Compass Points - Taken Prisoner
Lessons from service
January 4, 2024
.
In the recent Compass Points post, "Compass Points - Marine to Marine - Share your leadership lessons" readers were asked to share some of their leadership lessons.
.
====================
.
Any Compass Points reader who has spent time in the Corps has been a leader. You have leadership skills.Β You have thoughts and tips on leadership. Share some of what you have learned. You may have things to say about your days in combat or your days not in combat. No matter your MOS, experiences, or years of service, you have wisdom to share. Share.
-- Compass Points
.
====================
.
Readers have sent in so many wonderful stories, anecdotes, and vignettes. Many thanks. All the stories are different, but many have a common theme. Do the right thing. Leaders of Marines always strive to do the right thing, even when it is difficult.
One Compass Points reader, Mike Ettore described how he came to be, "Taken Prisoner by My Marines!"
.
====================
.
Mike Ettore
.
πππ€ππ§ ππ«π’π¬π¨π§ππ« ππ² ππ² πππ«π’π§ππ¬!
.
I was the CO of Weapons Company 1/8 during the Gulf War.
.
A few days before we began combat operations in Kuwait, a team from the 8th Marines Regiment came to brief my company on proper handling of Prisoners of War (POW) and to review the aspects of the Laws of Land Warfare that applied to same.
.
1stSgt Bryant and I stood in the back of the audience. As I listened to the two young Marines β a Sergeant and a Corporal β I realized they were not giving a legit brief and were actually saying things like βYou all know what the rules are, but nobody is watching out here in the desert, so do what you think is bestβ and βWe already have too many POWs, so thereβs no need to bring us moreβ and other statements that were essentially encouraging my Marines to do whatever they felt like doing to captured enemy soldiers.
.
After several minutes passed, I had 1stSgt Bryant interrupt them and tell them the brief was over and they should leave immediately. Frankly, I was pissed that they would say such things to my Marines about such an important topic.
.
After they left, I stood in front of my Marines and set things right, using some of my previous experiences to convey the proper message.
.
I made sure they understood that we were about to face Iraqis who would definitely try to kill us and that weβd kill all of them if thatβs what it took, but once enemy soldiers surrendered to us and we disarmed them, we would not abuse them in any way.
.
I left no doubt among the Marines regarding what was expected of them relative to handing captured Iraqis.
.
A day or two into the ground war, one of our CAAT teams (a group of heavily armed Humvees) had somehow veered off course in the darkness and was headed straight at us.
.
I thought it was odd they were moving in the wrong direction and was pretty sure they were members of my company, so I figured they would just drive up to us and weβd get them reoriented and on their way.
.
The smoke from the burning oils wells had turned our uniforms dark and as such they resembled the uniforms worn by Iraqi soldiers. That caused a big problem. My Marines thought we were Iraqis and shouted at us to drop our weapons.
.
I realized they didn't know who we were and that they couldn't hear us yelling to them.
.
They were about 100 yards away from us and while we could hear them talking as if they were standing next to us, they obviously couldnβt hear us due to the direction of the wind.
.
I heard one of the Marines say, βIf they make any threatening move, open fireβ and I realized that something very bad could happen if the situation went in the wrong direction.
.
So, I told everyone near me to drop their weapons and raise their hands.
.
The gun vehicles slowly approached us and I can tell you that staring down the barrels of 50cals and MK19's was a new experience for us all β suffice it to say that the βpucker factorβ was quite high!
.
As they approached is, I heard one of them say "The big one on the end looks a lot like Captain Ettoreβ and another one say, βHe does and and he looks pissed off, too!" which caused some of the others to laugh.
.
As the vehicles got closer to us, we remained standing with our arms raised upward, I could hear the Marines talking among themselves, and one said, βOh shitβ¦that is Captain Ettore!β and the group went silent as they slowly came closer to us.
.
When they got to us, one of the team leaders said, "Sorry Sir, we thought you were Iraqis."
.
I told him "No problem...thanks for not lighting us up!"
.
We reoriented them and sent them on their way and nothing more was said about this incident, which serves as a great example of whatβs called βThe Fog of War.β
.
I've often wondered if this story would have turned out differently had I allowed the POW briefers to put the wrong mindset into my Marines regarding handling Iraqis who were surrendering?
.
Iβve had several memorable experiences as a Marine serving in combat operations, and I must say that staring into the barrels of friendly weapons and being taken prisoner by my own men ranks as one of the most memorable, and frightening!
.
There are several leadership lessons associated with this anecdote, but perhaps the most important are:
.
- Leaders must supervise and be aware of what's happening within their units. Had 1stSgt Bryant and I not attended the brief given to our Marines regarding the handling of POW's, we'd likely never known that they'd received defective (and illegal) guidance on this topic, and some might have acted upon it, thinking they were within the established laws and rules.
.
- Marines must be trained to be aggressive in combat and to "arrive violently" when engaging with an enemy force. That said, this aggressiveness must be tempered with sound judgement, because once rounds and ordnance are sent downrange, they cannot be "recalled." Thus, before Marines unleash the awesome firepower they have at their disposal, they must be 100% positive that they are shooting at enemy forces and legit combatants.
.
- The Fog of War remains on the modern battlefield, despite advances in technology. Leaders should expect it to happen and remain vigilant, so they and their Marines can avoid having "tunnel vision" regarding the original plans and details made regarding combat operations and ever changing battlefield conditions.
.
- Leaders should remember that everyone at every level of the chain of command can fall victim to the Fog of War. When such a situation happens, it's best to focus on getting everyone reoriented on the stated Mission of the unit, along with any modifications that are needed due to changing battlefield conditions that will enable the achievement of the Commander's Intent.
.
- Individual and Unit Discipline is critical to success in combat, and both must be continuously taught, developed and enforced in peacetime. An undisciplined Marine or Marine unit will not suddenly obtain necessary levels of discipline simply by deploying to combat and an attitude of "OK...this is for real...time to get serious about thing." It's easy for some leaders to ease up on various aspects of discipline in peacetime/garrison, but history has shown that without fail, undisciplined Marines and Marine units almost always experience higher casualty rates and mission failure than their well-led counterparts.
.
Semper Fidelis,
Mike Ettore
.
"ππ§π₯π² ππ‘π ππππ π‘ππ―π π¬πππ§ ππ‘π π₯ππ¬π π¨π π°ππ«." - ππ₯πππ¨
.
====================
.
Compass Points salutes Mike Ettore and all those sending in leadership lessons. Keep 'em coming!
.
- - - - -
.
Compass Points - Marine to Marine
Share your leadership lessons.
December 31, 2023
https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-marine-to-marine
I loved this story!!! I was with 1stMarDiv Forward Command Element. I was assigned as the PPA for LtCol Reardon, who was the SJA for 1stMarDiv. He and I would go to as many of the 1stMarDiv Units as we could and he would give the Law Of War and Armed Conflict Briefs. Then when we did encounter POW's he and I would watch the MP's as they searched the POW's. One night, while the Colonel and I were getting ready to turn we heard a Kuwaiti questioning a POW and then we heard a pistol chamber a round. We both rushed over, evidently the Kuwaiti didn't attend the brief.
Lessons Learned from the US Army βTiger Brigadeβ (attached to the 2nd MARDIV); Desert Storm
On the second night of ground combat, 6th Marines (the 2nd MARDIV Breaching Force) set a defensive line with 1-6 on the left (West) flank (2-2 center and 1-8 on the right). On the 1-6 left flank the USA Armor Tiger Brigade moved into their defensive positions. Once the sun set and it went dark (and when I say dark I mean, canβt see your hand touching your nose dark) we realized that there was some Iraqi tanks in the gap between 1-6 and the adjacent Tiger Brigade. We had received tank fire from our left flank and one of our tanks (M60) returned fire with one round before we gave our tank company CO the WTF; Cease fire, wait; Out.
We immediately raised the Tiger Brigade on the radio. We were talking with the 1-66 Armored BN CO. I believe it was their CO because he immediately said βI will handle itβ by sending in some of my scouts to locate and verify. A very short time later 1-66 came back with; yes, there are Iraq tanks in the gap, βI am sending in a tank (M1s) platoonβ to clean them out. Again, in a very short time we heard the M1s firing and the secondary explosions of destroyed Iraqi tanks. I was very surprised how quickly this maneuver was executed. Initially, I was expecting that it would take all night to coordinate the problem of Iraq tanks in the gap.
After Desert Storm I thought about this incident and realized we missed using an old but standard tactical procedure of setting a βCoordination Pointβ (https://www.pinterest.com/pin/588212401328177509/ ) on the boundary between the units. We seem to have a few intermural fire fights in both I MEF Divisions during the 100 hours of Desert Storm. Generally speaking, Marineβs focus on lone Battalion Operations and donβt do enough training on coordination between Battalions.
However, even with a Coordination Point, this did not answer the question of how quickly and nimbly the Tiger Brigade handled the situation. Then I came across this paper: Band of Brothers: The Band of Brothers: The 2D Marine Division and the Tiger Brigade in the Persian Gulf War. https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=445fae7daba39660JmltdHM9MTcwNDQxMjgwMCZpZ3VpZD0zODBhY2EyMy0xMGVlLTYyZjAtMGQ5Yi1jNWE3MTFjMjYzZjYmaW5zaWQ9NTI5Mg&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=380aca23-10ee-62f0-0d9b-c5a711c263f6&psq=US+Army+Tiger+Brigade+2nd+MARDIV+Desert+Storm&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9jZ3NjLmNvbnRlbnRkbS5vY2xjLm9yZy9kaWdpdGFsL2FwaS9jb2xsZWN0aW9uL3A0MDEzY29sbDMvaWQvMTIxNy9kb3dubG9hZA&ntb=1 p. 37-41
The paper tells us the issue here is the difference in βnight fighting technologyβ available in a comparison between the Tiger Brigade and 2d MARDIV.
A number of Brigade officers commented that the Marines "generally halt at night." The Brigade, trained and equipped to fight armored warfare at night, was surprised that the Division did not press the fight through hours of darkness. LTC Obermeyer (USA BN CO) thought the Division "weak at best at night fightingβ and assumed that Marine Corps doctrinally did not fight at night. All of the Brigade officers attributed this perceived weakness to the Division's lack of night-vision capability. They are partly right. COL Sylvester (Brigade CO) corrects them in his summation of the issue: βThe night-attack business is an equipment issue, not a mentalityβ. The Tiger Brigade CO however states, βThe night-attack issue is a subset of the tempo issueβ¦β
The author states from a Marine Corps Lesson Learned that: βThe Marine regiments had approximately 150 ANPVS-I's each. The assault amphibian vehicle does not have a night vision capability. One-half of the TOW systems in the Division did not have thermal-imaging devices. The 2d Tank Battalion was equipped with M1A1s, but the 8th Tank Battalion fought with M-60's. Compared to the Brigade, which averaged two night vision goggles per vehicle and was equipped with M1A1's and Bradley's. The Division had a paucity of night-fighting equipment.β
What the (2dMARDIV) Division learned from the Brigade is best summed up by BGen Sutton (USMC): I think we learned how capable the Army is with its night-vision equipment, the Bradley and MIA1 as fighting vehicles and the capabilities and limitations of an armored brigade. Col. Van Riper added that the Division learned "how agile, fast and powerful an armored brigade isβ¦β.
What the US Army learned from the Marine Division is best stated by a Brigade BN CO: βI was amazed at the capabilities of their fire support systems, particularly close air support, the capabilities of the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), and how ~well the towed artillery could unlimber and shoot. I was very impressed with the LAV...I'd give my eyeteeth for a wheeled recon vehicle that can do what the LAV can do. And I was pleasantly surprised to find that the Marines can plan and war fight as well as the Army.β
In addition the Brigade officers were: βvery impressed by the esprit and cohesion demonstrated by the Marines, and a number commented on the value of the Division's informal war gaming sessions. LTC Greczyn also commented that the Marine Corps is "exceptionally skilled at dismounted infantry operations---clearing trench lines and bunkers, fighting in urban terrain, and patrolling: skills I think, that have been neglected in the Army's mechanized infantry.β
My lessons learned:
β’ You go to war with what you have in equipment and TRAINING (you MIGHT be able to do limited adjustments based on time)
β’ Well trained infantry is always valuable
β’ Night attacks can be confusing but remember they confused your enemy more
β’ Avoid intermural fire fights by coordinating with your adjacent units (this holds true for Generals to Squad Leaders)
β’ Always play to your strengths like βfire support systems, particularly close air supportβ
Semper Fi