Compass Points – Understand the Challenge
Understanding the Problem First, Leads to Better Solutions
Compass Points – Understand the Challenge
Understanding the Problem First, Leads to Better Solutions
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union lasted nearly half a century from 1945 to 1991. During all those decades, Soviet tanks never flooded the Fulda Gap and Soviet ICBM’s never launched. The military forces of the United States, primarily Air Force long range bombers, Army tanks, and Navy surface and sub-surface ships, held the Soviets in check. While the hot war with the Soviets never happened, crisis and conflict around the globe was constant and Marines responded to each one.
In the current contest with China, now and in the near future, the question once again is what forces will hold China in check and what forces will respond to constant crisis and conflict in the Pacific and around the globe?
In the second of the three articles in the National Interest introducing Vision 2035, author and Marine, John Schmitt, argues that any response to China must begin with a proper understanding of the problem. First, understand the challenge, then craft a better response.
Vision 2035 is not intended as the end of the discussion of a better way forward for the Marine Corps. It is the beginning of a discussion. But it is a discussion the Marine Corps and the Nation must have. The Marine Corps is too important to national security to remain on the path it is on now.
National Interest (nationalinterest.org) December 13, 2022
Force Design 2030 Is Trying to Solve the Wrong Problem
The most valuable contribution the Marine Corps could make in preparing for future conflict is to focus its force design efforts on preserving or restoring the ability to maneuver in the age of precision weapons rather than on developing capabilities that are already core competencies of other services.
By John F. Schmitt
. . . We began by making the point that to devise an effective solution to a problem, you need to get the problem right because the way you frame the problem informs how you solve it. We have argued that Force Design 2030 frames the future operational problem in a way that will lead to a less versatile, less effective Marine Corps. We have proposed an alternative problem framing—preserving or restoring the ability to maneuver in an age of precision weapons—which we believe is both consistent with traditional Marine Corps roles and missions and responsive to the emerging security environment. Solving that problem will lead to a very different force design. Part III of this series, “Vision 2035: Global Response in the Age of Precision Munitions,” describes a vision of what that force would be . . . .
John F. Schmitt is a former Marine infantry officer and author of the Marine Corps’ capstone doctrinal manual, Warfighting
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/force-design-2030-trying-solve-wrong-problem-205991
John, once again cuts to the chase with profound common sense, historical perspective and a precise understanding of tactics, operations and strategy. The Commandant would do well to hire him in some capacity to educate, guide and enlighten those working the FD-2030 challenges.
Suggested Improvement One- Problem statement phrase "preserve and restore" should be refined and taken further. Suggest "restore and preserve and enhance and increase" ability to maneuver etc. Rationale: Start steps to RESTORE obviously diminished lethality capabilities because time is not our friend, and it will take time. Example: Getting our tanks and tankers back from the Army. PRESERVE our existing combat power structure needed across the RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (ROMO), once our clearly understood operational CONOP- the ability to project, engage and prevail as needed globally, clearly the AORs for America's 9-1-1 Force. ENHANCE our maneuver because there is no reasonable argument not to in the era of precision fires, particularly as our potential adversaries will continue to improve their abilities in the years to come- the world is NOT standing still. INCREASE our ability to maneuver over greater and sometimes constrained areas of operations e.g. MV-22. BTW, if we abdicate ROMO, our sister services will fill the vacuums we leave.
SI Two- It is self limiting to describe our future fights as Joint, when any COCOM's OPLAN is written as Joint/Combined/Allied.
SI Three- There is an implicit assumption that mainland China is impregnable and the PRC forces are only defeated with desperate, defensive tactics. Simply self defeating to operate under these unnecessary constraints. But because the decisions executing US Forces movement, maneuver and engagement are political decisions, COCOM INDO-PACIFIC must bring in the Commander-In -Chief's Cabinet to orchestrate and synchronize the "soft power" of particularly, economic sanctions, to prevent war, and support it, with Congressional approval, should deterrence fail.
SI Four- Have to disagree with the author's assertions re: technological advances that failed to change everything. Submarines, long range bombers, aircraft carriers, armor, machine guns and atomic bombs clearly changed everything.
Jim Burke LTCOL USMC (Ret)
Saved Round. I'm on record in May of 2022 against the "divest to invest" tactic- it is not a strategy, just a myopic means to an end. Nothing since has changed my opinion.