Amidst all the chaos of FD2030, the good news is that we know what needs to be done to fix the problem. We’ve a magnificent lineup of senior retirees to lead our recovery effort - let ‘em roll. What I do hope we’re doing is bringing MCU & its curriculum in line with educating for our future establishment. That element, outside the “inside the Beltway” fight - may be the most important. Offered as Food For Thought.
What is sad, is that as a maritime nation, we have let this occur. Just as the decimating of the Marine Corps was self-inflicted, the loss of our shipbuilding capabilities is self-inflicted. We need more oversight on building and maintenance of our ships.
Don't focus on 'getting enough ships". That is a outcome based issue. The important aspect here is the process: how do we develop a process that solves the shipping problem. And I mean domestically. Coffeejoejava has spoken to this a lot. The allied solutions are great, especially in terms of the PACOM challenges, but we still need a good domestic solution to our hull sourcing, unless we don't.
I am sick of the subject to the point of wanting to regurgitate. When the Reagan Administration pulled up short of 600 James Webb resigned. The lack of accountability in DON and DOD over the last 40 years is criminal. In a properly functioning society many would be swinging from the scaffolds. War is coming and most of these solutions are years and years away - if ever. There is no statute of limitations on gross incompetence. The butcher’s bill will be paid by 18-19 year olds. I am not exaggerating. Round them up and hold them accountable.
Already suggested this: if we can’t build ships here, we might consider building 90% hulls overseas to our spec- and then finish them off with our ship fitters and security upgrades. We will at least put hulls in the various AOA’s around the globe. Safe some bucks, too?! This might excite the ship builders here into action. The only way is underway!!
I have previously posted this ship building data from WW2. It shows the ability we once had to build increasingly sophisticated warships while engaged in a world war. We employed the will, ingenuity, patriotism,and industrial might that staggered the world. These numbers show what we could do . Where did we lose this ? Outsourcing dependence to other countries? Too much dependence on fewer ships with more technology? Naivety of thinking we would never again need such an armada due to the changing nature of warfare and our adversaries?
All thoughts to consider. As we increasingly see , a fully formed MEU is vitally needed in all corners of the world and we desperately need all of the organic shipping necessary to maintain and reinforce it.
7 December 1941 14 May 1945
Battleships 17 - 23 (all types)
Fleet Carrier 7 - 28
Escort Carrier 1 - 71
Cruiser 37 - 72 (all types)
Destroyer 171 - 377 (all types)
Frigate 0 - 361
Submarine 112 - 232
Amphibious Warfare 0 - 2,547 (including small craft)
When I was Combat Cargo Officer aboard the USS Juneau (LPD-10) out of Sasebo Japan, we took the ship into a three month docking in Sasebo at a Japanese drydock. With the rare exception of a few Americans, all the workers working in the steam plant and the hull of the vessel were all Japanese. At the morning meetings it the Japanese workers that were briefing the status of the work. Any ship that goes into drydock in Yokosuka or Sasebo utilizes Japanese workers.
Not sure what the "rub" against utilizing foreign workers, in most cases, to repair the ship with American oversight.
The problem with using foreign shipyards for new production should be obvious, far too much money going out of the country to do work that could be done domestically if the shipbuilders were structured to do the job.
The second problem is Navy management of these programs, a problem that is certain to be exported over to the foreign shipyard. The Navy imported a design, the FREMM frigate, and promptly redesigned 85% of it---the same problem will happen in South Korea or Japan that is occurring in Wisconsin.
There are two work arounds to the problem. First, the largest deficiency is in the logistic and sealift part of the fleet, a part of the fleet re-capitalization that organizations like NAVSEA and similar career surfers can be kept at a distance from because these are not combat ships and in many cases can be developed much more easily engineered unmanned single service forms produced in numbers. Asian shipbuilders are the current masters at mass production of generic commercial vessels, even novel types are possible if kept simple and free for builder input, they have their own domestic market to look forward with innovation. However, they have to invest in shipyards here, its not an out-sourceable problem, and the biggest problem will be the clash being disciplined managers and untrained working class Americans...but I would not dismiss it as unfeasible, history has shown less likely outcomes. Set the top line requirements, and keep the career surfers from meddling...mandate non-interference in the contracts.
In the mid term, success with the support fleet could be extended to groups of lesser combatants, conceivably even up to the capital ships, but at any rate, the military primes will be wary of the course of future events and be much more motivated to perform. Its called competition.
The second deficiency is in the volumes of munitions produced and the ability to efficiently deliver and rapidly replenish the expensive battle force ships. Novel concepts like ghost fleets make for good book sales, but their throughput efficiencies are needless distractions and their effectiveness in an era where quantum math run on cloud networks to break codes represents a severe threat that can turn these untested theories back on their original owners.
Containerize everything. Its too late too obsess about ship count numbers, that generally are not an objective comparison anyways. Come war the next time there is an escalation in one part of the world and the opportunity is used by the PRC to strike, which is what they are waiting for, not some notional date on a calendar, those ship numbers will not matter, the empty VLS cells will.
Plug and ready to fire full and half size containers, pre-loaded at the munitions factory, 100-500 short range attack drones, 16-48 PrSM's, reloads for HLS batteries, 9-packs of horizontal strike weapons like 21" subsonic and 25" supersonic cruise missiles and extended loiter air cruise underwater attack torpedoes, 9-packs of half length VLS SAM reloads, even automated reload containers of 127/155/180mm projectiles can rapidly reload a surface warship. Modify the surface fleet to make a full replenishment a one hour exercise, not half a day or half a week or half a month at a port near a tropical beach resort, it does not matter if a destroyer's VLS battery is reduced to 63-72 cells since it can completely re-arm, re-fuel, and re-supply and be back in the fight 48 hours later. USS Zumwalt had one cannon and magazine removed and ballistic missile sized cells installed in a matter of several weeks, and that's the first of a small three ship effort under no particular combat command urgent priority. Although more complex engineering, a large 12' diameter weapon silo reloadable quickly in moderate sea states, SLS, with a capacity for 19 strike weapons or 25t manned or unmanned subcrafts, and a related rapid reloading system for tactical torpedos, anti-aircraft missiles, and countermeasures, would be a far more prudent investment than $5-10B dollar SSN(X)'s that verge into DSM grade grandiose delusion.
Worry about the future fleet of capital aviation ships, cruisers, frigates, corvettes, and attack and ISR submarines tomorrow, fix the priorities today. It's not rocket science.
"While U.S. forces withdrew from Subic Bay in 1992, American warships and troops have refueled and offloaded for exercises at the strategic port since. Military Sealift Command vessels have also conducted repairs at the former base."
I won't get into the other part of the article about Blount Island Command leasing a 57,000 sqft warehouse for pre-positioning of equipment for "humanitarian" purposes.....yet.
Seems to me that there was talk awhile ago about having Destroyers built in Japan. We could get 3 built there for the cost of one built in the US. The quality was the same, and the completion would be done in the US ship yards. Looks like other class ships could be done the same way using our allies in the Pacific. Any thoughts on this for ship types that are needed by the Marines?
Amidst all the chaos of FD2030, the good news is that we know what needs to be done to fix the problem. We’ve a magnificent lineup of senior retirees to lead our recovery effort - let ‘em roll. What I do hope we’re doing is bringing MCU & its curriculum in line with educating for our future establishment. That element, outside the “inside the Beltway” fight - may be the most important. Offered as Food For Thought.
What is sad, is that as a maritime nation, we have let this occur. Just as the decimating of the Marine Corps was self-inflicted, the loss of our shipbuilding capabilities is self-inflicted. We need more oversight on building and maintenance of our ships.
Don't focus on 'getting enough ships". That is a outcome based issue. The important aspect here is the process: how do we develop a process that solves the shipping problem. And I mean domestically. Coffeejoejava has spoken to this a lot. The allied solutions are great, especially in terms of the PACOM challenges, but we still need a good domestic solution to our hull sourcing, unless we don't.
FD2030’s Ship Shortage
Compass Points’ March 17 “Ship Solution” exposes FD2030’s mess—five years, amphibs slashed—31st MEU’s all we’ve got—Smith blames Navy—Berger cut ‘em—3,700 tank billets gone—25,000 MAGTF gutted
late fixes fail!
- **Cuts**: Tanks, arty, infantry—China-only—Indo-Pacific zero MAGTFs—USNI Tracker, March 10 “short ships, short spine!”
Title 10—standalone—FD2030 flops short sight’s treason!
Semper Fi
I am sick of the subject to the point of wanting to regurgitate. When the Reagan Administration pulled up short of 600 James Webb resigned. The lack of accountability in DON and DOD over the last 40 years is criminal. In a properly functioning society many would be swinging from the scaffolds. War is coming and most of these solutions are years and years away - if ever. There is no statute of limitations on gross incompetence. The butcher’s bill will be paid by 18-19 year olds. I am not exaggerating. Round them up and hold them accountable.
Spot on Sir!
Already suggested this: if we can’t build ships here, we might consider building 90% hulls overseas to our spec- and then finish them off with our ship fitters and security upgrades. We will at least put hulls in the various AOA’s around the globe. Safe some bucks, too?! This might excite the ship builders here into action. The only way is underway!!
I have previously posted this ship building data from WW2. It shows the ability we once had to build increasingly sophisticated warships while engaged in a world war. We employed the will, ingenuity, patriotism,and industrial might that staggered the world. These numbers show what we could do . Where did we lose this ? Outsourcing dependence to other countries? Too much dependence on fewer ships with more technology? Naivety of thinking we would never again need such an armada due to the changing nature of warfare and our adversaries?
All thoughts to consider. As we increasingly see , a fully formed MEU is vitally needed in all corners of the world and we desperately need all of the organic shipping necessary to maintain and reinforce it.
7 December 1941 14 May 1945
Battleships 17 - 23 (all types)
Fleet Carrier 7 - 28
Escort Carrier 1 - 71
Cruiser 37 - 72 (all types)
Destroyer 171 - 377 (all types)
Frigate 0 - 361
Submarine 112 - 232
Amphibious Warfare 0 - 2,547 (including small craft)
Total active 790- 6,768 [27]
When I was Combat Cargo Officer aboard the USS Juneau (LPD-10) out of Sasebo Japan, we took the ship into a three month docking in Sasebo at a Japanese drydock. With the rare exception of a few Americans, all the workers working in the steam plant and the hull of the vessel were all Japanese. At the morning meetings it the Japanese workers that were briefing the status of the work. Any ship that goes into drydock in Yokosuka or Sasebo utilizes Japanese workers.
Not sure what the "rub" against utilizing foreign workers, in most cases, to repair the ship with American oversight.
This was 2003!
https://youtu.be/OJtpNr8KJ5c?si=FPBCcUGyse2U_9A3
The problem with using foreign shipyards for new production should be obvious, far too much money going out of the country to do work that could be done domestically if the shipbuilders were structured to do the job.
The second problem is Navy management of these programs, a problem that is certain to be exported over to the foreign shipyard. The Navy imported a design, the FREMM frigate, and promptly redesigned 85% of it---the same problem will happen in South Korea or Japan that is occurring in Wisconsin.
There are two work arounds to the problem. First, the largest deficiency is in the logistic and sealift part of the fleet, a part of the fleet re-capitalization that organizations like NAVSEA and similar career surfers can be kept at a distance from because these are not combat ships and in many cases can be developed much more easily engineered unmanned single service forms produced in numbers. Asian shipbuilders are the current masters at mass production of generic commercial vessels, even novel types are possible if kept simple and free for builder input, they have their own domestic market to look forward with innovation. However, they have to invest in shipyards here, its not an out-sourceable problem, and the biggest problem will be the clash being disciplined managers and untrained working class Americans...but I would not dismiss it as unfeasible, history has shown less likely outcomes. Set the top line requirements, and keep the career surfers from meddling...mandate non-interference in the contracts.
In the mid term, success with the support fleet could be extended to groups of lesser combatants, conceivably even up to the capital ships, but at any rate, the military primes will be wary of the course of future events and be much more motivated to perform. Its called competition.
The second deficiency is in the volumes of munitions produced and the ability to efficiently deliver and rapidly replenish the expensive battle force ships. Novel concepts like ghost fleets make for good book sales, but their throughput efficiencies are needless distractions and their effectiveness in an era where quantum math run on cloud networks to break codes represents a severe threat that can turn these untested theories back on their original owners.
Containerize everything. Its too late too obsess about ship count numbers, that generally are not an objective comparison anyways. Come war the next time there is an escalation in one part of the world and the opportunity is used by the PRC to strike, which is what they are waiting for, not some notional date on a calendar, those ship numbers will not matter, the empty VLS cells will.
Plug and ready to fire full and half size containers, pre-loaded at the munitions factory, 100-500 short range attack drones, 16-48 PrSM's, reloads for HLS batteries, 9-packs of horizontal strike weapons like 21" subsonic and 25" supersonic cruise missiles and extended loiter air cruise underwater attack torpedoes, 9-packs of half length VLS SAM reloads, even automated reload containers of 127/155/180mm projectiles can rapidly reload a surface warship. Modify the surface fleet to make a full replenishment a one hour exercise, not half a day or half a week or half a month at a port near a tropical beach resort, it does not matter if a destroyer's VLS battery is reduced to 63-72 cells since it can completely re-arm, re-fuel, and re-supply and be back in the fight 48 hours later. USS Zumwalt had one cannon and magazine removed and ballistic missile sized cells installed in a matter of several weeks, and that's the first of a small three ship effort under no particular combat command urgent priority. Although more complex engineering, a large 12' diameter weapon silo reloadable quickly in moderate sea states, SLS, with a capacity for 19 strike weapons or 25t manned or unmanned subcrafts, and a related rapid reloading system for tactical torpedos, anti-aircraft missiles, and countermeasures, would be a far more prudent investment than $5-10B dollar SSN(X)'s that verge into DSM grade grandiose delusion.
Worry about the future fleet of capital aviation ships, cruisers, frigates, corvettes, and attack and ISR submarines tomorrow, fix the priorities today. It's not rocket science.
"While U.S. forces withdrew from Subic Bay in 1992, American warships and troops have refueled and offloaded for exercises at the strategic port since. Military Sealift Command vessels have also conducted repairs at the former base."
https://news.usni.org/2025/03/17/u-s-marines-to-stage-equipment-at-subic-bay-under-new-prepositioning-plan?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
I won't get into the other part of the article about Blount Island Command leasing a 57,000 sqft warehouse for pre-positioning of equipment for "humanitarian" purposes.....yet.
Seems to me that there was talk awhile ago about having Destroyers built in Japan. We could get 3 built there for the cost of one built in the US. The quality was the same, and the completion would be done in the US ship yards. Looks like other class ships could be done the same way using our allies in the Pacific. Any thoughts on this for ship types that are needed by the Marines?