by limited numbers of Houthi drones and missiles. Today, Russia is routinely launching over 500 missiles and drones in a single night. Complicating the problem, the current concept of “shooting the archer” will simply not work against proliferating containerized weapons, which are effectively indistinguishable from the millions of cargo containers across the globe. From the time the containers open until weapons are away is 10 to 15 minutes — too fast to preempt.
Today, Iran, Russia and China are fielding and exporting shipping containers with missiles and drones that have more than double the range of the F-35B.
Ships, beachheads, logistics nodes and airbases — even temporary forward arming and refueling points — will be overwhelmed in mass attacks. In a world of proliferating cheap drones, helicopter insertions are rapidly becoming infeasible too. In short, the United States has heavily invested in incredibly expensive ships and planes that are vastly outranged and outnumbered by smart and cheap systems.
Fortunately, the Marine Corps’ modernization plan, Force Design, started moving the service in the right direction. Smaller units with emphasis on intelligence collection and long-range fires have proven they can play a significant role in modern combat.
Warfighting will still require combined arms teams that include space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. But those units will have to blend into the environment, minimize signatures, operate in much smaller elements, procure logistics locally and be commanded by very small mobile headquarters.
Power projection remains a core mission, but it cannot be executed using World War II tactics. The Navy-Marine team must adapt."
T.X. who I have known for years, stopped contributing to this site when he wrote that the Marine Corps' combined arms was its rifle squads and I responded with words that amounted to "get real."
Your words that "combined arms teams . . . include space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities" suggest that breaching and bridging capabilities, cannon artillery, and armor are not needed; these are the very elements along with infantry that make up a combined arms team. Space, cyber, and so forth are additive that's all. Only amateurs would believe otherwise.
Examine the CCP/PRC’S massive Amphibious Force poised to invade ROC aka Taiwan….it is Operation Overlord modified and adapted to 2025. IOW it is based on WWII tactics. Sadly the USMC under Berger and Smith adopted the Japanese model of Defensive Forces left on islands w/o logistical support to be destroyed or bypassed and starved!
In a recent comment on Compass Points, I applauded the 39th Commandant for making significant changes to Force Design to get the Marine Corps back on track. I also pointed out that despite these changes, much more needs to be done. The best place to start should be obvious: kill the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR); the current concept for small, isolated and widely separated Stand-in Forces (SIFs); the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)/Naval Strike Missile (NSM); and the Landing Ship Medium (LSM).
The purpose-built MLR and ineffective NMESIS/NSM are neither relevant today nor in the future. The NSM is ill-suited for attacking ships from fixed positions ashore given its slow speed and short range. Isolated and widely separated SIFs and 14-knot, lightly armed, and unprotected LSMs are not survivable in contested waters. Were none of the NMESIS/NSM and LSM tactical limitations bad enough, the programmatics should be a coup de grace for both programs. Consider the following:
1. According to the FD 2025 update: “The Service fielded the first six NMESIS launchers to 3rd MLR in 2023 and continues to build capacity toward 18 launchers per medium-range missile system launcher (MMSL) battery, which will be full realized in FY 33.” Note: not said is when the 12th MLR will receive its full complement of launchers.
2. The fielding schedule for the first nine LSM/LSV type vessels that Congress authorized for “testing and experimentation” is well into the future. The lead ship is not expected to be delivered until 2029 or later. At best, these ships will compete with traditional amphibs for funding and manning. At worst, they will count against the 31amphibious ship requirement.
The Marines have a lethal, supportable, and sustainable solution to these ill-conceived programs - - task organize for any mission from the Corps’ traditional toolkit of capabilities, augmented with new and better equipment as appropriate. Consider the following:
The U.S. Army recently conducted a live-fire test of the precision strike missile (PrSM), increment 2 in Australia. See https://www.foxnews.com/politics/next-gen-missile-shows-off-first-pacific-test-us-expands-long-range-arsenal. This version of the ballistic PrSM has an unclassified range of 300 miles and can hit moving targets on land or at sea. Future increments are expected to increase the range to 600 miles. The missile was fired from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) vehicle owned by the Australian Defense Force. The Marine Corps has seven batteries of HIMARS in the active force and three batteries in the Reserves. Each battery consists of six missile launchers, for a total of 60 launchers.
And the Marines have other anti-ship options in their toolkit that are better than the ground launched subsonic, 115-mile range Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
One option is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), which is the air-launched joint version of the NSM. The JSM can be carried in the F-35C’s internal weapons bay, which allows the aircraft to maintain its stealth capabilities. Capable of attacking both land and sea targets, the JSM has an unclassified range of 200 miles. When coupled with the combat range of the F-35C (600 miles), targets can be struck at distances approximating 800 miles. The Marines have six squadrons of F-35Cs in the active force and 2 squadrons in the reserve force. Each squadron has a Primary Aircraft Authorization of 12 aircraft, for a total of 96 aircraft. The JSM can also be carried externally by the F-35B, which degrades some of the aircraft’s stealth capabilities. The combat range of the F-35B is 450 miles, which is 150 miles less than the F-35C. The Marines have twelve squadrons of F-35Bs in the active force, with a PAA of12 aircraft per squadron, for a total of 144 aircraft.
Another anti-ship option available to the Marines is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (AGM-158 LRASM). The LRASM is designed to strike targets at significantly greater range than other older air-delivered anti-ship missiles. The exact range is classified, although the US Navy states the range is “greater than 200 nautical miles.” The LRASM can be carried by both the F-35C and F-35B but externally on both aircraft. See https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-f-35-fighter-can-now-sink-your-battleship/
Clearly, the Marine Corps has better options than the purpose-built MLR, small and isolated SIFs, and the subsonic, short-range NSM. There is no need to continue down the current path of a largely purpose-built, regional defense force that is neither survivable nor sustainable inside hotly contested areas. The Marines already have the HIMARS and F-35s and can task-organize for an anti-ship mission if necessary. The same case can be made for a “sense and make sense” mission.
And if the Marines need a SIF, task-organize it to be a combined arms MEB or MEF size force, supported by traditional amphibious ships and MPF.
It's not too late for the senior leaders to change course and do the right thing for the Marine Corps, the combatant commanders, and the Nation. Simply stated, reorganize III MEF into a traditional division, wing, and CSS structure; divest the MLR and NMESIS/NSM; replace the LSM with traditional amphibious ships; and task organize for missions from a robust and resilient toolkit of MEF capabilities.
BGen McAbee is on point. Of particular concern is the LSM. This version of a WW2 LST - although with fewer self defense weapons - should be a nonstarter. It does not solve any problem and will never survive high intensity combat. It will be counted against the 31 amphib requirement without doubt. CMC/CNO need to recalculate the shipping requirement and tell DoD and Congress the "real" requirement. We cannot be a 911 force/force in readiness if we can't maintain MEUs at sea 24/7/365; don't have sufficient lift for a MEB/MEF; and don't have a robust MPF capability.
I'd love to see CP readers reimagine the SIF. What kind of low-signature forces could the Marines actually bring to bear that might move the needle? If the answer is none, at least we would have steel-manned the argument: instead of just shitting on it, we tried to make the SIF as good as it could get within some realistic constraints and restraints.
I truly believe (I have no actual experience) that a traditional MEU equipped with HIMARS could perform the anti-ship mission. Instead of tanks load up with HIMARS. Maybe even a manned JLTV HIMARS/PrSM for a smaller footprint aboard ship. They could be landed as needed. By conducting spontaneous landings, will keep the PLA guessing. I'm sure PLA forces know where the SIF will deploy to now, and have these spots zeroed in. The Marine Corps did not have to be reorganized and given a new mission statement in order to sink ships.
TANSTAAFL (There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch). The famous acronym used by legendary economist Milton Friedman reminds us that everything has a price, even if it is deferred or hidden. Much like the Fram Oil Filter commercial of old – you can pay me now, or you can pay me later!
Simple question that I hope has a simple answer. 2 regiments? The entire Marine Corps was stripped of combat power to field 2 regiments that are glorified defense battalions from WW2? Was the original plan to convert the entire Marine Corps to this new formation? If the advocates are now "falling back" then why is there any doubt that rebuilding the GCE back to fighting shape is now needed? Keep the answers simple. I didn't go to Harvard or the War College.
Very good question, Solomon. The whole Marine Corps was turned upside down, just to change two regiments. Yet, 6 yrs later we still do not have a complete NMESIS battery!
Agree that there is reason for modest optimism in signs that the Marine Corps is now acknowledging the need for course correction to begin the return to once again becoming the nation's force in readiness, a force requiring a true combined arms capability that can be task organized to expand and be sustained per the challenge at hand. Compass Point contributors, often led by BGen McAbee, have time and again through the months clearly articulated the fundamental flaws in the original 2030, both as conceptualized and in the fragmented attempts at implementation. If Marine Corps leadership is truly invested in righting the ship, it needs to be honest in acknowledging a degree of misjudgment (no doubt problematic) and a strong desire to get back on track. Should there be an acknowledgement it must be included in pending testimony before the Congress. Returning to true relevance will obviously be long and require support from this and future administrations as well as a Congress that is more willing to accept their fundamental role in meaningful oversight. The previous Commandant took full advantage of the long forthright actions of those ahead of him to convince an at best casually engaged Congress that he was to be trusted in his dramatic refocus that required only level funding. I can assert with a degree of first hand experience that few had even a modest appreciation for the true impacts of what was taking place, but as always most 'trusted the Marines.' Time for the Congress, authorizers and appropriators, to become part of the solution in assisting the Marine Corps in returning to once again becoming a viable force in readiness. Long, long road back, but it must begin with more meaningful engagement.
The Marines are supposedly the most analytical service by virtue of operations research investment in the US Military; however, the decisions made by leadership betray that investment. Like so many other Force Design decisions, the choice to eliminate Scout Snipers will probably be reversed--like the mortgaging of tubed artillery, creation and dissolution of the third MLR, and the slow-bleed death of both the MEBs and amphibious warships. The cost will be high, the capability returned to the Fleet will be less than what was lost--this is the reality of fixing mistakes. You are never made whole, let alone better than what you were. You find yourself with a new baseline, and that will be hard. If long range reconnaissance wasn't important, JSOC would not have a Ranger Reconnasissance Company. The Marines need this capability to support the MEUs, MEBs and MEFs, and REALLY need this capability if you want to have a SIF! The proliferation of low-cost, high-impact unmanned systems does not eliminate the need for LRRP, it simply adds a new dimension to it! Remember, while the 'character of warfare' evolves, the nature of war does not. This is something that is beat into the heads of every Marine from OCS to TBS, IOC, EWS and beyond. DO NOT FAIL YOUR EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
I appreciate the comments of T.X. Hammes, Ph.D., distinguished research fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, 30-year Marine Corps veteran.
I also remember when he used to contribute to this site.
"The emerging operational environment of AI-assisted command and control, precision mass and pervasive surveillance in all spectrums directly challenges two of the Marine Corps’ signature missions — amphibious assault and forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units.
Both rely on big amphibious ships operating close to shore.
This year, a reinforced carrier strike group strained to defeat attacks by limited numbers of Houthi drones and missiles. Today, Russia is routinely launching over 500 missiles and drones in a single night. Complicating the problem, the current concept of “shooting the archer” will simply not work against proliferating containerized weapons, which are effectively indistinguishable from the millions of cargo containers across the globe. From the time the containers open until weapons are away is 10 to 15 minutes — too fast to preempt.
Today, Iran, Russia and China are fielding and exporting shipping containers with missiles and drones that have more than double the range of the F-35B.
Ships, beachheads, logistics nodes and airbases — even temporary forward arming and refueling points — will be overwhelmed in mass attacks. In a world of proliferating cheap drones, helicopter insertions are rapidly becoming infeasible too. In short, the United States has heavily invested in incredibly expensive ships and planes that are vastly outranged and outnumbered by smart and cheap systems.
Fortunately, the Marine Corps’ modernization plan, Force Design, started moving the service in the right direction. Smaller units with emphasis on intelligence collection and long-range fires have proven they can play a significant role in modern combat.
Warfighting will still require combined arms teams that include space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. But those units will have to blend into the environment, minimize signatures, operate in much smaller elements, procure logistics locally and be commanded by very small mobile headquarters.
Power projection remains a core mission, but it cannot be executed using World War II tactics. The Navy-Marine team must adapt."
T.X. who I have known for years, stopped contributing to this site when he wrote that the Marine Corps' combined arms was its rifle squads and I responded with words that amounted to "get real."
Your words that "combined arms teams . . . include space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities" suggest that breaching and bridging capabilities, cannon artillery, and armor are not needed; these are the very elements along with infantry that make up a combined arms team. Space, cyber, and so forth are additive that's all. Only amateurs would believe otherwise.
General PVR simply stated facts. Some people cannot handle the truth!
Examine the CCP/PRC’S massive Amphibious Force poised to invade ROC aka Taiwan….it is Operation Overlord modified and adapted to 2025. IOW it is based on WWII tactics. Sadly the USMC under Berger and Smith adopted the Japanese model of Defensive Forces left on islands w/o logistical support to be destroyed or bypassed and starved!
Excellent observations, Sam. When you break down FD, that is exactly what you get.
The Netflix documentary, MARINE, I thought was very well done. None of the usual Hollywood BS, just Marines being Marines.