The issue here is crystal clear. A gross lack of integrity by omission and commission. This is not putting a positive spin on a situation. It is intentionally deceptive. The lack of integrity across the senior leadership of the Corps is a disgrace.
Toxic ambition spawns moral cowardice. Someday this will be a case study at the War Colleges.
The sad part about lies and deception is that you actually are insulting people when you believe they are dumb enough to believe the amateurish deception.
The admission that a firing section is now 3 vehicles for one launcher is sheer madness. 5 vehicles for 3 launchers was not great math, but not quite as wild.
This does not make sense in any way you look at it. We got rid of over 400 tanks and three quarters
of our field artillery, for a system that is still not fully operational after six years? Three vehicles for a firing section? How does that make sense? This is not only sad, its disgusting!
I was in the process of pasting quotes from the link to show how badly the Corps has handled this "FD2030" transition.....but I realized that the entire article is a damning report card on something done completely half-assed.
Captain Mario A. Fajardo, thank you for pointing out, at the company level, the absolute tragedy of this. Here is a Marine Corps company officer, how has been told "this is the way it is" since the day he joined....and what he has found in the fleet.
I hate repeating myself but in 2019 the US Marine Commandant had many different ways to go in the development of “lethality”. I am at a loss for a reason why he decided to chase land based anti-ship missiles to support a decade long “pivot” to the Pacific. (The Clinton Administration was the first to order a pivot to the Pacific.)
In 2019 the Commandant was at the beginning of a Joint Force Deliberate Planning Process. I understand looking out to 2030 for development purposes but the idea to “divest to invest” for 2030 was a mistake. Instead of providing and improving US Marine MAGTF capabilities for the Combatant Commanders deliberate planning process, he diminished those capabilities under a false banner of increased lethality.
Amphibious ships and maintenance issues was and remains the major problem because it denies the Joint Force the strategic and tactical capability of amphibious operations.
The problem for the pivot to the Pacific is the same when the post WW1 Orange War Plan began. “The Mahan ruler” is a shorthand way of referring to Mahan’s strategic framework—a set of principles he believed every maritime nation should follow… A navy can only project power as far as it can sustain coal, fuel, logistics, and repairs. This is why Mahan emphasized overseas bases, coaling stations, colonies and control chokepoints. In other words: A fleet’s effective power shrinks with distance unless supported by bases.” (AI) The problem that defined the Mahan Ruler was the DISTANCE from the West Coast to the Philippines. Today, compared to the WW1 war planners, the Joint Force now has the additional domains of air and space to consider and the distances that represent.
General Berger should have turned to the US Marine Development Center and asked them to coordinate with not only the Combatant Commanders but also the Military Services development centers to see what was on their drawing boards.
Here is a list of news article just from the last week with military developments that leaves FD2030 in the dust. Yep, WTF, Over. S/F
U.S. Army Develops ‘Breakthrough’ Quantum Sensor | RealClearDefense
The issue here is crystal clear. A gross lack of integrity by omission and commission. This is not putting a positive spin on a situation. It is intentionally deceptive. The lack of integrity across the senior leadership of the Corps is a disgrace.
Toxic ambition spawns moral cowardice. Someday this will be a case study at the War Colleges.
The sad part about lies and deception is that you actually are insulting people when you believe they are dumb enough to believe the amateurish deception.
The admission that a firing section is now 3 vehicles for one launcher is sheer madness. 5 vehicles for 3 launchers was not great math, but not quite as wild.
Idee fixe – An idea/desire that dominates the mind, an obsession. A “fixed idea” in French. In psychology it’s an irrational obsession.
This does not make sense in any way you look at it. We got rid of over 400 tanks and three quarters
of our field artillery, for a system that is still not fully operational after six years? Three vehicles for a firing section? How does that make sense? This is not only sad, its disgusting!
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/june/eabos-maritime-targeting-problem
I was in the process of pasting quotes from the link to show how badly the Corps has handled this "FD2030" transition.....but I realized that the entire article is a damning report card on something done completely half-assed.
Captain Mario A. Fajardo, thank you for pointing out, at the company level, the absolute tragedy of this. Here is a Marine Corps company officer, how has been told "this is the way it is" since the day he joined....and what he has found in the fleet.
WTF! Over?
I hate repeating myself but in 2019 the US Marine Commandant had many different ways to go in the development of “lethality”. I am at a loss for a reason why he decided to chase land based anti-ship missiles to support a decade long “pivot” to the Pacific. (The Clinton Administration was the first to order a pivot to the Pacific.)
In 2019 the Commandant was at the beginning of a Joint Force Deliberate Planning Process. I understand looking out to 2030 for development purposes but the idea to “divest to invest” for 2030 was a mistake. Instead of providing and improving US Marine MAGTF capabilities for the Combatant Commanders deliberate planning process, he diminished those capabilities under a false banner of increased lethality.
Amphibious ships and maintenance issues was and remains the major problem because it denies the Joint Force the strategic and tactical capability of amphibious operations.
The problem for the pivot to the Pacific is the same when the post WW1 Orange War Plan began. “The Mahan ruler” is a shorthand way of referring to Mahan’s strategic framework—a set of principles he believed every maritime nation should follow… A navy can only project power as far as it can sustain coal, fuel, logistics, and repairs. This is why Mahan emphasized overseas bases, coaling stations, colonies and control chokepoints. In other words: A fleet’s effective power shrinks with distance unless supported by bases.” (AI) The problem that defined the Mahan Ruler was the DISTANCE from the West Coast to the Philippines. Today, compared to the WW1 war planners, the Joint Force now has the additional domains of air and space to consider and the distances that represent.
General Berger should have turned to the US Marine Development Center and asked them to coordinate with not only the Combatant Commanders but also the Military Services development centers to see what was on their drawing boards.
Here is a list of news article just from the last week with military developments that leaves FD2030 in the dust. Yep, WTF, Over. S/F
U.S. Army Develops ‘Breakthrough’ Quantum Sensor | RealClearDefense
https://www.realcleardefense.com/2026/06/08/us_army_develops_breakthrough_quantum_sensor_1187269.html
Air Force F-35s Get New Joint Strike Missile | RealClearDefense
https://www.realcleardefense.com/2026/06/08/air_force_f-35s_get_new_joint_strike_missile_1187267.html
EABO’s Maritime Targeting Problem | Proceedings - June 2026 Vol. 152/6/1,480
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/june/eabos-maritime-targeting-problem
Accelerating U.S. Missile Development and Naval Posture in the Indo-Pacific - Defense Security Monitor
https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2026/02/17/accelerating-u-s-missile-development-and-naval-posture-in-the-indo-pacific/