Compass Points - Wargames 2
No validation, no foundation.
Compass Points - Wargames 2
No validation, no foundation.
February 2, 2024
.
Yesterday's post on Compass Points, "Wargames Timeline" provided a detailed timeline of the events surrounding the Force Design wargames. The central portion of the wargame timeline is based on a much larger report prepared by Dr. Scott Moore the senior analyst and head of wargame analysis at the Marine Corps Wargaming Center from November 2016 to April 2021. Dr Moore's full report on the Force Design wargames is receiving growing attention from Congress and elsewhere.
As Compass Points reported yesterday:
.
=================
.
The wargame timeline shows the Marine Corps had already started to divest capabilities before the wargames took place. And when the wargames were held, they did not even explore the crucial options and dangers. The wargames did not validate anything. The wargames provide no foundation for Force Design. As time has gone by and the cracks in Force Design have grown into fissures, Congress is beginning to ask questions.
-- Compass Points, February 1, 2024
.
=================
.
One Compass Points reader called the Force Design wargame process nothing but, "criminal dereliction of duty" and urged that all responsible "should be brought up on charges."
.
Many other readers, online and off, have been quick to respond. Comments have been edited for length and content.
.
=================
.
TW
I’ve always believed that Berger made his transformation decisions long before he took over as CMC and that his actions after assuming office were intended to obscure his end state from those who might have stopped him. He had no intention of letting the Force Development process get in the way of bringing FD2030 to fruition. I grudgingly give him credit for exploiting the weak leadership in DOD, Congress and Administration (not to mention an ignorant media incapable of being a watch dog) to achieve his desired outcome. All the superficial concept development and wargaming were part of the deception plan to obscure what was underway until it was too late to stop it. The damage done to the Marine Corps becomes more clear with each passing day. What worries me more is how something this significant was allowed to transpire without somebody (OSD-P, JtStaff-J5, GCCs) raising the bullshit flag.
-- TW
.
- - - - -
.
John Tate
I say now the same thing I said before - the Marines have a mission that the MAGTF was designed for and proven to be pricelessly effective. It is the ARMY whose mission has included coastal artillery! "The U.S. Army Coast Artillery Corps (CAC) was an administrative corps responsible for coastal, harbor, and anti-aircraft defense of the United States and its possessions between 1901 and 1950." It was abolished in 1950.
--J.C. Tate, CDR USN (ret)
.
- - - - -
.
Paul Van Riper
[The official Force Design] so-called "campaign of learning" occurred largely after the decisions to divest major items of equipment and to stand down units were made. I know a little more than the average Marine about force development having commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
In outline, the proper sequencing is after a problem or opportunity is identified, draft solutions are brought forward in formal and informal ways, eventually becoming formal concepts. These are subject to rigorous debate and those that demonstrate merit in a competition of ideas are explored more deeply in war games. WAR GAMES VALIDATE NOTHING! If they show promise, experimentation follows. These concepts then evolve into doctrine, decisions are made on organizational structures, and then and only then does procurement action begin.
General Gray created MCCDC based on this system and for more than 30 years it proved to be the most successful of all the service's force development organizations. The 39th CMC walked away from that proven system and used secretive groups whose members were forbidden to discuss what they were doing with others to flesh out what were obviously his preconceived ideas and then to announce decisions. The whole process was corrupt and anathema to Marines who live by a different set of standards.
-- Paul Van Riper
.
- - - - -
.
Jeffrey Dinsmore
As I review the past 5 years in the maintenance of my own timeline, this article provides much needed context. I have also noted the periodic shifts in the information operations narrative across the enterprise of leaders and apologists . . .
. . . 2021: Uncertainty and doubt grow as exercises of notional future tech reveal major unchallenged assumptions and fairy-dusting of capabilities (obviously beyond the usual exercise fairy-dusting that normally occurs). This exacerbates the continuing perception that the texts of 2019 do not truly philosophically support the Warfighting concepts.
Apr 2022: James Webb letter claiming signatures of 22 retired generals in opposition. Shortly thereafter, articles published explaining the 2 year journey of private discussions before reluctantly going public. As I’ve written here before and elsewhere, this was an Aha! moment. It was that proverbial moment that sometimes happens when one looks around and wonders if you’re off your rocker, but then the truth comes out and it all makes sense. Their writings only came after the uncertainty set in. Far from undermining from the start, the generals were respectful and circumspect for a very long time, and their eventual reveal only confirmed uncertainty among honest and serious thinkers.
2022-2024: Since then, the Occam’s Razor principle “When you hear hoofbeats, don’t think Zebras,” has been apt. The dismissive institutional marginalization and professional debarment of the content of their argument on a largely ad-hominem basis (old, anonymous, untrustworthy) combined with the lack of advancement in meaningful detailed content in favor of various aspects of change (divest to invest, global readiness, etc) has spoken volumes about the good faith or bad faith of both camps. That is why the details of this timeline article are useful. Incrementally, the details chip away at the uncertainty, and some realize they weren’t so crazy after all.
-- Jeffrey Dinsmore
.
- - - - -
.
Bill Campbell
Divest to invest?? Those of us who have walked the Halls of HQMC remember the ongoing battles with the Navy and the other Services to successfully gain the required funding for critical programs. I am unfortunately not so confident that the Navy or other Services will agree to "Invest" the funds divested by Force 2020 when the bill comes due. The other critical issue of Force 2020 in my humble opinion is the large divestiture of critical Artillery, Tanks, Aviation and other unique Marine capabilities leads to an even greater reliance on our Sister services for support. Anyone remember Black Hawk Down where the Army was dependent on Tank support from another Country? This leads to the unthinkable question, "Why do we need a Marine Corps?" I thought we learned our lesson at Guadalcanal and Midway.
--Bill Campbell
.
=================
.
Compass Points thanks all readers for their insights and thanks Dr. Scott Moore for his insightful report on the Force Design wargames. As one reader said, "The whole process was corrupt and anathema to Marines who live by a different set of standards."
LtGen Van Riper: "The whole process was corrupt and anathema to Marines who live by a different set of standards."
This is a profound "quotable quote" that defines the current age of information ops-driven combat development. It should be unpacked in detail. What is this different set of standards?
There are two aspects that manifest this "different set of standards." One is a natural and perennial manifestation of "where you sit is where you stand," but the second defines a bone-deep sickness that is plaguing our Corps and its leadership in the modern age.
The first is a natural organizational divide. Col Bill Dabney, son-in-law of Chesty Puller and CO of India Co, 3/26 at Khe Sanh was asked why he ended up at Khe Sanh, in the fight, when he could have remained at HQ. He said: "I knew, even at that young age, that the combat effectiveness of any adequately commanded unit is multiplied by the square of its distance from the next higher headquarters."
This cultural reality has been amplified into the modern difference in standards between the NCR and the FMF. This is an inevitable organizational phenomenon, and any operational commander can attest to the immediate detachment from operational reality when one is removed from contact with forward units. Any commander can also attest to the deleterious effects this detachment has on his decision-making over time. For example, frequently in my career I have had conversations from positions in the FMF with fellow Marines that occupied billets, for long periods of time, in the NCR. I often discovered that we seemed to speak a completely different language…with a different set of standards. This sense has grown with the last 20-years expansion of Quantico’s NCR influences. I have discovered that Marines who sometimes spend early careers in operational billets, but then transition to lifelong billets at Quantico and the Pentagon begin to become invested in the cultural framework of the NCR and its value system. They begin to believe that to be successful, the institution must operate within that framework, and they become immersed in its language, culture, and norms. Add to that the personally attractive intangible incentive system of professional popularity, post-retirement security and relevance, and being "in-group," and they gradually but inevitably become detached from the reality of actual warfighting requirements. They speak a different language, and operate from a different set of standards.
A caveat to this is that the most effective and successful officers assigned for short periods to that NCR framework have usually spent long careers in the FMF…in operational and combat environments. The most effective are able to resist the allure of the DC think tank phenomenon, skillfully translating operational requirements into the language of MCCDC, the NCR, and even Congress. The best and most effective understand combat’s reality, GCC and OPLAN demands, and the service’s warfighting philosophy, and communicate those requirements in a way that enhances the service’s combat effectiveness while preserving its ethos. They are able to achieve success while maintaining their different set of standards.
*BREAK BREAK*
The second phenomenon is more insidious, has infected our leadership in the modern age, and is deadly to our ethos and our Corps.
In the early years of OIF, I served in a unit in which several Marines were accused in the media of horrific war crimes. Within weeks of the accusations, without any complete investigations, the institution was eager and ready to condemn these Marines in the public square. Premature and premeditated press releases announced command reliefs, command influence was exerted over military justice outcomes…these were early and obvious indicators that individual Marines were secondary to the institution’s image.
Fast-forward to three years later…I attended a briefing by the CMC Strategic Communications advisor, who proudly claimed credit for rescuing the Marine Corps image amidst the controversy. Sally Donnelly, a civilian Time Magazine reporter, was the CMC’s Information Operations Engine for press releases, for military justice system influence, and for a Marine Corps PME overhaul that forever institutionalized the pre-determined outcomes and condemned young innocent Marines. Despite, in the words of one Marine Corps judge, “to believe the government’s version of events is to disregard all evidence to the contrary.” Neither she nor the CMC ever actually tracked the outcomes for those Marines. LtGen Mattis wrote a public letter, but on the whole, those Marines remained at the mercy of an IO juggernaut that no Marine Corps leader had the courage to question. They were operating on a different set of standards.
Forgive the tangential history, but this story is an apt checkpoint along the route into today's IO driven decisions by our leaders. During that time, Marine Corps Leaders--General Officers--made specific decisions that were wholly informed by institutional and political pressure, unencumbered by the actual evidence or the personal moral effects of their decisions...or indecision. While I pragmatically understand the requirement to guard the institution by the “Legal, Ethical, and Moral” rubric, I also recognize the easy internal rationalization that must take place when assaulted by the influences of NCR "stake-holders." Comfort-based decisions, as we used to say in TBS.
This is the essence of the bone-deep sickness that plagues the modern age of our Corps. The different set of standards.
Leaders can justify a decision or a capitulation of the moment by the LEM rubric, while remaining willfully ignorant or disclaiming personal moral responsibility for the obvious 2nd and 3rd order effects of that decision. Whether those effects are the destruction of a Marine's life...or the destruction of a Corps capability, the abdication of JUDGMENT in favor of institutional pressure are not marks of a leader, they are marks of a PFC. This is not what we learned at TBS. This is not what we expect of our lieutenants...or generals.
The different standard to which LtGen Van Riper refers is a dying one among our leaders.
What are examples of the different set of standards? Compared against speech after predictable speech from leaders parroting the latest shifting IO narrative, there is a different standard apparent in the tone and tenor of LtGen George Smith’s final speeches. The commander of the Corps' Imperial MAGTF, who methodically outlined the FMF’s operational realities, with the blessing of his intelligence, the credibility of his experience, and his long-earned judgment. He exemplified standards decidedly different from the NCR or CommStrat standards of the moment.
He's now retired.
We’ve heard the different standard periodically in the last few years, from some of our most decorated and experienced combat generals…now retired.
The standards of judgment-driven decisions; decisions not just made rationalized against an LEM rubric, informed by the pressures of the NCR present, but with an understanding of history, our warfighting philosophy, and the law of unintended consequences…those standards are dying or dead. Sacrificed at the altar of IO and LEM.
“A process corrupt and anathema to Marines who live by a different set of standards.” Indeed.
What is it in General Berger’s background and personal experience that would lead him to these disastrous decisions? I have never known a Marine Officer who thought and acted in such a prescriptive manner. Whatever it is, it’s time for an exorcism and close look at our leadership.