Compass Points - Red Glare Comments

Readers expand the discussion

Compass Points - Red Glare Comments

Readers expand the discussion

September 14, 2014

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On this day in history the Star-Spangled Banner was written. In the summer of 1814, Virginia lawyer and sometime poet, Francis Scott Key received word that his friend Dr. William Beanes had been captured by the British and was being held on the  HMS Tonnant somewhere between Washington DC and Baltimore. Key hired a 60 foot sloop and set out to find Dr. Beanes. Approaching the warship under a flag of truce, Key negotiated the doctor's release.

But there was a problem. During the negotiations, both Key and Beanes had heard discussions about the British plan to sail an armada to Ft. McHenry at Baltimore. The British would not allow Key and Beanes to be released until after the battle. The 16 ship attack force began bombarding Ft McHenry on September 13, 1814. Key watched from a British ship all through the 'rockets red glare' and 'bombs bursting in air' until finally at dawn on the 14th he could see that the US flag at Ft McHenry was still flying. That morning, Key sat on the deck and penned the poem that became the Star Spangled Banner.

While there is no expectation that Ft McHenry will be shelled in the coming week, still the US is being challenged around the world by ongoing threats and conflicts. What will happen next? No one knows. No matter what happens, however, there is no doubt Compass Points readers will have insightful analysis and comment.

Over the last week, Compass Points readers have responded online and off with a cornucopia of comments, insights, and analysis. Only a few of the comments are re-posted below. Most of the full comments are available for reading on the Compass Points site. As always, comments have been edited for length and content. Several long, thoughtful comments have been reduced to just a sentence or two. Often the real enjoyment comes, not as much from the excerpt included below but, from reading the comment in full. Compass Points appreciates the full, insightful, and professional comments of all readers. Many thanks!

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Bing West

CMC remains committed to deploying 400 missiles on small islands, targeted against Chinese ships. CMC states that 35 Medium Landing Ships (LSM) is the “main effort” in the Planning Guidance. CBO estimates the cost at $13 billion. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60071

The new Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRSM) cost $3.4 million per unit, with a range between 400 and 600 miles.

For $13 billion, the US Navy can procure 400 Marine missiles on 35 delivery ships, or 4,000 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRSM), with a range five times farther.

400 vs 4,000 missiles? By a factor of ten to one, the Commandant’s concept makes no fiscal sense.

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Alfred Karam

Today’s Compass Points commentary is the most sensible approach to the FD fiasco. Marine Corps leadership should have applied this approach from the get go. There was no need to divest from so much firepower to create the SIF. I know, money is the driving factor for the divestment. However, I don’t believe the MC leadership advocated hard enough to increase the Marine Corps budget so the the missile units could have been stood up and integrated into, what is arguably the greatest military concept ever developed, the MAGTF!

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Douglas C Rapé

One of the many strengths of the MAGTF is its flexibility to grow, contract and task organize based on multiple factors. That adaptability is a remarkable, often under appreciated, characteristic that makes it singularly lethal. The Marine ethos and training approach make this complex versatility look easy. In fact it is honed over decades and becomes an institutional muscle memory executed by competent leaders developed over decades.

It is for that reason that the decisions in 2019 puzzled so many with a lifetime of understanding a MAGTF. As the leadership came to believe that some response to the Chinese Fleet in the South China Sea needed to be developed, doing so in the framework of the MAGTF was only logical and was actually suggested early on. Add a Bn with the ship intradiction mission to each Artillery Regiment and experiment with four versions until such time as the optimal T/O &E emerges. This model has been done repeatedly over the previous decades. Expand, contract, modify, disband, restructure all within the MAGTF concept.

That funding would be required is a given. It light of the overall DoD budget the requested funding would have been modest and precisely what a Commandant is expected to be able to accomplish.

To circumvent the budget request by a misinformed quid pro quo realignment of funding outside of your authority through secrecy, smoke, mirrors, deception and the arbitrary elimination of units and capabilities did not just attempt to catch the Corps flat footed it was an attempt to bypass Congress and the laws concerning appropriations. The fact that it slid through under the radar of a distracted Congress and DoD does not change that it was underhanded, Machiavellian and, with begrudging respect, cunning. The other services chiefs raised no objections because it looked like it would benefit them. Some other Secretaries of Defense would have dragged the CMC into their office to set them straight on the unauthorized midnight end run to the edge of the cliff.

As a former Commander I cannot imagine a subordinate of mine acting in a similar manner and retaining his/her position.

What now? If I were an advisor the the current CMC I would suggest:

1. Place EABO development into the construct and framework of the MAGTF. Request the appropriate funding and end strength increases.

2. Properly request funding for the EABO development from Congress as well as funding and end strength increases.

3. Move swiftly to restore assets and manpower to the MAGTF while developing doctrine on how to support EAOB if it were to execute.

There is little doubt in my mind that defense spending is going to increase in light of the growing global threats. A failure to do so rapidly and in a very focused fashion could be very dangerous. The requests in 1 through 3 above will be expensive but not in the overall spending scheme and could yield rapid, globally relevant capabilities.

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polarbear

One of the best examples of the Marine MAGTF flexibility is the 22nd MEU’s operations in Grenada. The Grenada invasion (Operation Urgent Fury) began the morning of 25 October 1983, two days after the 24th MAU, suffered the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut. The 22nd MAU was diverted to Operation Urgent Fury while in route to Lebanon and its Mediterranean float. After the Grenada invasion, the MAU then continue on its original mission to the Mediterranean.

The 22th MAU initially captured the northern Pearls airfield in Grenada with Echo and Fox Company’s by vertical assault after Navy Seal Team 4 determine the beaches were not suitable for amphibious assault. On 25 October, 250 Marines from G Company landed at Grand Mal Bay equipped with amphibious assault vehicles and four M60 tanks. They relieved the Navy SEALs the following morning, allowing Governor General Paul Scoon, his wife, and nine aides to be safely evacuated. Golf Company also rescued 233 US medical students. The Marine tank crews continued advancing in the face of sporadic resistance, knocking out a BRDM-2 armored car. G Company subsequently defeated and overwhelmed the Grenadian defenders and Cubans at Fort Frederick after running “roughshod” over Grenada.

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Randy Shetter

The Marine Corps, pre-FD, was first and foremost, a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It had the ground force triad of: infantry, armor, and artillery. Considering today's environment, the Marine Corps needs to be brought back to pre-FD capabilities now, with armor and artillery. The MAGTF MEU as we know, is a tailored combined arms force, and the ground combat element can be tailored to the mission. For this reason each Marine artillery regiment should be equipped with a HIMARS battery, if not a full HIMARS battalion. This would give each Marine Division a Deep Strike and an anti-ship capability. Depending on the mission, the MEU could have a HIMARS section or platoon added. Which would be more survivable, a HIMARS as part of an SIF, or HIMARS as part of a MEU? As part of a MEU, the HIMARS will have all the needed assets of the MEU. They can be inserted by LCAC or C-130. This would return the Marine Corps to its true mission of combined arms naval expeditionary warfare, and add the Deep Strike and anti ship mission.

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Solomon

I continue to be amazed at the desire of so many General Officers to try and find a middle ground with the Force Design advocates. It should be obvious to all that this switch from being America's force in readiness to a diminished role of being a "recon for the joint force" has the stench of politics, political ambition, and a fool hardy desire to"put their stamp" on the New Marine Corps.

How do you reach a middle ground with a man that says "we're on the righteous path." That person has stopped talking about tactics or logistics or warfighting in general. That person is on a crusade.

When any issue has turned into a quasi-religious debate and the person you're talking to has no ability to look seriously at his plans without it being an attack on his "faith" then you're wasting your breath and your time.

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Coffeejoejava

The USS Iwo Jima suffered issues with her steering gear, same thing that plagued the Boxer. She was assisted in with tugboats. She went out again today, surrounded by tugboats. This was the first time in MONTHS that the Iwo has been out of NOB. She has been having serous issues since leaving NASSCO Norfolk after her DSRA. There was a drydock loading issue so the determination was made that the rudders would be put back onto the vessel while she was in the water. Normally done while docked, divers accomplished that very difficult task of installing the 20 ton each rudders underwater. Not saying that had anything to do with why she was escorted back in...but it makes you wonder. Oh, and if you are wondering, yes, she is the ship that is supposed to be training with the Marines right now to relieve the WASP who is currently deployed.

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DARRELL HATCHER

In my opinion Gen Berger failed us. He destroyed the MAGTF. The army won't provide us with armor support. The air force can't provide CAS. The navy is neglecting amphib ships. He seemed determined to turn the entire Corps into one huge recon team. We are on the cusp of irrelevance.

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Jerry McAbee

High level guidance should be written clearly, concisely, concretely, and correctly. Readers can judge for themselves if the Commandant's Planning Guidance hits or misses the mark.

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Tom Eagen

The CPG? Maggie's Drawers!

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William Pratt

While the CPG is obviously intended as a general policy document, the verbiage seems to dwell almost solely on the "what" and not the "how." Sounded woefully similar to a current presidential candidate.

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polarbear

When I read the CPG I get the feeling that the Commandant sounds like a “used car salesman” instead of a leader of a war fighting organization. As the Commandant shouts “full speed ahead” with 2030 Design, I have to wonder where is the “Risk Analysis”? At the start of the 2030 Design transformation, we did hear the justification by “wargame”, however, a wargame is not a risk analysis.

When I retired and moved into the civilian job market I learned that the business world is better than the military at risk analysis. Normally, it is a formal systematic process and a documented requirement conducted by management and the project team. The key components of a Risk Analysis are:

Identification: Recognizing potential risks that could affect the objectives.

Assessment: Evaluating the likelihood and potential impact of these risks.

Mitigation: Developing strategies to manage or reduce the identified risks.

Monitoring: Continuously tracking and reviewing risks to ensure they are effectively managed.

Taking the lost tank battalions and towed artillery for example, the Commandant needs to identify, in all potential combat operations, the potential risks of no tanks and the reduction in tubed artillery. In the assessment phase, the risks potential likelihood and impacts on combat operations are evaluated. The “strategies” to manage and reduce the combat risks are then developed. (BTW I get the feeling that “strategy” is not the Commandant’s strength). Of course, the risks have to be tracked and reviewed.

The Commandant needs to drop the “used car routine” and start a risk analysis on his 2030 Design project. In addition, our political leaders in Congress and the Senate need to ask the Commandant for his 2030 Design “Risk Analysis” or they can always conduct their own risk analysis.

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Al L.

As usual for the FD2030 opponents the commenter bases his arguments on subjective judgements and provides almost no analysis based on reasoned arguments. His basis seems to be "that which was must be assumed to be what was right and that which has changed must be assumed to be wrong"

This of course is foolishness. Anyone who has made themselves aware of the USMCs force structure prior to FD2030 knows it was falling apart . . . .

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Douglas C Rapé

AI L’s comments are not even worthy of a response. AI L is clearly not reading Compass Points. He even introduces a new term: ex-officers. No need for further comment

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The Wolf

AI L., As I read your words I thought this does not sound like any Marine I ever served with. Your words are defeatist and don't represent the Corps I served in for many years. In that Corps (pre-Berger/Smith) Marines tackled problems that prevented it from fulfilling its Title 10, USC mission; they did not go looking for a mission that the other Services were handling well. And they certainly were not interested in being part of an organization that favored the defense. No they were real Marines, fix bayonets and take the hill was their mindset. You may have earned the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor but I wouldn't want you in a fighting position next to me! I wear my Purple Heart Medal proudly and hold those with a defeatist outlook in great disdain.

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Jerry McAbee

AI L., You must be referring to the bad ole days when the Navy and the Marine Corps were falling apart. No matter what problems there might have been back then, in those years, the first two questions asked by the NSC during a crisis were: where are the carriers and where are the Marines?

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Alfred Karam

Reading the CPG, I don’t know if I should laugh or cry. All that is in place are words. There are NO weapons systems in place. Where is the logistics plan to support the SIF? From what I’ve been reading, the MC planners are still “working” the plan. There is no credible, and transparent wargaming of FD. We need some lawmakers with military background to do their job and make the MC leadership show them what they’ve done in the past 5 years. Leadership’s feet must be held to the proverbial fire! Sad state of affairs for our Corps!

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Coffeejoejava

A member of Congress, that knows something about the military, needs to call the Commandants bluff and ask to see a MLR. See the missiles, see the launchers...ask the hard questions about logistics and the support of Marines.

Problem is, it seems they are all intimidated by colored pieces of cloth stacked on the left side of a uniform or the 4 stars glittering.

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Greg Falzetta

I don’t believe that I’ve ever seen or heard that the SIF has a T/O or T/E. I know that the Commandant says that the SIF is a CONCEPT not a physical entity, but a MAGTF is a concept that is backed by concrete units that have fixed T/Os and T/Es. As Gen McAbee stated after 5 years, “where’s the beef”?

I would hope and expect the senior retired Marine in Congress, Alaska’s Sen. Sullivan, to be the leader in questioning this “Ship of Fools”. Not sure where he is, but he or another Marine needs to step forward ASAP.

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norman sheridan

Don't know the current leadership of our CORPS, but it sounds like these "Leaders" are a bunch of barracks lawyers. They have all these ideas and "plans" but no way to implement them. All they did is cripple our ability to fight. SAD!

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DARRELL HATCHER

All CMC said is political speak, say a lot without saying anything.

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Douglas C Rapé

Gen Smith became the acting CMC 15 months ago and a CPG should have followed literally the day he formally became the CMC in late September 2023. He had a major medical episode that made him unable to serve for many months. In the Corps I remember the second in command steps up to continue the mission. In this case the issuance of the CPG, which could have been modified later, languished for well over a year. Why? The Corps has been in a period of paralysis through analysis and divestment for five years.

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Coffeejoejava

I will never forget September 11, 2001. Okinawa, stationed on Camp Hansen. We were in the middle of TC-1E and I slept in since the base was locked down. Turned on the TV to see the videos of the planes hitting the buildings and wondered what movie this was. Then the phone call from my Colonel.."Get to base NOW." Drove through the howling winds and they opened the gates for us to come in. When we got done setting up the base, the folks at Camp Foster that came up called it "Fortress Hansen." We had machine gun nests at each of the three gates, we improvised serpentine obstacles out of quadcons, we had the UDP battalion on gate guard. The gates were rotated as to which one was open for incoming and which one was outgoing daily. We had traffic jams from the express way exit in Yaka all the way to Kinville.

Spent 5 days straight on base before seeing my family again. The world changed that day.

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Compass Points salutes all readers who in their own ways are continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps.