Compass Points - Readers Respond
And Presley O'Bannon Attacks Derna
Compass Points - Readers Respond
And Presley O'Bannon Attacks Derna
April 4, 2023
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On this April 2023, Compass Points celebrates First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon who in April of 1805 with only 8 Marines and a mercenary army of 500, crossed the desert and captured Derna, Tripoli, thereby taking his place in Marine Corps history and hymn for his deeds on the "shores of Tripoli."
Compass Points also appreciates readers comments, replies, input, and opinions. Readers, Colonel Howell and Polarbear, have contributed particularly insightful comments. (Comments have been edited.)
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Colonel Jack D. Howell
(Writes Colonel’s Substack)
Here is a thought. How can losing two battalions of artillery be a step forward? How can a 'combat team that has an anti-ship missile battery provide the Marine Corps with a step-up in flexibility and combat power? A battery is a big step down from two battalions. If the 12th Marines could be improved by adding an anti-ship missile battery, why not add one? How does taking away the 12th Marines make the Marine Corps stronger or the United States safer?
Here is the bottom line:
In the last three years, the Marine Corps has divested 21% of its infantry, 100% of its tanks, 100% of its bridging and mine clearing capability, 67% of its cannon artillery, 29% of its fixed wing aircraft (fighter/attack) and 29% of its rotary wing assets (heavy lift, V-22, and attack helicopters), 100% of its military police units (rear area security during time of war), and a significant amount of its logistics capability! Even worse, Marine Corps combat engineers if called upon today, are no longer capable of providing essential support to breach a minefield, reduce an obstacle, or bridge a gap. This is insane! . . .
The littoral island scenario in the South China Sea will be a logistical nightmare. Marines left to forage for ammo, food, weapons, etc.? Marines operations should have a realistic plan for support, evacuation of wounded, and resupply. Marines should not have to forage!
How did this restructuring plan get this far without SecDef and SecNav raising severe issues? In addition to the fancy "Smoke and Mirrors" shows presented to SecDef and SecNav, my gut tells me that SecNav will be a winner as the Navy will probably cut back on their amphib ship requirement and Marine aviation thereby saving "Blue Dollars."
Finally, we must focus some of our thinking on the Chinese mindset. Know your adversary! I am sure the CCP and the PLA see the Marine Corps restructuring plan Force Design 2030 as folly. While President Lincoln's point about the 5 legged dog is noted, another old story warns us not to put all our eggs in one Force Design basket!
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Polarbear
First assume that the Island Chain Strategy is fundamentally flawed because of it defensive nature. If this assumption is true, then what is the best focus for the Marine Corps, when it comes to a great power competition and potential global war with the CCP?
The Littoral Regiment, because of its defensive nature, should not be the excuse to reduce the capability of this nation’s 911 force. A battalion MAGTF (MEU) is a Swiss army knife for flexible military operations.
For example, in 1983 the 22nd MEU was diverted to Operation Urgent Fury while in route to Lebanon and its Mediterranean float. After the Grenada invasion, the MEU then continued on its original mission to the Mediterranean.
In Grenada, the 22th MEU initially captured the northern Pearls airfield with Echo and Fox Companies by vertical assault after Navy Seal Team 4 determined the beaches were not suitable for amphibious assault.
On 25 October, 250 Marines from G Company landed at Grand Mal Bay equipped with amphibious assault vehicles and four M60 tanks. They relieved the Navy SEALs the following morning, allowing Governor General Paul Scoon, his wife, and nine aides to be safely evacuated. Golf Company also rescued 233 US medical students. The Marine tank crews continued advancing in the face of sporadic resistance, knocking out a BRDM-2 armored car. G Company subsequently defeated and overwhelmed the Grenadian defenders and Cubans at Fort Frederick.
One more example of the flexibility of the MAGTF occurred in 2001 with Task Force 58 (26th MEU), a 200 nautical miles amphibious operation launched from the sea to seize FOB Rhino and then the Kandahar Airfield. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Rhino
These kind of forward, flexible MAGTF operations should be the focus of the Marine Corps -- not defensive ops along the island chain.
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Correction
In yesterday's post, Compass Points - Marines are Ready, a number that should have been posted as "50" was inadvertently posted as "5." The sentence has been corrected on the site and now reads as it should,
"In FY 2020-2024, the Marine Corps is buying fewer than 2,000 HIMARS rockets for approximately 42 HIMARS launchers -- less than 50 new rockets per launcher."
Compass Points regrets the error.
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Look no further than the North Pacific to Kiska. The Japanese did indeed occupy American soil. When the ships to support the army unit on Kiska could not supply the force and with limited and dwindling ammo and food supplies, the commander elected to attack the American landing force. In 36 hours he lost over 2000 men. Lodging oneself on an island with no mobility is suicide when a blockade and subsequent landing occurs. Polak, Adak survivor
One of the greatest causes for my concern is that the propenency for FD 2030 has failed to provide a convincing narrative for the initiative as executed by the USMC. The Gazette and other professional periodicals print much fan fiction about MLRs sinking russian amphibs in the Baltic and Littoral platoons fighting off Peoples Militia in the Indo Pac. It's compelling, but with as much grounding as saying we should aquire UNSC Pelicans and Spartans (Halo video game) level tech. There is a reason so many former senior Marines and Marines have breached the 'protest in private' rule. That alone should merit introspection by FD 2030 proponents. The open questioning is in part ibecause we see the obvious and aren't buying SPAC level marketing to justify 'divest to invest'. The USMC has always had hotly contested force transitions, but those transitions did not abruptly impact force wide capability.
I get the USMC has to manage spending on the four pots (equipment, maintenance, facilities, manpower) and I don't want to fairy dust that challenge. I may not agree with the gap, but would feel more confident if the USMC would just admit they are gapping a capability for a few years to get where they think they need to be. Then I would have cause to think they embraced the risk and developed a robust hedge. I saw too many examples of the 'that GO puts his cammie trousers on like I do' to give a blind pass. If a GO can give a personnel call to the RS COs because the recruiting force is about to lose a key capabilty to dod policy / chinese intrusion (2008)...then we can ask better for FD 2030 implementation.
If FD 2030 is on point, then give us something more than 'take your PRC 77 and go home boomer'; how the sausage is made doesn't change over the decades and many of us have seen how it's made.
But what do I know; I am just a pair of red eyes on the internet....