Marine Corps Compass Points is blessed with an remarkable roster of authors, contributors, readers, and commenters. We appreciate everyone who takes the time to come to Compass Points. We welcome comments. We particularly value comments where commenters share their insights and experience.
Because comments are posted after the original post, the only way to see them is to go back to previous posts. This leads to some comments being overlooked. To prevent good comments from being overlooked, we will post from time-to-time a collection of Compass Points “Top Comments.”
Compass Points - Top Comments
FD 2030 - Risking War - The 'Divest to Invest' Business Model is Dangerous
Dirk Ahle
As usual, BGen Holcomb (and Gen Sheehan) are dead on balls accurate in their assessment of this new restructuring that is solely focused on a possible, future Sino conflict. Will this new strategy make the Marine Corps a one trick pony?
FD 2030 - Loss of the Amphibious Fleet - A Force-in-Readiness Requires Amphibious Lift
Mo Gauthier
The amphibous shipbuilding industrial base has dwindeled to a single zip code. That is the zip code for Pascagoula, MI. The vendor base for those ships is, in many cases, down to a single supplier. In many of those instances, the product line for these ships is the lions share of their sales. It only takes rumors of termination to cause this fragile lower tier of the industrial base to collapse. Reconstitution will take years with sharp increases in cost due to the absence of competition. The LPD 17 has been designed to accommodate many variants. One compelling example is JCC(X), requiring only a 50m plug. There are others for another discussion. Building one LPD 17 every other year for a decade will grow lift nicely as we watch LAW unfold in much the same manner as LCS. Like LAW, LCS was a mandated departure from conventional wisdom in an environment where dissent was unwelcomed, and the surface Navy took its long trip to Abilene.
FD 2030 - FY24 Budget, Too Much Risk - Stop Shifting Risk Into This Decade From Future Decades
Douglas C Rapé
The author is 100% correct. It is so obvious it is a surprise that it even needs to be discussed. We have repeatedly been caught flat footed by RD&A failures and delays. Precision does not neutralize the principle of mass. DCR
Compass Points PME Library - The independent library of articles regarding Marine Corps FD 2030
Richard
From what I’ve read in the annual report that came out some months ago, the size of the infantry, artillery, etc. is still being experimented. I.e. the “campaign of learning” and infantry BN exercise 30. Divesting 100% of tanks was a shock to everyone, of course.
Flashman
“ I recognize there are varying degrees of agreement on this issue but, at the end of the day, divesting 31% of our infantry, 100% of tanks and bridging equipment, 67% of our cannon artillery, 30% of our fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and significant logistics capability should raise concerns about the ability of the Marine Corps to provide required capability to the COCOMs and to respond to worldwide contingencies.
As you look at these articles and have any comments to make, please don't hesitate to do so.”
Raise concerns??? WTF. Fire the FPF.
FD 2030 - Issues for Congress - Congressional Research Service Raises Issues About FD 2030
M. Marletto
IRT to artillery the issue is cannon artillery not towed artillery. There are truck mobile system available with displacement/emplacement times comparable or faster than HIMARS. Framing it as "towed" opens up the argument that it's less survivable.