The author of a recent post on a blog website forcefully argued that Operation Epic Fury is a validation of Force Design. One could just as easily argue that the operation is proof that Force Design has rendered the USMC largely irrelevant. The truth is that neither assertion is correct. Drawing sweeping conclusions from the opening salvos of a single operation is not just dangerous, it is also foolhardy. History has taught us that.
Epic Fury, Absolute Resolve, and the new National Defense Strategy all portend a changing security environment and America’s role in it. The Services must adapt to remain relevant. A snarky comment in yesterday Compass Points (“Tanks, scout snipers, and bridging companies ought to fix it”) reinforces my point. The author of the comment (probably an active duty/reserve Marine with the best intentions) unknowingly made a prescient observation, i.e. Marines need be discussing the operational concept and associated capabilities they require today and tomorrow to remain relevant. Is it EABO, SIFs, MLRs, NSMs, LSMs and a myopic focus on the First Island Chain or something else? Only the Marines can answer this question since the future of the Marine Corps is in their hands. History will reward them if they get it right or judge them harshly if they get it wrong.
I'm glad you noted that article also. I tried to read it, and frankly I didn't get far. I could not get past the thought that the analysis and takeaways were more premature than letting loose the morning after Taco Tuesday before one pulls one's pants down and sits. Not to mention, the argument was up there with claims the NATO Air War validated terrain seizure without ground forces on March 27, 1999. I fervently hope we don't see US ground forces committed into Iran; it is probably the best strategy, outside of a few coastal points. That said, long range strike does not control territory, secure objectives, or provide local control in human terrain. Sensing and precision strike are great tools...but saying they are the only solution is just on the opposite end of the spectrum from saying they are not relevant.
As for Mr. Snarky...I out-rolled him and he lost. You know how these 'wargames' advocates are.
Excellent points, General. I think the current and last CMC did not understand the true mission of the Marine Corps and thus lost their way. In "wanting" to be relevant they took the Marine Corps in the wrong direction. In my opinion, they did not understand that the Marine Corps since 1948, has been the Nation's crisis response force. They did not understand that only one force does persistent crisis response, and that is the United States Marine Corps.
I totally agree on all of these points, and especially on the deterrent features of both Submarines and the MAGTF. Neither should be thought of as an obsolete tool that should no longer be used. As Iran has just declared that they would crush any invasion force that was landed on their shores, perhaps we should start thinking about how to strengthen the MAGTF. Some modern creative ideas that undergo modern testing on various nonpartisan ideas might be just the ticket.
I wonder if President Trump, Vice President Vance, and/or Secretary of War Hegseth has ever had a real MAGTF briefing without mentioning SIF missiles units.
Imagine Col’s Rape, Anderson, or Wilson and many more being the MAGTF briefing officer with all the living CMC’s in attendance with the President, Vice President, and Secretary of War.
Mr. Button (a.k.a. TruthToSoup, Red Cell Activist, Corporal Gable, & other handles) often provides kool-aide drinking FD-2030 comments on Compass Points.
Cpl G seems to always take the opposite side especially with obvious more experienced contributors (senior officers).
He likes pulling the chain of anyone senior.
I am pretty sure Corporal Gable is Nick Coffman. Served as enlisted 2007 - 12. A Comm IT MOS.
Highest rank Sgt. HQ 8th Marines in Iraq then MarForComLant Comm.
I assume he was spanked and hates officers.
I read some of his articles and watched a YouTube.
Hey Mr Button (a.k.a. TruthToSoup & Corporal Gable), I am Major Steve Burke USMC (Ret). Served 1969-1994 through GySgt, CWO-5, and LDO Major. Comm as enlisted and EmbO/SMO as an officer.
I developed lift requirements use to justify HQMC amphibious lift and MPS requirements.
Pedigrees don't matter here. Grable's comments sit on their own merit. Funny thing, French pre WW2 doctrine for defense was thoroughly institutionalized by the 3rd Republic, who were trying NOT to fight the last war AND who were privy to the 'full threat analysis'. The Line itself, in isolation, worked....unfortunately it did not exist in isolation. Probably, in comparative analysis, the Line was more operationally capable as an applied practical concept, than the 'still in concept' FD(2030). Regardless, the simple rubber stamp of Congress is not the litmus test for the concept in application. Congressional approval, at it's basic level, is the reflection of desire, not the 'proofing' stage. How many NMESIS launchers, sustained by EABO, are operationally vetted and available for immediate deployment?
BZ to the crew of the USS submarine which sunk the Iranian frigate/corvette. Also, BZ to the Israeli pilot of the F35I which shot down an Iranian Yak 130.
Of the four main military services, three provide military power based on geographic domains. The Army is the Nation's ground power military force. It provides military ground power and also theater level deep-strike and air defense. The Navy provides sea-power and freedom of navigation to all, on the world's maritime commons. The Air Force gains and maintains air supremacy and dominance over the skies. The Marine Corps however, is not based on one domain. As an immediate crisis response force, the Marine Corps encompasses all domains. While it operates from the sea, it covers the land, air, and the sea. This is part of why it has its unique capability to be a crisis response force. Many think of the Marine Corps as just an amphibious assault force. While that was its main mission in WWII, since 1948 it has become an amphibious expeditionary force. Amphibious assault is just one of many ways to get to the shore from the sea. Each of our military branches offer unique capabilities. The Marine Corps, likewise, offers this Nation a unique capability that none of the other branches offers: a ready, globally responsive combined-arms naval expeditionary force.
At the March 4, 2026 Senate Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee hearing, not a single senator—Republican or Democrat—questioned the validity or utility of Stand-in Forces or Marine Littoral Regiments.
For a concept critics insist is failing, that silence from members with full classified access is deafening.
Bravo Zulu to ACMC Gen. Gering for reinforcing the CMC’s priority: 3.0 ARG/MEU remains the explicit requirement, SECNAV is aligned, and the new Amphibious Force Readiness Board (co-chaired by the ACMC and VCNO) is the path to close the gap.
General Berger codified the CMC’s statutory authority to set amphibious requirements at no fewer than 31 warships—halting decades of decline under prior Commandants. CMC Smith is now wielding that authority aggressively, driving toward “north of 31” while keeping SIF/MLR on track and delivering in the pacing theater.
When senators with the full threat picture, including Chairman Sullivan, choose not to challenge SIF after years of retired-community warnings, that silence is the institutional verdict: the concept is funded, accepted, and part of the solution.
HA, HA. Do the members of the Senate or the House Armed Services Committees ever get to hear in committee, any rebuttal to the SIF or MLR?? The answer is NO. Do they realize what has been lost with the divestment of military capabilities? NO.
Where are your SIFs, MLRs, and NEMESIS systems? Are they deployed ANYWHERE in the world? You know the answer as well as we do. NO.
Where are the MAGTFs? Are they in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, or the Persian Gulf? Are they deployed anywhere in the world that can support the current battles? How can the Corps execute NEO, or recover downed aircrew or aircraft from Australia, or Okinawa, Pendleton, or Lejeune? You and every Marine know they can’t.
Has ANY Combatant Commander asked for an ARG/MEU? You know they haven’t because our feckless Commandant thinks that words matter more than actions. The proof of the validity of FD will be on the field of battle. Congress isn’t the final arbiter of FD, the Marines that come home in body bags though will be, and FD pretty much portends that.
Your comment reeks of the mendacity of the PAO shop of HQMC.
Cpl. Grable since you’re in the HQMC PAO shop, would you care to comment on the good news that Col. John Ripley and Maj. James Caper have been recommended by Congress to receive the MOH? Now that’s something readers here could get behind. Your earlier propaganda, meh, not so much.
The sinking of the IRIS Dena by the USS Charlotte might have prevented an Iranian commerce raiding campaign in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. My latest Substack article covers that topic.
The author of a recent post on a blog website forcefully argued that Operation Epic Fury is a validation of Force Design. One could just as easily argue that the operation is proof that Force Design has rendered the USMC largely irrelevant. The truth is that neither assertion is correct. Drawing sweeping conclusions from the opening salvos of a single operation is not just dangerous, it is also foolhardy. History has taught us that.
Epic Fury, Absolute Resolve, and the new National Defense Strategy all portend a changing security environment and America’s role in it. The Services must adapt to remain relevant. A snarky comment in yesterday Compass Points (“Tanks, scout snipers, and bridging companies ought to fix it”) reinforces my point. The author of the comment (probably an active duty/reserve Marine with the best intentions) unknowingly made a prescient observation, i.e. Marines need be discussing the operational concept and associated capabilities they require today and tomorrow to remain relevant. Is it EABO, SIFs, MLRs, NSMs, LSMs and a myopic focus on the First Island Chain or something else? Only the Marines can answer this question since the future of the Marine Corps is in their hands. History will reward them if they get it right or judge them harshly if they get it wrong.
One could reasonably surmise that the Marines don’t currently have a good sight picture on the capabilities required to better serve the national defense. And they won’t until they first agree on their role in national security and then craft an operating concept to meet it. Only the active-duty Marines can do this. For more on this issue, see my article at the link: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/16/rethinking_the_role_of_the_marine_corps_in_national_security_1165065.html
I'm glad you noted that article also. I tried to read it, and frankly I didn't get far. I could not get past the thought that the analysis and takeaways were more premature than letting loose the morning after Taco Tuesday before one pulls one's pants down and sits. Not to mention, the argument was up there with claims the NATO Air War validated terrain seizure without ground forces on March 27, 1999. I fervently hope we don't see US ground forces committed into Iran; it is probably the best strategy, outside of a few coastal points. That said, long range strike does not control territory, secure objectives, or provide local control in human terrain. Sensing and precision strike are great tools...but saying they are the only solution is just on the opposite end of the spectrum from saying they are not relevant.
As for Mr. Snarky...I out-rolled him and he lost. You know how these 'wargames' advocates are.
Excellent points, General. I think the current and last CMC did not understand the true mission of the Marine Corps and thus lost their way. In "wanting" to be relevant they took the Marine Corps in the wrong direction. In my opinion, they did not understand that the Marine Corps since 1948, has been the Nation's crisis response force. They did not understand that only one force does persistent crisis response, and that is the United States Marine Corps.
History has an amazing way of repeating itself. That doesn't mean to ignore current technolgy, it means don't ignore the past
I totally agree on all of these points, and especially on the deterrent features of both Submarines and the MAGTF. Neither should be thought of as an obsolete tool that should no longer be used. As Iran has just declared that they would crush any invasion force that was landed on their shores, perhaps we should start thinking about how to strengthen the MAGTF. Some modern creative ideas that undergo modern testing on various nonpartisan ideas might be just the ticket.
I wonder if President Trump, Vice President Vance, and/or Secretary of War Hegseth has ever had a real MAGTF briefing without mentioning SIF missiles units.
Imagine Col’s Rape, Anderson, or Wilson and many more being the MAGTF briefing officer with all the living CMC’s in attendance with the President, Vice President, and Secretary of War.
How can this be arranged?
SteveB
Well said Sir! My thoughts exactly.
Cpl Gable is back. Recommend reread Compass Points - Marine Leadership.
Mr. Button (a.k.a. TruthToSoup, Red Cell Activist, Corporal Gable, & other handles) often provides kool-aide drinking FD-2030 comments on Compass Points.
Cpl G seems to always take the opposite side especially with obvious more experienced contributors (senior officers).
He likes pulling the chain of anyone senior.
I am pretty sure Corporal Gable is Nick Coffman. Served as enlisted 2007 - 12. A Comm IT MOS.
Highest rank Sgt. HQ 8th Marines in Iraq then MarForComLant Comm.
I assume he was spanked and hates officers.
I read some of his articles and watched a YouTube.
I am not impressed.
He is a want-a-be Recon/MarSOC.
Search the net:
Nick Coffman and Marine
https://sofrep.com/news/4-star-liars-moral-decay-senior-military-officers/
—>
Hey Mr Button (a.k.a. TruthToSoup & Corporal Gable), I am Major Steve Burke USMC (Ret). Served 1969-1994 through GySgt, CWO-5, and LDO Major. Comm as enlisted and EmbO/SMO as an officer.
I developed lift requirements use to justify HQMC amphibious lift and MPS requirements.
Who are you?
SteveB
Pedigrees don't matter here. Grable's comments sit on their own merit. Funny thing, French pre WW2 doctrine for defense was thoroughly institutionalized by the 3rd Republic, who were trying NOT to fight the last war AND who were privy to the 'full threat analysis'. The Line itself, in isolation, worked....unfortunately it did not exist in isolation. Probably, in comparative analysis, the Line was more operationally capable as an applied practical concept, than the 'still in concept' FD(2030). Regardless, the simple rubber stamp of Congress is not the litmus test for the concept in application. Congressional approval, at it's basic level, is the reflection of desire, not the 'proofing' stage. How many NMESIS launchers, sustained by EABO, are operationally vetted and available for immediate deployment?
BZ to the crew of the USS submarine which sunk the Iranian frigate/corvette. Also, BZ to the Israeli pilot of the F35I which shot down an Iranian Yak 130.
Of the four main military services, three provide military power based on geographic domains. The Army is the Nation's ground power military force. It provides military ground power and also theater level deep-strike and air defense. The Navy provides sea-power and freedom of navigation to all, on the world's maritime commons. The Air Force gains and maintains air supremacy and dominance over the skies. The Marine Corps however, is not based on one domain. As an immediate crisis response force, the Marine Corps encompasses all domains. While it operates from the sea, it covers the land, air, and the sea. This is part of why it has its unique capability to be a crisis response force. Many think of the Marine Corps as just an amphibious assault force. While that was its main mission in WWII, since 1948 it has become an amphibious expeditionary force. Amphibious assault is just one of many ways to get to the shore from the sea. Each of our military branches offer unique capabilities. The Marine Corps, likewise, offers this Nation a unique capability that none of the other branches offers: a ready, globally responsive combined-arms naval expeditionary force.
At the March 4, 2026 Senate Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee hearing, not a single senator—Republican or Democrat—questioned the validity or utility of Stand-in Forces or Marine Littoral Regiments.
For a concept critics insist is failing, that silence from members with full classified access is deafening.
Bravo Zulu to ACMC Gen. Gering for reinforcing the CMC’s priority: 3.0 ARG/MEU remains the explicit requirement, SECNAV is aligned, and the new Amphibious Force Readiness Board (co-chaired by the ACMC and VCNO) is the path to close the gap.
General Berger codified the CMC’s statutory authority to set amphibious requirements at no fewer than 31 warships—halting decades of decline under prior Commandants. CMC Smith is now wielding that authority aggressively, driving toward “north of 31” while keeping SIF/MLR on track and delivering in the pacing theater.
When senators with the full threat picture, including Chairman Sullivan, choose not to challenge SIF after years of retired-community warnings, that silence is the institutional verdict: the concept is funded, accepted, and part of the solution.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/02/25/2026/to-receive-testimony-on-the-current-readiness-of-the-joint-force
HA, HA. Do the members of the Senate or the House Armed Services Committees ever get to hear in committee, any rebuttal to the SIF or MLR?? The answer is NO. Do they realize what has been lost with the divestment of military capabilities? NO.
Where are your SIFs, MLRs, and NEMESIS systems? Are they deployed ANYWHERE in the world? You know the answer as well as we do. NO.
Where are the MAGTFs? Are they in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, or the Persian Gulf? Are they deployed anywhere in the world that can support the current battles? How can the Corps execute NEO, or recover downed aircrew or aircraft from Australia, or Okinawa, Pendleton, or Lejeune? You and every Marine know they can’t.
Has ANY Combatant Commander asked for an ARG/MEU? You know they haven’t because our feckless Commandant thinks that words matter more than actions. The proof of the validity of FD will be on the field of battle. Congress isn’t the final arbiter of FD, the Marines that come home in body bags though will be, and FD pretty much portends that.
Your comment reeks of the mendacity of the PAO shop of HQMC.
Cpl. Grable since you’re in the HQMC PAO shop, would you care to comment on the good news that Col. John Ripley and Maj. James Caper have been recommended by Congress to receive the MOH? Now that’s something readers here could get behind. Your earlier propaganda, meh, not so much.
The sinking of the IRIS Dena by the USS Charlotte might have prevented an Iranian commerce raiding campaign in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. My latest Substack article covers that topic.