Compass Points - Seize the Initiative

Initiative, mass, and maneuver

Compass Points - Seize the Initiative

Initiative, mass, and maneuver

August 19, 2024

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Perhaps the military leaders of Ukraine have been studying the Marine Corps' foundational publication, MCDP 1 Warfighting, particularly about the importance of seizing the initiative.

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All actions in war, regardless of the level, are based upon either

taking the initiative or reacting in response to the opponent. By

taking the initiative, we dictate the terms of the conflict and force

the enemy to meet us on our terms. The initiative allows us to

pursue some positive aim even if only to preempt an enemy ini-

tiative. It is through the initiative that we seek to impose our will

on the enemy. The initiative is clearly the preferred form of action

because only through the initiative can we ultimately impose our

will on the enemy.

-- MCDP 1 Warfighting, page 2-11

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Recently, the Ukraine military took a big risk and seized the initiative by attacking across the Russian border into Kursk Oblast. The Institute for the Study of War reports:

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It is too early to assess the outcomes and operational significance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these operations will not emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.

The scale of the war in Ukraine prevents either side from resolving the war in a single decisive campaign. ISW recently published "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War," wherein Dr. Frederick W. Kagan and Dr. Kimberly Kagan noted that Ukraine and Russia both have the ability to establish deep defensive positions and reserves that will prevent any single campaign from achieving strategic war aims before it culminates.[1] Russia's and Ukraine's ability to generate enough combat power to man continuous defensive positions with no open flanks and establish tactical depth at significant points along the frontline has forced both sides to attempt penetration battles that are so costly that subsequent exploitation is often not feasible.[2] (Ukraine, in fact, took advantage of a flank the Russians had left open in Kursk Oblast, but Russia has enough combat power to cover its frontiers if it so chooses at the cost of pursuing other objectives). Russia and Ukraine can usually establish defensive positions at some distance in the rear and sufficiently stabilize the frontline even in the event of a successful penetration and exploitation.[3]

Effective Ukrainian and Russian campaign design therefore requires forethought and planning for multiple successive operations that each set conditions for the subsequent operation.[4] Rarely has either side been able to conduct successive operations without interruption, however, since operational pauses or decreased operational tempo have offered the other belligerent the opportunity to contest and seize the initiative.[5]

-- ISW

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As the authors Kagan and Kagan emphasize in their "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War," the events in Ukraine are one example of a larger issue: maneuver. To seize the initiative requires re-discovering maneuver. Author B.A. Friedman commented on the events in Ukraine in his article, "Maneuver is so Back -- Not that it ever went away."

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This offensive makes clear that widely reported death of maneuver warfare was false. Ukraine successfully concentrated roughly a corps’ worth of troops, prepared an offensive, launched it, and are now exploiting it.

-- B.A. Friedman, Fire for Effect

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Where did the Ukraine military get the idea to seize the initiative by massing forces and then attacking through a gap with high tempo maneuver? Maybe they have been learning from MCDP 1 Warfighting.

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Maneuver relies on speed and surprise for without either we

cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo is

itself a weapon—often the most important. Success by maneu-

ver—unlike attrition—is often disproportionate to the effort

made.

-- MCDP 1 Warfighting, page 2-17

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The concept of maneuver is much more than mere movement or mobility. Maneuver is an opportunity-seeking approach to battle, where small units in contact with the enemy seek and seize fleeting gaps in the enemy's position. To take full advantage of a gap requires not just seeing a gap but also the ability to rapidly mass forces and send them through the gap. Marine Corps doctrine and Marine Corps history have long emphasized an approach to battle that focused on initiative, mass, and maneuver.

The Ukraine military leaders are putting their confidence in initiative, mass, and maneuver. Are the leaders of the US Marines still doing the same? Isolated Marine units distributed on Pacific islands doing what has been called, 'sensing, making sense, and passing on data' are small, defensive units. They are not seizing the initiative, massing for an assault, nor maneuvering through a gap.  Ukraine is not in a war game; it is locked in bloody fighting with an enormous peer competitor. Ukraine forces are not focused on 'sensing, making sense, and passing on data.'  Instead, the Ukraine military is focused on seizing the initiative, massing for an assault, and maneuvering through a gap. It is time for the Marine Corps, once again, to prepare every Marine and every Marine unit to do the same.

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ISW Press - 08/17/2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2024

By Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024

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Fire for Effect - 08/11/2024

Maneuver is so Back

Not that it ever went away.

By B.A. Friedman, substack