Compass Points - Think Bigger
More Marines may be needed.
Compass Points - Think Bigger
More Marines may be needed.
February 10, 2024
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When it comes to Marine Corps global MAGTF operations, Marine leaders need to think bigger. The basic Amphibious Ready Group - Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) MAGTF is just the beginning of what the Marine Corps may be asked to provide in a crisis. When the ARG-MEU (SOC) arrives at a crisis, the crisis may require more Marine forces. What happens then? One way to prepare for the next crisis that requires not only an immediate MEU, but also more follow-on Marine forces is to study what Marines have done in the past.
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MajGen Harry Jenkins, USMC (ret) recalls the service of 4th MEB during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
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Prepare Now for Larger MAGTF Operations
By MajGen Harry Jenkins, USMC (ret)
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What follows is a brief example articulating the challenges of planning and conducting amphibious operations at the MEB level in a live scenario. Operations above MEU(SOC) can be distinctly different and much more complex. The example below is from Desert Shield and Desert Storm and shows what MAGTF commanders today may have to contend with in an environment of constrained resources.
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BACKGROUND
If the United States is to sustain global presence in support of our national security objectives, it must have a Navy that can deploy a combined fleet with aircraft carriers, surface combatants, submarines, and aviation that can respond to any contingency. There must also be a robust amphibious capability integrated within the fleet that supports the fleet commander as well as the Combatant Commander ready to respond to humanitarian crises or provide combat power at all levels of conflict if necessary.
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For presence missions the Marine Corps has a comfort zone with the MEU(SOC) concept after several decades of refining the organization, tactics, and techniques. The MEU(SOC) has been an excellent resource to the Combatant Commanders for presence, humanitarian operations, a variety of special operations missions, and combat missions. A MEU(SOC) unit is thoroughly trained and certified prior to deploying with the fleet. While it has excellent capabilities for operations at the low end of the conflict spectrum, it contains only limited combat power for sustained conventional operations.
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Unlike the smaller MEU, the larger Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) does not go through the same formal approach to training and certification. The MEB will participate in a variety of exercises to test contingency plans along with the capabilities of staff coordination with elements of the brigade GCE, ACE or the BSSG. If a real world contingency develops, the scramble will start to see what amphibious ships the commander will have assigned to to deploy the MEB. The example here is the 4th MEB and its deployment to Desert Shield and Desert Storm. If Marine commanders are ever required to carry out a mission this size in the future with the available assets in the force today, there are serious questions regarding the ability to succeed both from a Navy and Marine point of view.
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DESERT SHIELD: THE BUILDUP
In early August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait under the justification that it wanted to take back oil fields that belonged to Iraq. The 4th MEB was alerted to deploy to the Persian Gulf. The mission was not definitive other than “Load and Go.” There was no established concept for landing in Kuwait, so the embarkation plan followed a generic plan the Brigade had used in Norway.
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The first issue was ships. While the Navy had around 65 amphibious ships active in the fleet, the lift requirement for a MEB at the time was 21. The timing for the deployment was such that the CATF (PHIBGP-2) was only able to get 13 available ships. That caused much heart burn over what was going to load out and what equipment going to be left behind between RLT-2 and MAG -14. A week later the MEB left the east coast in three Transit Groups. TG -1 with four ships on August 17, TG -2 with 4 ships to include the Nassau on August 20, and TG-3 with 5 ships on August 21.
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The 5 commercial RO-RO ships for the supplies for the MEB Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE) were not identified until after we had left the east coast. The 5 RO-ROs eventually joined us in the Persian Gulf, but they were foreign- flagged so could not sail in the combat zone. At the time the defined combat zone was more up in the northern Persian Gulf.
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The force at this point consisted of 9,000 troops embarked in 13 ships, 20 AV8B Harriers on Nassau, and 40 helicopters from MAG 40 spread across the force. MAG-40 F-18s and A-6A attack jets were forward deployed and bedded down for the MEB in theater. The transit to the Persian Gulf was spent trying to get better organized and establish communications along the route.
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The Task groups came together off of Masirah in mid-September. On September 13, USNAVCENT directed the 13th MEU(SOC), which had been deployed in the region, become part of the 4th MEB. It was integrated into the MEB, maintained its tactical integrity, and was used as the advance force in the upcoming rehearsals. The amphibious force now had 12,000 Marines embarked in 18 ships. On September 21st the first of the five RO-ROs steamed into the Persian Gulf, and all five would eventually be downloaded at Al Jubayl over a 30 day period. CENTCOM then established the 4th MEB as the theater reserve.
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PREPARATION, INTERDICTION, & NEO
The initial relations with NAVCENT were difficult primarily because there were no Marines on the fleet flagship (Blue Ridge), and only one officer had any knowledge of amphibious operations onboard. That changed in December when General Gray made an inspection trip to the theater in the Fall. He dispatched a special staff to go aboard the Blue Ridge in January 1991. Shortly thereafter the Initiating Directive was published directing guidance for the upcoming conflict. The rehearsal schedule was promulgated in late September which gave the troops a chance to get ashore and offload the equipment to maintain and reconfigure it for embarkation back aboard ship.
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Four MEB- level rehearsals were conducted in Oman over the next four months that covered all phases of amphibious operations. Both the MEB and the 13th MEU(SOC) also participated in Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations that intercepted several Iraqi bound ships in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the 4th MEB conducted a NEO in Somalia in January 1991 which rescued nine ambassadors and over 281 civilians.
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DESERT STORM
On January 13, 1991, the 5th MEB arrived off of Masirah in ships belonging to PHIBGP- 3 from the west coast. 5th MEB with RLT-5, MAG-50 and the BSSG had been coordinating with the 4th MEB as they were making their way across the Pacific in December. NAVCENT then designated both PHIBGPs TF-156, while placing 4th MEB, 5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC) under the 4th MEB as TF-158. The size of this force was now 17,200 Marines embarked in 31 amphibious ships. The force structure consisted of 8 infantry and artillery battalions in the GCE, plus 25 AV-8 Harriers and 139 helicopters in the ACE. Relations were good between the three MAGTF commanders as well as their Navy counterparts. Our first step was to conduct the fourth and largest amphibious rehearsal in central Oman in order to sort out tactics and procedures within the force. This was accomplished without any clear idea as to the missions from the Initiating Directive that would be tasked to us when the war broke out.
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THE REHEARSAL – SEA SOLDIER IV
The rehearsal was scheduled for early February 1991. The scheme of maneuver for the landing force would task the 13th MEU(SOC) as the advance force with a variety of special ops missions in the landing area. The 4th MEB with RLTs 2 and 5 would make the initial helicopter-borne and surface assault supported by the ACE and 14 LCACs. Following the landing, both RLTs would stand down and conduct unit training under their own commanders. Two days later, 5th MEB was tasked to conduct an amphibious withdrawal of both RLT-2 and RLT-5 under cover of darkness back to the ships.
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The command and control of all of that worked well as did the required maintenance of the equipment. Once back on the ships, the staffs continued to develop plans for the potential tasks listed in the Initiating Directive. Meanwhile the logisticians had developed plans to combat load the AFOE for the 4th MEB into one of the empty MPF RO-ROs sitting in the common user pool in theater. This was accomplished and it was ready to go into the Gulf when the amphibious force moved up through the Strait of Hormuz prior to the outbreak of hostilities. That proved to be a major success.
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OPERATIONS
There were several plans that were drafted as the conflict approached. The entire force was tasked to go through the Straits of Hormuz in broad daylight as a show of force. We did that while small Iranian patrol boats darted in and out of the column. 4th MEB Harriers were the first Marine aircraft to conduct combat air strikes off of an amphibious ship. Over an eight-day period during the air campaign their sortie rates climbed from 19 on the first day to 47 on the 8th day. The MEB ACE also conducted three night helicopter feints off the Kuwaiti coast in order to reinforce the idea of an impending amphibious assault. That worked as the Iraqis reacted to each one of those feints with missiles on one instance, and anti-aircraft fire in others.
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The end result of all of this activity was to pin down six Iraqi divisions to the Kuwaiti coast while I MEF swept north behind them. At the close of hostilities, the 5th MEB flowed units ashore to become the I MEF Reserve. 13th MEU(SOC) started an immediate redeployment for home. 4th MEB began to move out of the Persian Gulf with two stops in Israel and Rota for vehicle wash downs, and then continued movement toward the east coast.
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For the 4th MEB this was an eight-and-a-half-month deployment.
-- MajGen Harry Jenkins, USMC (ret)
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MajGen Jenkins was the Commanding General for 4th MEB during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Compass Points thanks General Jenkins for his service in peace and war.
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During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Navy did not have enough amphibious ships for 4th MEB. But the lack of ships did not stop the requirement to get more Marines to the crisis. When it comes to Marine Corps global MAGTF operations, Marine leaders today need to think bigger. The future will not limit its demand on the Marine Corps. A future crisis may require the Marine Corps to supply more than just one forward deployed MEU. The only warning the Marine Corps may get about the need for more Marines is "Load and Go."
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Compass Points thanks MajGen Jenkins for his timely warning and thanks all those across the Marine community and in Congress who are thinking bigger about MAGTF operations.
The point being well articulated is twofold. The Amphibious forces feinted a potential amphibious assault. That tied down Iraqi forces that might have been better deployed in the defenses elsewhere. Iraqi Stand In Forces were next to useless in the defense, in fact worse since they were tied down awaiting possible attack. The second that the structure of the MAGTF was articulate enough to build out a capable fighting force, abet with some early logistical difficulties (over come over time and clever use of ALL assets) to potentially assault the Iraqi flank, and was task organized for the mission. The sort of conflict described has been the rule for decades, and the rapid response is a matter of history and the successes which were achieved, are clear, the exception has been in the last 20 plus years. But any planning based on long protracted nation building efforts are not the norm. Many said after Viet Nam, never again, yet that is exactly what the 20:years war were, long protracted nation building efforts and the outcomes equally bad or worse than in Southeast Asia. Senior Marine Corps leadership, ignored points 1 and 2, and as opined by General Van Riper driven the Corps in to a ditch. Now if we had some blade tanks with towing gear….
The future does not make the demand. Tha nation does. My assessment: the nation, leaderless as it is at the moment, does not know what it wants the Marine Corps to do. Thus the Marine Corps has created a relevant and viable force that the nation can use. Thankful that we have USMC leadership that knows how to drive.