Compass Points - Simple Wars?
Will technology make wars simple?
Compass Points - Simple Wars?
Will technology make wars simple?
March 31, 2026
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Cry ‘Havoc!’, and let slip the dogs of war.
-- William Shakespeare, from his play, Julius Caesar
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Does new technology make war simple?
It sometimes seems that way.
Consider the two military operations the US undertaken recently.
First, Operation Absolute Resolve on January 3, 2026 was a precision raid on Venezuela that seemed very quick and very successful. US forces suffered no KIA and few WIA.
Next, US current operations against Iran began June 22, 2025 with Operation Midnight Hammer, a very quick and successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. That strike on Iran has now grown into a much wider series of strikes on Iran through Operation Epic Fury.
The US raid on Venezuela and the ongoing strikes on Iran make war seem quick and simple. Fly into a country, get what you came for, and get out. Or, use missile technology to strike enemy targets from a distance. Expensive perhaps and technologically complex, but still fundamentally simple.
As simple as these operations may seem on the surface, however, war still presents unpredictable dangers and complexity. The US operations in Iran have not ended and multiple dangers grow even as more and more targets are struck. When and how will US operations in Iran conclude?
There are two other global operations that reveal war to be something much different than just simple raids or strikes.
Israel’s current operation in Gaza began October 7, 2023 when Israel was attacked by Palestinian forces from Gaza. Israel has responded by moving a heavy military force into Gaza, vowing to eliminate the Palestinian military once and for all. Israel’s campaign in Gaza has been anything but quick or simple. Israel has had to go block by block in urban combat. And has had to fight corridor by corridor in dark subterranean tunnels. Nothing has been easy and nothing has been quick.
In a very different war, in February 2022 Russian forces launched a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Russia planned for a quick and easy take over. After more than four years of brutal fighting and there is no end in sight. Despite millions of drones and much new technology, there is no victory for either side. Nothing has been easy and nothing has been quick.
Any nation embarking on war must prepare for contingencies that cannot be fully predicted.
Bring missiles, bring drones, bring the latest in technology, but it is also wise to bring a mobile, flexible, combined arms force that can be used when the unexpected happens.
The Marine Corps’ foundational publication, MCDP-1 Warfighting, emphasizes the importance of combined arms operations.
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COMBINED ARMS
In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma, a no-win situation.
We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making them a vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If they move to escape the impact of the grenades, we engage them with the automatic weapon.
We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault support aircraft to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements that move to contain the penetration. Targets which cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make themselves vulnerable to the supporting arms. If they seek cover from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against them. In order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with their reserve. However, in order to avoid our deep air support, they must stay off the roads, which means they can only move slowly. If they move slowly, they cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put them in a dilemma.
-- MCDP-1 Warfighting, pp 4 24-25
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Despite advances in technology, there has never been as great a need as today for skilled ground units that can conduct decisive combined arms operations. Over many decades, the Marine Corps has been a premier combined arms force. Unfortunately, over the last six years, the Marine Corps has made its priority the making of sensor and missile units. The Marine Corps has divested, degraded, and destroyed combined arms combat power.
The Marine Corps’ own foundational publication, MCDP-1 Warfighting, highlights the importance of combined arms operations. It is time for the Marine Corps to rediscover, restore, and enhance Marine combined arms units, equipment, and capabilities.
Sensors, missiles, and technology alone have not solved the challenges of war.
The fighting in Ukraine continues.
The fighting in Gaza continues.
The fighting in Iran continues.
Even after the raid on Venezuela, the US armada still waits off shore.
What military challenge will the US face next in the Middle East, in the Caribbean, in the Pacific or somewhere else around the world? The answer is unknowable. What is knowable is that to be prepared for the current crisis and the next, the US needs to keep always on continual patrol around the globe, its flexible, combined arms, 9-1-1 force, the US Marines.
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Marines.mil
MCDP 1 - Warfighting
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Core Point
Technology does not make wars simple.
Drones, missiles, sensors, and precision strikes can deliver spectacular tactical successes (Venezuela raid, early Iran strikes), but they do not replace the need for skilled, flexible, combined-arms ground forces when the enemy adapts, the terrain is difficult, or the conflict drags on.
The piece contrasts:
Quick, high-tech raids that look clean on video.
The grinding reality in Gaza, Ukraine, and now Iran — where even advanced technology has not produced decisive, clean endings.
The author’s conclusion is blunt and correct:
“Despite advances in technology, there has never been as great a need as today for skilled ground units that can conduct decisive combined arms operations.”
He calls out the Marine Corps specifically for divesting heavy combined-arms capability in recent years to prioritize sensors and missiles. The result? When the nation needs a ready, powerful response in a littoral fight like the Persian Gulf, the Corps is lighter and less capable than it used to be. The piece ends with a strong reminder that the Corps’ foundational doctrine (MCDP-1 Warfighting) still emphasizes combined arms as the way to create dilemmas for the enemy — not just firepower or technology alone.
This reinforces everything General Gray would have said — and everything we've been pointing out.
Desert Storm ended with U.S. forces out of Kuwait and heading home three weeks after the ground war concluded because we went in with overwhelming mass, combined-arms shock, and the ability to impose a decisive outcome quickly.
Today we’re seeing the opposite: incremental surges, lighter forces, longer transits, and a grinding campaign where the enemy still has levers to pull (Strait disruptions, proxy attacks, economic pain). Technology helps, but it hasn’t made the war “simple.” The human, logistical, and doctrinal elements still matter — sometimes more than the shiny new systems.
The Marine Corps’ shift toward lighter, distributed, sensor/missile-centric units was sold as modernization for a China fight. The current conflict is reminding us that real-world crises don’t always read the PowerPoint slides
Semper Fi
Simply, why USCENTCOM is going to need a 24/7 365 day ARG MEU/SOC on Station
Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz commenced in 1971 when they occupied the three UAE Persian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran officially claimed authority over these three islands in 1979. Iran also designated these islands as IRGC bases. Of course, UAE is disputing these claims and has gained some international support.
In 2025 UAE’s political moves created “growing European pressure on Iran over ownership of the islands. On 24 September, the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the UK's Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, called on Iran to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. On 6 October, the European Union went further, accusing Iran of "occupying" the islands. In a joint statement, the GCC and EU foreign ministries urged Tehran "to end its occupation of the three islands. While the dispute is not new, the recent strong backing from European countries has raised concerns among Iranian politicians”.
https://www.newarab.com/news/iran-uae-dispute-over-three-islands-gulf-heats
The US needs to remove Iran’s control of Straits of Hormuz, however, the US does not have a strategic dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf like Europe. Why not solve this dilemma by giving control of the Hormuz Straits to UAE?
UAE does have a small 65,000 man military with what is described as a first-class Air Force, Naval Capabilities and Ground Forces. All armed with US, UK and French equipment and weapons. The UAE’s military strength is amplified by deep ties with: United States (major arms supplier, joint training), France (permanent French base in Abu Dhabi), and UK (training and intelligence cooperation). One of the strategic missions of the UAE military is “Protection of Shipping Lanes”. UAE also recognizes that they could not win a military slugging match with Iran.
If Iran does not agree to a peace “deal”, the question then becomes, what can the US do to ensure the security of the Hormuz Straits. With two ARG/MEUs, (and a severely weakened Iran) USCENTCOM is now in a position to seize the three Iranian occupied UAE Islands. Control could then be transferred to the UAE.
If UAE does get control of the Strait, they are going to need help. A dedicated ARG would fit nicely into USCENTCOM’s tack organization for contingency purposes.