Compass Points - Trust & Congress

Finding the best way forward

Compass Points - Trust & Congress

Finding the best way forward

July 5, 2025

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There are 435 voting seats in the US House of Representatives and 100 in the Senate.

It is too much to ask these roughly 500 people, from a wide variety of backgrounds, to become expert enough to put together a comprehensive military strategy for each of the US military services. The Congress funds each military branch, but Congress cannot on its own create an operational military strategy for each service branch.

Congress must rely on what the most senior military leaders swear under oath needs to be done.

When the Marine Corps comes in front of Congress, only a handful of more informed Representatives and Senators ask insightful questions. Most members of Congress will not. Most members of Congress will simply trust the testimony of the Marine Commandant and the most senior Marine Corps staff.

All this should serve as a caution to those proponents of the Marine Corps' controversial Force Design who continually claim that Force Design must be good for the Nation and good for the Corps because Congress approves certain parts of it.

Just because the Congress appropriates funding for the Marine Corps does not mean members of Congress have stayed up late at night pondering over the best military strategy for the Marine Corps. Congress trusts the Marine Corps to do that.

Despite the best of intentions, Congress supports projects that sometimes turn out to be less than successful. It is an unfortunate fact of politics. This is true for not only the US Congress. but for legislatures around the world.

For example, the French legislature after World War I was presented by the French military with an idea to build a large defensive fortification to guard against German invasion. It was an exciting idea and it received glowing articles in military journals. What a great idea, said so many in the French defense establishment. The promise was that if the French legislature would provide funding to build an impregnable fortress line, then France would always be safe.

The French legislature allocated funded for a complete set of fortress plans. The plans were prepared and approved. Then funds were appropriated for Phase I, proof of concept, for the complex fortress network. A small section of the fortress was constructed. Then the legislature approved Phase II. Years were going by. Reports were issued. Inspections were conducted. More glowing articles were issued. Finally after more than a decade and rivers of money expended, the now infamous Maginot Line, was constructed, equipped, and fully staffed.

The Maginot Line was far more than a brick wall winding through the French countryside. It was a tremendous defense in depth. Nothing like has ever been constructed, before or since.

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The Maginot Line was organized as a “defense in depth.” Scores of fortresses, bunkers, pillboxes, shelters, miles of underground passageways, and other features made up the most technologically advanced defensive system of their day. An army of planners, architects, engineers, and armament specialists envisioned some of the most diabolical obstacles ever devised to thwart an enemy. The most forward positions, a string of small, outer posts, known as maison fortes, were set directly along the border. In the event the enemy was seen approaching the frontier en masse, the occupants of these listening posts would sound the alarm, fight a delaying action, demolish nearby bridges, and set up obstacles at crossroads before falling back.

-- Warfare History Network - The French Maginot Line

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This was only the beginning of the defense in depth of the Maginot Line.

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Behind this forward line, about two or three kilometers to the rear, was a series of two-level pillboxes, or casemates, complete with small-caliber armaments, mostly 25mm, 37mm, and 47mm antitank weapons and machine guns. These positions were sited about 1,200 meters from neighboring casemates and could provide interlocking, mutually supporting fire. In addition to firing embrasures, many casemates sported “pop-up” steel turrets that could be raised and lowered at will.

. . . Some five kilometers behind the casemates were the real “teeth” of the French Maginot Line—the ouvrages, or fortresses, which were divided into two main classifications, based on the size of their garrison and their armament. The infantry fortresses were called minor fortresses (petit ouvrages), while the larger artillery fortresses were known as gros ouvrages. Each gros ouvrage had two entrances, one for personnel and one for munitions and supplies, sometimes as far as two kilometers to the rear and accessible by underground electric train.

The ouvrages were technological marvels. The reinforced concrete roofs were so thick that they were basically impenetrable by any munitions the Germans possessed. The minor fortresses had two or three “battle blocks,” each with its own turret, and could accommodate from 65 to 250 men. The major fortresses were, in many ways, like subterranean cities, although others compared them to large, concrete submarines. Both views were accurate, for the troops’ existence below ground was a dank and gloomy one. Seeping water needed to be pumped out constantly. The air was chilly, almost clammy. Only artificial light illuminated the multitude of rooms and, despite the hard-working ventilation system, fresh air was almost nonexistent—except for those detailed to man the drafty turrets and observation posts, where the pressurized air from inside the underground forts blew like a gale.

-- Warfare History Network - The French Maginot Line

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After listening to one confident brief after another, after being reassured of the impregnable strength of the magnificent Maginot Line, the French legislature paid for every ton of concrete, every tunnel, and every gun. The French legislature trusted the French military leaders. They could do little else.

Unfortunately, even continual approval and continual funding from legislatures cannot turn bad ideas into good ideas. Without genuine change to bad ideas, all that happens is bad ideas are turned into more expensive bad ideas.

The Maginot Line was never a good idea, no matter how many legislators, military leaders, and defense experts thought it was. The Maginot Line, though it was an extremely strong fortification, was quickly by-passed by the Germans in World War II. Despite all the funding and all the work constructing the Maginot Line, France was defeated in only a few days.

Decades have gone by since the end of World War II. In Europe, the German Nazis were defeated. France was rescued and is a free nation once again. The remains of the Maginot Line, now crumbling and covered in moss, still sprawl across the French countryside.

Legislatures around the world still get briefings from their military leaders today.

In the US proponents of Marine Corps Force Design have been giving to Congress much the same presentation for nearly six years. It is a imaginative tale of small Marine sensor and missile units strung along the chain of islands just off the coast of China. The Marine missile units are said to be both small, and difficult for China to find and target, and yet large enough to have substantial active radars and cumbersome missile launchers. In theory these sensor and missile units are nimble enough to constantly relocate around their island locations, and then rapidly transportable from island to island.

It is a compelling, although mostly theoretical story, and Congress, as always, has been mostly supportive of Marine Corps budgets. Should the Marine Corps make such staggering cuts to so many Marine combined arms units, equipment, and capabilities? Congress cannot take time to study the answer. Congress is always dealing with too many crises, too many emergencies, and too many catastrophes. As a result, Congress cannot come up with its own independent path forward for the Marine Corps. Congress must trust the senior Marine military leaders who come to testify.

Everyone involved in directing and funding the US military should keep in mind the lessons of the French Maginot Line. Neither confident testimony, nor continual funding can turn a bad idea into a good idea.

How can the Marine Corps make better decisions in the future? How can the Marine Corps make sure it is making decisions that Congress can rely on?

First, use the full Marine Corps Combat Development Process. Never jettison proven units, equipment, and capabilities before that process is complete. It is inconceivable that the Marine Corps threw overboard way too much armor, infantry, air, artillery, engineering, and more and then decided to embark on a "campaign of learning" to figure out if that was a good idea. Do not throw away proven units, equipment, and capabilities until the Combat Development Process is complete, along with any additional 'campaign of learning.' And never get rid of old gear until the replacement gear has arrived.

Second, encourage wide ranging discussion, discourse, and debate about all new initiatives. Marines are smart. Marines have insights. The senior leaders of the Marine Corps should seek out input and ideas from Marines on active duty and from Marine veterans. All Marines should have the same goal, to serve the Nation better by making sure the Marine Corps is strong today and stronger tomorrow.

Third, build on what has worked. There is no need to throw away Marine Regiments that have poured out their blood for the Nation and suddenly remake them, rename them, and replace them. The honorable and historic Marine Regiments have done so much for Corps and Country.

In the same way, why suddenly turn away from the powerful and flexible Marine MAGTF that has proven itself around the world in every type of conflict, crisis, and contingency? It would have been easier and wiser to simply add new missiles, sensors, and drones to III MEF instead of stripping III MEF of its combat power and leaving little more than a headquarters unit just off the coast of China. Any member of Congress or advisor in the DOD focused on deterring China should ask the Marine Corps hard questions about the actual combat power in the Corps's so called "fight now" III MEF in southern Japan.

There are 435 voting seats in the US House of Representatives and 100 in the Senate.

It is too much to ask these roughly 500 people in Congress, all of them from a wide variety of backgrounds, to become expert enough to put together a comprehensive military strategy for the Marine Corps. Instead, it is the responsibility of the entire community of active duty Marines, Marine veterans, and friends of the Marine Corps to ask the hard questions, propose necessary course corrections, and keep pushing for a Marine Corps that is stronger today and even stronger tomorrow. The Marine Corps will be better in the future. There is no doubt. There is no doubt because, no matter how difficult the task, Marines never give up and Marines never give in.

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Warfare History Network

The French Maginot Line: Its Full History and Legacy after WWII

Although the Maginot Line did not prevent a German invasion, it forced Adolf Hitler’s generals to rethink their plans for conquest.

By Flint Whitlock

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-french-maginot-line-its-full-history-and-legacy-after-wwii/