Compass Points - Prodigious Comments

Readers expand the discussion

Compass Points - Prodigious Comments

Readers expand the discussion

August 23, 2024

marinecorpscompasspoints.sutstack.com

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Compass Points readers have responded online and off with a treasure load of comments, insights, and analysis. Only a few of the comments are re-posted below. Some long, insightful comments have been reduced to merely a line or two. Most of the full comments are available for reading on the Compass Points site. Comments have continued to arrive in response to a previous comment that argued, "We, the Corps, need to be a combination of Commando, Massad, ninja, Cyber spook, CIA analyst, and Ambassador.” As always, comments have been edited for length and content. Compass Points appreciates the full, insightful, and professional comments of all readers. Many thanks!

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Randy Shetter

We do not need a Commando, ninja type Marine Corps. We already have SOCOM for that (MARSOC, SEALS, Delta Force, Special Forces, Rangers, and AFSOC). We also do not need additional light infantry, since we have Army airborne, airmobile, and light infantry. In CMC Amos' Planning Guidance, he said the Marine Corps is "A middleweight force, we are light enough to get there quickly, but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival...."

What does a middleweight force mean (my answer is based upon the pre-FD Marine Corps)? While the Marine Corps is an infantry centric force, it has a substantial armored and mechanized component, with tanks, AAVs/ACVs and LAVs. The Marine Division has its own artillery regiment for robust fire support. With its own aviation component, infantry can be vertically inserted into the enemy's rear or flanks. All these elements of the combined arms force (pre-FD) are built around a Marine infantry battalion, and are at sea ready for any contingency.

While SOCOM is light and ninja like, they do not have the staying power of conventional ground forces. They are great at what they do: hit and run raids and making mischief. The middleweight, general purpose nature of the Marine Corps enables it to be infantry, mech, airmobile and amphibious. It is a versatile force with many capabilities. This is the real Marine Corps needed to fight a two-front war.

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Roman Lash LaRue

The Marine Corps needs to return to its former stature. It's a designer force. That's why we had the various components to field a strike force and follow on force for various emergencies or conflicts.

Upgrades are always required but you don't remove or deplete without properly trained replacement of personnel and equipment.

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Thomas M. Huber

It strikes me that the purpose of commandos is to support the modern-combined-arms effort. That commandos alone could replace modern-combined-arms operations is fantasy. Sooner or later the USMC will have to face the Chinese Goliath on Pacific shores, and it will need more than commandos.

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medevicerep

I had the honor of growing up in the same neighborhood where PFC Simanek lived in the 60’s and 70’s. He was just a regular guy, but every Memorial Day he would put on his MOH and ride in the parade. My father had deep respect for him and told us his story. He also told us not to bother him with any questions, just always be respectful. He was one of my earliest inspirations to join the Marine Corps. Thanks for sharing this story. I had not thought of him for a long time.

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polarbear

Maneuver has never gone away. Ther US Marine Corps leadership (and SECNAV) abandon maneuver. Naval and Amphibious Warfare is all about maneuver strategically, operationally and tactically, The US military national defense strategy has refocused on the threat of a global peer-to-peer war where the US Naval Services should be leading the charge. Instead, we have a Navy that cannot build and maintain ships. In addition, the US Joint strategic mobility contingency plans now have a gap that once was filled by amphibious and prepositioned Marine forces. Instead of buying into a bad strategy, the Marine Corps missed the opportunity to demonstrate leadership in global strategic thinking by raising the horse-pucky flag on the island chain strategy.

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Alfred Karam

I do think there were two funerals on the day Gen. Al Gray was buried. Although we can’t resurrect the General, we could do everything possible to resurrect the Marine Corps as was envisioned by Gen. Gray. We can resurrect the MAGTF and push the Marine Corps leadership to add lethality to meet the current and emerging threat!

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Douglas C Rapé

Hindsight can distort what was evolution and ascribe revolution. The Corps had been maneuver warfare centric through much of its history. Before Bill Lind burst on the scene the fundamentals of maneuver warfare were being exercised and executed by numerous units blessed with well educated and insightful leaders. Gen Wilson’s implementation of CAX’s at 29 Palms revitalized the use of maneuver and supporting arms integration. The acquisition of the Harrier and FARPs were maneuver warfare. The LAV was maneuver warfare driven. The development of the MV-22 was an endorsement of maneuver warfare. Those who were avid professional readers saw the fingerprints of maneuver warfare in Alexander the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, RE Lee, Stewart, even Longstreet, MacArthur, Rommel, Guderian, Patton, Manstein etc. It was not revolutionary to the initiated. It needed polishing, reinforcement, implementation and customization. Col Wyly was one of many of the acolytes as demonstrated by his tours at TBS and AWS. Gen Gray became the intellectual leader and champion in that era. He refocused the Corps to its only reason for existing. Desert Storm/ Desert Shield was classic maneuver.

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Jerry McAbee

The sad fact is that Marine infantry is essentially naked and alone on today's battlefield. Most will not have artillery support. None we will have tank, bridging, or in-stride breaching support. Most will have limited CIF and CAS support. Relying on another service to provide this support is a fool's errand. Unless properly supported, infantry - - no matter how good the individual Marine - - will be unable to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. We know this from past battles. Sending Marine infantry into combat without robust and resilient combined arms support is criminal.

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Paul Van Riper

What some FD supporters miss is it is not just those of us who retired some time ago who see fatal flaws in Force Design 2030; there are a large number of recently retired three and four-star Marine generals who are in the same camp. And there are many active duty officers who reach out to us routinely voicing their concerns about the course on which the present and past CMC have placed the Corps.

My own analysis is that those who are true Force Design believers are in a sense victims of 20 years of fighting an insurgency. Those of us who fought main force Viet Cong units, and the North Vietnamese Army’s forces, as well as insurgents have a much different view of war. It is one where mass and maneuver count and precision fires are important but not central to battles and engagements. We know that it is the proper employment of combined arms that wins battles and campaigns as it has for more than 100 years.

Generals Krulak, Zinni, Sheehan, I, and others have seen what it’s like to face a determined enemy that fights in large formations where cannon artillery and close air support are vital with large numbers of munitions the order of the day. In my first fire fight as a rifle company commander, I called for over 300 rounds of artillery and three air strikes in a little over an hour. All those Marines I mentioned had similar experiences. Each was seriously wounded during the Vietnam War and spent weeks in the hospital. As a result, our view of war is different than many currently serving officers—not better or worse—just different. However, it represents a type of war that has existed for millennia and there is no evidence it is going away.

I have listened to the hype surrounding new technologies for more than 60 years and found it to be a siren song. Napoleon was correct, big battalions and artillery win wars, all else is and remains peripheral.  -- Semper Fi!  “Rip” Van Riper

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

What I learned at TBS and 6th IOC class (Nov/Dec 1978) was in part “never again” and part, "damn it don’t do this and don’t do that." How did our instructors know? Because they got the hell shot out of them and learned how to survive and thrive in a very, very difficult constant combat environment. Organic Battalion combined arms, the 60mm mortar aka the Company Commander's hip pocket artillery, etc., etc. Those lessons carried with me into the FMF 3/2 and instructor training at the then ITS and later ALL through a civilian career. To this day I don’t just take a walk in the forest or down a street without some assessment of the ground around me. What would I do if? A large part of this mind set is again OUR Marine Corps ethos, our unwillingness to compromise our values and way of doing business.

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polarbear

 One of the major points of “Warfighting” (and winning), taught by Col Boyd, Bill Lind, Col Wyly and General Grey, is the need to adapt to ever changing situations. The MAGTF organization and combat power offers tremendous adaptability and flexibility. We have heard on CP from experienced combat commanders they want their FULL tool bag in hand.

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Lynn Stuart

The analogy of the world’s precious Antimony with the diminishing role of the MAGTF and its impact on our national defense couldn’t be more explicit.

Why does the active leadership in our Corps continue to ascribe to Force Design 2030 philosophy and courses of action that defy logic and common sense? The Marine Corps has been relegated to a menial role in the overall military defense scheme, not only incapable of performing its traditional Title X responsibilities, but unable to maintain a consistent MEU presence in most troubled spots of the world.

Other than Compass Points, where is the dialogue, debate, discussion, or arguments (by our Marine leadership) for or against Force 2030? I don’t see it in Leatherneck or any other military journals! Why is this discourse suppressed or obviated at a time when the Corp’s combat capabilities have been significantly depleted and/or divested? To what end? Seven cannon batteries for an entire U.S Marine Corps? Really!! No Tanks, virtually no Combat Engineering, no MP’s, 1/3 reduction in Assault Amphibs, and over 20% reduction in Infantry??? And more! What have we done to our national defense?

Rescuing the Marine Corps from its dwindling self must start from within — with its senior leadership acknowledging its diminished abilities and willing to restore both logic and common sense that has been a casualty of Force Design 2030. That same venue should also open a dialogue among all to support/defend it or lay out a course for a new direction for the Corps. Simultaneously, our leadership should join others (lawmakers and friends of Marines) to take certain initiatives to restore, upgrade, and expand the Marine Corps’ global, combined arms, crisis response MAGTFs. Our US National Defense depends upon it! The U.S. Marine Corps future depends upon it! Semper Fi!

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Douglas C Rapé

Today we are facing a narrow window to rebuild, reform and once again make the Marine Corps a globally relevant MAGTF. Failure to do so will result in a catastrophic impact with Congressional funding priorities and then extinction.

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Raymond Lee Maloy

The vital elements that were divested required brains, brawn, dedication to excellence, supervision and relentless training. Characteristics these pretenders have not demonstrated. They seem lazy and without the traits always associated with Marines.

Of course, it’s easier and less stressful to play at special operations and gimmickry. When nothing is actually being done, there are no accidents or incidents that might negatively affect careers. They can always stay in a transition mode and “look to the future.” How in the world did we get to this point? Semper Fi

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polarbear

I met Bill Lind at the beginning of my academic year at AWS. It was the same year that Maj Wyly took over the tactics instruction at AWS. I had read Bill’s Maneuver Warfare article (or two) in the MC Gazette before AWS but really did not understand what he was writing about. I “got it” when I spent a very long day in the AWS “bed room” listing to Col John Boyd give his “Patterns of Conflict” Presentation.

The presentation was scheduled for 8 hours but it went long after dark. There was no naps in the AWS bed room that day. Col Boyd was a remarkable presenter and in the Patterns of Conflict Presentation he hammered away at his audience that day like an M60 machine gun complete with 8 round bursts with tracers. Most of the class left between 4:30 and 5:30 PM but a small group of us stayed until the end. If I remember correctly that was around 9 PM. It was during that presentation that I got what Bill Lind was talking about. The Patterns of Conflict was the basis for Maneuver Warfare.

The next day Maj Wyly announced that he and Bill Lind were going to form the first AWS Maneuver Warfare Seminar for any interested student. I remember I didn’t get to Maj Wyly’s office until late in the day and fully expected he would tell me the seminar was full but to my surprise it was not. The ten or so seminar volunteers met in the evening once a week in Mr Lind’s living room in DC. Each week Bill gave the group a reading assignment and usually had an invited guest to discuss different aspects of Maneuver Warfare.

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Jeffrey Dinsmore

Attending General Gray's funeral and interment was an incredible life event. He was a personal hero to me as a young Marine, and eventually became a personal acquaintance due to our common experience with SIGINT and 1st Radio Bn. It was also a bit like milling about during a Hall of Fame induction event, looking around at the men of renown who built the modern Corps. I can understand Bill's emotional response to what seems to be a decaying Corps, in light of having attended that event.

I would recommend a re-read of "The Attritionist Letters," which documents, in real time, the decline of the Warfighting philosophy while we fought a slow, methodical, precise, certain insurgency. It fooled everyone into thinking we were masters of the battlespace and could subjugate the nature of war.

It might be worth taking some comfort in history if you are concerned with the immediate decline and death of the Corps:

-For decades prior to WWII, the Corps was viewed nationally as the least desirable service for any young man to join. Our talent management was lacking, to say the least.

-We once had a drunk and a brawler for Commandant. Archibald Henderson corrected the course.

-We once had a Commandant known as a martinet and empty suit. We got a dramatic course correction.

-We once had a Commandant presiding over a Corps in chaos. The Corps was fat, drugged, and racially riven. But when things were at the worst, the Corps embarked on a multi-decade course correction, culminating with General Gray's foundational innovations. We have been riding that momentum, if not nurturing and expanding, for the last 30 years.

The Marine Corps is embroiled with serious problems today.

But this too shall pass.

The Marine Corps will regain its strength.

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Compass Points salutes all Marines and friends of the Corps who in their own ways are continuing to fight for a stronger Marine Corps.